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
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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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&c., &c., &c.

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BOOK LVII.

THE ISLAND OF ELBA.

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HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE
UNDER
NAPOLÉON.

BOOK LVII.

THE ISLAND OF ELBA.

Lord Castlereagh having left Vienna on the 15th of February, 1815, arrived at Paris on the 26th, and remained a few days, being impatiently expected in London by his colleagues, who dared not venture in his absence on a discussion of the acts of the Congress. He had seen Louis XVIII, had been received by this prince with great courtesy, and had succeeded in the negotiation he had undertaken, which consisted in leaving Parma to Maria Louisa during the life of this princess, and placing meanwhile at Lucca the heiress of Parma, that is to say, the Queen of Etruria. Louis XVIII consented to this arrangement to please England, and especially to secure the assistance of this power in the affair of Naples. As to the rest, the reports circulated about Murat's armaments, simplified the difficulty to the English Ministers, and it had become easy to represent the King of Naples as unfaithful to his engagements,

as a disturber of the peace of Europe, and as consequently deserving to be hurled from the throne upon which he had been for a short time suffered to sit. Austria was preparing to add 100,000 men to the 50,000 she already had in Italy, and Louis XVIII had already decided in his Council, that 30,000 men should be assembled between Lyons and Grenoble to assist by land and sea in the projected operations against Murat. Everything was prepared to destroy, in Italy, the last vestige of Napoleon's vast empire.

But the destiny of the Bourbons had decreed that they should fall before Murat himself into the ever-open gulf of the revolutions of the century, but they were to re-issue, more enduring and unfortunately less innocent. Their position unhappily was not more improved than their conduct. About the end of December all that had been wished from the Chambers having been obtained, they had been adjourned to the 1st of May, 1815, and the Crown in throwing off an apparent yoke, had flung away its best support, for the Chamber of Deputies was in an especial manner, in its timid but prudent progress, the faithful expression of public opinion, which, though declaring the Bourbons imprudent, and often even offensive, was still willing to maintain and support them. The Chamber of Deputies, which was only, we must remember, the ancient *Corps Législative* under another name, though it sometimes severely blamed the folly of the emigrant party, gave a certain satisfaction to public opinion, and served as a salutary warning to the government, and thus acted as a kind of mediator, that on one side prevented irritation from rising to an excess, and on the other checked faults that might be carried too far. The absence of the Chambers was therefore much to be regretted at this moment, for the breach between the nation and the emigrant party was gradually becoming wider, whilst there was no mediating power capable of reconciling and restraining them.

Thus errors and the consequences of errors increased every day. The priests from the pulpit preached incessantly against the usurpation of church property; amongst the laity, the former proprietors of the property that had been sold, worried the new possessors, trying to induce them to restore the property which they had acquired at a low price, and which the others sought to wrest from them at a still lower valuation. The article of the charter which guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales ought to have been a sufficient security to any of the new holders, capable of understanding the question, but they were told that the charter was a momentary concession forced by circumstances, and in the constantly-changing state of public affairs, it was no wonder that the actual possessors of national property should feel alarmed. Besides the tone in

which the most influential of the royalist journals spoke on this subject was calculated to excite alarm, and when they were answered by citing the fundamental law, the reply was that the law could guarantee the sales in a material sense, but could never justify their morality, and make that which was evil appear good to the public conscience. "The law," they said, "justified the national sales, public opinion condemns them. Nothing can alter the fact, and this universal moral reaction against crime and spoliation, merits the highest applause." This language, had those who uttered it been consistent, would have been followed by aggressive measures, but they dared not venture so far, but offered this species of moral violence to the holders of the property in question, in the hope of forcing them to surrender the contested possessions. Here was a verification of the truth of what M. Lainé had said in committee, touching this article of the charter, when he declared that it was of course right to guarantee the sales, but not too firmly, in order to oblige the new proprietors to negotiate with the former.

It was with the design of illustrating these views that a very significant fable was put into circulation. It was asserted that the Prince of Wagram—Berthier—who possessed the estate of Grosbois, had laid his title deeds at the feet of Louis XVIII and begged him to accept the restitution; the King, it was said, received the papers, kept them an hour, then sent for the Marshal, and said to him, "Resume the possession of the Grosbois estate, I cannot make a better use of these lands than bestow them on you in recompense of your long services."

This anecdote was propagated with inconceivable rapidity even into the remote provinces. It was in vain that the Prince of Wagram, on being questioned, declared it to be an invention, the story was not the less believed nor less widely circulated. He endeavoured to obtain a retraction in the royalist journals, but did not succeed.

M. Louis, fearing the effect that the uneasiness experienced by the holders of national property, might produce on the public credit, had forced Louis XVIII in full council, and not without great resistance on the part of the King, to sign an ordinance for the sale of a portion of the state forests, in which was comprised a considerable quantity of timber, formerly belonging to the church. The ordinance being signed, M. Louis had, without delay, commenced his adjudications in order to tranquillize the purchasers, for it was not to be supposed that new sales would be made, if the titles of the former could be disputed. The moderate price asked had attracted speculators, who found that the sale of the timber would nearly liquidate the purchase money, and that the land would become

theirs for a mere trifle. With such inducements they did not hesitate to purchase. Still this measure did not restore public confidence, and the proprietors who had purchased during the Revolution, and who were very numerous in the country districts, continued to experience serious alarm. To throw a doubt on the security of such interests is equivalent to ruining them, for the apprehension of evil produces as great, and sometimes a greater influence on men, than the evil itself.

Manifestations against the French Revolution had not ceased. The anniversary of the 21st of January furnished a new opportunity for these exhibitions, and was eagerly taken advantage of. A pious man had purchased in the Rue de la Madeleine at Paris, the ground in which Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and Madame Elizabeth had been buried. As the 21st of January drew near, he began to dig, hoping to recover the remains of these august victims. He thought he had found them, and according to all appearances he was justified in believing so. In consequence of this discovery, the Government ordered a funeral ceremony for the translation to Saint Denis of these remains so worthy of respect, but unfortunately this ceremony was accompanied by an outpouring of maledictions of all kinds against the French Revolution, to which men, connected by their acts or their opinions with this Revolution, replied by doubts and railleries about the discovery made in the Rue de la Madeleine. The Royalists replied by fresh insults against the Revolutionists, and repeated that if in a legal sense they pardoned them, and by a great favour did not send them to the scaffold, it was all they had a right to expect in compliance with the promise of oblivion contained in the charter, but that the public conscience could not be stifled, nor prevented from judging their execrable crime. As if to secure a repetition of these painful recriminations, an annual ceremony was appointed to expiate the crime of the 21st of January.

To these proceedings were added others, still more significant with regard to individuals. In recognizing as a principle the permanency of magistrates in their office, the King had reserved to himself the right of giving or refusing the investiture to those who were actually in office, and of revising in this way the entire *personnel* of the magistracy. Consequently, magistrates of every rank were anxiously expecting to hear their fate pronounced, and they remained in a state of dependence which might be prejudicial to those who sought justice, and especially to the holders of national property. The Chambers, before separating, demanded that an end should be put to this state of uncertainty, and in January, 1815, the Government commenced, in the highest court, the so-much-dreaded charges. M. Muraire was dismissed from the office of Premier Président on account of

his private affairs, and M. Merlin lost the post of Procureur Général on account of his vote on the trial of Louis XVI. These gentlemen were replaced by M. Sèze, and M. Mourre. These changes were only natural, but it was quite as natural that the Revolutionists should regard them as evidence of the feeling entertained for them, especially as these acts were followed by most acrimonious language. To pardon such things would have required a spirit of justice with which partizans are not endowed.

It was just at this time that the clergy, yielding in this instance not to passion, but to sincerely conscientious scruples, were very near exciting an insurrection amongst the Parisian populace. Mademoiselle Raucourt, a celebrated actress, died. Her coffin was brought to the Church of Saint Roch, in order that prayers for the dead might be said, but without previous intimation being given to the vicar. It would have been prudent in the vicar to have avoided a commotion, and taken for granted that all those manifestations of repentance had been made, which are required before a tragedian can be looked upon as restored to the Catholic communion. The vicar obstinately refused to admit the coffin. The crowd soon increased, and the public seeing in this scene a fresh proof of the intolerance of the clergy, burst open the gates of the church. The coffin was carried in by force, and it would be hard to say what might have happened, if a royal order, despatched from the Tuileries, had not commanded the vicar to grant the deceased funeral honours.

Judging by canonical rules, the vicar was right, and as the clergy no longer keep the civil registers, as their refusal has no longer any influence upon the social position of the people, and entails no consequence but the privation of honours which the church has the right to accord or deny according to its belief, the vicar of Saint Roch was justified in refusing the solicited prayers, and the friends of the deceased ought to have carried her remains to the cemetery, without presenting them to the church. But the abuse of power often prevents its most legitimate exercise. The incendiary sermons of the clergy had so irritated the public mind, that even the legitimate exercise of their functions was now considered unpardonable, and it is probable that had the vicar not yielded to the royal order, the excited crowd might have committed some deplorable profanation, which the army and even the National Guard might have shown little anxiety to repress.

Of all the events of this period, the most vexatious, and that which most excited the public mind, was the suit commenced against General Exelmans.

We have already made our readers acquainted with the
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charges brought against this illustrious General. Amongst the letters found on Lord Oxford, and addressed to the Court of Naples, there was one in which General Exelmans again assured Murat—from whom he had received many services and marks of friendship—that should his throne be threatened, there were many French officers whose swords were at his service. It was publicly known that the Court of France was making every effort at Vienna to procure the expulsion of Murat from Naples, but war had not been declared against him, and consequently there was nothing in the detected letter contrary to military discipline. It might indeed be said that General Exelmans having been kept on active service, had subjected himself to the reproach of showing little regard to the feelings of a government, from which he had received many marks of attention. But the strongest charge that could be brought against him only amounted to an infraction of conventional rules, and could by no means be considered a violation of duty. General Dupont had taken this view of the case, and had contented himself with reprimanding General Exelmans, and advising him to be more circumspect in future. But the minister Dupont had been replaced in the war department by Marshal Soult, and we have seen how this Marshal, who was at first very ill-disposed towards the Restoration, but afterwards accepted office under the Bourbons, had promised to re-establish discipline in the army, and with discipline, fidelity to the reigning dynasty.

One of the means he thought proper to employ, was to revive the forgotten affair of General Exelmans, and by making one of the most popular generals feel his authority, intimidate the rest. In fact, it was at this period the custom to say and to believe that it was the weakness exhibited by the Government that encouraged the disaffection of the army. The Duke de Berry, irritated at finding that the feelings he exhibited towards the army were not responded to, adopted this erroneous idea, and supported it with all the natural violence of his temperament. Marshal Soult who was most anxious to please this prince, had put General Exelmans on half-pay, and ordered him to repair to Bar-sur-Ornain, his birth-place, which was ordering him into a species of exile. At this time, half-pay officers questioned the right of the War Minister to appoint them a place of abode. They said that being unemployed, and consequently having no duties to perform that might require their presence in a particular locality, they were free to choose their residence, and that not enjoying the advantages of active service, they ought not to be burthened with its responsibilities. On the other hand, the War Minister maintained his privilege, and he was right in persisting, for in the actual state of

things, with the desire exhibited by the unemployed officers, to repair to Paris, it was of the first importance to be able to disperse them by a simple order of the administration. Such orders had been repeatedly issued, but remained unexecuted, and the half-pay officers continued to flock to Paris, where their language was not only offensive but seditious. But there was great want of tact in seeking to solve the question in the person of so distinguished an officer as General Exelmans, and for the ridiculous fault with which he was reproached.

General Exelmans, around whom had congregated the most excited spirits that Paris contained, showed little inclination to obey an order, which he pronounced to be a sentence of banishment, but for the moment he contented himself with asking for a delay, alleging the state of his wife, who had just given birth to a baby, and who needed his personal attentions. It would have been prudent to accept this demi-obedience, and not provoke an open resistance by persevering obstinacy in the exercise of a contested right. But Marshal Soult persevered and insisted on the immediate departure of General Exelmans. The latter, urged on by his young friends, peremptorily refused to obey. The Marshal then, without consideration for the state of the General's young wife, sent an order to his house to arrest him. The General was arrested and conducted to Soissons. He contrived to escape from his guards, and wrote to the Minister demanding that his case should be brought before competent judges, and promising to yield himself prisoner as soon as a legal tribunal should be pointed out before which he could appear.

This event produced amongst military men, and amongst a great portion of the public, an intense sensation. A strong feeling of irritation prevailed against Marshal Soult, who from having been a zealous servant of the Empire, was become a not less zealous agent of the Bourbons, and persecuted his ancient companion-in-arms more than General Dupont had ever done. People began to talk of the insults offered to one of the most distinguished military officers, and above all, they expatiated on the annoyance caused to his young wife, and all that for a questionable fault, merely for a token of remembrance given to Murat, his former commander, his benefactor; and the disaffected denied, whether right or wrong, that the Minister had a right to appoint a residence for unemployed officers. Public opinion was excited in the highest degree, and that too by stimulants the most calculated to produce such an effect.

This unfortunate commotion being once excited, it was impossible for the authorities to draw back, and allow General Exelmans to remain at large with no judges appointed to try his case. It was absolutely necessary to take some steps.

Marshal Soult consequently presented to the royal council a badly drawn up report, that embarrassed even the least moderate members of the government. It would have been sufficient to accuse the General of disobedience, and much might have been said in favour of the right claimed by the War Minister. In fact, the state, in granting half-pay to a considerable number of officers, not as a retiring pension, but for the purpose of keeping them on what may be called demi-active service, certainly retained some authority over them, and it was not assuming too much to fix their abode, for the government might need them in certain localities, and ought to possess the power of sending them there. But the Minister did not limit himself to this charge of disobedience, which might have been plausibly supported; he proposed to arraign General Exelmans before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, then sitting at Lille, on a charge of corresponding with the enemy, of acting as a spy, of disobedience, of a want of respect to the King, and violation of his oath as Chevalier of Saint Louis. Though the Government began to be very much irritated against him, still, this long list of accusations excited great surprise. General Dessoles deplored the necessity of proceeding against so distinguished an officer as General Exelmans, and thought the charge of espionage very strange. However, he said that it was necessary to condemn one as an example, but he, at the same time, intended that pardon should be granted immediately after the sentence was passed. The Count d'Artois, with a severity unlike his ordinary kindness of feeling, exclaimed that it would be dangerous to pardon, that on the contrary, the sentence should be put into force, in order to show the military that they must obey. The Duke de Berry spoke in the same tone, but could not help admitting that the charge of espionage was ill-placed. The King himself, and M. de Jaucourt, who were both in the secret of foreign affairs—M. de Jaucourt had temporarily replaced M. de Talleyrand—thought there was a risk, not alone in making a charge of espionage, but in accusing the General of correspondence with the enemy. They knew how difficult it had been at Vienna to contest Murat's title; they knew that up to the period of his last acts of imprudence, the title of king had not been refused him; the assembled sovereigns at Vienna had even spoken of him as "an ally," and had not yet qualified him as "enemy," though they threatened to treat him as such, the moment he should put his troops into motion. The King and the temporary Minister of Foreign Affairs could not dissimulate the fact that it would be difficult to apply officially to Murat the title of enemy, which was uncontestedly implied in the accusations made against General

Exelmans, against whom no other fact was alleged than the letters addressed to the Court of Naples.

But Marshal Soult's self-love was touched, and he obstinately persevered in retaining the original terms of his report. *The General who reigned at Naples*—it was so he styled Murat—was, according to him, only the usurper of one of the thrones belonging to the house of Bourbon, and consequently the enemy of France, and whoever had written to him, *had corresponded with the enemy*. The crime of espionage was, in his opinion, fully established, by the simple fact of the General's having informed Murat of the willingness with which many French officers would draw their swords in his service. As to the crime of disobedience, that was flagrant, for the General had contested the right of the Minister to determine the abode of half-pay officers, and had not only contested the right as a principle, but had refused, in fact, to submit. As to the want of respect to the King, and to the violation of the oath of Chevalier of Saint Louis, the proofs adduced by the Minister were insignificant, and these charges were, besides, unimportant. The Marshal persevered so obstinately in urging this system of accusation, that the King, as much through complaisance as through indolence, permitted him to draw up his report as he liked, reserving to himself, in case of condemnation, the right of pardon. The Duke de Berry, though entertaining some doubts as to the validity of certain accusations, exclaimed against the indulgent feeling exhibited by the King, and repeated that it would be unwise to grant a pardon, "for," he said, "it is indulgence that has ruined the army." The King, somewhat annoyed, replied, "My dear nephew, do not anticipate the decision of the judges: wait until they shall have pronounced sentence."

The War Minister was consequently allowed to draw up a list of accusations against General Exelmans, of which, as we have seen, the most probable were not very serious. When General Exelmans learned that his case was referred to the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, he immediately yielded himself a prisoner, by the advice of his numerous friends, who justly believed that no military officer, nor even civil magistrate could be found, who would condemn him.

The General repaired to Lille, and appeared on the 23rd of January before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division. The list of accusations drawn up by Marshal Soult having been read, the General replied simply and clearly, and with at one of moderation not habitual to him, but which he had been advised to adopt. As to the accusation of corresponding with the enemy, he replied, that France being then at peace with every state in Europe, it was impossible to maintain that he had corresponded with

an enemy, and that if France happened to have one, this secret enemy could not be reputed such, until a declaration of war had been made, or decided hostilities commenced. As to the charge of espionage, he declared, with a feeling of dignity that was understood and approved by all present, that he would not even reply to the accusation. As to the charge of disobedience, he maintained that the Minister, not requiring, in the actual state of things, any service from the half-pay officers, assumed the right of sending them into exile, when he asserted the privilege of making them change their abode at his bidding. With regard to the offence to the King, he declared, that entertaining the most profound respect for His Majesty, he was certain of having never written anything contrary to that feeling. Lastly, touching the reproach of having transgressed his obligations as a Chevalier of Saint Louis, he replied carelessly, that possibly he did not understand these obligations, for he could not discover anything contrary to them in what he had done.

These replies were so natural, and so truthful, that they rendered any defence nearly useless. The debate was short, and almost without consultation, the *conseil de guerre* unanimously acquitted the General. We may easily imagine the joy, and above all, the manifestation of this joy, amongst the military men, numbers of whom had accompanied the General. He was brought back to his own house in triumph, and in a few days, the impression experienced at Lille spread throughout France amongst the numerous enemies of the government. The more enlightened friends of the reigning dynasty regretted a proceeding by which so many serious questions were all at the same time so awkwardly asserted, and solved after so dangerous a fashion. The evident consequences of General Exelmans' trial were, that the army did not consider Murat as an enemy, and did not recognise the War Minister's right to fix the residence of half-pay officers; and it proved that all the military, whether as judges or accused, did not hesitate to put themselves in determined opposition to the established authority.

No circumstance had yet shown, in so striking a manner, the weakness of the restored dynasty. Upon whom could the Bourbons now rely, against the many enemies they had so unwisely provoked, when the public force was manifestly hostile? There was, indeed, the National Guard, composed of the middle classes, who wished to see the Bourbons on the throne, restrained, however, by the proper intervention of the public bodies. But at Paris, the insolence of the household troops in the provinces, that of the landed nobility, and the intolerance of the clergy on every side, the threats against the holders of national property, the sufferings of the manufacturing classes, who were ruined by the introduction of English produce, the loss of territory unjustly

imputed to the Restoration, and lastly, the revival of that liberal spirit of which the Bourbons made an enemy, instead of making it an ally—all these circumstances had changed the disposition of the middle classes, and there were now to be found amongst them only a few rarely sage minds, who believed that the Bourbons ought to be supported, and, at the same time, restrained. But would this opinion, entertained by a small number, be sufficient to sustain the Bourbons against so many and such varied hostilities? Nobody could believe it, and the thought of an approaching change, a thought which often induces what it foresees, had taken possession of the public mind. In fact, when this fatal opinion, that a government cannot last much longer, is spread abroad, the indifferent and the cold become more careless and colder, the interested turn their eyes in another direction, alarmed friends commit greater faults than ever; and the public functionaries, upon whom the responsibility of defending the government is thrown, hesitate to compromise themselves for a power which will not be able to recompense either the efforts they make, or the dangers they incur. It was the latter especially, who, in the circumstances of which we treat, exhibited the worst dispositions. They belonged, for the most part, to the Empire, for the royalists, nobles or plebeians, emigrants, or those who had remained at home, notwithstanding their willingness to take places, had not been able to obtain them from the government, because of their complete ignorance of public business. Many, as we have seen, had directed their ambition to military posts, which produced the most deplorable effects on the army. Others had sought employment in the financial department, but M. Louis, who was a fanatic in financial affairs, repelled them without pity. Some, again, aspired to places in the Administration, but the Abbé de Montesquiou, no less haughty with his friends than with his adversaries, said that the mere fact of having emigrated did not imply that men were thoroughly acquainted with the interests of France, or qualified to administer her laws, and through pride, as well as through indolence, he had not changed twenty out of eighty-seven prefects. Lastly, with regard to those who aspired to the magistracy, the Government was determined to admit them, but the long-announced changes in the magistracy had scarcely commenced, and the new candidates had not yet found places; whilst the deposition of MM. Muraire and Merlin had caused the magistrates, still in office, serious alarm. The army was intensely hostile; the public functionaries, who had been originally appointed under the Empire, were distrusted by the reigning dynasty, to which they bore no affection; they were undermined by the royalists, who coveted their places, and wearied of the hypocrisy to which they

were condemned; the middle classes, at first favourably disposed, had afterwards grown cold; the people of the country districts were completely alienated, on account of the disputes concerning national property; the inhabitants of the towns were inclined to favour the revolutionists, both through taste and habit, and there remained to the Bourbons a few friends amongst enlightened men, whose counsels were little heeded, and who foresaw the danger of the re-establishment of the Empire. Such was, in a few words, the position of French society with regard to the Bourbons, a position which each succeeding event, as it hurried rapidly along, rendered more conspicuous.

Amongst these different classes, whether indifferent or hostile, the most formidable, that is to say, the military men, entertained the belief that the Government was wholly dependant on them, and would be overthrown when they willed it. This disposition, had never before been manifested by our army, and happily, has never since reappeared; for there is nothing more dangerous than an army that seeks to take any other part in the revolutions of a state, than that of maintaining order in the name of the laws. An army soon becomes the most fearful and the most abject instrument of revolution, for soldiers become rapidly licentious, insatiable, and sometimes cowardly, well-suited to oppress a state at home, but powerless to defend it abroad, dishonouring their country, and dishonouring themselves, until they are ultimately destroyed by fire and sword, as in the case of the Prætorian guards of antiquity, of the Strelitz, the Mamelukes, and the Janissaries of modern times. Up to this period, in fact, the revolutions that had taken place in France had had no reference to the army, for the army had neither caused these revolutions, nor been their object nor instrument. But the Revolution of 1814, effected by armed Europe, against a military chief who had abused his own genius, and the valour of his troops, seemed to be especially directed against the French army, by whom its effects were particularly felt. Flattered for a moment by the Bourbons in the person of their chiefs, the military soon perceived that there was, between them and the government, all the difference that may be conceived between those who had defended their native land, and those who had been willing to invade it, and on this occasion—and only then, we repeat, during our century—the military conceived the idea of playing a political, a revolutionary part. “Let us drive out these emigrants,” was the remark of all the youthful military that crowded Paris. Whether Napoleon came to head them, which they ardently desired—without understanding, alas! what they wished—or whether he did not come, they were determined to overturn the government with their own hands, and that, too, as quickly as possible. The

unemployed officers openly avowed their intentions, and when they spoke in this fashion, they found, in the officers on active service, either silent or open approvers of their sentiments, with a perfect willingness to second their efforts. As to the soldiers, there could be no doubt about their sentiments, for the younger had quitted the service in the general desertion of 1814, and having been replaced by the old soldiers, who had returned from imprisonment, or from remote garrisons, the army was, especially in the lower ranks, as hostile to the Bourbons as it was devoted to Napoleon.

No War Minister, whomsoever he might be, could have overcome such difficulties, and Marshal Soult who had been chosen in the hope that he would accomplish this feat, had failed in the attempt. His severity towards General Exelmans had occasioned alarming excitement. It was not possible that officers of every grade, from the generals, colonels, and brigade-majors, down to the simple sub-lieutenants, who were on half-pay, and thronged Paris in thousands, it was not possible we say, that these men could incessantly repeat that the emigrants ought to be driven out of the country, without thinking of passing from words to action. Though they were sufficiently numerous to attempt a *coup de main*, they were conscious that the result would be more certain could they secure the co-operation of some of their comrades who were in command, and could at a beck bring with them bodies of troops. In this respect they were highly favoured by circumstances, for some of the most hot-headed general-officers commanded troops within a short distance of Paris. The brilliant Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had remained in command of the Cavalry of the Guard, then stationed in Le Nord. The brothers Lallemand, officers of great merit and determined foes to the Restoration, commanded, one the department of Aisne, and the other the artillery of La Fère. Lastly, one of the principle *divisionnaires* of the Empire, Drouet, Count d'Erlon, son of the ancient postmaster at Varennes, was at the head of the 16th military division at Lille. These four officers could assemble from fifteen to twenty thousand men, lead them to Paris, and join some thousands of half-pay officers who were collected there. In the capital they had only to fear the household troops, and these they felt assured they could overcome. Still notwithstanding the threatening aspect of affairs for the Government, the success of the malcontents was less certain than they believed, as the result soon proved, for fortunately the sentiment of obedience is so strong in the French army, that it is not easy to seduce the troops to follow even the dictates of their own passions, when opposed to their duty. Nevertheless the discontented officers were full of confidence,

and it must be said that never had conspirators more reason to hope for success. The unemployed officers, and those who were on active service, took council together, and fully conscious that in enterprises of this nature, a great name is an important condition to success, they turned their thoughts to the only great military man who was left in disgrace. This was Marshal Davout. This grave and stern man, a strict observer of military discipline, was ill-suited to take part in a conspiracy. He was deeply offended at the treatment he had received, and which was really unjustifiable, for he was banished at the request of the enemy for his defence of Hambourg, one of the most memorable recorded in history. It was on this account he did not refuse to listen to the young and hot-headed generals who applied to him. Inclined like them to look upon the Bourbons as strangers, and flattering himself that by a word despatched to Elba, he could bring back Napoleon, and place him again at the head of the Empire, the proposed enterprise appeared to him only the substitution of a national for an anti-national government, that had been forced on France by Europe. The Marshal, without actually pledging himself to the young framers of this project, still sympathized with them so much as to induce them to believe that he would become their leader, and quite joyous at this accession to their party, like all persons under the influence of joyous feelings, they made no secret of the hopes they entertained.

But in working thus for Napoleon, it was necessary to work in unison with him, to have his consent and his assistance, and consequently to be in communication with those who were supposed to represent him. Though those who sought to get rid of the Bourbons, showed a special anxiety to strengthen their party by the acquisition of great military names, they were not less anxious to reckon amongst their members distinguished civilians, in order to commence negotiations with Napoleon by their intervention. They dared not address themselves to the prudent Cambacérès, whose timidity and gravity rendered him inaccessible, neither could they apply to the reserved Caulaincourt, who shunned all communication with strangers, nor to the Count de Rovigo, who was too much suspected by the Government and too closely watched, not to render any communication with him equivalent to a self-denunciation to the police; they consequently turned to the two men who were reputed to possess Napoleon's personal confidence, MM. Lavalette, and de Bassano. M. Lavalette had received from Napoleon during the late campaign a deposit of sixteen hundred thousand francs in specie, a sum that constituted the entire personal fortune of the late Emperor, and which M. Lavalette had carefully kept, ready to restore it at the first

demand. But in the excess of his fidelity, fearing to betray a deposit upon which his master might be one day dependent for bread, he had hidden it with many precautions in his own house, and in order to conceal it better, he concealed himself by not receiving anybody. It was therefore to the faithful and ever-accessible Duke de Bassano that the authors of the projected enterprise had recourse. They at the same time charmed and alarmed him, charmed by proving that they still remembered Napoleon, and alarmed by informing him of a project that compromised so many persons, particular Napoleon himself, who, in the Isle of Elba, was still in the hands of the Allied Powers, and liable to suffer from any uneasiness they might be made to experience. What contributed to intimidate M. de Bassano was that since Napoleon's departure for Elba, he had not received any communication from him, and had not dared to address any to him. Those who served under Napoleon were so accustomed to wait until he had taken the initiative, that they never ventured to anticipate him, and since his fall they had pursued the same course. The errors committed by the Bourbons had inspired Napoleon's friends with hope, without teaching them unanimity of action, which they never possessed. M. de Bassano, who was intimately acquainted with the young generals who made themselves so conspicuous at this time, assured them that he kept up no communication with Napoleon, and that consequently he could neither give them his advice nor approbation, still less the authority of his name; he then begged them not to compromise their former leader, who still at the mercy of his enemies, at a word despatched from Vienna, might be forcibly transported to remote regions, and a climate destructive to his health. But this reserve of manner had only been considered as the ordinary prudence of politicians, and these hot young heads, so anxious to restore the Empire, had been neither discouraged nor rendered doubtful by the manner in which the Emperor's ancient confident had expressed himself.

There was another aid which it was quite as natural to desire and hope—that of the revolutionary party. Even had the Bourbons exhibited towards the Revolutionists, and especially towards the *voters*, a spirit of conciliation which they certainly did not feel, it is not probable that they would have found favour with them. But if to this fundamental difficulty we add the bitter insults lavished by the Royalist press on the Revolutionists, it is easy to understand that their antipathy to the Bourbons was converted into violent hatred. Under the influence of these feelings, Carnot had written and allowed to be published the famous Memoir of which we have spoken; Sièyes had laid aside his disdainful moderation of tone, and given way

to an outburst of feeling in which he seldom indulged, and several persons of the same party had followed his example. Barras was not of the number, for he felt no desire to find himself again under the rule of the ungrateful general, of whose fortunes he had laid the first foundation. He was desirous of dying peaceably under the Bourbons, to whom he gave prudent advice that met little attention. With this one exception, the Revolutionists were highly exasperated. Pleased at first at Napoleon's downfall, they now deplored it, and openly expressed their desire of his return. M. Fouché, as usual, figured at their head. It was his constant endeavour to make himself conspicuous, and he did so by meddling in everything. Whilst he was, as we have seen, in close relation with the agents of the Count d'Artois, and with the Count d'Artois himself, promising to save the Bourbons if they confided in him, he was writing to Vienna to M. de Metternich to express his views upon the manner of arranging European affairs, information which M. de Metternich certainly never asked; and he was writing to Napoleon, advising him to flee to America, and no doubt he was sincerely anxious to deliver Europe and himself from the presence of his former master. He was thus perpetually meddling with the different parties, and after having excited the Revolutionists against the emigrants, he made of the agitation thus raised, a scarecrow to the emigrants, in the hope that he would be called on to allay the alarm. But the last ministerial changes, by which Marshal Soult was made War Minister, and M. d'André head of the Police Department, having deprived him of all hope of a speedy return to power, he had like all the men of his party, but from different motives, transmuted his previous good-will towards the Bourbons into anger, and he was ready to join any party that would overthrow them. It would be difficult that any plot could be laid against them, with which he was not acquainted, and in which he did not play the chief part. But the Bonapartists held him in profound distrust, and preferred Count Thibaudeau, an old Conventionalist and regicide, and formerly a prefect under the Empire. He was a talented and harsh man, and was living retired at Paris, whither he had fled to avoid the resentment of the Marseillais, who were exasperated against his administration. A Revolutionist upon principle, and a Bonapartist through ambition, he was still trustworthy, and had been the connecting link between the Revolutionists and the Bonapartists, until M. Fouché appeared and meddled in every plot for the purpose of directing men after his own fashion and to his own advantage. M. Fouché presented himself to the Revolutionists as a regicide, to the Bonapartists as the oldest minister of Napoleon, and offered to all parties the essential qualifications

of his well-known activity and business capabilities. He soon became an important personage, and endeavoured to carry out his own views. His leading principle was to expel the Bourbons, but not to replace them by Napoleon. He said that a new state of things, a new prince would be needed, a prince liberal in his ideas as the existing generation, a prince who would not inspire Europe with the hatred of which Napoleon was the object, and who would not like him, be exposed to see six hundred thousand men cross the Rhine to dethrone him. He said that France, wearied of war and despotism, was as little inclined to Napoleon as to the Bourbons, and that there remained only two princes who could be thought of; the Duke d'Orléans, or Napoleon II under the Regency of Maria Louisa; but the Duke d'Orléans, bound by family ties, could not sever them to aid revolutionary principles; that the friendly dispositions he exhibited, were limited to being more polite than the other branch of his family to the army and the Revolutionists, but that it would be impossible on such a foundation to effect a change of government, consequently the only solution of existing difficulties was to accept the King of Rome under the Regency of Maria Louisa, and that avowing this intention would secure the support of Austria, and through Austria, Europe, and with Europe, peace. Besides the army would be glad to see the Empire revived, and Napoleon would be indemnified in the person of his son for his lost throne, and lastly, the Revolutionists and the Liberals would be perfectly satisfied, for seeing in the son the glory of the father without his despotism, and freed at the same time from the insults of the emigrant party, they would have every possible reason to support a *régime* which offered all the advantages of the Empire without any of its drawbacks.

These reasons, though very rational in many respects, erred in a fundamental point, like all those adduced in support of a fresh revolution, which was to suppose that any but Napoleon could replace the Bourbons. The Regency of Maria Louisa was a mere dream, for Austria would not have given up either Maria Louisa or her son, and this princess was as little desirous as capable of filling such a position. The Duke d'Orléans, who might be some day induced, were the throne vacant, to yield to the unanimous wishes of the public, would neither anticipate nor excite these wishes, which were at that time very vague. The rule of Maria Louisa and the Duke d'Orléans being, from different reasons impossible, either Napoleon ought to have been proposed, which would be a mad and disastrous provocation to Europe, or the Bourbons, their errors corrected, ought to be retained, which indeed was at that time the only honest and rational course. M.

Fouché, though apparently more prudent, was in reality as rash and less innocent than the giddy heads he pretended to direct. Still his observations produced some effect upon the former servants of the Empire, who remembered the despotism and ambition of Napoleon, and who dreaded his resentment, for nearly all had abandoned him, and apprehended the effect that his presence would produce on the European Powers. But it was difficult to persuade the young generals who were ready to risk their lives, to think of any one but Napoleon, and this question was accordingly laid aside to give place to the former—the overthrow of the Bourbons. Those who wished to overthrow the Bourbons saw only one means of accomplishing their object, which was to assemble the troops commanded by some amongst them, lead them to Paris and join the half-pay officers, and by these means effect a *coup de main*.

During the months of January and February, 1815, the originators spoke of this plan with an amount of indiscretion that shocked Marshal Davout, who was too serious-minded for enterprises conducted so lightly, and alarmed M. de Bassano, who was ever fearful of compromising Napoleon without having consulted him. And so M. de Bassano repeated to these young military men, that he had no communication with the Isle of Elba, and consequently could not promise them any support, but he begged them not to compromise Napoleon, whom a single act of imprudence on their part would expose to be transported to the extremities of the earth. M. Lavallette, spite of his efforts at concealment, had ultimately been brought into contact with the young men, and conversed with them about their project. He begged them to remain quiet, and not seek to anticipate Napoleon's wishes, and they replied that they wanted neither the consent nor assistance of any one to overthrow a government as odious to the nation as to them, and whose existence was entirely in their hands. They consequently persisted in their designs, and kept up a constant intercourse with M. Fouché, who endeavoured to win their confidence, because he saw in them an additional puppet that he might put into motion, and in order to succeed in his object, he adopted the simple means of listening without contradicting what they said.

If we regard as a conspiracy every desire to overturn the established order of things, accompanied too by threatening words, there certainly was a conspiracy in what we have narrated; but if we only consider as a conspiracy a well-planned project, and that by serious-minded men, firmly determined to attain their object even at the risk of their lives, and who have arranged their means with prudence and precision, it would be impossible to assert that there was anything of the kind

here. These young officers were certainly anxious to get rid of the Bourbons, even at the cost of their own lives, which they were never wont to consider; some of them, on active service, held powerful means of action in their own hands, and it cannot be denied that amongst these there was a conspiracy. But it was far otherwise with the pretended leaders. Marshal Davout had listened, but without pledging himself to projects that flattered his resentment, but were repugnant to his good sense and habits of discipline. M. Lavalette had rejected all confidence. Although M. de Bassano was more complaisant than M. Lavalette, he took care not to compromise Napoleon in the slightest degree, declaring that he had neither told nor would tell him anything of the project; and as for the Dukes of Vicenza and Rovigo, and Prince Cambacérès, it had not even been mentioned to them. Marshal Ney and the other principal military men who were suspected of being discontented, were quite ignorant of what was going on, and were even distrusted by their old comrades because of the royal favours they had accepted, and only knew with the public in general, that Paris was crowded with half-pay officers who were ready for the most desperate attempts. M. Fouché was the only person of note, that from his desire to have a hand in everything, had entered into these plans, of which he was in reality become the true head, since that far from discouraging the authors of the enterprise, he became their confident, their adviser, and very rarely sought to moderate their sentiments. Indeed if there was a conspiracy, it was between him and these military men, whose passions he flattered and whose projects he countenanced. But this was all that could be asserted of them or of him, for nothing was decided on, neither time, nor plan, nor place, nor who were to be the co-operators in the enterprise. Though the police were willing to see plots in every direction, they could not discern the only one that had an appearance of reality. All the military were objects of suspicion to them, but those we have mentioned the least of all. As for M. Fouché, he was far from being thought a dangerous person whose every act ought to be watched. The official police pointed him out as a suspicious man that ought to be distrusted, but the officious police of the Count d'Artois described him as the most skilful and powerful of men, to whom the safety of the dynasty and of France ought to be entrusted. Were these police to be believed, the real conspirators were, Prince Cambacérès, who sometimes invited a few friends to dinner, M. de Bassano and M. Lavalette, who as we have said, avoided every serious enterprise, the Duke de Rovigo, who was so compromised that everybody avoided him, and he avoided everybody, having met with such ingratitude from his

friends; and finally Queen Hortense, who had accepted Alexander's protection and the polite attentions of Louis XVIII, and who was now occupied in defending her children's property against her husband, and who, though still much attached to Napoleon, was too much dispirited by his fall to suppose his return possible. This police, called the police of the Château, asserted that Prince Cambacérès, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Queen Hortense were in secret correspondence with Napoleon, from whom they received money to support the plots that were on foot, and whose ramifications were even more extensive; for M. de Metternich, who had quarrelled with the Northern Powers, had been brought into correspondence with Napoleon by the Queen of Naples, and was now thinking of replacing him on his throne in order to be avenged of the ungrateful allies who wanted to seize Saxony and Poland.

The facts already quoted in this history are sufficient to show how much reality there was in these suppositions. It is very true that M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Prince Cambacérès were possessed of Napoleon's confidence, and because they were worthy of the trust, they would be very careful not to talk of his affairs to every chance comer. Queen Hortense was most devoted to her step-father, but at this moment the feelings of the adopted daughter were absorbed in those of the mother. M. de Metternich was discontented with Russia and Prussia, and had with difficulty separated himself from the Court of Naples, but we have seen whether he thought of using Napoleon as an instrument to check the pretensions of Russia and Prussia; and as for Napoleon we shall soon see whether he had money to employ in such enterprises, or whether he had any part in those that were being formed in France. The real risk resulting from such extravagant inventions, to which governments too willingly listen when not guided by cool and solid judgment, is that their attention is turned from real to imaginary dangers, or in hunting phrase, that the false scent is followed instead of the true. No notice was taken of M. Fouché, who was not only treated with attention but even lauded by the police, nor of those young generals who commanded in *Le Nord*, and whose daring might soon become dangerous, whilst attention and hatred were directed towards men who were indeed disaffected, but of whom not one was inclined to raise his hand against the Government. The Count d'Artois was besieged by a thousand alarming reports, which increasing terror made him believe, whilst Louis XVIII, wearied by these perpetual alarms, believed nothing, and the Government for want of a firm and intelligent head, hovering between a blind credulity and absolute unbelief, overlooked all these

perils, not through the absence of fear, but the want of ability to discern them.

M. de Bassano at once disturbed and pleased by what he heard, trembled at the idea of such an enterprise as the one in question, being undertaken without Napoleon's knowledge, with whose views it might interfere, whom it might expose to severe treatment, and which, were it carried on without his knowledge, might prove more advantageous to others than to him. This faithful servant was consequently desirous of informing Napoleon of what was going on, and the opportunity he sought was soon offered him by the zeal of a young man with whom he had had no previous acquaintance.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon, an auditor of the Empire, endowed with intelligence, vigour of mind, and ambition, and weary of being nobody at Paris, had determined to go to the Island of Elba and offer his services to the dethroned Emperor, but he wished to take with him an introduction that might secure him a favourable reception. He applied to M. de Bassano, who treated him with reserve, but became more communicative when he recognized the young man's sincerity, and finally commissioned him to inform Napoleon verbally of the true state of France, that is to say of the increasing unpopularity of the Bourbons, the coldness with which they were looked on by the middle classes, the irritation of the holders of national property, the exasperation of the army, the inclination of the young officers to risk everything, and lastly the general opinion that the present state of affairs could not last, but must change either to the advantage of the Bonaparte or Orleans family. M. Fleury de Chaboulon pressed M. de Bassano to be more explicit, and send some advice to Napoleon, such as that he ought to leave Elba and embark for France. M. de Bassano replied, and with justice, that he could not undertake such a responsibility, and that advice, especially such advice, could not be given to such a man as Napoleon. M. Fleury de Chaboulon was merely instructed to bear to Elba an exact account of the state of affairs, with the express recommendation not to say anything that might influence one way or the other. M. de Bassano refused to give any written document, but furnished him with a token that would prove to Napoleon whence he came. M. Fleury de Chaboulon left in January, passed through Italy, fell sick on his journey, and did not reach Elba until the month of February.

Before speaking of the result of this mission, we must first describe how Napoleon lived in Elba since he had passed from the government of the world, to the sovereignty of one of the smallest isles of the Mediterranean. It is indeed a strange spectacle, and one worthy the attention of history, to con-

template a mind whose wondrous activity once filled all Europe, now confined within the space of a few leagues, and occupied with twelve or fifteen thousand subjects, and one thousand soldiers! We should but badly fulfil our task did we not sketch this picture.

Transported to Elba on board the English frigate "The Undaunted," Napoleon anchored opposite Porto-Ferrajo on the 3rd of May, 1814, and landed on the 4th. A few days before his arrival he had been burned in effigy by the inhabitants, for the same reasons that had turned all the nations of Europe against him—war, conscription, and the *droits réunis*. When told of his arrival, their anger was forgotten, and all impelled by intense curiosity, hastened to meet him. They now manifested tumultuous delight, remembering that they would be freed from the Tuscan yoke, and believing that their new monarch brought vast treasures, they fancied that he would introduce a large commerce, and that his creative genius would soon effect wondrous changes in their island. He was conducted in triumph to the church, where a *Te Deum* was sung. He graciously yielded to their wishes, as if he could, in any way, share in the childish joy of his new subjects.

Yielding submissively to present circumstances, and not seeming to note their insignificance, he set to work the day after his arrival, and made the tour of his island on horseback. When, in the course of a few hours he had gone over its entire extent, he decided on a system of government, and exhibited as much energy in undertaking his new task as he had displayed fifteen years before, when he commenced reorganizing France.

His attention was first directed to the city of Porto-Ferrajo, which is situated on an eminence, commanding a beautiful gulf that looks towards the mountains of Etruria. This city had been formerly fortified, and might still be made a place of considerable strength. Napoleon immediately applied himself to getting it in a complete state of defence. By bringing a detachment of his Guards to the Isle of Elba, he had secured to himself some hundreds of devoted men, either to defend him against violence, or to serve as the basis of some daring adventure, should he ever attempt one. These companions of his exile, in number about a thousand, being shut up in a good maritime fortress, with provisions and ammunition, could defend themselves for some weeks, and give him time to escape, in case the sovereigns regretting that they had left him so near Europe, should think of transporting him to the ocean. He therefore hastened to repair the fortifications of Porto-Ferrajo, and to bring thither the artillery that had been distributed along the shores of the island during the late war. The guns were mounted on the walls, the forts that commanded the

harbour were finished and fortified, and the magazines were furnished with provisions and ammunition. Within a few weeks Porto-Ferrajo was so strengthened that a considerable force would be required to seize the place. By these precautions, Napoleon gained, besides the means of actual defence, the advantage of being able to ascertain more certainly the existence of any plans that might be formed against him, by the extent of the forces that would be needed to attack him. But his forethought did not stop here. The very small island of Pianosa, dependant on his sovereignty, and at three leagues distant from Elba, offered many conditions favourable to the execution of his designs. This island, flat and covered with pasture land, which is most valuable in these climates, was overlooked by a pyramidal-shaped rock, and a fort, in which a garrison of fifty men would be almost impregnable. This fort he put into a state of defence, and supplied with provisions and a small garrison, and without imparting his secret to any one, he arranged so that it would be possible to descend from the fort at night to the shore, embark and put to sea, which would be easy, as the island was not on the Tuscan side but in the open sea. Therefore, if any attempt were made to seize him, Napoleon could take refuge in this island during the night, and thence embark for any region he pleased. In order to make use of the pastures, he sent his horses and cattle thither, and thus whilst he profited by the advantages of the island, he removed all suspicion of his being about to form a military establishment.

After having provided for the defence of Elba, Napoleon organized a most vigilant police. The only landing places were to be at the capital, Porto-Ferrajo, or at Rio, Porto-Longone, and Campo, small ports situate some on the east and some on the west coast, the former intended for the benefit of the mines, the latter for the exportation of the productions of the country. Guards of gens-d'armes were to prevent any person landing at any other port, and a well organised naval police subjected all comers in the open ports to a strict investigation. Within four or five hours after the arrival of a stranger in any port, even the most distant from Porto-Ferrajo, Napoleon was informed of who he was, and wherefore he came. He had grave reasons for these precautions. The French Government had placed General Brulart, an old friend of Georges, in the Island of Corsica, and had raised him to a rank and command beyond his position, evidently for the purpose of keeping watch on the Isle of Elba. Nothing could certainly be more reasonable on the part of the French Government than this surveillance, but Napoleon, from information he received, was tempted to believe that to observe his proceedings was not

the sole object in view, but that an attempt upon his personal liberty was contemplated. But it must be said that no documents since produced contain any evidence tending to criminate General Brulart, still there can be no doubt that intriguers who kept up a correspondence with what was called "la police du Château," boasted of being able to get Napoleon assassinated, and even said they were making arrangements for the purpose; it is also undeniable that Corsican bravos were arrested in the Isle of Elba, and could give no satisfactory explanation of their presence there. Napoleon sent them away, assuring them that the first of their class whom he again caught in Elba should be shot, and he added that on good proof of any overt act, he would despatch fifty determined men to the city of Ajaccio to seize General Brulart, upon whom in the face of Europe he would execute signal justice. We must add that whether through fear, or because he really harboured no evil design, General Brulart remained quiet, and no act of his went beyond a legitimate surveillance.

Napoleon had now taken precautions both against an attempt at assassination or abduction, for owing to the arrangements he had made, a large force would be needed to attack him, and could not come upon him unawares.

As to the *personnel* of his force, he showed as much skill in the management of a thousand men as he had formerly displayed in directing the disposition of a million. Before leaving Fontainebleau, Drouot had selected from amongst the soldiers of the Old Guard—who were all willing to accompany Napoleon—about six hundred grenadiers, and *chasseurs à pied*, one hundred cavalry, and twenty marines, making in all seven hundred and twenty-four picked men. Having marched from Fontainebleau to Savone, they embarked on board English vessels, and landed at Porto-Ferrajo about the end of May. For a time Napoleon had feared they might be forcibly detained, and great was his joy at seeing them arrive, a joy excited as much by prudence as pleasure at again meeting his old companions in arms. He gave them as good quarters as he could, and sent the horses to the pastures of Pianosa. As in his island he had no need of the cavalry soldiers, he converted them into gunners, and employed the leisure hours of his exile in instructing them. Sixty Poles that were at Parma having got permission to embark at Leghorn, Napoleon paid their passage, and so obtained an additional reinforcement of devoted men. He was also joined by some French officers, who had been reduced almost to a state of starvation, and had travelled across Italy as best they could. His troops now amounted to about eight hundred men, though of the original number he had lost some by death and sickness.

To these eight hundred men Napoleon found the means of adding some daring and intrepid soldiers. During his reign, the guardianship of the islands had been confided to battalions of light infantry, into which the conscripts who had shown a disposition to desert had been drafted, and all of whom were brave and active though somewhat insubordinate. Two of these battalions, belonging to the 35th Light Division, and consisting of Provençals, Ligurians, Tuscans, and Corsicans, were in garrison at Elba in 1814. When they were about to embark for France, Napoleon told them that he would retain such as would enter his service. About three hundred, chiefly Corsicans, remained, and with the exception of a few deserters, were faithful to him to the last. He consequently had at his disposal eleven hundred men of the very best regular troops. To these he joined four hundred natives, organised in the following manner.

The Island of Elba possessed a battalion of four companies of Militia, tolerably well disciplined, and quite as good soldiers as the Corsicans. Napoleon ordered that each of the companies forming the battalion, should every month have twenty-five men under arms, while seventy-five were left at their usual employments, by which he had a hundred men in active service, and three hundred ready at the shortest notice. Only the hundred men on active service were paid, and of these the interior and marine police were formed. Napoleon's army thus amounted to fifteen hundred men, who being mingled with the Old Guard were almost equal to that celebrated corps.

These were not the meaningless occupations of a maniac, amusing himself with toys that reminded him of his former state, but were as we have said, a means of defence against assassination, or transportation to some distant clime, which could never happen unexpectedly if he were in a position to defend himself for some days; and should a new future present itself, these arrangements secured him the means of landing on the continent, and commencing a new career, without running the risk of being arrested by a few gens-d'armes and shot on the road.

With the same extensive views, Napoleon took care to form a navy. At Porto-Ferrajo he found a brig, "The Inconstant," in tolerably good condition, that might be manned by sixty men, and a goelette, "The Caroline," that would require a crew of sixteen. At Leghorn he had bought a felucca, "L'Etoile," that could be managed by fourteen men, and two avisos, "La Mouche," and "L'Abeille," which together would require a crew of eighteen men. These vessels, for which about a hundred sailors would be needed, together with two or

three feluccas, that might be easily procured, could embark the eleven hundred men of whom Napoleon's regular army was composed. This was all that he needed in case he should ever think of leaving his island, an event he considered very doubtful though not impossible. These hundred and odd sailors he counted amongst his indispensable expenses, and by adding to them a small number of native seamen, he could complete the equipment of his flotilla in twenty-four hours. In the meantime, by the help of the two advice-boats he corresponded with the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, whence he procured provisions, letters, and newspapers. By means of the "Caroline" he maintained a strict police in the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo; he occasionally displayed from the "Inconstant" the flag of his little state, which was white, striped with purple, and studded with stars, and thus accustomed the English, French, Genoese and Turkish sailors to see his colours in the Tuscan sea.

Having thus provided for his personal safety, and as far as he could for his future prospects, Napoleon next turned his attention to embellishing his residence, and making it comfortable for himself his family, and soldiers, also to developing the prosperity of his little state, and finally to arranging his finances in such a way as to secure their duration. On his arrival he took up his abode at the Hotel de Ville of Porto-Ferrajo, and afterwards removed to the dilapidated and confined palace of the former governors. This building he determined to enlarge and improve by the addition of a *corps de bâtiment*, so that he might be able to receive his mother and sisters, and even his wife, if, which was very improbable, she would decide on coming. He purchased furniture at Genoa, and made his home quite habitable. He also erected a building for the officers of his battalion, that they might be always at hand and a little better lodged than in the town. Besides the dwelling at Porto-Ferrajo, he built a simple but elegant summer residence in the Vale of San-Martino, a charming valley opening on the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo, and looking towards the mountains of Italy. He commenced by cultivating and planting, and made the simple-minded mayor, who was little accustomed to flatter, laugh, by pretending that he would soon sow the spot with five hundred sacks of corn. "You laugh, Mr. Mayor," he said, "but you have no idea of how things develope and increase. The first year I shall sow fifty sacks, a hundred the second, two hundred the third, and so on." This agricultural enterprise like his great empire, needed alas! but time! Having completed his town and country residences, he turned his attention to his capital, Porto-Ferrajo, a town containing three thousand inhabitants. He had the streets paved and cleaned, and

erected a pretty fountain, which scattered refreshing showers, around. He made the two main roads which crossed the whole island practicable for carriages. One of these ran from Porto-Ferrajo to Porto-Longone, the principal port of communication with Italy, and the other from Porto-Ferrajo to Campo, a small port looking towards Pianosa and the open sea.

As his finances would not allow him to spend more than six or seven thousand francs on these works—a sum whose importance must not be estimated by the present value of money—he employed his soldiers to whom he paid a small stipend, whilst he furnished the stone, marble, brick, cement, and wood. He spent a part of each day on horseback, directing to these trifling works that powerful mind whose attention was once fixed on the world at large, and which was as correct in its estimate of small as of great objects. Nor was he less mindful of all that could ameliorate the soil or advance the commerce of the island. He wished to cover the whole country with mulberry trees, in order to encourage the rearing of silk worms, and commenced by planting some of those valuable trees along the two roads he had constructed. He ordered that the marble quarries near Campo should be worked. The salt mines and tunny fisheries formed two of the principal sources of the revenue of the country, he turned his attention to the improvement of both, and lastly the iron mines, which constituted the principal riches of the island, attracted his consideration. These mines had long produced an excellent ore, containing more than eighty-four parts of pure metal in every hundred; but for want of fuel, the inhabitants were not able to smelt the ore, and sold it to Italian merchants. The smelting of iron had dwindled down to almost nothing, but Napoléon sought to revive that branch of industry on a large scale, and to attract workmen he promised to support them at his own expense.

The corn employed for this purpose was to be purchased in Italy. But the execution of all these enterprises was checked by the smallness of his finances. If the inhabitants of Elba, his soldiers, the European public, and especially the Bourbons were to be believed, he had carried immense treasures with him, for excepting his stature, none could believe that anything connected with him could be small. The very idea of these treasures made his enemies tremble, and his unsophisticated subjects bound with joy. But these treasures were a vain chimera for he, the most ambitious of men, was the most heedless of what concerned himself personally. Until the very day of his abdication, he had never asked on what he had to live should he descend from the throne. The one hundred and fifty millions

that he had economised out of the civil list were not spent on himself but on extraordinary war expenses, and when at the moment of quitting Fontainebleau, he, for the first time inquired into the state of his finances, he found that he had but the few millions sent on to Blois, and of which the greater part had been carried off from the Empress by M. Dudon, the envoy of the Provisionary Government. It was fortunate that before the commission of this act of rapine, the Emperor had had time to send for 2,500,000 francs which the Lancers of the Guard had escorted. He desired the Empress to take 2,900,000 for her own use, and out of this she had been able to send him 900,000 francs, by which his finances were raised to the sum of 3,400,000 francs when he left for Elba. This sum, in gold and silver, followed his carriages, and was received by him at Porto-Ferrajo. This was the sole means of support for himself and his soldiers were he content to end his days in Elba. The annual subsidy of two millions that had been stipulated by the Treaty of the 11th April had not been paid, and he had no other revenues but those derived from his island. These revenues were very small. The town of Porto-Ferrajo contributed about one hundred thousand francs by harbour dues and other taxes, and the island itself about another hundred thousand by direct taxation. The fisheries, mines and salt pits in their actual state produced about 320,000 francs being altogether 250,000. Of this sum at least 200,000 francs were consumed by the municipal expenses of Porto-Ferrajo and the other small towns, and by the cost of maintaining the roads in the state to which Napoleon had brought them, which left a net product of about 300,000 francs per annum. Now, Napoleon would not require less than fifteen or sixteen hundred thousand francs to support his household, his army and his navy. There was therefore a deficiency of 1,200,000 francs to be drawn annually from his private treasury, which the expenses of building had already reduced from 3,400,000 to 2,800,000 francs. He could not, therefore, live long at Elba if the appointed subsidy were not paid, unless he dismissed his guard; that is deprived himself of the faithful soldiers, that had followed his fortunes, which would be to leave himself without defence against the first band of assassins that should attack him, and give up the nucleus of an army with which he could not dispense, in any enterprise he might be induced to undertake at a later period. Consequently, though he had not yet formed a project of any kind, he paid such minute attention to the smallest expenses, that he astonished even those accustomed to his love of order, and made many accuse him of avarice. After six months residence in the island, he ceased to require the service of the native militia, of which, as we have mentioned, a fourth part was always under

arms. There were, thus, one hundred men less to be paid. He changed the organization of the battalion of his Old Guard, by reducing it from six to four companies. His stables were reduced to what was absolutely necessary, only the carriages needed by his mother, his sister, and himself being kept, and a few saddle horses for himself, Drouot and Bertrand to ride over the island with a small escort.

The pay of his principal officers was fixed at a moderate but sufficient sum, Drouot could not be induced to accept any pecuniary remuneration, as he had, he said, all that he needed, when he shared the roof and table of his old general.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements at Elba, for the present and the future. His life was calm and occupied, for it is the privilege of great minds to be able to submit to the reverses of destiny especially when deserved, and to take an interest in the smallest things because that in themselves they have as profound a meaning as the greatest. His mother, a harsh and imperious woman, but faithful in the performance of her duty, considered it due to her own dignity to share the destiny of her son, and she was at Porto-Ferrajo the object of profound respect to the exiled court. The Princess Pauline Borghèse whose friendship for her brother was almost carried to passion, had also come, and her presence was most soothing to Napoleon. She took great pains to reconcile him to Murat, which, indeed, was not very difficult. Napoleon understood human nature too well to entertain resentment long. He knew that Murat was thoughtless and vain, and consumed by the desire of retaining his kingdom, but he also knew that he was both kind-hearted and brave, and he pardoned him for succumbing to extraordinary circumstances. When Murat reflected upon the deceitfulness as well as the ingratitude of his conduct, he sent a declaration of his repentance to Elba, and Napoleon, in return, desired his sister Pauline to bear his pardon to Murat at Naples, and, at the same time, advised him to be prudent and hold himself in readiness for any unexpected event that might occur. The Princess had carried this message to the delighted Murat, and then returned to take her place beside her brother. She was the centre of a small society composed of the most respectable inhabitants of the island, who crowded around Napoleon as their sovereign. A theatre was arranged, into which Napoleon admitted this little society, and very often the soldiers of his guard. He was gentle, polite, calm and as attentive to the performance as though he had not formerly seen the *chefs-d'œuvre* of the French theatre represented by the first actors of the age. When the duties of his modest sovereignty were fulfilled, he passed his time with Bertrand and Drouot in inspecting the works of the island, on horseback, on foot or sometimes in a boat. He occasionally

embarked on board a half-decked boat with some of his officers, and remained at sea for two or three days where he was recognized and saluted by the sailors of every nation. During these long trips he conversed gravely or gaily as the subject demanded, sometimes talking with the liveliness of a young man, but more frequently with the gravity of profound and vast genius. He was continually thinking of writing the history of his reign, and discussed the darker points of his career with tolerable frankness, frequently speaking of the irreparable mistake of refusing peace at Prague. It was the only fault that he freely admitted. "I was wrong," he said, "but let any one imagine himself in my place. I had gained so many victories, and had just re-established my power by the two battles of Bautzen and Lutzen! I had so much faith in my soldiers and myself, that I *would* throw the dice once more. I lost, but those that blame me have never drunk of fortune's intoxicating cup." Drouot listened with downcast eyes, not daring to say how unwise it was to risk one's own existence, how culpable to venture the well being of one's children, and how criminal to stake the safety of a nation! The honest man was silent, and justified his silence to his own conscience by remembering that his master was conquered and exiled.

In this tranquil mode of existence, whilst he dreamed of raising an immortal historical monument, Napoleon was almost happy because that a gleam of hope was mingled with its calm. He read the journals carefully, and with a penetration that made him divine the truth, as clearly amid the thousand assertions of the journalists as though he had been present at the deliberations of the different Cabinets. He said that the French Revolution had been arrested for a moment, but would resume its irresistible course. The old Régime and the Revolution would have some terrible struggles, and in the consequent confusion an opportunity would assuredly offer for him to appear upon the stage. He did not know whether he should reign again, though he was certain that he could not reign in the same manner as before, for the minds of men, which had been paralysed for a time by the terrors of the Revolution, had resumed their vigour and independence. What should he be? what should he become? what part would he have to play? Considering the awkwardness of the Bourbons at Paris, and the ambition of the powers at Vienna, he felt convinced that the world was far from being about to subside into a state of tranquillity, and he knew that in a politically-tossed world, he would be sure to find a position eminent as his genius. Such were his dimly seen views of the future, and they sufficed to prevent the energy shut up in his soul from destroying him. His repose was thus enlivened by a ray of hope. He was, some-

times, annoyed by the outrageous language of the public papers. One day he found a journal, amongst a number he had received, which said that he was become mad, and that Bertrand and Drouot, his most faithful servants, together with his mother and sister and the most devoted of his family, had been obliged to leave him, not being able to endure his violence. He repaired to the drawing-room where his mother, sister, Bertrand and Drouot were assembled, and flinging a number of papers on the table he exclaimed, "You did not know that I am mad. None of you can bear my violence—you mother, you Drouot, and you all have left me." He then gave them the papers to read, whilst he exclaimed, "I am mad, I am mad." He sat down and avenged himself by discussing the state of the world, and pointing out the faults of all parties with wonderful sagacity. "Europe and the Bourbons shall find," he said, "that the present state of things will not last six months."

His life at Elba was rendered tolerable by the fact that he saw every day more clearly that the great theatre of the world would be soon accessible to him. This made him eager for intelligence, and for intelligence different to that contained in the journals. He had sent agents to Italy, and learned that the whole country would rise at his appearance, but this did not tempt him, as it was not at the head of the Italians that he could flatter himself to oppose Europe. It was of the state of France that he wished to be informed, but he would not write to the men of rank who had served under him, lest he should compromise them, and they through fear of compromising him were equally reserved. He was better informed of what was going on at Vienna. He was not indebted for this information to his wife, but to M. Meneval, whose fidelity and zeal had never failed, and who through Genoese merchants had sent him frequent accounts of his son and of the Congress. M. Meneval had his information from Madame de Brignole, a Genoese lady of high birth and rare intelligence; who was most devoted to France, and who in her office of lady of honour had vainly sought to make Maria Louisa listen to the dictates of duty. Madame de Brignole received her information from the principal persons of Vienna, and particularly from her son-in-law, the Duke Dalberg, Minister of Louis XVIII. She carefully watched the course of events, and discovered the project of sending Napoleon to an island in the Atlantic. M. Meneval had not failed to inform Napoleon of this project, at the same time that he exaggerated the probability of its execution, for as we have said, the sovereigns were about to quit Vienna without having come to any determination on this subject. To this M. Meneval added the information that the Congress was

about being dissolved, and that the sovereigns would leave on the 20th of February, at the latest.

These several pieces of information produced a great impression on Napoleon, and made him reflect deeply on his present and future position. He had said more than once that he could not die upon this island, and that a tragic end even would be better suited to him, and more consonant with his glory, than an effeminate old age in the tranquil prison of Elba. The evident weariness of his companions in misfortune encouraged such thoughts. Marshal Bertrand felt the pangs of exile a little less, since he had been joined by his family. Drouot was as ever occupied, in all simplicity, with the fulfilment of his duty. It was not so with others. The first excitement that follows self-sacrifice having passed away, both officers and soldiers were profoundly wearied of their want of occupation. They often let Napoleon see this, as they said to him in their familiar way, "Sire, when shall we set out for France?" He only replied by silence and a friendly smile, but he perceived what was passing in their minds, and foresaw that their patience would not last to the end of his exile. He tried to occupy them, by employing them for a small addition to their pay, in working on his roads, in his garden, and allowed those who would not work to plunder the vineyards on his domain at San-Martino, whilst he laughed at their innocent depredations. "We are coming from St. Cloud," they said, when he met them on the road eating the grapes they had stolen. "Very good," he replied, but he comprehended the *ennui* that oppressed them, and from which he suffered more than they. About twenty, no longer able to bear this state of inaction, demanded their *cong  *, which he gave in the most honourable terms. It is true that in return he was reinforced by some officers from the continent, men who fled from the *ennui* of France, but had not yet experienced that of Elba. Besides the too evident disposition of his soldiers which made him fear that he would not be long able to retain them, he saw that it would soon be impossible to support them, since when his present works would be finished, there would remain but 2,400,000 francs of 3,400,000 that he had brought to Porto-Ferrajo, a sum that would exactly pay his army and navy for two years. These reasons, without taking the indomitable energy of his mind into consideration, would have made him resolve on again appearing on the great theatre of the world. Still Napoleon had not formed any decided plan, when he received the two-fold intelligence we have recorded, that is the project of transporting him to some isle in the ocean, and the intention of the sovereigns to leave Vienna as soon as their labours should be terminated. It needed nothing

more to inflame his ardent spirit. Two powerful considerations struck him immediately. First, if the sovereigns were about to separate, they must have decided his fate, and the decision once made, would be immediately put into execution. Secondly, the sovereigns being about to leave Vienna and repair to their respective dominions, it would be a good opportunity to attempt a revolution in France; for having once quitted the Austrian capital, it would not be easy to assemble the Powers again, and all arrangements between distant Cabinets must necessarily be slow, imperfect and wanting in vigour. These were weighty considerations, and as Napoleon was in the habit of looking to the immediate means of executing his project, he found in the season itself a motive for immediate action.

It was the middle of February, and long days would soon succeed long nights. But long nights were more favourable to Napoleon's escape from Elba, and to embarking on board his flottilla with his soldiers. This last consideration almost decided him, and in order to be ready for any event, on the 16th February, he ordered the "Inconstant" to be put into dock to be repaired, painted like an English vessel, and provided with provisions for some months. The same day he ordered his agent for the mines at Rio, to hire two large transports for the ostensible purpose of sending ore to the continent. He did not speak of his plans to any one.

Whilst he was thus thinking of escaping from his prison, and had been for two or three weeks deprived of all communication with Europe, he received a number of journals at once. He read them with the greatest eagerness, and it was with the liveliest satisfaction that he found in them new indications of the excitement that prevailed in France, for they contained an account of Exelmans' trial, of the disturbance at Mlle. Raucourt's funeral, and proved that the soldiery and inhabitants of Paris were ready for a revolt. The *Journal des Débats* especially, being correctly informed by the Duke de Dalberg of what was going on at Vienna, confirmed the intelligence of the approaching separation of the sovereigns, and this concordance with M. Meneval's report, confirmed Napoleon's resolution to prepare for his departure.

It was at this very time that he was informed of the arrival of a young stranger at Porto-Ferrajo, who announced that he was charged with an important message to him. This was M. Fleury de Chaboulon of whom we have spoken. Immediately on his landing, he asked to be conducted to General Bertrand, announcing himself as an envoy from M. de Bassano. Napoleon admitted him at once, and from a slight feeling of distrust inspected him minutely from head to foot, but soon

perceived that he was a young man of integrity and zeal, and listened to him with profound attention, when he was informed of a circumstance known only to himself and M. de Bassano—this was the means employed by M. de Bassano to obtain credence for M. Fleury de Chaboulon. “They think of me still in France,” said Napoleon in a discontented tone, “M. de Bassano has not forgotten me?” This slight reproachfulness passed away as M. Fleury de Chaboulon informed him why his most faithful servants had been so reserved, and he listened attentively to the earnest and agitated account of his informant. Although M. Fleury de Chaboulon told him nothing but what he had already divined from the public papers, he was delighted to find his opinions confirmed by an ocular witness, and especially by one who quoted M. de Bassano’s own words. What did and ought to touch him most was the positive announcement of the feelings of the army, and the evident impatience of the military to escape from the authority of the Bourbons. Here were good grounds for believing that at the first appearance of their old general the feelings of the soldiers would declare themselves, and for a man so daring as Napoleon, the mere hope of success was sufficient to induce him to act. Having heard M. de Bassano’s emissary to the end, he resolved to leave immediately. However to induce a more minute explanation he proposed the following question. “Now finish,” he said, “and tell me whether M. de Bassano advises me to embark for France?” Interrogated by that piercing glance that none could resist, the young man dared neither to assume himself nor impose so great a responsibility on M. de Bassano, and timidly replied that M. de Bassano gave no opinion, and recommended him to confine himself to the simple statement of facts. Napoleon did not insist further, for he saw that nobody could assume so grave a responsibility with respect to him, and he dismissed M. de Chaboulon without telling him of his plans, though he gave him reason to divine them. Fearing that the excitement of a young man admitted for the first time to the knowledge of important secrets might lead to some imprudence, he sent him on an imaginary expedition to Naples, with orders at its termination to return to France for fresh instructions from M. de Bassano.* At this period Napoleon ought either to have overturned the Bourbon dynasty or fallen in the attempt.

* M. Fleury de Chaboulon in his work on the Hundred Days, entitled “Memoirs of Napoleon’s Private Life in 1815,” a very truthful work, which had the honour of being spoken of by Napoleon at St. Helena, has somewhat magnified the part he played, and which he relates under an assumed name. In his recital, he seems to think that it was he that induced Napoleon to decide on quitting the island of Elba. But like all those who know but one phase of an

Reserved as Napoleon was with others, he told his mother of his plans. "I cannot," he said to her, "die on this island and terminate my career in a repose unworthy of me. Besides, want of money would soon leave me here alone, exposed to the attacks of my many enemies. France is excited. The Bourbons have roused against them all the convictions and interests connected with the Revolution. The army wishes for me. Every thing inclines me to hope that the moment I appear the soldiers will hasten to meet me. I certainly may meet some unexpected obstacle in my path, I may meet an officer, who, faithful to the Bourbons, would restrain the impetuosity of the troops; and then a few hours would end my career. Such an end were better than a long residence in this isle with the future that awaits me there. I will leave and tempt fortune once more. What is your advice, mother?" This energetic-minded woman experienced an emotion of terror on receiving this confidence, for she saw that her son, notwithstanding all his glory, might die as a common malefactor on the shores of France. "Let me," she said, "be a mother for a moment, and then I will give you my opinion." She reflected for some time in silence, and then in a firm and inspired tone, she said, "Go, my son, go and fulfil your destiny. You will fail, perhaps, and your failure will be soon followed by your death. But I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here; but let us hope that God, Who has protected you amid so many battles, will save you once more." This said, she embraced him with deep emotion.*

Napoleon was now more confirmed in his design than ever. It was at the very last moment that he told the delighted Bertrand, who had some merit in enduring his exile, since it was painful to him though surrounded by his family. Drouot was greatly disturbed when Napoleon admitted him to his confi-

event, he has referred everything to his personal experience, and to what he saw. Napoleon's orders in Elba, which have been preserved, his own account to Queen Hortense and Marshal Davout at Paris, which are contained in the manuscript memoirs which we have received, together with Napoleon's notes on the work in question prove clearly that the facts were not quite as M. de Chaboulon relates, but exactly as we tell them here. One circumstance alone—the date of the order for the repairs of the 'Inconstant,' puts all doubt at an end. These orders preserved in the correspondence of the island of Elba, which has been preserved, are dated February 16th. Now, although M. de Chaboulon, in relating his journey under a borrowed name, has not mentioned the precise date of his arrival at Elba, still certain indications prove that he had not arrived there before this order was issued. This is an important point, as will be seen hereafter, for it proves that it was not by advices from Paris that Napoleon was led to this enterprise. M. de Chaboulon's information certainly hastened the execution of his project, but was not the primary cause of his determination.

* This is Napoleon's own account in his manuscript memoirs.

dence. This hero, the most upright of men, asked himself whether the duty of sharing Napoleon's sufferings involved the obligation of accompanying him in an enterprise that might bring such frightful misfortunes on France. Napoleon sought to combat these doubts by depicting the state of France, divided, and rent by parties, condemned to suffer from the attempts of one or the other, and treated with the greatest indignity by Europe; whilst on the other hand she had still a chance of rising, by the aid of that vigorous arm that had organised her resources in 1800. Besides the new ideas with which Napoleon would return to France after ten months of profound reflection, his determination not to sink again, of his own free will, into the abyss of war, to treat the French people as a free nation, by allowing them to have a large share in the Government; all these were reasons for hoping that France would obtain peace, unanimity of opinion, well regulated liberty, and a firm position, all that she might have had, had Napoleon restrained himself during his former reign. Devotedness to his master did the rest; and Drouot yielding to his wishes commenced secret preparations for the approaching expedition. Napoleon had, under specious pretexts, brought the Corsican battalion, stationed in the island, to Porto-Ferrajo, and ordered new clothes for the men. But he left the horses of the Polish Lancers in the meadows of Pianosa, as it would be difficult to remove them, nor could he easily have found an excuse for doing so. About eleven hundred soldiers were collected, of whom eight hundred belonged to the Guard, and three hundred were Corsicans, Piedmontese, or Tuscans, belonging to the 35th Light Infantry that Napoleon had found in the island. None of these men had an idea of the projected enterprise, and the ordinary works going on as usual, they might have supposed they were about to be reviewed. One circumstance in particular was very favourable to the projected attempt. In order to watch the proceedings in Elba, the English had retained in the neighbourhood, Colonel Campbell, one of the commissioners that accompanied Napoleon from Fontainebleau to Porto-Ferrajo; and in order to conceal the object for which he was really sent, this officer received an ostensible mission to the Tuscan Court. Colonel Campbell went backwards and forwards from Florence to Leghorn, from Leghorn to Porto-Ferrajo, and was in reality a spy without seeming so. He had at this moment left Porto-Ferrajo and gone to Leghorn. The eye of English policy was consequently closed, and there only remained the cruisers that were easily deceived or avoided. In order to keep his preparations a profound secret, Napoleon, two days before embarking, laid an embargo on all the vessels in the harbours of Elba, and cut off all communication with the

sea. He ordered his ordinance officer, Vantini, to seize one of the large vessels lying in the port, which with "L'Inconstant" of twenty-six cannons, the goëlette, "La Caroline," the felucca, "L'Etoile," the advice-boat, "La Mouche," and two other transports, freighted at Rio, making in all seven vessels, he secured the means of embarking his eleven hundred men and four pieces of field artillery.

Having meditated seriously on his determination and project, having considered that he could not remain in an island so near France, where he would be soon alone for want of money to pay his troops, and where he would be exposed to the dagger of every common assassin if he were not thence transported by the European powers; considering, too, that in the present state of France others might make a similar attempt, without the same success as he, since his mere presence would suffice to attract the army and put the Bourbons to flight; that as the sovereigns were on the eve of separating, as the latest accounts showed, and that it would not be easy to assemble them again, and they seeing the weakness of the Bourbons, would not be so ready to take up arms in their cause, and finding him pacific (as he was determined to be) he considered that he had every chance of re-establishing the Imperial throne as by the touch of a magic wand, and that, in short, he ought to execute his project whilst the nights were still long. Having again weighed all these considerations, he resolved to commence his romantic enterprise on the 26th of February.

Before leaving, he sent a message to Naples by one of the vessels with which he communicated with the coasts of Italy. At the same time that he announced his departure to Murat, he desired him to send a courier to Vienna to inform the Austrian Court that he would be soon in Paris, but with the firm resolution to maintain peace and confine himself within the terms of the treaty of the 30th of May, 1814. He also traced for him the part he was to act as King of Naples. He particularly recommended him to prepare his troops, and hold them in readiness in the Marches where they were already partly assembled, but not to take the initiative in hostilities, but patiently observe what would occur at Paris and Vienna before making any movement, and should he be obliged to fight, to retire rather than advance until the enemy should come within his reach, for the nearer he was to Naples the stronger he would be, and the weaker the Austrians.

On the 26th, Napoleon allowed his soldiers to remain at their usual employments until the middle of the day. They were suddenly summoned in the afternoon, regaled with soup, and then assembled with arms and baggage on the pier, where they were informed that they were to go on board the vessels.

Though they had not been told that France was their destination, they entertained no doubt on the subject, and gave utterance to the wildest expressions of joy. To emerge from their wearying inactivity, to quit Elba, to be called into action, to behold France again, and remount the summit of power and glory; such were the prospects that filled them with joy as they made the harbour of Porto-Ferraio re-echo with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*.

But the inhabitants of the island regretted Napoleon's departure, for they thought that the prosperity of their island left with him, and in mournful silence they surrounded the noisy and animated group about to embark. Many who had become intimate with the officers and soldiers bid them a sad farewell, wished success to their enterprise, and consoled themselves in thinking that should Napoleon's star again rise radiant in the firmament—and of this they entertained no doubt—some of its rays would fall upon their isle. Napoleon soon appeared accompanied by Bertrand, Drouot, Cambronne, and the entire staff that had accompanied him in his exile. He had just dined with his mother and sister, and embracing them several times, sought in vain to dry their tears, reminding them how miraculously he had been preserved during twenty years amid the artillery of all Europe. He left them, his heart touched, but his resolution unshaken, and descended to the shore his brow radiant with hope. His presence excited new bursts of enthusiasm, and soon the little army of eleven hundred men that was about to conquer the empire of France against all Europe was embarked. The staff and about three hundred men embarked on board "*L'Inconstant*," the remainder were distributed between "*La Caroline*" and the other vessels of the flotilla. At about seven in the evening, the crowd being assembled on the quay, and Napoleon's mother and sister at the windows of the palace, the Imperial flotilla weighed anchor, directing its course towards Cape St. André. It was to coast along Elba, proceed northwards between the Isle of Capria and Italy, and keep as far as possible out of the latitudes frequented by the cruisers. The wind was from the south, as though fortune wished to favour the daring expedition, and for the last time protect the extraordinary man whom she had so often transported beyond the Alps, whom she had carried into Egypt, and restored safe and sound again to France, whom she had aided in all his enterprises from the Tagus to the Borysthenes, and never abandoned but at Moscow! Would she grant him one more of those favours with which she had filled his wonderful career? That was the doubtful point, but neither Napoleon nor his soldiers in their boundless confidence could entertain any doubt.

But soon difficulties arose, as they will even in the most

successful enterprises. The favourable south wind fell sensibly, and when the flotilla arrived at St. André it was becalmed. It was with difficulty that a little progress was made northwards towards Capria, and on the morning of 27th the flotilla had advanced only seven or eight leagues. The vessels were now in the waters of the French and English cruisers, whom they might meet at any moment. The danger was great. The captain of the frigate "Chautard," who had joined Napoleon at Elba, Captain Taillade of "The Inconstant," and several sailors advised returning to Porto-Ferrajo to await a more favourable wind. This would be avoiding one danger by seeking another, for, notwithstanding the embargo laid on all vessels in Porto-Ferrajo, the English might have heard of what was going on, in which case, a British force suddenly appearing might shut Napoleon up in Porto-Ferrajo, detected in the very act of disturbing the public peace, and thence he might be transported to some island, not as a sovereign, but as a prisoner. It was better, therefore, to lie to and await this much desired south wind. Napoleon, who was unequalled in his experience of the caprices of fate, knew that the various phases of fortune must be viewed with calmness, and a favourable change awaited with patience. Indeed the greatest danger lay in the possibility of falling in with the French cruising party, consisting of two frigates and a brig. The sentiments of the crews were well known, and it was possible to seize these vessels without firing a shot, by suddenly boarding them with the eagles and the tricolour flag. Napoleon therefore determined to wait the course of events, and extricate himself by a *coup d'audace*, should he fall in with the French cruisers.

At noon the wind freshened, and the vessels advanced as far as Leghorn. A frigate was perceived in the direction of the Genoese coast, and another in the open sea to the left, whilst a ship of the line was seen in the distance coming with a favouring wind in full sail towards the flotilla. These were the dangers to be braved in trusting to fate. Napoleon's vessels continued their way, when suddenly "L'Inconstant" came deck to deck with a French brig of war, "Le Zéphire," commanded by Lieutenant Andrieux, a good officer, that had often met the little navy of Elba. An attempt might have been made to seize this brig, but Napoleon opposed the design, not wishing to incur unnecessary risk. He ordered the grenadiers to keep out of sight, and desired Captain Taillade to speak to the commander Andrieux, with whom he was acquainted. Captain Taillade saluted Andrieux by the aid of his speaking trumpet, and asked whither he was going. "To Leghorn," was replied, "And you?" "To Genoa," said Captain Taillade, and offered to take charge of any commission that "Le Zéphire" might

have for that port, but there were none. "And how is the Emperor?" asked the officer of the Royal navy. "Very well," replied Captain Taillade. "So much the better," added Andrieux, and went on his way without suspecting whom he had met, and the immense importance of what he had passed unnoticed.

During the night, the two war vessels which had caused so much uneasiness some hours before, disappeared; and the flotilla shaped its way towards France.

The 28th was employed in crossing the Gulf of Genoa, where only a frigate was seen, which was at first believed to be a cruiser belonging to the enemy, but which soon ceased to notice the flotilla; and on the 1st of March, an ever memorable though fatal day for Napoleon and for France, the French coast was discernable, to the infinite joy of Napoleon and his troops. At noon they came in view of Antibes and the St. Marguerite isles. At three o'clock they anchored in the Gulf of Juan; when Napoleon, having surmounted the first difficulties of his enterprise, felt as though his ancient good fortune was returning, and his soldiers sharing his belief made the air resound with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*.

At an appointed signal and amid the roar of cannon each vessel hoisted the tricolour flag, and the soldiers displaying cockades of the same colours prepared to disembark in the boats. Napoleon ordered Lamouret, a captain of Infantry, to take twenty-five men and seize a battery that was in the centre of the gulf. Captain Lamouret went in a boat, but found the battery occupied only by some custom-house officers, who were delighted to hear of Napoleon's arrival, and most anxious to join him. The joy with which all landed may be easily imagined; and whilst the boats were going backwards and forwards to bring the men ashore, Captain Lamouret conceived the design of seizing the fortress of Antibes, which would have been an important acquisition.

This rash officer proceeded to the fort, and entered into conversation with the guard at the entrance, by whom he was very well received. The commander, General Corsin, was on a visit at the St Marguerites. Colonel Cuneo d'Ornano was in command, and anxious to fulfil his duty as a soldier he allowed the twenty-five grenadiers to enter, and then ordering the drawbridge to be raised, he made them prisoners. But they, entering into conversation with the soldiers of the 87th, then in garrison at Antibes, influenced them so far that they crying *Vive l'Empereur* insisted on the place being given up to Napoleon. Colonel Ornano succeeded in calming them, whilst he ordered that the twenty-five grenadiers should be disarmed, promising to return their arms when every thing should be explained.

These too-venturesome twenty-five men were thus lost to Napoleon, and this might be considered as an evil omen, but that at the same time a number of the soldiers of the 87th letting themselves down from the ramparts, hurried to Cannes to join their Emperor as they said.

At five o'clock all were landed. Napoleon's eleven hundred men with their baggage and four pieces of cannon, had established their bivouac in a field of olives on the road between Antibes and Cannes. When the inhabitants saw several ships crowded with soldiers and firing cannon, they were terrified, thinking that the Moors had come to seize the fishermen. But when they learned the truth, they hurried to the shore to gratify their curiosity, but did not express an opinion one way or the other, for the inhabitants of the coasts were not in general favourable to the Emperor, who had involved them in fifteen years of naval warfare. Napoleon sent Cambronne at the head of a van-guard to Cannes to order provisions and buy horses, and pay ready money, knowing that if he wished men to favour his cause, he must not commence by hurting their private interests. The provisions were prepared and some mules and horses bought. Notwithstanding the order that no person should be allowed to leave Cannes, particularly by the Toulon road, an officer of gendarmerie from whom Cambronne had proposed to buy some horses, pretending that he would sell, set off at a gallop for Draguignan to tell the Prefect of Var of the great event that had occurred. Fortunately for Napoleon, this officer having seen the artillery on the Toulon road was deceived, and announced that the expedition was advancing in the direction of Provence, that is towards Toulon and Marseilles.

But he was much mistaken as we shall see. A table and seat having been prepared in the olive field where Napoleon had encamped, he opened his maps. He had the choice of two roads, one level, leading to Toulon and Marseilles, the other leading to Dauphiné over steep mountains, at that time covered with ice and snow, and intersected by narrow defiles, where fifty determined men could arrest the progress of a whole army. This latter road passing across the French Alps, was in some places inaccessible to wheeled vehicles, consequently if Napoleon chose this route he should leave his artillery behind. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which at first sight appeared so formidable, Napoleon did not hesitate, and by the choice he made, assured the success of his adventurous enterprise.

The physical difficulties of the Alpine route consisted in steep and ice-covered roads, in defiles to be forced or avoided by a détour, but these obstacles could be surmounted by patience, perseverance, and daring. Napoleon was accompanied by

eleven hundred men capable of anything, and quite equal to overcoming any opposition that might be met in these parts, where there could be none but small garrisons commanded by a captain or a *chef de bataillon*. On the other hand, the moral difficulties to be met on the other route were much more to be dreaded. Had Napoleon chosen this route which passes through Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, he would meet with none but violent royalists, who might possibly check the zeal felt by the troops for him. Besides he would meet on that route authorities of high rank. There were admirals at Toulon, and a Marshal of France at Marseilles (Massena commanded in this town). In Napoleon's position, his greatest danger was to be apprehended from those high in authority. In the army the soldiers, almost all veterans who had come from prison or foreign garrisons, were all frantically devoted to Napoleon. The officers shared their sentiments, though with more reserve, as they were restrained by their oath and sense of duty. The generals, the marshals especially, were still more influenced by these considerations, and could better appreciate the danger of re-establishing the Empire, and would consequently be less inclined than the officers to share the enthusiasm of the troops. It would therefore be more difficult to seduce a marshal at the head of eight or ten thousand men, than a captain or colonel in command of some hundreds.

For all these reasons the higher authorities, whether civil or military, ought to be avoided, and even the worst routes preferred if only officers of inferior rank were to be met there. On the Dauphiné road, as we have said, Napoleon would only meet with small garrisons feebly commanded, and peasants who liked neither nobles nor priests, and who were almost all holders of national property. The largest town Napoleon would meet did he choose the mountainous route, was Grenoble. Now Napoleon knew well that the Grenoblais, like all the inhabitants of the frontiers, animated with a most warlike spirit and faithful to liberal traditions, were since the famous assembly of Vizille, totally opposed to the Bourbons. He had in his guard a surgeon, Dr. Emery, a native of Dauphiné, who had kept up a secret correspondence with his native city, and was ready to answer for his compatriots. Napoleon therefore chose the mountainous route, leaving to his left the beautiful sea-side road, and the Marseillais royalism, and thus gave another proof of the excellency of that *coup-d'œil* which had so often procured him the greatest military triumphs, and which now secured him the greatest political success that ever the head of an empire, or the leader of a party had obtained. He took all his measures accordingly.

He determined to leave his artillery behind, which he did

not really need, as he had no intention of fighting with cannon. His eleven hundred men would suffice to defend him against the *gens-d'armes*, or the opposition of the leader of a battalion, all other resistance he expected to overcome by the mere effect of his presence. The moment he appeared in his redingote and celebrated cocked hat, the first detachment sent to oppose him would fall at his feet, an example that would be followed by the entire army; or he should die on the high road the death of a common malefactor; this was a question that cannon could not decide. As he left the artillery behind, he ordered that the small sum—about seventeen or eighteen hundred thousand francs—which remained of what he had taken to Elba, should be placed upon the mules. The remainder had been partly spent at Elba, and a part was left to his mother. He determined to leave Cannes about midnight. At the same time he sent emissaries to Grasse, to order provisions and to have two proclamations printed, of which his officers had already made several copies on board “*L’Inconstant* ;” of these proclamations, one was addressed to the people of France, the other to the army. The proclamations were actually or substantially as follows.

“Frenchmen,” he said in the first, “the victories of Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Vauchamp, Mormans, Monterau, Craonne, Reims, Arcis-sur-Aube, Saint Dizier, the insurrection of the brave peasantry of Lorraine, Champagne, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, and the position I had taken in the enemy’s rear by separating them from their transports, magazines, and ammunition, had placed them in a desperate situation. France was on the eve of being more powerful than ever, and the chosen troops of the Allies would have found a grave in the vast countries they had so cruelly ravaged, when the Duke of Ragusa’s treachery gave up the capital and disorganised the army. At the same time, our ruin was completed by the defection of the Duke of Castiglione, to whom I had confided a sufficient force to beat the Austrians, and who, had he appeared on the rear of the enemy, might have perfected our triumph. Thus was the destiny of war changed by the unexpected conduct of these two generals, who were at once traitors to their country, their prince, and their benefactor. In these painful circumstances my heart was rent, but my soul remained immovable. I consulted the interest of the country alone, I exiled myself to a rock in the sea, and preserved an existence that might still be useful to you. . . .”

Having given this explanation of his reverses, Napoleon sought to illustrate the spirit of the emigrants, who depended

as he said upon foreign aid, and were seeking to re-establish the abuses of the feudal system. He added.

"Frenchmen, in my exile, I heard your complaints and prayers; I have crossed the sea amid perils of every kind; I am come to you to assert my rights, which are yours. All that has been said, done, or written by individuals since the taking of Paris, I shall ignore, and remember nothing but their important services, for events sometimes occur which the weakness of human nature cannot resist. . . . Frenchmen, there is no nation, however small, which has not the right, and which ought not to seek deliverance from the dishonour of obeying a prince imposed on it by the momentary victory of an enemy. When Charles VII returned to Paris and overturned the ephemeral throne of Henry VI, he declared that he was indebted for his throne to the valour of his soldiers and not to the Prince Regent of England. And I consider and ever shall consider it a glory to owe every thing to you and my brave soldiers." Napoleon said to the army,

"Soldiers!

"We were not conquered; two men from our ranks betrayed our glory, their country, their prince, and their benefactor.

"Shall those, whom we have seen during twenty-five years traversing Europe, seeking to raise up enemies against us, who have passed their lives in fighting against us, in the ranks of foreign armies and cursing our beautiful France, shall they pretend to command or enchain our eagles, they who have never been able to gaze steadily upon them. Shall we suffer them to inherit the fruit of our labours, to seize our honours, our property, and to calumniate our glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost, even the memory of our greatest deeds.

"Your general, who was called to the throne by the choice of the people, and raised upon your bucklers is restored to you, come and join him.

"Tear down those colours which the country has proscribed, and which for twenty-five years have served to mark the rallying point of France's enemies. Display the tricolour cockade that you wore on the days of your greatest glory. We must forget that we have been the masters of nations, but we must not suffer strangers to interfere in our affairs. Who will pretend to be our master? Who shall have the power? Take possession again of those eagles that you bore at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Wagram, Friedland, Tudela, Eckmühl, Essling, Smolensk, at the Moskova, Lützen, Wurtchen, and Montmirail. Come take your place beneath the standard of your chief. His existence is part of yours, his rights are yours and the nation's, his interests, his honour, and his glory are identical with yours. Victory will advance in full gallop; the eagle

with the national colours will fly from steeple to steeple, even to the towers of Notre Dame. Then you may with honour show your wounds, then you may boast of what you shall have done; you will be the liberators of your country."

Thus in these fiery proclamations, imbued with the passions of the time, and adroitly touching all the essential questions of the day, Napoleon, not over-scrupulous as to the justice of the proceeding, gave up Marmont and Augereau to all the fury of the soldiers, by whom he knew they were detested. He opposed the rights of the people to the rights of the Bourbons, and thus touched the masses in their most sensitive point. He adroitly promised to forget certain weaknesses, imputing them to the overpowering might of revolutions, appealed to the tricolour cockade which he knew every soldier had concealed in his knapsack, told them how their immortal glory had been tarnished by the ill-placed hatred of the emigrants, and in a striking and still popular figure of speech promised victory to his partisans. These proclamations were not the least thoughtful, neither were they the least efficacious of his profound calculations.

Before commencing his land journey, he sent the fortunate flotilla back to Elba to announce to his mother and sister the success of the first part of his enterprise, and ordered they should be taken by "The Inconstant" to Naples, and remain there in safety until the end of the crisis.

Towards evening he reached Cannes, and in consequence of an order he had given that all carriages should be stopped, the Prince of Monaco, who had, like many men of the times, changed his party, turning from the Empire to the Restoration, was arrested on his road, and brought before him. Napoleon immediately ordered that he should be set free, received him gaily, and asked whither he was going. "I am going home," replied the prince. "So am I," said Napoleon. He then left the petty sovereign of Monaco, wishing him a pleasant journey.

At midnight he set out for Grasse, following Cambronne, who had gone before with a detachment of one hundred men. The battalion of the Old Guard was in the centre, escorting the treasure and ammunition, and was followed by the Corsican battalion that formed the rear-guard.

Just outside Cannes commenced the mountainous road which the troops were to follow for eighty leagues, until they should reach Grenoble. About day-break on the 2nd of March they reached Grasse. The few hours they had spent in the neighbourhood of Cannes had been employed in preparing rations and getting the two proclamations printed. From this moment, Napoleon was determined not to lose an hour in order that he might reach Grenoble earlier than any orders that

might be sent from Paris. He breakfasted standing, surrounded by his staff, a short way outside the city of Grasse, within sight of the inquisitive but perplexed inhabitants, who exhibited no trace of the enthusiasm with which he hoped to be soon greeted.

He set out at eight in the morning still preceded by his van-guard, and was several hours engaged in climbing by a narrow pathway covered with ice, the steep mountain chain that separates the sea from the basin of the Durance. The greater part of the journey was made on foot. The men who had been able to procure horses walked beside their beasts, the others followed carrying their kit. The cold was intense, and Napoleon was frequently obliged to dismount to warm himself by walking, a species of exercise to which he was little accustomed. He sometimes stumbled in the snow, and on one occasion stopped a few minutes in a hut occupied by an old woman and some cows. Whilst he warmed himself before a brushwood fire he entered into conversation with the old countrywoman, who little imagined what guests she entertained beneath her humble thatch, and asked what news from Paris. She seemed surprised at a question to which she was little accustomed, and replied very naturally that she knew of none. "You don't know what the King is doing then," said Napoleon. "The King!" answered the old woman still more astonished, "the King! you mean the Emperor—he is always *yonder*." This dweller in the Alpine regions was wholly ignorant that Napoleon had been hurled from his throne and replaced by Louis XVIII! All present were struck with astonishment at witnessing this extraordinary ignorance; Napoleon who was not less surprised than the others, looked at Drouot, and said, "Well, Drouot, of what use is it to disturb the world to fill it with one's name?" He left the hut, plunged in thought and reflecting on the vanity of earthly glory. The march was resumed, and the little army stopped that night at Seranon, a small hamlet consisting of a few farms. The soldiers lay in the out-houses, and Napoleon found a good bed in the country house of an inhabitant of Grasse. The little army had in their first day's march advanced a distance of fifteen leagues without encountering other obstacles than those presented by the ice and the rocks. The men were exceedingly fatigued, but sustained by the enthusiasm of their feelings they seemed ready to fulfil the prophecy of the eagle *flying from steeple to steeple*.

Early on the morning of the 3rd of March they again set out. The paths were still mountainous and covered with snow, and the same evening, after a march equal to that of the preceding day, the troops took up their lodgings for the night

at Barrême, in the valley of the Durance, but at a distance of twelve miles from the banks of the river.

Notwithstanding the increasing fatigue the troops set out at an early hour on the morning of the 4th; they halted at Digne to breakfast, and afterwards advanced as far as Malijay. They had now nearly reached the banks of the Durance, and it was necessary to ascend by Sisteron and Gap, and cross a narrow neck of land in order to reach the basin of the Isère. Here an alarming obstacle presented itself. At Sisteron the route passed from the left to the right bank of the Durance by a bridge, which the artillery of the fortress, if defended, would render inaccessible. An officer devoted to the Bourbons could, by merely closing the gates of this little fortress, arrest the progress of the advancing column. In this case the troops would be obliged to descend the Durance to cross lower down, and so losing some valuable hours, allow the military commanders in the neighbourhood time to take precautions and afford the infuriated populace of Marseilles an opportunity to track Napoleon. The danger was imminent, but Napoleon, confiding in the influence of his name, advanced without hesitation on Sisteron.

He had divined justly; and those who were opposed to him, instead of accumulating difficulties on his route, in their alarm, removed them. In fact, according to the information received from the officer of gendarmerie of whom we have already spoken, the Prefect of Var, believing that Napoleon was advancing on Toulon and Marseilles, had placed in the forest of Esterel, that is to say, on the sea-shore route, all the National Guards and regular troops he could assemble. The former could be depended on, but the sentiments of the latter were doubtful. Having taken these precautions, he despatched to Marshal Massena at Marseilles an express which could not arrive before the 4th. At the same time he had endeavoured to inform all the commanders of the Alpine fortresses of what had occurred; without, however, giving them any instructions, which indeed, spite of his zeal, he was incapable of doing. In this state of things, each commander, struck with a kind of terror on learning the alarming intelligence, had only thought of retiring within his walls, without daring to venture forth to dispute the passage with Napoleon. General Loverdo, who commanded in the Department of the Lower Alps, had drawn up the few troops at his disposal on the Lower Durance and Aix; on their side, the commanders of Embrun and Mont-Dauphin, anxious to retire into the fortresses confided to their honour, recalled all their forces to the Upper Durance, so that Sisteron, which was situate mid-way, was left undefended. This species of contraction, natural to surprised and alarmed

people had left the way open to Napoleon without the intervention of treason. His name alone had produced these imprudent resolves, which he was about to turn to his advantage.

Cambronne presented himself before Sisteron at the head of one hundred men, and entered the place without difficulty on the 5th, Napoleon breakfasted there, after having seen one of the greatest obstacles on his route, fall as if by enchantment. He now came in contact with the spirit of the mountaineers of Dauphiné. These brave mountaineers, highly sensitive to military glory, hated foreigners and detested what was called the nobles and the priests, and were alarmed beyond measure by the sermons of the clergy about national property and tithes, and influenced by all these motives, they were enthusiastically devoted to Napoleon. They rushed in crowds from their mountains when they heard the cry of "Vive l'Empereur," vied with each other in offering provisions, and horses and every thing required; these they gave willingly gratis and still more willingly for money.

Spite of his friendly reception at Sisteron, Napoleon did not delay there, but passed the night at Gap, in order to seize the defiles that lead from the basin of the Durance to that of the Isère. His troops were worn out, for they had marched from ten to twelve miles a day, sometimes even fifteen, and many of the men had fallen behind. But the peasants received them hospitably, lent them waggons, and after a few hours repose the laggards were able to join their ranks. Napoleon arrived on the evening of the 5th at Gap, after having traversed nearly fifty leagues in four days, over mountainous roads. And yet this extraordinary rate of progress was surpassed in the succeeding days.

Napoleon was very well received at Gap, but he there learned intelligence that forbade a protracted stay. He had sent an emissary to learn the sentiments of the garrison of Embrun, and this emissary reported that the soldiers were ready at the first signal to assume the tricolour cockade, but that the officers restrained by a sentiment of duty, were far from wishing to deliver up the fortress, and were on the contrary thinking of occupying the defile called Saint-Bonnet, which led from the valley of the Durance to that of the Drac, an affluent of the Isère. This defile commences immediately outside Gap, crosses a high mountain along the peak known as Saint-Guignes and then descends on Saint-Bonnet. Napoleon fearing to be forestalled in so dangerous a passage sent his van-guard thither early on the morning of the 6th, and followed in person after having waited until noon at Gap, for the remainder of his column. The defile was not guarded and he was able to sleep that night at the borough of Corps, situated on the boundary of the

Department of Isère. Hitherto, success had crowned all his efforts. He was in the centre of Dauphiné, and already began to be sensible of the emotion that his approach caused at Grenoble. If he succeeded in taking this city, which was important on account of its site, its fortifications, its arsenal, its large garrison and the political and moral strength of its inhabitants, Napoleon would be almost master of France, for Grenoble would be a guarantee for Lyons and Lyons for Paris. Careful not to neglect any precaution, he sent forward Doctor Emery, who had connections in Grenoble, and who might be able to dispose the public mind in his favour.

The express sent from Draguignan by the Prefect of Var had reached Grenoble on the evening of Saturday, the 4th of March. An illustrious savant, M. Fourier, was Prefect of Isère. General Marchand, one of the most distinguished imperial officers, commanded at Grenoble, where the 7th military division was stationed. The Prefect and the General were very disagreeably surprised by the intelligence they received, for besides its importance for France in general, it increased a thousand fold their personal responsibility. In fact, the Prefect of Var, thoroughly well informed, named the direction of Grasse, Digne, Gap and Grenoble as that which Napoleon was most likely to take. The storm was then advancing directly towards them. Influenced by a feeling natural to all governments, upon learning a disagreeable event, they concealed the intelligence, which besides gave them the advantage of a few hours of quiet, to deliberate upon the best course to pursue. M. Fourier was one of those savants that public disturbances annoy, and who only require from the governments they serve time to pursue their studies in peace. He would therefore naturally have desired that Providence had averted this terrible trial from him. Attached to Napoleon by recollections of former glory—he had accompanied him in the expedition to Egypt—and to the Bourbons through personal esteem and love of repose, he had no decided preference for either dynasty, and was much inclined to entertain ill-will towards any one who disturbed the tranquillity of his life. Add to this an honest sentiment of duty, and we can easily understand that he wished in the first instance to be faithful to the Bourbons, without however incurring the risk of martyrdom in their service. As to General Marchand, though largely associated with the imperial glory, he was a strict observer of military discipline, and though he disapproved the conduct of the emigrants, he was too intelligent not to comprehend the dangers to which Napoleon's return exposed France. His resolution was much firmer than that of the Prefect, but at this moment, a little more or less energy, did not procure the

means of resistance. There was no want of troops. The concentration of troops in the direction of the Alps, induced by Murat's imprudence, had commenced, and there were in Franche-Comté, in Lyonnais and in Dauphiné, more soldiers than the emergency called for. But unfortunately, when Napoleon was in question, it was not the number of the troops but their fidelity that became a matter of consideration. Would they resist the influence of his name and still more could they resist the influence of his presence? General Marchand knew the army too well to entertain a doubt on the subject. He summoned the *chefs de corps* to a private conference, and these declared that they were ready to do their duty, that they had doubts as to the fidelity of the officers and could by no means answer for the soldiers. It happened that the choice of regiments stationed at Grenoble was unfortunate. With the 5th infantry which was well disciplined and well officered, there was the 4th artillery, in which Napoleon had made his first essay in arms, and into which several companies of the artillery of the Imperial Guard had been draughted, after the dissolution of that body. There was also the 3rd Engineers, a corps by no means attached to the Bourbons, and whose influence over the rest of the troops was much feared. General Marchand became very uneasy and awaited the arrival of General Mouton-Duvernét, who commanded the sub-division of Valence, before coming to a determination. The 7th military division, consisting at that time of four departments, was divided into two sub-divisions, that of Grenoble comprising Isère and Mont Blanc, and that of Valence comprising Drôme and the Upper Alps. From this arrangement, it naturally resulted that General Mouton-Duvernét in going to give orders in the Upper Alps that is to say at Gap, was obliged to pass through Grenoble.

This General, upon learning recent events, had hastily taken precautions for the defence of the Roman bridge on the Isère, in case that Napoleon should advance along the banks of the Rhône, he then left hurriedly for the Upper Alps, and arrived at Grenoble on the morning of Sunday the 5th. A meeting, consisting of Prefect Fourier, General Marchand, General Mouton-Duvernét and some staff-officers was held, to deliberate upon the measures most proper to take under existing circumstances. It would not be easy to fix on any that could satisfy the well-founded anxieties of thoughtful men.

To send the troops against Napoleon was running the risk of giving them up to him, for notwithstanding the fidelity of the leaders, it was not very probable that the soldiers would resist the influence of his presence. To summon the soldiers to their quarters, would be to leave the country empty and give

it up to Napoleon, as well as the most important posts, like that of Sisteron for example. Thus, whatever measures were determined on, there was a risk of abandoning to Napoleon either men or territory. However, the occupation of Grenoble by the enemy was so serious a consideration, as to admit of no deliberation. This capital of Dauphiné, besides being of vast moral importance, was a fortress of great strength in former times, and contained *une école d'artillerie, une école de génie* and an immense *matériel*, consisting of 80,000 muskets, 200 cannon, and all the accompaniments attendant on such a military dépôt. A post of so much importance could not be abandoned. It was agreed that all the troops scattered through Dauphiné, and that portion of Savoy that still belonged to France, should be concentrated at Grenoble. Orders were sent to Chambéry for the two infantry regiments stationed there, and to Vienne for the 4th hussars, who were greatly needed at Grenoble, where there was a want of cavalry. Unfortunately the 4th hussars, though commanded by an excellent and honourable officer, was so little to be relied on, that during the recent visit of the Count d'Artois, the men could not be prevented from crying "Vive l'Empereur!" But the authorities were obliged to make use of the means within their reach, and they flattered themselves that by assembling a considerable mass of troops, they could revive the military spirit amongst them, and with the military spirit, the sense of duty attached to this noble profession. These resolutions being adopted, General Mouton-Duvernet set out for the Upper Alps, pursuing the Gap route, along which Napoleon was advancing. The General hoped to anticipate his arrival at the important pass of Saint-Bonnet and take measures to arrest his progress.

The intelligence, which at first had been known only to the principal authorities of the city, was soon spread abroad, and on Sunday afternoon was become public. The Prefect and General then thought it their duty to announce the intelligence officially, and they published a proclamation in which they invited the functionaries of every class to fulfil their duty, promising to give them the example. Grenoble was a perfect sample of France at this period. There were to be seen some of the ancient nobility openly proclaiming their hopes and their wishes, but fully conscious since the trial of Exelmans and the funeral of Mademoiselle Raucourt, that it would be better to restrain their feelings, if they did not wish to expose themselves to fresh misfortunes. There was also, a numerous *bourgeoisie* rich and intelligent, who had participated neither in the excesses nor the sudden revival of the revolutionary spirit, a *bourgeoisie* who admiring the genius of Napoleon and detesting his faults, were deeply offended by the conduct of

the emigrants, but were at the same time sensitively alive to the danger of re-establishing the Empire in opposition to Europe in arms. There was also a lower class, industrious, well-to-do and brave, less fluctuating in their sentiments than the *bourgeoisie*, because less intelligent, passionately fond of military glory, and detesting what they called the nobles and priests, sympathising in a word with the sentiments of the peasants of Dauphiné, though unlike them, they had no interest in the question of national property.

It is easy to divine without description, what must have been the feelings of these different classes upon learning the intelligence of Napoleon's approach. The nobles uttered exclamations of anger, and hurriedly sought the authorities, urging them to do their duty, and uttering angry threats if they showed the least hesitation. But though they exclaimed and made great commotion, they did not offer to do anything for the general defence. There was one means certainly at their disposal, which was to furnish some reliable men who would fire the first shot, which would be the best way to induce the troops to do the like. They promised to find such men, but their power to do so was doubted, and they doubted it themselves too. The *bourgeoisie* were restless and divided in opinion, for though they condemned the political conduct of the Bourbons, they saw clearly the perils inseparable from their overthrow. As to the people, in whose ranks were many half-pay officers, they were transported with joy, and made no attempt to disguise their desires and hopes. The public functionaries dissimulated more than ever their real sentiments, but they were in reality favourable to Napoleon; they were weary of the hypocritical part they were obliged to act towards the Bourbons, which humiliated them, without affording any certainty that they would be continued in office. A population, divided in this manner offered no great resources. Had there been in Grenoble a united and well-organized National Guard, these might, if mingled with the regular troops, have restrained them by the influence of good example. But the nobles had there, as throughout France, assumed the privilege of forming the cavalry of the National Guard, allowing the infantry to consist of the *bourgeoisie* alone. The latter, having on many occasions, opposed the proceedings of the government, had been, under divers pretexts, deprived of their muskets and were, at the time of which we speak, disarmed and disorganized. Consequently, there only remained for the defence of the city, the troops of the line, whose fidelity was the great problem of the day.

The entire afternoon of Sunday the 5th, and all the forenoon of Monday the 6th, were passed in intense uneasiness, and a quick succession of hopes and fears, making what was joy to

one party, grief to another. It was at one moment asserted, that Napoleon was pursued, arrested and shot. Then the royalists walked about the streets in joyous, even insulting triumph, and afterwards returned home to communicate the happy intelligence to their friends at Lyons and Paris. The next report declared that Napoleon had overcome every obstacle, and was even then close to the gates of Grenoble. It was then the turn of the royalists to be sad and silent, and the people, in a delirium of joy, ran through the streets exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur.*" The half-pay officers, whose influence was much dreaded, sought the society of the troops. They found the officers reserved and silent, but the men were demonstrative and joyous and had the tricolour cockade hidden within their schakos. The general-officers, knowing the danger of such intercourse endeavoured to prevent it, and for that purpose kept the men either in their barracks or under arms, but they only succeeded in creating discontent amongst the soldiers without being able to hinder those electric-like communications, which result from a perfect community of sentiment.

About the middle of the day on Monday the 6th, intelligence was received of General Mouton-Duvernet. Having advanced rapidly along the Gap route by Vizille, the General met a traveller whom he caused to be arrested. This was Doctor Emery whom Napoleon had sent on to Grenoble. The General questioned the traveller, who declared he knew nothing, that he had left the island of Elba several months previously, and was returning quietly to Grenoble, his native place, to take up his abode there. Deceived by these declarations, General Mouton-Duvernet, dismissed Doctor Emery and advanced on his way. He soon learned that Napoleon, after having passed the previous night at Gap, was advancing that very day on Corps, where he would soon arrive, after having passed through the defile of Saint-Bonnet. It was too late to offer any opposition, and to retrace his way to Grenoble was the only course left to General Mouton-Duvernet. *En route*, the General remembered what had taken place with Doctor Emery, and sent some soldiers in pursuit with orders to arrest him. But the Doctor was too quick and had already reached Grenoble, where he was sheltered by his friends, whom he commissioned to spread abroad Napoleon's proclamation, and intelligence of his approach.

The agitation became fearful when it was known at Grenoble, that it had been impossible to anticipate Napoleon's passage through the defiles that separate the basin of the Durance from that of the Isère, that he would that evening arrive at Corps and perhaps the next day at Grenoble. One party declared that nothing could resist him, and that the troops sent against him would only augment his forces; another party announced that

an army commanded by the Count d'Artois and several marshals was assembling at Lyons to arrest the fugitive from the island of Elba, and punish him in a signal manner. The royalists who put the report into circulation, in order to raise their own courage, did not succeed in their design. They beset the authorities, scolded them, accused them of doing nothing—whilst they did nothing themselves—and reproached them bitterly with shutting themselves up passively in Grenoble. According to the royalists, this was opening every issue to Napoleon and abandoning France to him. They mentioned another point, where it would be possible to arrest his progress, by blowing up a bridge. This was the Ponthaut bridge, thrown across a small river—the Bonne—which falls into the Drac, an affluent of the Isère, and intersects the Gap route. The royalists said that were this bridge blown up, Napoleon would be obliged to take refuge in the mountains, or descend to the plain, that is to say to the banks of the Rhône, where the forces assembled at Lyons would not fail to destroy him. They insisted so much on this point with the civil and military authorities, that the Prefect and the General resolved to send to this bridge of the Bonne, a company of artillery, a company of engineers, and a battalion of the 5th of the line, troops in whom confidence was placed on account of their perfect discipline. This battalion was commanded by a very distinguished officer named Lessard, who had formerly served in the Imperial Guard, but was strict in the discharge of his duties and resolved to keep his oath. The people of Grenoble accompanied these troops to the Bonne gate of the city, the royalists confiding in their excellent discipline, the Bonapartists, on the contrary, saying that the looks and gestures of the soldiers left no doubt as to the part they would act on meeting Napoleon.

The column left in the evening, consequently intelligence, which was eagerly expected, could not be received until next day. On the morrow—Tuesday the 7th, the 11th and the 7th of the line arrived from Chambéry, and the 4th hussars from Vienne. Preparations for strengthening the town were being actively carried on, cannons were brought from the arsenal, and hoisted on the walls. The royalists placed great confidence in one of the two infantry regiments that came from Chambéry. This was the 7th, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, a young and highly distinguished officer, who had served in the most severe campaigns of the Empire. He was a gentleman of high birth, and connected through his wife with the Damas family; he was in high favour at court, and appeared to be devoted to the Bourbons. It was said that on entering Grenoble he had distributed amongst his soldiers a sum of money, drawn from his private resources, and it was supposed he had done so

to gain the affection of his soldiers and make them more faithful in the discharge of their duty.

This young colonel, with the officers of the garrison dined the same day with General Marchand, who had invited them for the purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the state of their feelings. The greater number, in the presence of their commanding officer, displayed considerable zeal, but some, more sincere, declared that though they were willing to do their duty, it would cost them a severe pang to do so against Napoleon. Amid, these different manifestations, Colonel de la Bédoyère remained silent, and this silence, on the part of an officer who was believed to be a staunch royalist, appeared strange but no ways alarming, as to doubt him was impossible. The company rose from table about two o'clock, and as it was calculated that at that hour, the troops sent to the Ponthaut bridge, would be face to face with Napoleon, and as the crisis was approaching, each retired to attend to his respective duties.

The troops that had left on the previous evening, had advanced through Vizille, La Frey, and La Mure on Ponthaut, the two companies of engineers and artillery strewing the way with their white cockades, and uttering insubordinate language, whilst the men of the 5th batallion, on the contrary, gave no indication of their sentiments. The two companies of engineers and artillery stopped at the village of La Mure, situate at a short distance from the bridge of Ponthaut on the Bonne. The mayor and inhabitants of La Mure, on learning the object for which the military had come, became greatly excited and opposed the destruction of a bridge which was their principal means of communication with Provence. They gave as a reason for their resistance that a little above Ponthaut, the Bonne was fordable, and that the only inconvenience that could be inflicted on the imperial column would be to make the men walk through some cold water. The two companies of engineers affected to think the reasons adduced by the inhabitants of La Mure, satisfactory, and without persevering in their design, they asked for quarters, which were quickly procured, and here they waited the arrival of the 5th of the line.

Napoleon, as we have said, had passed the night at Corps, in his eagerness to seize the defiles between Gap and Grenoble. He passed through without interruption, and advanced with confidence, as the disposition of the people became manifest in the cries of "Vive l'Empereur." But he knew that the morrow would be the decisive day, for he should then meet for the first time a large body of troops, and upon the manner in which these troops should act, depended the success of his undertaking. Whilst he remained at Corps to take a few hours repose, he sent forward Cambronne with an advance guard of

200 men to take possession of the bridge of the Bonne, and prevent its destruction. The Polish lancers who had procured horses since they advanced into the interior, had outrode Cambronne, and having crossed the Bonne had asked quarters from the Mayor of La Mure. At the same hour, that is to say about noon, the battalion of the 5th arrived. The lancers endeavoured to fraternize with them, and found the soldiers well disposed but embarrassed by the presence of their officers. But communications were kept up, and the soldiers of the 5th showed strong symptoms of friendly feeling towards the lancers, when Lessard the commander of the battalion suddenly arrived, and dreading the influence of the soldiers from Elba on his troops, he determined to make a retrograde movement, and accordingly fell back on the village of La Frey. Cambronne arrived too at La Mure, and fearing that in the intercourse between the different parties, some drunken soldier might provoke a collision—which Napoleon had given express orders to avoid—he collected his troops, so to speak one by one, in order to concentrate them on this side of Ponthaut. And so both parties spontaneously abandoned La Mure, Cambronne holding possession of the bridge of Ponthaut.

The night passed in this manner, the opponents as well as the followers of Napoleon filled with the most intense anxiety. Meanwhile the commander of the 5th battalion had made a retrograde march of some hours, in order to cut off all communication between his soldiers and those of Napoleon, and had taken up a good position, with the mountains on his right and the marshes on his left. He could defend himself there and allow his troops a little repose. He waited until noon, and seeing no enemy approach, he began to flatter himself that Napoleon had changed his route, which would have relieved him of an immense responsibility. About one o'clock some lancers appeared, several of them advanced close enough to be heard by the soldiers of the 5th, and told them that the Emperor was coming up, begged them not to fire, but to join him. The brave commander of the battalion ordered the lancers to withdraw, threatening to fire on them, if they persevered in advising his soldiers to desert.

These horsemen fell back upon a larger column that was advancing and which seemed to consist of several hundred men. This was the Elba column led on by Napoleon himself. He had slept at Corps, and then marched to La Mure, where he was informed he would find a battalion of the 5th of the line, with some artillery and engineers that seemed prepared to make a defence. The lancers who had fallen back, told him that the officers seemed disposed to resist, but that probably the soldiers would not fire. Napoleon took up his glass, and looked for some time at the troops before him, in order to

observe their bearing and position. At this moment, some half-pay officers, disguised as *bourgeois*, arrived and informed him of the sentiments of the troops sent to oppose him. They assured him that the artillery and the engineers would not fire. As to the infantry, the officer who commanded them would certainly order them to fire, but it was doubtful whether they would obey. After hearing this, Napoleon determined to advance and decide by an act of personal daring a question that could not be otherwise determined.

He placed the van-guard under Cambronne on the left of the route, on the right, the mass of his column, and in advance, the fifty cavalry soldiers for whom he had been able to procure horses. Then in a distinct voice, he commanded the soldiers to put their muskets under the left arm with the muzzles pointed downwards, and ordered one of his aides-de-camp to advance in front of the 5th, and tell them that he was coming up, and that those who fired would have to answer to France and to posterity for the consequences of their conduct. He was alas! right, and those to whom he appealed were about to decide whether Waterloo should or should not be inscribed on the bloody pages of our history.

Having given these orders, he put his column in motion, and marched at the head, followed by Cambronne, Drouot and Bertrand. The aide-de-camp who had been sent forward, addressed the battalion, repeated the words of the Emperor and pointed him out as he approached. At this sight, the soldiers of the 5th were seized with an extraordinary emotion, and looking alternately at Napoleon and at their commander, seemed to implore the latter not to impose upon them a duty impossible to fulfil. The commander of the battalion seeing the soldiers so agitated, perceived very clearly that they could not resist the influence of their old master, and in a firm tone ordered them to retreat. "What would you have me do?" he said to an aide-de-camp of General Marchand, who was with him *en mission*, "They are pale as death and tremble at the idea of firing on this man."

Whilst they were retreating, Napoleon's fifty lancers galloped up to the 5th, not to charge them, but to overtake and speak with them. The brave Lessard believing he was about to be attacked, ordered his soldiers to stop and present bayonets to the assailants. The lancers rode close up to the bayonets of the 5th, with their swords still in the scabbards and exclaimed, "Friends, don't fire, the Emperor is coming up." At the same moment Napoleon arrives and pauses in front of the battalion, at speaking distance, "Soldiers of the 5th," cried he, "do you recognize me?" "Yes, yes," responded hundreds of voices. Then opening his redingote and presenting his breast, he added, "Which amongst you, will

fire on his Emperor?" overpowered by these words, the artillery and foot soldiers, waving their schakos on the end of their swords, cry out, "Vive l'Empereur." Then breaking the ranks, they surround Napoleon, kiss his hands and call him their General, their Emperor, their father. The commander of the 5th battalion thus abandoned by his soldiers, knows not what to do, when Napoleon freeing himself from the thronging soldiers, steps towards him, asks his name, his grade, his services and then adds, "My friend, who made you *chef de bataillon*?" "You, Sire." "Who made you captain?" "You, Sire." "And you would fire upon me?" "Yes," replied this brave man, "in the performance of my duty." He then gives his sword to Napoleon, who takes it, presses his hand, and in a tone of voice free from the slightest irritation, says to him: "Meet me at Grenoble." Napoleon's manner and voice show that he accepted this worthy officer's sword with the intention of restoring it. Then turning to Drouot and Bertrand, he said, "All is decided; within ten days we shall be in the Tuileries." And indeed, after this significant event, there could be no doubt that he would reign again. But for how long nobody could say!

The first emotion of joy having subsided, the troops won over at La Mure, fell into the ranks with those that came from Elba, and all marched in a body towards La Frey and Vizille. As they advanced, they met enthusiastic partizans of the Empire, who hastened to meet Napoleon, and announced that an entire regiment, headed by the colonel, was coming from Grenoble in the direction of La Mure. The narrators seemed to think that, from the manifestations made by the soldiers, there was nothing to fear. And, in effect, a regiment was seen at a distance, advancing in column, and new comers brought further intelligence. It was the 7th of the line, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, whose silence at General Marchand's table had appeared strange, and in contradiction to his supposed sentiments. The young De la Bédoyère was, as we have said, closely connected, by his wife's family and his own with the house of Bourbon, to whose interests he was naturally believed to be devoted. But he nurtured in the depths of his heart, sentiments antagonistic to his birth and family ties. He had conceived an intense attachment for Napoleon and the glory of the French arms. Sharing the prejudices of the greater number of his comrades, he looked upon the Bourbons as the creatures of foreigners, and did not wish to remain longer in their service. Nevertheless, yielding to the entreaties of his family, he had consented to take service again, and had accepted the command of the 7th, flattering himself, from the vague rumours of war circulated during the Congress of Vienna, that the latter misfortunes of

France might be avenged on Austria. Sent, by a terrible destiny, into Dauphiné, and finding himself in Napoleon's path, he was not able to resist the impulse that impelled him towards the Emperor. But unable to delay the expression of his feelings until fortune should have declared in favour of Napoleon, he had, on leaving General Marchand's table, assembled his regiment in one of the squares of Grenoble, ordered the eagle of the 7th to be taken from a case, and cried, "*Vive l'Empereur !*" Then waving his sword, he said to his soldiers, "Those who love will follow me."

Nearly the entire regiment followed him, and took the road to La Mure, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the people of Grenoble.

Such were the accounts brought to Napoleon, and they were of a nature to dissipate his uneasiness, if he could feel any after what had passed at La Mure. The 7th was now within sight, and La Bédoyère was seen to throw himself from his horse, and hurry towards Napoleon, who had alighted; he embraced the Colonel, and thanked him warmly for the unselfish affection with which he joined him, at a moment when his fortunes were still involved in uncertainty. La Bédoyère replied that he was influenced by a desire to lift up humiliated France; then, in an outburst of unrestrainable emotion, he told Napoleon that he would find the nation much changed, that he would be obliged to renounce his former mode of governing, and could only keep the throne on condition of commencing a new reign.* "I know that," said Napoleon, "I return to revive the glory of France, to establish the principles of the Revolution, and to secure to the nation a degree of liberty, which, though difficult at the commencement of my reign, is now become not only possible but necessary."

Napoleon then passed through Vizille, where his reception was highly demonstrative, and continued his route towards Grenoble, where he arrived about nine o'clock on the evening of the same day—the 7th. He had performed, in six days, a journey of eighty leagues, at the head of a body of armed men,

* Napoleon denied at St. Helena that La Bédoyère spoke in that fashion. Napoleon was certainly justified in denying that La Bédoyère used the violent language attributed to him; but he could not deny the general character of the sentiments expressed by the latter, and of which we have given the pith. As to the rest, I can answer for all the circumstances described in the text. As authority for what occurred at Elba, Cannes, Grasse, Gap, La Mure, Grenoble and Lyons, I have had a number of highly interesting manuscripts, some written by military men, others by civil magistrates, who were all ocular witnesses of the events they describe, and worthy of implicit confidence, both from their character and social position. The most curious and most satisfactory document regarding his abode in the isle of Elba, is the register of Napoleon's Orders and Correspondence, and it was with this document before my eyes, that I wrote these pages.

a march, as he said himself, unexampled in history. The people, in their zeal, had provided the soldiers with horses and carts, and had wonderfully assisted in accomplishing this prodigy of rapid movement.

Meanwhile, all Grenoble was thrown into confusion. When the General learned that the 7th had left, he ordered the gates to be closed, and the keys given up to him, which did not prevent some soldiers of the 7th, who had remained behind, to let themselves down from the ramparts, in order to join their comrades. The terrified nobles had retired to their houses. The *bourgeoisie*, divided between the pleasure of being revenged on the nobles, and the apprehension of the misfortunes that threatened France, scarcely showed themselves. The people, free to do as they pleased, traversed the streets pêle-mêle with the half-pay officers, crying out, "*Vive l'Empereur !*" The enthusiasm of the people was excited to the highest degree by intelligence of what had occurred at La Mure, and which they learned from some horsemen. They immediately ran to the city gates, and finding them closed, they hastened to the ramparts, awaiting with anxious eyes the appearance of the Elba column.

When Napoleon appeared within sight, the people of Grenoble burst into transports of joy. The people on the ramparts rushed to the gate, to endeavour to open it, whilst, on the outside, bands of peasants tried to force it. The gate, yielding to this double effort, fell at the very moment that Napoleon appeared at the head of his soldiers. It was with considerable difficulty that he made his way through the crowd that pressed round him, and alighted at the hotel of the Trois Dauphins.

No sooner had the principal authorities learned his approach, than they disappeared. The General retired into the Department of Mont Blanc, to assemble the remaining troops, and endeavour to fulfil, to the last moment, his military duties. The Prefect, embarrassed by his former connections with Napoleon, for fear, should he see him, of being induced to deviate from the line of duty, took his way to Lyons, after sending an apology to his old master for his precipitate departure. Napoleon would not lodge either at the Prefecture, nor at *l'hôtel de la division militaire*, but remained at the inn of the Trois Dauphins, where he first alighted, in fulfilment of a resolution he had made, to pay his expenses everywhere, in contradistinction to the Bourbon princes, whose journeys had been very burdensome to the provinces they visited.

Napoleon was no sooner established in his humble apartments at the Trois Dauphins, than he prepared to give audience to all who should appear, and passed the evening in receiving the mayor, the municipal authorities, the military commanders, and

in showing himself, from time to time, at the window, to satisfy the impatience of the people. He deferred until the next day the reception of the official departmental authorities, as well as the review of the troops.

On the following day—the 8th of March—he employed the early morning in giving orders for the organization of his government in the provinces he had conquered; he afterwards received the civil, judicial, and military authorities. All, in congratulating him on his triumph, and prophesying for him a triumph still greater in his march to Paris, congratulated themselves on seeing him return to defend the threatened principles of the French Revolution; but still, amid these protestations of devotedness, they declared to him boldly, that he should prepare for a new reign, entirely different from the former—a reign at once liberal and pacific. Though the respect for Napoleon's scarcely established authority was very great, the language in which he was addressed was no longer that addressed to a master, but to the head of a free state. The faces that thronged round him, though still, in his presence, testifying curiosity and admiration, no longer wore the look of humble submission formerly discernible when he appeared.

Napoleon gave no evidence of either annoyance or discontent. Tranquil, serene, fashioned, as it were, to the new part he was called upon to perform, he said to all whom he received, whether in private or in public, sometimes in a familiar, conversational tone, sometimes in the measured language of an official reception, that he had employed ten months in reflecting on the past, and had endeavoured to draw useful lessons from his reflections; that the outrages of which he had been the object, far from irritating, had taught him; that he saw what France needed, and would endeavour to effect it; that peace and liberty were, if he understood aright, a craving want of the times, and should, from thenceforth, be his rule of conduct; that he had certainly loved power, and allowed himself to be too far led away by the thirst of conquest; but he was not the sole criminal, for the powers of Europe, by their submission, the constituted bodies, by their eagerness to place at his disposal the blood and treasures of France, and France herself, by her approbation, had contributed to an illusion that was general at the time; that, besides, the attempt to make France the governing power in Europe was excusable, it was an error that deserved pardon, and should never occur again; that he would not have signed the Treaty of Paris, for he had not hesitated to descend from the throne, rather than deprive France of that which he had not given her, but that a respect for treaties was a principle of every regular government, and he would therefore accept the Treaty of Paris, and would make it the basis of his policy; that, having

made this declaration, he had no doubt as to the maintenance of peace, for he had made his father-in-law acquainted with his sentiments, and had reason to hope that this communication would obtain him the aid of Austria; that he was then about to write to Vienna, by Turin, and expected to see his wife and son soon at Paris.

As to the home government of France, Napoleon, borrowing the language of the ruling passions of the day, said that he was come to save the peasants from tithes, the holders of national property from imminent spoliation, the army from insupportable humiliation, and, in short, to maintain the principles of 1789, imperilled by the designs of the emigrants; that the Bourbons, even had they possessed the intelligence and strength, of which they were wholly destitute, could never have acted otherwise than they had done, because, being representatives of a feudal royalty, and looking for support to the nobles and the priests who had lived in foreign lands with them, they could not keep the throne without their aid, that without depreciating or being unjust to the Bourbons, there could be only one conclusion drawn from their errors, which was, that they were incompatible with France; and that to protect the new interests that had sprung up, a new government would be needed, a government, the offspring, so to speak, of these interests, formed by and for them; that his son, for whom he was preparing the way, would be the true representative of this government, that he was come to prepare his reign, in order that it might be dignified and tranquil; that, moreover, even had he not come, the Bourbons would not the less inevitably have succumbed amid the convulsions they would have necessarily provoked; whilst he, on the contrary, by giving stability to the new interests, and satisfying the spirit of liberty, would avert future commotions by suppressing their cause; that he would himself propose a revision of the imperial laws, in order to raise from them a true representative monarchy, the only form of government becoming a nation so enlightened as France; that whoever would aid him in this patriotic work would be well received, as from late events he wished to draw salutary lessons, and not make them subjects of resentment; that his arms were open to all who would espouse the national cause; that as it was wise to have received the Bourbons, and tried once more their mode of governing, he could not entertain an ill-feeling towards any who had aided in the attempt, for, on leaving Fontainebleau, he had advised his most faithful followers to do so; but the trial had been made, and the conclusion to be drawn from it was, that the Bourbons were an impossibility, and he would therefore await with confidence, and receive with cordiality, those patriotic Frenchmen who would return to the cause of the Revolution, liberty, and

France, a cause, of which he and his son were the true and only representatives.

Napoleon spoke simply, and frankly, and with tact. He avowed his faults, and by this self-condemnation appeased the wrath of others. But he expressed himself with dignity, attributing both his own faults, and those of others, to the force of circumstances, which he said were stronger than human nature. He even excused the Bourbons, by endeavouring to show them rather incorrigible than guilty, and never mentioned the claims of his dynasty but as the rights of the nation. He spoke of his son more frequently than of himself, in order to indicate that he only re-appeared on the scene to prepare for his child, who would be the child of France, a tranquil, liberal, and prosperous reign. These explanations produced a very good impression, even on those who dreaded this attempt at re-establishing the Empire, in opposition to Europe in arms, and who also feared Napoleon's confirmed habits of arbitrary and absolute authority. But they flattered themselves, or, at least, the die being cast, they found a pleasure in flattering themselves, that, with this mode of thinking, and his genius regenerated by repose, by deep reflection, and by his late experience, he would be able to surmount the difficulties of his new task, and give France all he had the good sense to promise her.

Napoleon, always master of his thoughts, even in the most perplexing circumstances, talked with M. Berryat-Saint-Prix, about some of our codes, concerning which the juriconsults were divided in opinion, and he promised to make the examination, and if necessary, the change of these acts one of the legislative reforms with which he intended to occupy himself when a profound peace should be established, which, he said, he would never again think of breaking.

After having given audience to the different authorities, he reviewed the troops, by whom he was naturally received with transport. The 5th of the line, quartered at Grenoble, the 7th and 11th, that had come from Chambéry, the 4th hussars, that had arrived from Vienne, the 3rd engineers, and the 4th artillery, gave utterance to almost frantic exclamations of delight. Two or three military commanders, influenced by professional scruples, had quitted their regiments, but the greater number remained, considering themselves freed from the obligations of their oath, by the authority of a revolution. The tricolour cockades, which the soldiers had kept concealed in their knapsacks, had sprung forth with magical celerity; the eagles even, hidden, nobody knew where, again appeared at the top of the tricolour flag, and it could scarcely be believed that the imperial reign had been interrupted for a year. Napoleon said a great deal to the soldiers about their glory, dimmed by the emigration.

He then told them that he was desirous of peace, and was sure of establishing it, for he was determined never again to meddle in the affairs of others, neither would he suffer strangers to interfere in the affairs of France, and if, unfortunately, they should interfere, he had no doubt of finding his soldiers as valiant and as successful as formerly. He added that, having marched on Grenoble, escorted by his companions in exile, who had accompanied him from Elba, he was now, accompanied by the brave soldiers who had rallied round his standard, about to march on Lyons and Paris, and so complete the conquest of France, which would be accomplished as that of Provence and Dauphiné had been, not by force of arms, but by the irresistible pressure of opinion, represented by the army and the people. He said that every moment was precious, for the Bourbons ought not to be allowed time to prepare and call foreigners to their aid; it was therefore necessary to set out without delay. Rations were already prepared, and by the Emperor's order, were distributed amongst the troops. About four in the afternoon, he gave them orders to march, directing their course to Lyons through Bourgoin.

Napoleon, on leaving his soldiers, said that he would soon join them, that the next day, at farthest, he would be at their head, and would open the gates of Lyons as he had opened those of Grenoble, by merely displaying the tricolour flag. The 5th, 11th, and 7th of the line, the 3rd engineers, and 4th artillery, furnished with a park of thirty field-pieces, the 4th hussars at their head, set out for Lyons amid cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Here was a corps of seven thousand men, fanatically devoted to their chief, able to conquer the soldiers that had remained faithful to the Bourbons should they encounter them, but more likely to seduce them, through the influence of the sentiment that had seduced themselves.

Napoleon, resuming his old campaigning habit of working whilst his soldiers were *en marche*, returned to the Trois Dauphins, intending to leave next day, escorted by the soldiers from Elba, who, thanks to this arrangement, would have enjoyed a day's rest. He would consequently arrive the next day but one—the 10th—at the gates of Lyons, at the head of a much larger body of troops than could be sent against him.

He was much displeased with the Prefect, Fourier, who had not awaited his arrival, and who had fled from Grenoble to avoid his presence. "He was in Egypt with us," he said, "he was deeply involved in the Revolution, he even signed one of the addresses sent to the Convention against the unfortunate Louis XVI."—Napoleon was deceived on this point—"what then can there be in common between him and the Bourbons?"

In the first moments of his anger, Napoleon was about ordering the arrest of M. Fourier, but he just then received the explanations, sent through an indirect channel by the Prefect on leaving Grenoble. Napoleon was appeased, and sent an order to M. Fourier to join him at Lyons. He despatched a similar order to General Marchand, and then wrote to Maria Louisa, announcing his entrance into Grenoble, and the certainty of his speedy entrance into Paris; he urged her to join him and bring his son, and requested her to present to the Emperor Francis the assurance of his pacific intentions. He sent this letter to General Bubna, commander of the Austrian troops at Turin, the same with whom he had treated so amicably at Dresden, in 1813. He requested the General to send on his letter to Maria Louisa, and wished that the courier should publicly take the road of Mount Cenis, in order to induce a belief that communications had been established with Austria. On Thursday, the 9th, having previously issued all his orders, he left Grenoble at noon, bearing with him the good wishes of the people of Dauphiné, and took his way towards Lyons.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing through France, winning over in succession all the troops sent against him, the rumour of his appearance had everywhere excited profound emotion. This intelligence despatched from the Gulf of Juan on the 1st of March, had spread as rapidly as the means of communication then in existence would permit. The news arrived at Marseilles on the 3rd, and threw the excitable population of that city into extraordinary agitation. It was known at Lyons on the morning of the 5th; the inhabitants of this city were divided in opinion, and much excited against each other. Lastly the intelligence was transmitted by telegraph to Paris, where it arrived in the afternoon of the same day—the 5th. M. de Vitrolles did not lose a moment in informing Louis XVIII. This prince, who generally viewed things with a considerable share of indifference, appeared at first more astonished than alarmed, and seemed to inquire in the eyes of those around, what was to be thought of this great event. But the frantic delight of some who thought nothing easier than to seize and shoot the fugitive from Elba, and the terror of those who already in imagination saw him master of all the troops sent against him, showed the gravity of what had occurred, and he sought to discover in the contradictory advice of his habitual counsellors what was best to be done. Helpless from his youth, accustomed to very little exertion during his exile, and frequently mocking his brother's incessant activity, he had become inert as much by habit as by nature, he was averse to all prompt and decisive resolutions, and was as unwieldy in mind as in person upon trying occasions.

Like his prefects, he wished the intelligence to be kept secret as long as possible. He would not at first allow this formidable mystery to be communicated to any but the princes, the war minister—a personage whose presence under such circumstances was indispensable—M. de Blacas, who was always informed of whatever occurred, and M. de Vitrolles, who of the wrecks of the ancient *Ministère d'Etat*, had retained the direction of the telegraph. The princes were greatly disturbed, for called by their rank to head the troops, they felt more than anyone the difficulty of their position. As for Marshal Soult, the war minister, who had attached himself to the Bourbons, as if there were no possibility of ever again beholding the terrible face of Napoleon, he was confounded at the complications in which he was involved. However, he made a great display of zeal. The first idea that naturally presented itself to every mind, was to put the princes in command of the different bodies of troops that were about being raised, and to put the largest of these divisions under the orders of the Count d'Artois, the most active member of the royal family, and the most popular with the ultra-royalists, who had now an opportunity of rendering signal service if their devotedness was as active as noisy.

Napoleon being *en marche* since the 1st of March, and being under a necessity of advancing to Lyons whichever route he chose, that of Grenoble or that of Marseilles, it was evident that he ought to be met at Lyons, and that it was there that the strongest means of opposition ought to be accumulated. The Count d'Artois immediately offered to go there, and this offer was so agreeable to the general wish that it was at once accepted. It was thought well to give him as lieutenants his two sons, the Duke de Berry on the left, and the Count d'Angoulême on the right; the latter was at this moment at Bordeaux. Both were to set out for the provinces they were in the habit of visiting, and bring up their forces on Napoleon's flanks. It was arranged that the Duke de Berry, who was known in the military provinces of the east, should repair to Franche-Comté, and assemble at Besançon the troops of the line, those of the National Guard that seemed well-inclined, and lead them through Lons-le Saulnier, to the left of Lyons. The Duke d'Angoulême, who was well acquainted with the people of the south, was to leave Bordeaux immediately, and repair to Nîmes by Toulouse, and so take Napoleon in the rear, with the forces he should have assembled. These combinations which the War Minister regarded as very profound, supposed two conditions; firstly, that there would be time to concentrate the troops on these different points, and secondly that the troops would be faithful. These arrangements were proposed

on the evening of the 5th. Orders despatched on the 6th, would not arrive at the different places until the 7th, the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th, according to the distances, and besides, time would be required for the execution of these orders, and we have already seen that Napoleon would reach Lyons on the 10th. As to the fidelity of the troops, what we have already narrated shows what hopes might be entertained on that point.

The War Minister made a great show of zeal and activity, and very seriously proposed the measures we have enumerated as infallible means of safety. He was allowed to do as he pleased, for after all he understood better than the men by whom the Bourbons were surrounded, the best mode of proceeding with the soldiers. Ignorant of what had occurred at La Mure and Grenoble, the royalists did not despair of the fidelity of the troops; as an additional security, it was determined that the princes should be accompanied by popular military chiefs, respected in the army. Marshal Ney, who commanded in Franche-Comté, was chosen to accompany the Duke de Berry. Marshal Macdonald, who commanded at Bourges, received orders to set out immediately for Nîmes, to aid the Duke d'Angoulême. These two marshals, who had acted at Fontainebleau as Napoleon's negotiators, seemed proper persons to oppose to him. No doubt was entertained as to the rigid probity with which Marshal Macdonald would fulfil his duties. As to Marshal Ney, though he was known to be discontented with the Court, and had on that account retired to his country residence, it was believed that he would be annoyed at Napoleon's return, especially in remembering the scenes that took place at Fontainebleau, and it was hoped that at the sight of this terrific apparition, all his passions would be aroused.

Lastly in order to procure the Count d'Artois an additional lieutenant, and one of great importance, the Duke d'Orléans was appointed to the post. This selection, apparently malicious, was in fact very innocently proposed by the Count d'Artois himself. The Duke d'Orléans, though he conducted himself with great reserve, was become an object of distrust to the Emigration. He received many visitors at his house, for he was popular with military men, who remembered with pleasure his services in the republican armies, and was no less liked by those who held constitutional opinions, and who were glad to find their sentiments shared by a member of the royal family. This species of popularity, which the Duke d'Orléans had no intention of abusing, offended the Court, and Louis XVIII was not sorry to get rid of him by sending him with the Count d'Artois, who was glad to be supported by a military Bourbon. This measure was as well received as the others, and the War Minister was desired to give immediate orders for the movement

of troops and *matériel* necessary for carrying into effect the proposed combinations. It was agreed that the Count d'Artois should leave for Lyons on the night of the 5-6th of March. The Duke d'Orléans was summoned to the Tuileries to be informed of the intelligence that was still kept secret, and to receive from the lips of the King himself the orders that concerned him personally. The Duke lost not a moment in appearing at the palace. "Well," said Louis XVIII, with wonderful nonchalance, "*Bonaparte* is in France!" The Duke d'Orléans perceiving with his ordinary sagacity, the danger that threatened the dynasty, did not conceal his apprehensions. "What would you have me do?" replied Louis XVIII, evidently impatient, "I should be better pleased if he were not here, but he is here, and we must get rid of him as well as we can." The Duke d'Orléans, convinced that the measures taken for the defence of Lyons would be slow and inefficacious, felt little inclination for the mission that was offered to him, and endeavoured to persuade the king to keep him at Paris, where there would be no Prince of the blood should his Majesty leave, and where the Duke's popularity, of which he did not boast, but which was an acknowledged fact, might be useful. But in asking to remain, he asked precisely what was least agreeable to the King, and he was obliged to leave. The sole result of his advice was that the Duke de Berry was retained at Paris. Indeed, it was considered necessary to leave one of his nephews with the King, and it was besides thought unsafe to invest the fiery-tempered Duke de Berry with uncontrolled authority. It was consequently decided that Marshal Ney should go alone to Besançon. This marshal, who was staying at his country residence, was immediately summoned to Paris by telegraph.

These military measures being determined on, the other ministers were summoned to provide for the political emergency. All were profoundly disturbed by what they heard; some with a consciousness of past errors, felt penitent, whilst others only regretted having been too gentle, or as they understood it, too weak. The latter wished to compensate for their recent weakness, by an extraordinary display of energy under existing circumstances. Without reflecting, without taking into account the gravity of the act they were about to commit, or the terrible law of retaliation to which they were about to render themselves obnoxious, they issued a proclamation, founded on the 14th article of the Charter, exhorting every citizen to pursue Napoleon, and take him, dead or alive; if alive, he was to be delivered to a court-martial, that would put the existing laws into immediate execution, that is to say, order him to be shot. This proclamation was not only issued against Napoleon, but against the companions and abettors of his enterprise. To

prove the identity of the accused person, was sufficient to procure his immediate execution.

To this dictatorial act, the first use made of the 14th article, which was afterwards so fatal to the dynasty, there was added another, both legitimate and necessary—the Chambers, that had been adjourned to the 1st of May, were summoned. Nothing could be wiser than to summon the Chambers to the King's aid, in order that he might, in concert with them, adopt those measures of defence that existing circumstances required, and so oppose to Napoleon—the representative of military despotism—legitimate royalty surrounded with all the appurtenances of constitutional liberty. The Chambers were accordingly summoned with the least possible delay, and the members actually in Paris were invited to repair to their respective halls of assembly in order to commence deliberations when a sufficient number of members should have arrived.

These resolutions, adopted on Monday the 6th of March, and published on Tuesday the 7th, the very day that Napoleon entered Grenoble, revealed to the public the mighty intelligence which had been kept secret as long as possible, but which had gradually escaped from the Tuileries, and had caused a profound sensation amongst those to whom it had become known. The published details somewhat allayed the first feeling of alarm. The Government as yet only knew of Napoleon's disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan, at the head of eleven hundred men, of the attempt on Antibes, which had failed, and the march towards the Upper Alps. The Prefects in sending intelligence of these events, had dwelt on the most favourable circumstances, and the Government endeavoured to infuse into the public mind the tranquillizing impression that the despatches sought to convey. As great importance was attached to the first manifestation of the sentiments of the army, much stress was laid on what had taken place at Antibes, and *Bonaparte*, as he was then called, was represented as repulsed by the troops he met on disembarking, and obliged to flee to the mountains, where he would e'er long sink beneath the pressure of want, or the arm of justice.

This *cowardly brigand*, it was said, unworthy to die the death of an hero, should soon die the death of a malefactor, and it was a motive of thankfulness to Heaven, that he had left the retreat where his adversaries were weak enough to allow him to remain, and put himself within reach of the punishment he so well deserved. This mode of viewing the question was adopted by the ultra-royalists, who having recovered from their first emotion of terror, only saw in the great event of the day a subject of hopefulness.

The remainder of the public thought differently. They did

not rely on the official version of what had occurred, and did not believe Napoleon so irrevocably lost as some people were pleased to say. The mass of the people, feeling an instinctive preference for the man who so powerfully excited their imagination, felt a secret joy at the news of his return. The military, touched to the depths of the soul, uttered wishes of which they made no secret, for the success of their ancient general, though the heads of the army professed a rigid adherence to their duty. The revolutionists after having ten months previously applauded the return of the Bourbons, who revenged them on Napoleon, now applauded the return of Napoleon, who revenged them on the Bourbons. The holders of national property, and they were innumerable in the country districts, considered themselves saved from imminent spoliation. The *bourgeoisie*, on the contrary, tranquilly disposed, and having no interest in the question of national property, of which they had purchased much less than the inhabitants of the country districts, anxious for peace and moderate liberty, were filled with intense alarm. Though offended at the partiality exhibited by the Bourbons for the nobles and priests, they preferred to support and at the same time restrain them constitutionally, than to run the risk, under Napoleon, of fresh wars and very little liberty. These sentiments were peculiarly those of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, the most prudent in France, because they are the most intelligent and less influenced by those private provincial interests, which often mar the honesty of men's opinions. Thus in the maritime cities, whose commerce had been ruined by the continental blockade, the *bourgeoisie* were in a kind of frenzy, whilst in the manufacturing towns, whose trade had been created by Napoleon, and which had suffered much by the communications established with England, the *bourgeoisie* experienced sincere delight, damped however by the apprehension of war.

Amongst enlightened men, only one feeling prevailed, that of grief. These men, who were small in number, but influential without seeking to be so, expected from Napoleon's return only fearful calamities. To all, war seemed inevitable. The Congress, which was believed to be on the eve of dissolution, had prolonged its sittings, and it was evident that the Powers would not separate, but would endeavour to overthrow, without leaving him time to collect his resources, the man who was endeavouring to undo all they had done at Vienna. There would be then another death struggle between France and the European Powers. This imminent danger ought to be sufficient to put every good citizen in opposition to Napoleon's enterprise. Indeed Napoleon was not alone in fault, the Bourbons had, by their errors, suggested the idea, and prepared the

success of his undertaking. But whether the fault lay with the one or the other, the misfortune was the same for France.

With regard to the home policy, the causes of regret, without being so serious, were still considerable. The Bourbons had alienated every Frenchman, who entertained an affection for his country, or for the principles of '89, but these men were resolved to oppose a constitutional resistance to the reigning dynasty. The elections of the current year would bring in a contingent of moderate oppositionists, who would reinforce the independant majority that existed in the Chamber of Deputies; and this assured a legal victory, slow, perhaps, but sooner or later, certain, over the dangerous tendencies of the Emigration. In this way, the true principles of the French Revolution might be established, combined with a wise, legal and practical liberty, similar to that which constitutes the happiness of England. Besides, the work was commenced, and it would be better to carry it out than to undertake another, and so continually recommence without ever coming to a completion.

Another consideration presented itself. Would there be with Napoleon, even when taught by adversity and reflection, equal chances of success? This was problematical. There could be of course no doubt with regard to the principles of '89, which formed, so to speak, his political philosophy, but with regard to constitutional liberty, there would be, probably, a sharp struggle. Even supposing that he had been rapidly instructed by misfortune, did there not still remain his powerful will, his formidable genius, and could they be made to bend to all the exigencies of a constitutional *régime*? Under Napoleon, there might therefore be anticipated certain war, and doubtful liberty, and these considerations were more than sufficient to prevent enlightened men from wishing his return.

There is neither exaggeration nor partiality in saying that the men who thought thus were to be found almost exclusively in the ranks of the constitutional party. That party was known as "constitutional" that sought to establish legal liberty under the Bourbons, gradually subjecting them to its yoke, by victories legally obtained over their evil tendencies. Both in the Chambers and outside their walls, this party unanimously exhorted all to rally round the Bourbons, and endeavour to support them. It cannot be denied that private interest alloyed the generosity of this resolution. The members of both Chambers knew they were compromised, some for having pronounced Napoleon's deposition, and others for having sanctioned the decree. Certain writers, such as M. Benjamin Constant, had employed against the imperial *régime* a violence of language, which, to say the least, would render them incompatible with the sovereign of Elba, should he again become ruler of France. But indepen-

dantly of any private motives, the greater number was animated by a sincerely honest desire to observe their oath to the Bourbons, and to complete, conjointly with them, the edifice of constitutional liberty which was commenced, and spare France a fresh and fatal struggle with all Europe. The leaders of the constitutional party thought themselves bound, in honour, to prove that their opposition, manifested either in their speeches or writings, was not directed against the dynasty of the Bourbons, but against their political proceedings. Such conduct on the part of these gentlemen was at once honourable, rational, and prudent.

The members of the Chambers hastened to take their seats. They were anxious to see each other, to converse about public affairs, and give vent to their sentiments in conversation, whilst awaiting an opportunity of enunciating them in their public speeches, when a sufficient number should be assembled to proceed to business. It was around M. Lainé, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, that the largest group collected. M. Lainé had, through hatred of Napoleon, become an ardent partizan of the Bourbons, and entertained the principles without the prejudices of the royalists. He began to perceive the errors that had been committed, of which he was not himself wholly innocent, and he was not a man to conceal what he felt. He avowed, without hesitation, these faults. His opinion was shared by the moderate royalists, and even by some of the Ministers.

The latter, as we have already said, did not really constitute a real cabinet. In order that a cabinet should exist, under the form of government then attempted in France, it would be, in the first place, necessary that the King should consent to it by suffering another will to exist co-equal with his; secondly, the Ministers should have a leader recognised as such by his colleagues, and accepted, at the same time, by the Chambers and the King as an intermediary and connecting link. Louis XVIII., though less alarmed, as we have said, than any of our previous monarchs, by the spectacle of free assemblies—a feeling resulting from his long residence in England—had not yet made all the sacrifices of authority that a representative government requires, and if, in practice, he yielded much of his royal power, it was as much through a dislike to business, as through an effort of good sense. Be this as it may, he did not seek to provide a leader for his cabinet, and indeed, there was not amongst the Ministers, any one competent to discharge the duties of such a position. M. de Talleyrand, absent-minded and habitually indifferent, was unsuited to the post, though the most distinguished statesman of the day. M. de Montesquiou, next in importance to M. de Talleyrand, and the only minister

capable of addressing a public assembly, might have become chief of the cabinet, had the Chambers enjoyed a higher degree of importance than was accorded to them, and had he possessed the pliancy, firmness, and business-like habits required in such a position. There were then, as we have seen, ministers, but no ministry. These Ministers were divided into men of sense, conscious of the errors that had been committed, and even inclined to acknowledge them, and others, either members or flatterers of the emigration, who believed that if they had committed a fault, it was that of being weakly indulgent to the adverse party. Amongst the former was Baron Louis, who was exclusively occupied with the finances, and who had displayed in his *spécialité* the qualities of a great minister. Amongst the men of sense we must also rank M. Beugnot, who was unjustly attacked by the emigrants, whose intervention in the police department he would not suffer, nor was he less disliked by the ultra-royalists, who bitterly reproached him with having facilitated the escape from Elba, which, as Minister of Marine, he could have prevented by employing more vigilant cruisers. In the same class was M. de Jaucourt, M. de Talleyrand's temporary substitute, a honest, intelligent, and moderate-minded man. And lastly, there was M. de Montesquieu, who saw clearly how much the Ministers had gradually deviated from the current of the national sentiments; he frankly acknowledged these errors, and discontented with all parties, but more especially with his own, to whom he unhesitatingly imputed all the evils that had occurred, in soreness of spirit, took a pleasure in saying that he and his colleagues could not do anything better than give up their places to men who were more popular and more competent to save the monarchy.

M.M. Dambray and Ferrand through blind obstinacy, and Marshal Soult in consequences of his connection with the ultra-royalists, supported the opinions of the emigration. They asserted that it was necessary to be a little more royalist than they had been, especially more vigorous, and strike right and left when the opportunity occurred, and perhaps revoke some of the concessions of the Charter—this was said in a low tone—and endeavour by these means to save the monarchy. M. de Blacas gave no opinion. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive that errors had been committed, either in one way or another, but he looked upon himself as so identified with the monarchy that he did not suppose that either public censure or change of ministry could ever touch him.

The penitent Ministers thronged round M. Lainé, and M. de Montesquieu did not hesitate to say, that it would be better to sacrifice three or four members of the cabinet, including himself, for he was ready to close the chasm by throwing him-

self in. M. Lainé highly applauded these sentiments, and sought to win the support of the leaders of the moderate opposition, both in the Chambers and outside their walls.

There were two of those in particular whom he had induced to join him, M. Benjamin Constant who had excited a great sensation by his writings, and M. de Lafayette, who after having visited Louis XVIII at the time of the promulgation of the Charter, in order to show that he was ready to accept liberty under the Bourbons, had returned to his estate of Lagrange, where he lived retired, awaiting a formal summons from the electors to take part in public affairs.

M. Lainé, M. de Montesquieu, and other leaders of the constitutional party, adopted the idea of changing three or four ministers, such as M. de Montesquieu, who offered himself as a sacrifice, and M.M. de Blacas, Soult, and Ferrand, who were not so generous, and replacing them by more popular men. It was also thought good to increase the Chamber of Peers, by elevating to the peerage men distinguished either by great civil or military services, and completing the Chamber of Deputies by replacing the two sets, whose powers had expired, by men of liberal opinions, leaving the selection to the Chamber, in consideration of the shortness of the time. It was also proposed to reorganise the National Guard, selecting them from amongst the *bourgeoisie*, who were for the most part well disposed, the command to be given to M. de Lafayette. The government would explain their views concerning national property in such a way as to appease the anxiety of the purchasers, and finally those measures that had given offence to the army were to be annulled.

M. de Montesquieu did not consider any of these concessions, even the appointment of M. de Lafayette, as too high a price to pay for saving the monarchy. The Ministers, especially those who were to be dismissed, exclaimed loudly against them, whilst M. de Blacas, who estimated things as they concerned Louis XVIII who gave no opinion, was silent and immovable. It was in vain that M. Lainé, foreseeing that Napoleon would advance with his usual rapidity, insisted that some determination should be immediately adopted. M. de Montesquieu disowned by the Court since he had adopted such rational opinions, could not give an answer, which he had not received himself, whilst Louis XVIII, worried by the remonstrances of the rational portion of the royalists, and by the excitement of the enthusiasts, not knowing to whom to listen or whom to believe, preferred in this state of doubt not to abandon his old habits, and resolved to retain M. de Blacas and not to dismiss anybody.

In this state of perplexity, the Court did not confine itself to consulting the Constitutionalists, who were the most honest of

its opposers, a party animated by the desire of preserving the dynasty, by correcting its errors, but resumed relations with the principal revolutionists, such as M.M. Fouché, Barras and others, like sick men, who are generally more inclined to trust quacks who flatter them, than accredited physicians who prescribe disagreeable remedies. It must be added that when the hot-headed and unwise members of any party are obliged to make a choice from amongst their adversaries, they more easily pardon those, who like themselves, hold extreme opinions, than moderate men whom they no more resemble in disposition than in opinions.

The persons employed to negotiate with M. Fouché, again held out hopes of the Ministry of Police, but long waiting had disgusted him, and he was more evasive and less anxious to counsel than before, which plainly showed his aid was sought too late. M. d'André, the wise and moderate director of the Police department, sought to win over the Duke of Rovigo and get his advice, but the Duke told him without hesitation that the adherents of the Empire, particularly military men, had been so badly treated that there was no chance of gaining any of them.

Whilst the royalists were thus exerting themselves without any result, the Bonapartists and revolutionists were not less active, and were equally unsuccessful in attaining their object. Both had been thunderstruck on learning Napoleon's return.

M. de Bassano, who alone had had any communication with Elba, and that merely to send some information, was no less surprised than the others, for M. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had not yet returned, had not sent him any information. Dreading the result, Napoleon's ancient and faithful minister regretted the part, trifling as it was, which he might have had in inducing his master to take his resolution. The young officers, the instigators of those plots of which we have spoken, and who had no communication with Elba, nor even with Colonel de la Bédoyère, were more ardent now than ever, and wished to act immediately in order to second Napoleon. The civic Bonapartists, M.M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, Boulay de la Meurthe, Thibaudeau and others, knowing as little as M. de Bassano of the real state of things, were equally disinclined to action or inaction; for if they should make a diversion in favour of Napoleon in the north, they dreaded lest they should derange his plans by a movement that he had neither foreseen nor ordered. Accustomed to waiting and not to anticipating the Emperor's orders they were strangely perplexed how to act.

Almost all the revolutionists were satisfied. However, their leader, M. Fouché, though always fond of exciting events, so consonant with his restless nature, was greatly annoyed by

Napoleon's return, as it deranged all his plans. He thought he held the Bourbons in his power, and could support or destroy them as he pleased, for he was implicated in every intrigue of the time, even those concocted by the royalists. "We could have formed a ministry," he said to his confederates, "composed of such regicides as Carnot, Garat and myself, and of inflexible soldiers like Davout, and could have ruled or dismissed the Bourbons at pleasure. But this terrible man has come to bring us war or despotism. In the present state of affairs we must support him, that our services may give us some claim upon him, but we shall wait until he arrives, when, in all probability, he will be as much embarrassed by his triumph as ourselves."

More daring than such Bonapartists as M. de Bassano, with less faith in the Emperor's infallibility, and willing to risk, if not his own life, at least those of others, he advised immediate action and to give the young officers their own way. Generals Lallemand, Lefebure-Desnoëttes, and Drouet d'Erlon were come to Paris, and he encouraged them in their plan of immediate action. Drouet d'Erlon commanded at Lisle under Marshal Mortier, and had several regiments of infantry at his disposal. Lefebure-Desnoëttes had the Chasseurs of the Guard, now called Chasseurs Royaux, at Cambrai, and the mounted Grenadiers, now Royal Cuirassiers, quite near at Arras. Of the Lallemands, one brother was commandant at Aisne, and the other general of artillery at La Fère. It was decided that Lefebure-Desnoëttes, the most daring of all, and he that could count most on his men, should leave Cambrai with the Chasseurs of the Guard and proceed to Aisne and La Fère, where he could be joined by the Lallemands and what troops they could induce to come with them; and then the combined troops should advance along the Oise to Compiègne, where Drouet would join them with the infantry from Lille. Placed thus at the head of twelve or fifteen thousand men, they would exercise no small influence on the course of events, perhaps induce the whole army to join them, or at the very least, cut off the Bourbons' retreat, and deliver them (in every other respect safe and sound) into the hands of Napoleon, to do with them as he pleased.

The plan was to be put into execution immediately, with only the necessary delay of proceeding from Paris to Lisle, for it was now the beginning of March, Napoleon had landed on the 1st, and though his friends knew as little as the Government what direction he had taken, they considered it necessary to make a diversion in his favour as early as possible. The insurgents had always hoped that Marshal Davout would take the command of this army, as soon as it should be collected, and

thought that so great a name at the head of veteran troops, would decide those that still wavered to join the movement. But this plot had been so hastily got up, that the Marshal, either from repugnance to an enterprise that accorded so little with his ideas of discipline, or through fear of being compromised by giddy-headed young men, or perhaps dreading to anticipate Napoleon's orders, came to M. de Bassano, and told him that he was not to consider him as sharer in what he looked upon as a very flimsily concocted enterprise. The young generals greatly displeased, said they could do without him, and without further delay, set off to attempt without their illustrious chief, their long-projected adventure.

Whilst the enemies of the House of Bourbon were acting with all that activity and daring that was natural to them, the Bourbons themselves, perplexed by conflicting councils, hesitated which of the proposed plans to adopt, and confined themselves to some military preparations, which might have been of use could they count on the army. We have said how the Duke de Berry who was to have been sent to Franche-Comté, was afterwards kept near the King at Paris, and how Marshal Ney had been ordered to repair to Besançon alone. The Marshal, summoned by a telegraphic message, had experienced much pain on learning an event which again opened to Napoleon a path to the throne. Less guilty towards his former master by the faults he had actually committed, than by those of which he had groundlessly accused himself, he had no wish to fall again into his power; but to his honour it must be said, that with his military good sense he foresaw that the re-establishment of the Empire would give rise to a war against all Europe. It was therefore no less from patriotic than from personal feeling, that he experienced both fear and anger at Napoleon's return. Never accustomed to restrain the expression of his sentiments, he loudly proclaimed his opinion when he arrived at Paris. This was most agreeable to the Royalists, who overwhelmed him with attentions, and conducted him to the King, who received him in the most flattering manner, and to whom he promised to bring Napoleon, conquered and a prisoner. The courtiers even asserted that he said, *a prisoner in an iron cage*, an expression, which whether true or false, was only the thoughtless and pardonable phrase of a soldier little accustomed to choose his words. Marshal Ney left, giving the Court hopes, which on his part were sincerely uttered, more sincerely than received, for there was more confidence expressed in his fidelity than was really felt. Without acknowledging it even to themselves, the Royalists had a presentiment of that universal impulse that would soon lead all minds and hearts towards the man, whom

by their own fault they had made the representative of all the moral and material interests of the French Revolution.

The Count d'Artois, who had left on the night of the 5-6th of March, arrived on Wednesday, the 8th, at Lyons, where he found the inhabitants in a state of extraordinary excitement. We have already explained the moral position of this great city. A small but violent party of bigotted Royalists had completely alienated from the Bourbons the affections of the Lyonnais, who always considered themselves indebted to Napoleon for the exertions he had made to repair their misfortunes, and because he had opened the continent to their commerce. This ill feeling had been excited to the highest degree by the assassination of a patriot by a royalist, a crime that besides was left unpunished, and when it was announced that the column from Elba was approaching, the entire population, with the exception of a few rational-minded men, were transported with joy. When an account of the proceedings at Grenoble arrived, there was no doubt of what would happen at Lyons.

The royalists, irritated and terrified, declared that the Government did nothing, but here as elsewhere, they did not say what ought to be done. Count Roger de Damas, the Governor of the division, was not wanting either in good-will or courage, but he had not the command of a force on which he could count. The National Guard—the most faithful expression of popular opinion—was at the best lukewarm, with the exception of the cavalry, few in number, who as elsewhere were formed of the nobility of the locality. The troops in garrison, consisting of the 24th of the line, the 13th dragoons, stationed at Lyons, and the 20th of the line, that had arrived from Montbrison, made no secret of their feelings, and appeared ready to open their arms to Napoleon as soon as he would appear at the gates of the town. There was not a single piece of artillery. Marshal Soult had very strangely ordered that artillery should be sent for to Grenoble, that is, the very place which in all probability would be invaded by the time the orders arrived from Paris. Indeed this was no great loss, for men would be needed to work the guns, and the artillery were as little to be depended on as the infantry.

Such was the state of affairs at Lyons when the Count d'Artois arrived. He soon saw that the honourable but thoughtless zeal that had brought him thither could only tend to involve him in a disagreeable affair. He was very sorry for having come, not because of the personal risk he incurred, but because that his presence would make the almost certain loss of this large city still more important.

He exerted himself very much, and as was his wont, he talked

to and flattered everybody, but gained none but those who came into personal intercourse with him, whom he conciliated both by his goodness and amiability. He wanted money to distribute amongst the troops, and the treasury not being supplied in time, he received excuses instead of loans. The Duke d'Orléans arrived at Lyons twenty-four hours after the Count d'Artois, and they deliberated as to what was best to be done. The difficulty here was the very same as at Grenoble. To send the troops against Napoleon, would be to deliver them up to him, to order a retreat would be to abandon the city to him. The latter was the only alternative, for as in all probability Lyons would be in the enemy's power within two days, it would be better to retire with the troops, than to supply Napoleon with a reinforcement of some thousand men. The Duke d'Orléans endeavoured to convince the Count d'Artois, that the wisest course would be to retreat, but the latter disinclined to abandon so important a city as Lyons, wished to consult Marshal Macdonald, who was about to pass through the town on his way to Nîmes to join the Duke d'Angoulême. It was nine o'clock at night when the Marshal arrived, his carriage having broken down on the road. He was immediately conducted to the Count d'Artois, who was impatiently awaiting his arrival, and who desired him to remain with him as the road to Nîmes was intercepted. The Marshal manifested the most loyal disposition, but was by no means pleased by the situation of affairs. However, he did not consider it advisable to evacuate Lyons until forced by the course of events. He proposed to cut off the bridges of the Rhone if possible, or at least to barricade them; to review the troops, speak to them, and seek to influence them in favour of the royal cause; to choose some zealous royalists, who, dressed as soldiers should fire the first shots, and perhaps induce the others to oppose Napoleon. These proposals did not delude the Duke d'Orléans, but he made no objection, as this was no time to dispute about means when they had so few at their disposal. The Count d'Artois adopted the Marshal's plan for want of a better, and desired him to give the necessary orders, and then retired to take some repose whilst awaiting the following day. For it was, indeed, on the next day, the 10th, that according to calculation, Napoleon would present himself before the gates of Lyons.

Marshal Macdonald passed the night in ordering the cutting down, or barricading of the bridges, in bringing the boats from the left to the right bank of the Rhone, and in receiving the commanders of the different regiments, who from a principle of honour but not of affection, were ready to do their duty, though they were unanimous in the doubts they had conceived of the soldiers' sentiments. He also recommended them to

give the Count d'Artois a suitable reception, but as he was giving these directions, General Brayer, the commandant at Lyons arrived, and said it would be better that the Prince should not present himself to the troops, as it was doubtful what reception he might experience. The Marshal immediately hastened to the Prince, awoke him, and related this sad news, which did not surprise the Count d'Artois much, and they agreed that it would be better to commence the review without him, but that he could be sent for in case things assumed a more favourable aspect. Early in the morning, under heavy rain, the Marshal assembled the 20th and 24th regiments together with the 13th dragoons, who in the present state of disorder, had received no rations, which added ill-humour to their hostile feelings. He collected them in a circle around him, reminded them of the twenty years warfare during which he had served in their ranks, how loyally he had behaved at Fontainebleau, of the faults which had occasioned the misfortunes of France in 1814, and told them of the still greater misfortunes that threatened if they should give up the country to Napoleon, since they would be again opposed to all Europe, now more powerful, more united, and more irritated than ever. He spoke with sincerity and warmth, but without success. Wishing to bring his discourse to a conclusion, he seized his sword and cried in a loud voice, "*Vive le roi!*" Not a voice replied. A little disconcerted, he thought of trying what effect the Count d'Artois' presence would produce, feeling certain from the aspect of the troops that nothing disagreeable would occur. The Prince came and presented his amiable and attractive countenance to the troops, who received him respectfully but coldly. When he came before the 13th dragoons, the Marshal called an old sub-commissioned officer from the ranks, whose long services were attested by his grey hairs, and the cross displayed upon his breast. He spoke to him of his campaigns, and in the Prince's presence desired him to cry "*Vive le roi!*" The old soldier was stunned, but remained immovable and silent, and then saluting the Count d'Artois returned to his place without repeating the desired cry.

The Prince, deeply moved, turned pale but said nothing, and retired to his residence, leaving the Marshal on the ground, who, to make a last attempt, invited the officers to his house. They accompanied him to about the number of a hundred, and then without failing in the respect due to the experienced warrior to whom they spoke, they bitterly complained of the wrongs they had suffered. In order to calm them, the Marshal admitted their wrongs, promised that they should be redressed, but could produce no effect, even when he showed them in perspective the certainty of a fatal strife with all Europe. They were

seriously irritated against the household troops, and those they called the Chouans, they were offended at the disdain exhibited for the Legion of Honour, for even at this very moment Count Roger de Damas did not wear it, and though they were convinced that there would be a new struggle with Europe, they were determined to run the risk, and die to free France from the emigrants, Chouans, Austrians, English, all of whom were alike objects of their hatred.

Nothing was to be expected from minds so prejudiced. The Marshal went to the Count d'Artois, whom although he ran no greater personal risk than that of becoming Napoleon's prisoner, he advised to leave at once with the Duke d'Orléans. He determined to remain himself and make a last effort to induce the troops to fight, and take part with the Restoration against the Empire.

Having accompanied the Princes to their carriage, Marshal Macdonald returned to the bridges of the Rhone to see if his orders had been executed. The bridges had not been cut down, for the people would not allow it, nor had they been even barricaded. Of all those royalists who had done so much to alienate the Lyonese populace, not one had assumed the schako, or offered to fire the first shot. The Marshal had the bridges barricaded as well as he could, and ordered a trench to be opened in order to commence a kind of *tête de pont*. Whilst he himself was presiding at these works, a foot soldier, whose zeal he was trying to stimulate, said to him with great coolness, "Marshal, you are a brave man, and have passed your life in our ranks and not in those of the emigrants. You would do better by leading us to our Emperor, who would receive you with open arms." Neither argument nor punishment could influence men so disposed, and the Marshal waited with intense anxiety the approach of the enemy, who, he was told by some officers he had sent to reconnoitre, was near. It was three or four o'clock in the afternoon of Friday the 10th, and he was assured that Napoleon was not far from the Faubourg de la Guillotière.

Napoleon, whom we left going out of Grenoble at noon on the 9th, had lost no time, but hastened to join his troops who were proceeding towards Lyons. His progress from Grenoble to Lyons had all the appearance of a triumph, as the open carriage in which he travelled could proceed but slowly in consequence of the numbers of farmers, holders of national property, that surrounded it, all curious to behold this extraordinary man. On all sides were heard cries of "*Vive l'Empereur! à bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres!*" and he was frequently obliged to stop and receive the addresses of the mayors and make them suitable replies. He supped at Rives,

slept at Bourgoïn, and on the 10th continued his route towards Lyons, which he hoped to enter before the end of the day.

About four o'clock his advance guard, composed of the 4th hussars, appeared at the entrance of the Faubourg de la Guillotière, where a detachment of the 13th dragoons was posted to make observations. No sooner did these two bodies of cavalry come within sight of each other than they fraternized with the cry of "*Vive l'Empereur*;" they then traversed the Faubourg, where the people received them with the same cry. Soon both people and cavalry poured together towards the bridge of Guillotière. When Marshal Macdonald heard the tumult, he ordered two battalions to follow him, and directed his course towards the bridge, ordering his officers to draw their swords, in order to stimulate the soldiers and induce them to fire that first shot from which he expected the safety of the royal cause. Whilst he was executing this movement, the 4th hussars and 13th dragoons appeared in a mingled crowd exclaiming "*Vive l'Empereur*," which excited an irresistible movement amongst the infantry on the bridge. These responded with "*Vive l'Empereur*," and rushing on the batteries they had helped to raise, began pulling them down as fast as possible. The hussars and dragoons, assisted by the people, also set to work, and in a short time the passage was clear. At this spectacle, the Marshal thought only of escaping from the zeal of his soldiers, who wanted to conduct him to Napoleon and effect a reconciliation. Putting spurs to his horse, he set off at full gallop accompanied by General Digeon and his aides-de-camp. He passed through Lyons at full speed, closely followed by some horsemen, who, without intending any personal harm, were anxious to seize and make him join the imperial cause. But the Marshal, obstinate in the accomplishment of his duty, from a sense of honour and a consciousness of the real interests of France, wished to avoid a reconciliation, which Napoleon would have accompanied by the most brilliant marks of favour. He was followed for some leagues, and then as the soldiers said "*abandoned to his evil star*," that he was determined to follow.

A very different scene was at the same moment being enacted at the bridge of Guillotière. The bridge had been cleared as quickly as possible, and an immense crowd of citizens offended by the royalists, and of patriots stigmatized for the last six months as revolutionists, had hastened to meet Napoleon, and mingling with the soldiers saluted him Emperor. As for him, he calmly received their greetings like a master returning to his patrimonial domain, and replied by affectionate salutations to the enthusiastic cries that met him on every side.

He was to stop, not at an hotel as at Grenoble, but at the archiepiscopal palace, which was for him a family mansion. The civil, judicial, and military authorities hastened to present their felicitations and homages. To all he repeated what he had said at Grenoble, but now couched in terms less popular and more imperial. He told them that he was come to save the interests and principles of the Revolution endangered by the emigrants, to restore France to her former glory, but without war, which he hoped to avoid; that he would accept the treaties that had been signed with Europe, and would live at peace with her provided she did not interfere in the affairs of France, that times were changed, that we must content ourselves with being the most glorious of nations without seeking to rule all others; that both at home and abroad he would take into account the changes that had taken place, and would accord France all the liberty of which she was worthy and which she was fit to receive; that if extensive power was needed when he entertained vast projects of conquests, a wisely restricted prerogative would now suffice to rule over happy and pacific France; that he would be soon at Paris, where he would convoke the nation itself in order to modify the laws of the Empire, and adapt them to the new state of things.

This language was as successful at Lyons as it had been at Grenoble, and it seemed so impossible to hold other opinions that nobody thought of asking whether Napoleon were sincere. When the receptions and harangues were ended, his first care, as at Grenoble, was to hurry towards Paris without losing an hour. He resolved to do as before, that is to keep the troops that had accompanied him near his person, that they might enjoy some repose, and send forward those that had joined him, and who had not yet experienced any fatigue. He intended to follow with those he had brought from Grenoble, who after one day's rest would be ready for the road. By the addition of the garrison of Lyons he would have twelve thousand men, and a park of artillery that would be completed in passing through Auxonne. It was doubtful whether the Bourbons would have time to assemble an equal force, and still more doubtful whether they could induce the men to fight. However, Napoleon could not send on to Paris the Brayer division which had given up Lyons to him, without seeing and addressing the men. He ordered a review of the National Guard and the troops for the following day. The next day, 11th March, he reviewed the soldiers from Elba, Grenoble, Lyons, and the Lyonnaise National Guard, on the Place Bellecour, which he had rebuilt. The hope alas, chimerical! of seeing at the head of the government a great man devoted to the Revolution, who, from reason as well as from necessity, was ready to accept the

principles of legitimate liberty, and who consequently combined the threefold advantage of genius, glory, and popular birth, and that without war or despotism; this hope seduced all imaginations, and won back to Napoleon the hearts of the Lyon-nais which he had lost by his errors of the last three years.

He rode along the front of the Brayer division, thanked the men in a dignified manner, like a general who knows how to address his soldiers, and bid them set out immediately and win him new regiments and new cities.

When he returned to the palace, he immediately occupied himself with the cares of the administration, whose scattered threads he sought at every step to gather up. The young Fleury de Chaboulon, now on his return from Naples, came to throw himself at his feet, intoxicated with joy at seeing him safe after having incurred so many dangers by land and sea. Napoleon received him most graciously, and immediately gave him a place in his Cabinet. He next thought of choosing a Prefect for Lyons. As has been seen, he was displeased at Grenoble by the sudden departure of M. Fourier. He was, however, soon calmed by his explanations, and told him to join him at Lyons, whither M. Fourier came, as incapable of resisting a rising as of betraying a falling power. Napoleon received him with cordiality, and considering it both suitable and piquant to appoint to the Prefecture of Lyons the very Prefect who had sought to prevent his entrance into Grenoble, he gave him the Prefecture of the Rhône, which M. Fourier accepted without hesitation.

Napoleon proceeded to more serious acts of Legislation. Since his arrival at Lyons he considered himself as already in possession of sovereign authority, and he resolved to use it in such a manner as to strike terror into those powers that were opposed to him. He pronounced the dissolution of the two Chambers of Louis XVIII, alleging against them such reasons as were most likely to render them unpopular. He said the Chamber of Peers was composed of old Senators of the Empire, who had come to terms with a victorious enemy, and of emigrants who had returned in the train of foreigners. As to the Chamber of Deputies, he said that the term for which the members, or at least of two thirds of them, had been elected, had expired, that the members had communicated with the enemy, and by a scandalous and anti-national vote had expended under pretext of paying the King's debts, a sum of thirty million francs, destined to pay the expenses of twenty years of civil warfare.

Though he uttered these fulminating denunciations against the two Legislative Chambers, he took care not to renew the idea of that gigantic despotism that for fifteen years had sought

to exist alone, and alone decide the destiny of France. The royal chambers being denounced, Napoleon prepared the way for the formation of the Chambers of the Empire. He ordered that the entire electoral body should assemble within two months at Paris in the Champ de Mai, to assist at the coronation of the Empress and the King of Rome, and to make such changes in the Imperial laws as would be consistent with the state of public opinion, and the demands of a well regulated freedom. This was an indirect announcement, though not an actual promise of the speedy arrival of Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, and an intimation that the new institutions were to originate with the people themselves, and that he assumed the national sovereignty as the base of Imperial power, and did not like, the Bourbons, appeal to divine right.

Napoleon did not confine himself to attacking the great Legislative bodies of the Bourbon government, and to announcing the approaching formation of his own; he also sought by some other measures to gain the assistance of the principal functionaries. The Bourbons had announced the reconstitution of the magistracy, but by deferring it had kept the magistrates in a state of continual anxiety. Napoleon declared all dismissals and appointments made since the April of 1814 to be null, and ordered the old Imperial magistrates to resume their functions. Thus was the entire magistracy gained by a stroke of his pen. He made no arrangement concerning the Prefects and the Sub-prefects, who were almost all imperialists who had retained office under the Restoration, and about whom it would be impossible to legislate at a distance, besides that the greater number would probably join him as soon as they should have an opportunity of making a choice. To these politically justifiable measures he added others less excusable, some meant to satisfy the army and revolutionary party, others to win over or restrain certain powerful enemies who were to be intimidated but not directly attacked. He decreed that all emigrants, who, without permission, had returned before 1814, should be obliged to evacuate the country immediately, and that such as had obtained military rank should quit the army. This measure, though rigorous, was inevitable, for without it the soldiers would have expelled with violence the emigrant officers that had been forced upon them; but this measure was surpassed in severity by another, which could not be excused on the plea of necessity, and which from the rank of those attacked would be certain to produce a bad effect. Napoleon was highly displeased with M.M. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles, Marmont, Augereau, &c., some of whom had invited the enemy into France, and others treated with them.

He drew up a decree by which he commanded the future trial and present sequestration of property of M.M. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles, and M. Lynch, Mayor of Bordeaux, together with Marshals Marmont and Augereau, asserting that all of them had connived with the invaders of the country. As the greater number of these was absent, and the others would soon leave, this decree could only affect their properties, and might be annulled should these personages join Napoleon's party. But still it was an act of violent reaction in Napoleon, which contrasted forcibly with the clemency promised in his proclamations, and which might be more injurious to his cause by exciting alarm, than to those who being absent were threatened, but were beyond reach of personal harm. These, in some sort military decrees, were to be countersigned by the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, in his quality of Major-General. But his generous nature revolted from such acts, and he made strong objections. He asserted that such a measure would be enough to destroy all confidence in Napoleon's promises, and would give his enemies an opportunity of saying that he returned to France inflamed with resentment, and as rooted as ever in his despotic habits. Napoleon told the Grand-Marshal that he understood nothing of diplomacy, that clemency would be unavailing unless accompanied by a dose of severity, especially towards dangerous, and some of them implacable enemies; that in reality he had no idea of acting with rigour, as he had proved by appointing M. Fourier, who had so loudly declared himself against him, to the Prefecture of Lyons; that besides it was necessary to act differently towards those who had yielded to circumstances, and those who had treated with the enemy, while honest Frenchmen were shedding their blood upon the frontier; that this appearance of severity would be most agreeable to his party in France, and besides he repeated that he only wished to intimidate and not to punish, that he was ready to receive with open arms all those that were willing to return to him. However, Napoleon allowed himself to be influenced by the Grand-Marshal, who said that he ought not to close the road to an accommodation, and that threats would rather repel than attract the men in question. The execution of the measure was therefore adjourned, but not abandoned.

Before quitting Lyons, Napoleon wrote again to Maria Louisa, informing her how far he had advanced and that he would make his triumphal entry into Paris on the 20th of March, the anniversary of the King of Rome's birth, and ended by requesting her to return to France. He sent this letter to his brother Joseph, who was in the canton of Vaud, with directions to have it sent to Vienna to Maria Louisa, informing him at the same

time of his immense success, and desiring him to declare officially to all foreign ministers residing in Switzerland, that he was determined to preserve peace according to the conditions of the treaty of Paris.

Having arranged everything, he determined to leave Lyons on the morning of the 13th of March, having remained there but two days, that is, only the time absolutely necessary for assembling the troops that arrived successively from Grenoble, giving them one day's rest, and then sending them on to join the Brayer division, which had left Lyons on the 11th. He determined to choose of the two roads that led from Lyons to Paris, the one that passed through Burgundy, and which the feeling of the people made safer than that through Bourbonnais.

Everything seemed to promise Napoleon as prompt and complete a success for the remainder of his journey, as he had met with from La Mure to Lyons. There was, however, great excitement both in his flank and rear. The Marseillais were greatly irritated when they heard of his landing. They saw in imagination their port again closed, and their misery assured for years to come, and all eagerly asked to be led in pursuit of him, whom they called the *brigand of Elba*. Marshal Masséna destined, despite his glory, to suffer from the injustice of the two dynasties, had no more reason to be grateful to Napoleon than to Louis XVIII. Weary of everything but repose, he judged the present state of affairs from the elevation of his rare good sense and sincere patriotism. Sincerely attached to the Revolution, but dreading a fresh struggle with Europe; he saw in Louis XVIII the personification of counter-revolution, and in Napoleon that of war, for neither of which did he feel inclined. These opinions made him feel rather pain than pleasure in the present attempt of his old Emperor, and he was determined to confine himself to the strict performance of his military duty. Yielding to the wishes of the Marseillais he had allowed twelve or fifteen hundred to leave, escorted by two regiments of infantry, who had their tricoloured cockades concealed in their knapsacks. This column proceeded towards Grenoble, in order to attack Napoleon in the rear, but certainly could not do him much injury, being more than a hundred leagues distant from him. Masséna had also taken precautions for the defence of Toulon, fearing that amid the conflict of parties, this important town might fall into the hands of the English, and he kept some forces at Marseilles, that he might not be at the mercy of a furious populace.

Some troops of the line began to assemble at Nîmes, and were to be commanded by the Duke d'Angoulême. But these preparations, though made in Napoleon's rear, were not by

reason of the distance much to be feared. Marshal Ney, who had been sent to Franche-Comté, was more to be dreaded, as he was to advance through Besançon and Lons-le-Saulnier on Napoleon's flank. He might overtake the imperial army, but could not assemble more than six thousand men, who would fight unwillingly, if at all, against Napoleon's twelve or fifteen thousand, filled with enthusiasm, and determined to march over the bodies of all that should oppose them. This latter danger was not therefore of a nature to cause much alarm, but a collision would be most disagreeable to Napoleon, who hoped to get to Paris without shedding blood. He therefore avoided a meeting, but was determined not to write either to Ney or the other Marshals, preferring to owe everything to the soldiers, to whom he had no objection to be under an obligation, but he would not owe anything to their commanders, with whom he was not pleased at the time of his fall, and from whom he would not accept conditions. The Grand-Marshal Bertrand did not follow this example. He wrote to Ney, describing the triumphal march from Cannes to Lyons, and predicting a continuation of the same success to Paris. He wrote thus, to make him feel the importance of the resolution he was about to take, and its danger to himself and inutility to the Bourbons should it be contrary to the imperial cause.

He sent some old non-commissioned officers of Elba to communicate with Ney's soldiers, and inflame them with the same ardour as the others. It was also very probable that they would have passed beyond Maçon and Châlons, the only places where they could be attacked on the flank, when Ney would be in a position to act. Napoleon left Lyons on the morning of the 13th, announcing publicly that he would be in Paris on the 20th. It seemed, indeed, likely that the rapidity of his eagle *flying from steeple to steeple*, as he expressed it, would be as great from Lyons to Paris, as it had been from Cannes to Lyons.

As Napoleon approached Burgundy he met populations inflamed in the highest degree with these sentiments, which had assured his triumph in the commencement of his expeditions. The country about the Saône had prospered greatly under the Empire, because that at that period fluvial communication had replaced maritime, and the Saône had become the medium of continental commerce. Independantly of this circumstance, the presence of the enemy, so feebly combatted by Augereau in 1814 had greatly exasperated the inhabitants, who like all those along the frontier, were very patriotic. The imprudence of the nobility and clergy had done the rest, and Franche-Comté and Burgundy were as well disposed as Dauphiné to open their arms to Napoleon. The cities of Maçon and Châlons,

in particular, were greatly excited when they heard of the proceedings at Lyons and Grenoble. Napoleon stopped for some minutes at Villefranche, and then proceeded through enthusiastic crowds to Maçon, where he was to pass the night. When the inhabitants heard of his approach, they assumed the functions of the magistracy, and effected the revolution themselves. So great was the excitement, that Napoleon's mere approach was sufficient to effect now, what his presence would have been needed to accomplish but a few days before. He was received with unheard-of enthusiasm at Maçon, the people hurrying along pêle-mêle, with the soldiers who either abandoned their commanders or forced them to do as they did. "*A bas les nobles ! à bas les prêtres ! à bas les Bourbons !*" such were the cries of this multitude of mingled peasants, soldiers, and sailors, all inflamed with the national and revolutionary sentiments which the Bourbons had so unwisely shocked.

Napoleon gave audience to the municipal authorities, and conversed familiarly with such of the inhabitants as addressed him ; told them why he had left Elba, in almost the same words he had used at Lyons and Grenoble, spoke to them of peace, and liberty, and charmed them by that friendliness of manner which he could so well summon to his aid whenever he wished to give himself the trouble. He asked one of the municipal officers how it had happened, that while the feelings and courage of Châlons and Maçon were the same, the former had defended itself so well, and the latter so ill against the Austrians ? "It was your fault," bluntly replied the Maconnais, "you gave us bad magistrates, and left us without arms or leaders, and our hands alone were useless." The Emperor smiled and said, "That proves, friend, that we have all erred, but we must not do so again. For the future we shall only trust in true patriots ; we will not go to seek strife with foreigners, but if they come to us, we shall receive them in such a manner as to deprive them of all desire of coming again."

Having exchanged some words with these good people, he took some repose, intending to continue his route to Châlons next day.

Napoleon was now approaching the second decisive event of his expedition—his meeting with Marshal Ney. He did not exactly dread it, for he had already been joined by twelve or fifteen thousand men, that is, by more than half the troops that the Bourbons had stationed in the east of France. From the accounts that had reached Napoleon, the Marshal could not have more than six thousand soldiers, and those probably ill-disposed, and surrounded by a population devoted to the Empire and the Revolution. It was impossible, notwithstanding, to foresee what the *obstinate-headed* Marshal, as

was generally said, might do, and Napoleon would have deeply regretted a collision, of whose success there could be no doubt, but which would have lessened the *prestige* of the pacific conquest of France, effected without bloodshed. Marshal Bertrand, as we have said, had written to Marshal Ney, hoping to induce him to reflect seriously. Napoleon had contented himself with sending him orders, as though he had never withdrawn from his command. He ordered him to proceed with his troops to Autun and Auxerre, where he expected to meet him. Besides he was very near the Marshal, who it was said was at Lons-le-Saulnier, and if some prudent men felt anxious, the people considered Ney and his soldiers as completely won as those that Napoleon had already met between La Mure and Maçon.

The moment was in fact approaching, when one of the most extraordinary scenes of our long and wondrous Revolution was about to be accomplished. Marshal Ney, ignorant of the proceedings of Generals Lallemand, and Lefebure-Desnoëttes, long on bad terms with Marshal Davout, believing that Napoleon regarded him with animosity on account of his conduct at Fontainebleau, and being consequently wholly unconnected with the Bonapartists, felt all his resentment against the Bourbons vanish when he heard of the disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan, which with his simple good sense he considered as the precursor of a foreign and perhaps of a civil war. He had, consequently, promised Louis XVIII that he would oppose Napoleon's progress by every means in his power.

When he arrived at Besançon, he did all that the circumstances required with zeal, intelligence, and resolution. Either through the fault of the War Department, or the effect of existing difficulties, scarcely anything necessary for the organization of a *corps d'armée* was prepared. He did everything in his power, at the same time that he complained to the minister with his usual bluntness. Finding the royalists dejected, and no longer supported by that arrogance which had been so injurious to the Bourbon cause, he was indignant with them, but soon revived their energy by the vivacity that revealed itself in his looks, his words, and every motion of his heroic person. The royalists of the locality without participating in the confidence he felt, were charmed by his sentiments, and the attitude he assumed.

Having ordered that some pieces of artillery should be mounted and cartridges prepared, he determined in order to supply the difficulty in *matériel*, to divide his troops into two divisions under two generals in whom he could confide. He had five regiments of infantry under his command, the 15th

light infantry at Saint-Amour, the 81st of the line at Poligny, the 76th at Bourg, the 60th and 77th already assembled at Lons-le-Saulnier, and three cavalry regiments; the 5th dragoons stationed at Lons-le-Saulnier, the 8th chasseurs on their way to the same place, and the 6th hussars, sent on to Auxerre to protect the artillery dépôt. He had also been promised the 4th of the line, and the 6th light infantry, but these could not arrive before a lapse of ten days. He had chosen Generals Bourmont and Lecourbe to command his two divisions. General Bourmont, commandant at Beaucou, was at hand. An old Chouan leader, he should of necessity be agreeable to the royalists, and could not be disliked by the troops, who remembered his distinguished services under the Empire. He combined in his person all that was required, and could not refuse service when the cause of the Bourbons was in question. This was not the case with General Lecourbe. This officer, the most distinguished of his time in mountain warfare, was an old republican, disgraced by Napoleon and living in retirement on his estates as unnoticed by the Bourbons as he had been by the Emperor. Ney sent for him, and found him free from all ill-feeling towards Napoleon, but alarmed lest his return should cause a foreign and a civil war; he reminded him of their former companionship in arms on the Rhine, of their mutual aversion to the imperial despotism; he told him of all the evils that Napoleon's ambition had caused France, and succeeded in inducing him to accept the command of one of the two divisions that the royalists were trying to form in Franche-Comté.

These arrangements being finished, and his artillery harnessed in haste, the Marshal set out for Lons-le-Saulnier, with Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont. He arrived in that town on the morning of the 12th of March, and found there the 60th and 77th regiments of the line, together with the 5th dragoons. The 8th chasseurs were expected. He had a choice of two alternatives. He could throw his troops into Lyons, if there were still time, to prevent Napoleon's entrance into that city, or he could make a movement to the right, advance to the Saône, and take possession of the route that led to Paris through Burgundy.

Scarcely had Ney entered Lons-le-Saulnier, when he learned that Lyons was evacuated, and he began to comprehend the immense agitation produced in the country by Napoleon's approach. The troops said nothing, but spite of their silence, the intensity of their emotion was discernible in their eyes. The restless and inquisitive population, seeking for news, and hoping to hear what was favourable to Napoleon, took no trouble to conceal their sentiments. The clergy had taken

refuge in the churches. The nobility, in distraction of mind, flocked round the Marshal, hoping he would restore the feeling of confidence they had lost. The Count de Grivel, an old soldier, inspector of the National Guard, and a devoted royalist, had come to offer his services in support of the royal cause, so imminently imperilled.

Marshal Ney was fully conscious of the difficulties of the position in which he had placed himself, but the more he felt himself inclined to yield to the influences that prevailed around him, the more resolutely did he resist the inclination. When the royalists spoke to him of the dangerous position of affairs, he said he was quite aware of it, that it was no slight undertaking to resist Napoleon, but that it was necessary to call up courage equal to the occasion. He added that he did not wish for the company of *tremblers*, that those who were afraid were at liberty to retire, for were he left alone he would resist; he would take a musket, fire the first shot, and force his soldiers to fight. The terrified royalists pressed his hand on hearing him speak in this fashion, uttered words of gratitude, even of admiration, but did not express great hopes of success, for indeed they entertained very little.

Some hours after his arrival, Marshal Ney reviewed his regiments. The 60th and 77th of the line deployed before him, with the 5th dragoons, and 8th chasseurs that had joined. After having carefully inspected his troops, he assembled the officers, and spoke to them with great warmth and determination. He reminded them that he had accompanied Napoleon to Maçon and to Fontainebleau, that he had consequently served him to the last moment, but that after Napoleon's abdication, he had, like them, taken an oath to the Bourbons, and intended to keep it. He represented to them that the re-establishment of the Empire would inevitably involve France in a deluge of woes, that it would draw upon her the anger of all Europe, and occasion the recommencement of a disastrous struggle; that every honest Frenchman ought to oppose such an event, that for his part he was decided to do so, without, however, wishing to constrain any person, and if there were amongst those who heard him, any, whose affections were opposed to their duty, they had only to declare their sentiments, and he would send them home, without exposing them to any other inconvenience than that of quitting the ranks, but that he did not intend to keep with him any but trustworthy men, determined to do their duty.

Notwithstanding the ascendancy that he in general exerted over the troops, the Marshal's address was followed by a glacial silence, which proved that if he wished to retain only those who shared his opinions, he would be obliged to send home nearly

all his officers. No sooner was the meeting broken up, than the aides-de-camp of the Marshal heard angry remarks on every side. "Where was the necessity," murmured the greater number of the officers, "for what the Marshal said to us? Does he not know our opinions? Ought he not to think as we do? We are in the ranks, we shall await there in good order, whatever fate shall determine. Let him wait as we shall do, he may allow the royalists that surround him to indulge their frenzy, but he ought not to give utterance to opinions that do not become him."

These remarks, when repeated to the Marshal, displeased him less than the dispirited language of the royalists. "Let them go," he said with a kind of nervous irritation, "let them go if they are afraid, let them leave me alone, and I will take a musket from the hands of a soldier and fire the first shot."

The more powerfully the general impression invaded his strong heart, the more resolutely did he defend himself, and by this interior struggle he touched the feelings of the more clear-sighted royalists, without encouraging them; but he afflicted the Bonapartists, who grieved to see him becoming entangled in a labyrinth from which he could never issue. Several officers belonging to the Count d'Artois, amongst the rest the Duke de Maillé, had joined Marshal Ney. He complained bitterly to them that Lyons had been so easily evacuated, he begged the Count d'Artois not to retreat further but to make a movement to the left, and so reach the Saône, whilst he, by a movement to the right, would join him, and he maintained that by combining their forces they would possibly succeed in arresting the enemy's progress. He promised, and with perfect sincerity, to take the initiative in the combat, and added that as soon as his artillery arrived, which would be probably the next day, he would advance on Maçon or Chalons to meet the Count d'Artois. The unhappy man did not know that it was not the Count d'Artois who had returned to Paris, but Napoleon himself who would be at the Saône.

The next day, the 13th, whilst Napoleon was advancing towards Maçon, the aspect of affairs became very sombre. Every moment, intelligence arrived that revolts had broken out, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, so that the royalist forces were as it were enveloped on every side. The Prefect of Ain arrived about the middle of the day, pursued by the inhabitants of Bourg, who had just revolted. The 76th, who occupied this city, had joined the inhabitants, and unfurled the tricolour flag. Nearer still, at Saint-Amour, the 15th light infantry threatened to do the like. About ten in the evening, an officer from Maçon brought intelligence that the city of Maçon had risen, and expelled the royalist authori-

ties. At midnight, a despatch from the Mayor of Chalons announced that a battalion of the 76th, employed to escort the artillery that the Marshal was so impatiently expecting, had revolted and gone off with the artillery to Napoleon. An hour after, an officer who had travelled by the Burgundy route related that the 6th hussars, commanded by the Prince de Carignan, had set off in full gallop for Dijon, for the purpose of raising that city, and an hour later a despatch from General Heudelet, announced that this city, the capital of Burgundy, yielding to the impulse communicated by neighbouring towns, had just proclaimed the re-establishment of the Empire.

These diverse messages, reaching the Marshal in succession during this fatal night, were to him like so many poignard stabs. Unable to resume a sleep that had been interrupted by so many violent shocks, he rose and walked distractedly about, expecting every moment still more terrible intelligence. He knew that some of the Elba soldiers had come from Lyons, and mingled with his troops, endeavouring to imbue them with the spirit of insurrection.

He was in this state of agitation, when about the middle of the night, two merchants who had left Lyons in the afternoon were brought into his presence; what they related made a profound impression on him. They told with what facility the revolution in favour of the Empire had been affected at Lyons, and that there were good reasons to believe that a similar revolution had taken place at Paris. They added something about the uselessness of shedding blood in opposing such a movement. At the same moment, the officers despatched with Marshal Bertrand's letter arrived. They were personally known to Marshal Ney, and empowered to add verbal explanations to the letter they brought. These officers, mingling falsehood with truth, and repeating what they had heard amongst Napoleon's followers, made a fatal commentary on the words of Marshal Bertrand. They declared that everything had been long previously concerted between Paris, the Isle of Elba and Vienna; that at Paris, a vast conspiracy, comprising the entire army, and even the War Minister, had already overthrown, or was about to overthrow the Bourbons; that Napoleon, who was the focus of this plot, was in correspondence with his father-in-law, that Kohler, the Austrian general, had made arrangements with him at Porto-Ferrajo, that the English vessels even had withdrawn to allow the imperial flotilla to pass, that the European powers, tired of the Bourbons, had resolved to accept Napoleon if he promised to preserve peace and observe the treaty of the 30th of May, which he had, in fact, solemnly promised to do; that thus everything had been previously arranged, that it would be a folly to resist a revolution, so deeply planned

between the highest potentates, and whose most alarming consequences had been foreseen and prepared for.

The reader can judge, from what we have narrated, how much truth there was in these assertions. They furnish another proof of the plausible falsehoods which, during a political crisis, may be constructed on a slight basis of facts, and a few remarks imperfectly examined and foolishly interpreted. In fact, Napoleon had allowed those about him to believe, though he did not assert it, that he was in correspondence with Austria. M. Fleury de Chaboulon had related to the officers of the staff, some of the lightly-laid plots of Generals Lefebure-Desnoëttes, and Lallemand, who as we have seen, had had no communication with the Isle of Elba, and with these slight materials, the tissue of falsehood narrated to Marshal Ney had been composed. "Now," said Ney, "I understand the meaning of Bertrand's words, when he says that measures are taken with infallible certainty, and so I was sent alone to fight against a revolution that was wished for by France and even by Europe." Reckoning from this moment, the Marshal looked upon himself as a dupe, the victim of his own ignorance, sacrificed to sustain a cause already lost, and which did not leave him in a position even to attempt to combat, for his soldiers would not fight, and even could he induce a few to do so, it would be only a useless shedding of blood, for which he would have to give a serious account to Napoleon and to France. The idea of advancing almost without soldiers to encounter his former companions in arms in order to defend a court that had inflicted more than one humiliation upon him and his wife, and to avert calamities in which the Marshal no longer believed, for Napoleon appeared to be in correspondence with the principal European powers, such a project seemed to him extravagant and one that ought to be abandoned.

But what was to be done, after having pledged himself so deeply, after having promised to fight *à outrance* against Napoleon! The unfortunate Marshal was sorely perplexed. The Bonapartists endeavoured to persuade him that there was but one safe mode of acting, which was to act openly, declaring for example, in a proclamation to his troops, that France having formally declared for Napoleon, he, the faithful servant of France, did not wish to provoke a civil war, in defence of a dynasty, antagonistic to the glory of France, and irrevocably condemned by its errors. A proclamation to this effect was drawn up, which Ney appeared disposed to publish, and perhaps read in person to his soldiers. If, in the present time, after forty years experience of liberty, interrupted indeed, but not forgotten, after having adopted certain principles, professed them openly and identified himself with them, if any man,

whether civilian or soldier, had under such circumstances, been asked so abruptly to change his party, he would express considerable astonishment and look upon such a proposition as an insult. But the education of public men in France was at that time based upon the doubtful morality of revolutions and despotism, and seeing the government pass so rapidly from the hands of one party to those of another, they had no idea of following a steady line of conduct unmoved by the fluctuating character of the times; and it soon happened that politicians, who in general are more cautious in their proceedings than military men, showed themselves quite as unscrupulous. The Marshal, whose principles were those of the times in which he lived, was besides of a fiery and irritable temperament that never allowed him to adopt a middle course. Having abruptly joined the Bourbons in 1814, because he was tired of war, and as abruptly alienated himself from them, when he became discontented with the Court, he as suddenly returned to them when he learned the disembarkation at Cannes, which had renewed in his mind the images of civil and foreign war, and he expressed his intention to resist Napoleon, with characteristic violence of language. And now seeing the probability of a civil war disappear in the affection exhibited by the soldiers for Napoleon, and that of a foreign war in the pretended concert with Europe, he did not think that he ought to desire other than what France desired, and he changed without scruple, with the mobility of a child; for a man governed by his impressions, is always a child. Another, on discovering that he had been deceived, would have stepped aside and allowed the train to pass, whose approach he had not foreseen. But the Marshal, influenced by personal interest as well as by temperament, had no idea of sheathing his sword because he had committed a political error in not foreseeing Napoleon's triumph. Yielding besides to some of his secret causes of ill-feeling, he said within his own breast, that if Napoleon entailed upon France neither a civil nor a foreign war, he was much better than the Bourbons, and that in getting rid of the Bourbons, France would get rid of their prejudices, their arrogance, and their counter-revolutionary tendencies. Before taking an ultimate resolution, he wished to consult Generals de Bourmont and Lecourbe, his two generals of division. One was, as we have said, an old royalist, the other, an old republican. Both were sensible men, strongly opposed to Napoleon, but they saw clearly how irresistible was the movement that was being accomplished around them. General Bourmont, gentle and astute, though an energetic soldier, kept a mournful silence, as if in acknowledgment of the irresistible force of circumstances, but did not recommend any line of conduct, leaving the Marshal to take care of his own

dignity. Lecourbe, who had not lost the frankness of an old officer of the army of the Rhine, said to Ney: "You abandon all thoughts of resistance, and I think you are right. It would be useless on our part to attempt to oppose this torrent. But you would have done better had you followed my advice and not mixed yourself in this affair, and left me to till my fields."

With the exception of these few unpolished remarks, Ney met with no opposition, and suddenly determined that, as he could not resist the torrent, he would go with the current. Without further delay, he called his aides-de-camp, who were not aware of his design, and ordered them to assemble the troops in the principal square of the city. He then advanced in front of the soldiers, surrounded by his staff, amongst whom were several royalist officers, whom he had frequently reproached for their want of zeal. He drew his sword in a convulsive manner, and amid an anxious silence, read the celebrated proclamation that had been drawn up for him, and which cost him his life. "Soldiers," he said, "the cause of the Bourbons is lost for ever. The legitimate dynasty that France has adopted, is about to re-ascend the throne. It is the Emperor Napoleon, our Sovereign, who is henceforth to reign over our glorious country!" At these words, which occasioned unspeakable surprise to those by whom he was surrounded, frantic expressions of joy, loud as a peal of thunder, burst from the ranks of the soldiers. Hoisting their schakos on the end of their muskets, they uttered cries of *Vive l'Empereur, vive le Maréchal Ney!* then breaking from the ranks, they rushed towards the Marshal, and some kissing his hands, others the skirts of his coat, they thanked him after their fashion, for having gratified their fondest wishes. Those who could not get near the Marshal, surrounded the aides-de-camp, who were rather embarrassed at receiving a homage that they did not deserve, for they had had no part in the sudden change the Marshal's opinions had undergone. The soldiers thronging round them, pressed their hands, and said, "You are honest fellows, we always reckoned on you and the Marshal, and we were very sure that you would not remain long with the emigrants." The inhabitants, not less demonstrative in the expression of their feelings, had joined the soldiers, and Ney returned to his house, escorted by a noisy and joyous multitude.

However, on returning to his residence, the Marshal found an expression of embarrassment, and even of disapprobation on the countenances of several of his aides-de-camp. One of them, an old emigrant, broke his sword, saying, "Marshal, you ought to have let us know what was about to occur, and not made us witnesses of such a scene." "And what would you have me do?" replied the Marshal, "can I stop the in-coming ocean with

my hands?" Others, whilst they admitted the impossibility of making the soldiers fight against Napoleon, regretted that the Marshal had thought proper, within so short an interval, to play two parts so diametrically opposite. "You are babies," replied the Marshal, "I was obliged to choose either one party or the other. Could I hide like a coward, shunning the responsibility of events? Marshal Ney cannot sink into obscurity. Besides, there is only one means of diminishing the evil, which is to take a decided part at once, in order to avert civil war, and get a hold upon the man who is about to become again our ruler, and prevent his committing new follies, for," he added, "I do not pretend to give myself to a man, but to France, and should this man wish to lead us again to the Vistula, I shall not accompany him."

After having thus roughly replied to those who condemned his conduct, Ney received at dinner, besides his generals, all the commanding-officers, with the exception of one who refused to go. Notwithstanding a slight feeling of restraint, induced by the consciousness of an infraction of military duty, the entire time of the repast was occupied in a long recapitulation of the errors committed by the Bourbons, who without wishing, or in wishing it—each judged according to his own fashion—had given himself up to emigration, to foreigners, and had enunciated anti-national sentiments. There was also a unanimous protestation against the former faults of the Emperor, against his mad passion for war, his despotism, and his refusal to listen to the representations of his generals in 1812 and 1813; in short, there was manifested a determined resolution to tell him the truth, and to require on his part guarantees for liberty and sound policy. "I am going to see him," said Ney, "I am about to speak with him, and I shall declare to him that we will not allow ourselves to be led again to Moscow. It is not to him that I give myself, it is to France, and if we join him, it is because we regard him as the representative of our glory, but we do not wish a restoration of the imperial régime."

Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont, who were at the dinner, took little part in the conversation, but admitted that the revolution that had just taken place was inevitable, and in a great measure induced by the errors of the Bourbons.

The Marshal quitted his guests for the purpose of executing the orders he had received from Lyons, written, as we have said, as if Napoleon had never ceased to reign, and directing him to bring his troops to Autun and Auxonne. He wrote a letter to his wife, in which he related what he had done, and finished with these characteristic words: "*My dear, you shall not again have reason to weep on leaving the Tuileries.*"*

* I have learned these details from an old artillery colonel of the Imperial

Marshal Ney's determination to join the Emperor, removed all doubt as to the success of the extraordinary enterprise of conquering France by his personal influence alone, which Napoleon had commenced at La Mure, and almost accomplished at Grenoble. Napoleon passed the night of the 14th at Chalons, and continued his route through Autun and Avallon, marching at pretty much the same pace as his troops, whom he sometimes followed, or sometimes outstripped, according to the position of any respectable house where he chose to pass the night. Journeying in this way, he arrived on the 17th at Auxerre, surrounded by the people of Burgundy, who in concert with the troops, rose to proclaim the re-establishment of the Empire. Napoleon repeated everywhere what he had said at Lyons, declaring that he brought peace, liberty, and the definite triumph of the principles of '89. M. Gamol, brother-in-law of Marshal Ney, came to Vermanton to meet him. Napoleon received him in a friendly manner, and took up his abode at the Prefecture, where he began to make preparations for his last march, that which was to conduct him to Paris.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing to Paris, M. Lainé, stimulated by events, had not ceased to make the most honourable efforts to reconcile the reigning dynasty with the constitutional opposition. As the members of the Chamber of Deputies continued to arrive at Paris, he prayed them to forget past errors, and to seek even in these errors an opportunity of doing good, by requiring reparation, which he said the Government was disposed to grant, such as modifying the ministry, increasing the number of peers, renewing two thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, all which changes were to be effected upon liberal principles. An electoral law was also contemplated, which recognising the influence of property, would also recognise the influence of the liberal and industrial professions, and a law upon ministerial responsibility—a guarantee to which much importance was at that time attached—a new legislative act touching the press, and lastly a tariff that would protect French manufactures against British competition. To the promises he enumerated, M. Lainé added, but with good intentions, an officious lie. He said the Government was reflecting on these concessions, and even preparing to make them the work of the session when the *genius of evil* put his foot again on the soil of France. But M. Lainé did not confine his rational observations to private conversations, he conducted the Deputies who arrived at Paris to the foot of

guard, a member of several of our public assemblies, and a sincere royalist; he was a man of good understanding, perfectly trustworthy, and had seen his letter in the hands of Madame Ney.

the throne, and repeated in the presence of the King that it was necessary to acknowledge and forget past errors, and repair them by a combination of measures, conformable to the necessities of the times and the wishes of the nation.

The leaders of the constitutional party, as well as those who were members of the Chambers as those who were not, and amongst the latter MM. de Lafayette and Benjamin Constant, gave their warmest support to M. Lainé, and publicly advocated his conciliatory principles. So far things were going on very well, but it was necessary that the Court should adopt these ideas, and M. Lainé insisted that the Government should put a hand to the work and commence at the commencement, that is to say by changing three or four of the Ministers. Of the necessity of this measure he had convinced M. Montesquieu, who had offered himself as a sacrifice, but he was the only convert M. Lainé made. The Court, whose royalist fervour was excited to the highest degree by the sense of danger, far from being disposed to make concessions, was rather inclined to be severe, declaring that the only faults committed were the result of too great indulgence. Louis XVIII was placed between the moderate and the violent royalists, not knowing with which to side, and half inclined to favour the former, only that he would have been obliged to make M. Blacas the first sacrifice in the proposed change of ministers—for ill-informed liberals looked upon M. Blacas as the agent of the Emigration at court—he consequently came to no determination, and lost in deplorable vacillation of opinion the time that Napoleon employed in advancing with lightning-like rapidity towards Paris.

As to concessions, the Court had not thought of making any except to the army, and these were ill-devised, for besides being undignified, they possessed the disadvantage of rather multiplying dangers than preparing means of safety. The War Minister had turned his attention to the half-pay officers and old soldiers who had returned to their homes, and recalled both to active service. The half-pay officers received orders to join their regiments immediately, in order to form the *cadre* of new battalions to be composed of the recalled soldiers. Those who could not find a place in these battalions, which were called "a reserve," were to be draughted into battalions of the National Guard that were to be mobilised. Others were to increase the number of the household troops, in whose honours and advantages they were to share. All were immediately put on full pay. There are undoubtedly difficulties to which no remedy can be applied, but still it was a strange illusion on the part of the War Minister, to imagine that the half-pay officers, with the feelings that had been allowed to grow and spread

amongst them, could be induced to support the Bourbons, at the very moment that they learned Napoleon's arrival in France. Even the National Guards, though animated by a *bourgeoisie* spirit, opposed to the re-establishment of the Empire, and who ought consequently to be reliable, were really not to be depended on. Had they been summoned in time, and prepared long before hand, for the two-fold defence of the throne, and the public liberty, they might have been able to restrain the army, and prevent the soldiers from throwing themselves into Napoleon's arms. But the National Guard was almost everywhere divided into cavalry composed of the ancient nobility, and of infantry formed from the middle classes. The latter, offended, irritated, and discontented, had been disbanded in the greater number of the cities. Much advantage could not therefore be expected from this force. Nevertheless the Prefects were ordered to organize battalions of the "mobile," National Guard, and half-pay officers. They were at the same time authorized to convoke the *Conseils Généraux* to vote contributions for this purpose. Remedies whose utility was doubtful were multiplied in this way, as is sometimes done in the case of a patient in the last extremity, whose friends do not like to witness his agony without prescribing something. To all these measures, the War Minister had added a violent proclamation, little calculated to conciliate the army, and of a nature to make those laugh who remembered his language and conduct at Toulouse.

Such were the measures taken to arrest Napoleon's march. But when the rapid progress he had made was ascertained, when it was known that he had entered Grenoble, then Lyons—what the royalists had at first denied, and declared to be false and impossible, they were then obliged to admit on evidence, and ceased to assert that Napoleon had only come to France to be shot. But if they now perceived the necessity of action, they did not see a whit more clearly in what way they ought to act. It is usual with political parties who have committed errors, to believe, not that they are guilty, but that they have been betrayed. The royalists of every shade, seeing the defections that had taken place at Grenoble and Lyons—they were still ignorant of Marshal Ney's—were seized with a kind of feverish distrust of everybody without distinction. They saw traitors on every side, and cried treason even in presence of the leaders of the army whom they had a short while before caressed. Those amongst the latter who were not haughty-minded—and there are such amongst the bravest—only replied to these offensive allusions by excessive protestations of sincerity, and were not the more faithful on that account. Others were indignant and felt but one desire, that of quickly seeing such

folly and arrogance punished. As had happened a few months previously, the Ministers of War and Police were the especial objects of distrust. After having been first accused of doing nothing, they were now accused of doing too much, when they took the measures we have narrated. The royalists believed that a vast conspiracy existed, comprising all the officers of the army, from the marshals to the sub-lieutenants. Our account has however demonstrated that nothing of the kind existed, that at Grenoble, the Generals Marchand and Mouton-Duvernét had sincerely endeavoured to fulfil their duty—that at Lyons, General Brayer had not yielded until his troops had opened the gates of the city to the imperial army, that La Bédoyère was wholly unacquainted with the plots of the brothers Lallemand and Lefebure-Desnoëttes, and even that Napoleon had acted independantly of the flimsy and giddy Parisian conspiracy. But it is history which by dint of patient researches and impartial inquiry, establishes truths of this nature, long after the events have passed, truths of which the different parties were wholly ignorant at the time they occurred. The royalists believing in the existence of a vast conspiracy, comprising the entire army, began to ask themselves whether Marshal Soult was not of the number. The more high-spirited of the royalists, whom Marshal Soult's conduct in Brittany, and his Quiberon monument had charmed, remained faithful to him, and asserted that he alone could save the monarchy. But the others, who were much more numerous, saw reasons for distrust in the very acts that pleased their fellow royalists. The violent language of the Marshal's proclamation was in their eyes only a feint to deceive the reigning dynasty, and give it up bound hand and foot to Napoleon. The proposed measure of assembly at Paris, and placing about the King's person the half-pay officers, who should not find place in the new battalions—a late and now imprudent measure, but devised in good faith—was in their eyes only an act of perfidy. But it was a most erroneous notion, for Marshal Soult, who was not incapable of abandoning people upon whom fortune commenced to frown, was wholly incapable of betraying them, and far from being a deep thinker, his was rather a shallow mind. And yet he passed for an astute Italian of the 15th century cast, and though three months previously when there was a question of dismissing General Dupont, it was said that all was lost if the Marshal were not made War Minister—it was now on the contrary asserted that all would be lost, were he allowed to retain the post.

Similar remarks, but not so violent, were made with regard to M. d'André, Director General of Police. This functionary, who as we have said, was an ancient Constituent, and devoted

to the King, with whom he had corresponded during fifteen years, ought to have been able to give the royalists full satisfaction, at least on the score of fidelity. But there are moments when the spirit of party, like a frightened horse, no longer recognizes the voice of its friends. Having succeeded M. Beugnot, M. d'André had been obliged to follow the same line of conduct, and reject the absurd inventions of all the officious police that the Count d'Artois encouraged by suffering and sometimes by paying them. Henceforth M. d'André was reported at Court incompetent, if not a traitor. "He will not believe anything he is told," was the principle charge brought against him. We shall here narrate a circumstance which would be unworthy a place in history, did it not truthfully paint the bewilderment of party spirit. Very little intelligence reached the capital, because the Prefects who were on Napoleon's route, terrified and disconcerted at his approach, had scarcely time to write before his arrival, and did not think of doing so afterwards. Still the telegraph was kept in incessant motion, either to transmit administrative orders, or to question the authorities, whose tone was not sufficiently pleasing to the Government, or to ask them for intelligence which they had not sent. It was immediately fancied that if the telegraph wires were kept actively employed, it must be in the service of Napoleon, and not of Louis XVIII. The director of the telegraph was summoned. He was much surprised at the suspicions that had been conceived, and gave explanations so simple and convincing that the doubters were satisfied after having propagated the most ridiculous terrors.

These facts prove how great was the terror of the royalists. M. de Blacas though he did not participate in the exaggerated fears of the majority, could not help sympathizing in their distrust, and in his profound alarm, he too asked himself whether Marshal Soult might not be a traitor, and M. d'André an incompetent person. Driven to despair by the news from Lyons, he conceived the idea of subjecting Marshal Soult to an examination in full council, as though he were a criminal, and in his excitement he provided himself with a pair of pistols, ready, as he said, to proceed to extremities if he found the Marshal a traitor. As a matter of course, the King was not to be present at such a scene, for it would not be desirable that His Majesty should witness the violence that might arise. But M. de Vitrolles, who had not lost his temper, remarked to M. de Blacas that in his opinion, the suspicions entertained against the Marshal were unfounded, that he appeared to him to be a man powerfully agitated by the circumstances in which he was placed, but that he was not a traitor. He added that there was evidently a false estimate made of his capacity when

he was chosen to succeed General Dupont, that it might be necessary to elect another minister, a proceeding in itself quite sufficient to meet the exigencies of the case, without the addition of a political scandal.

The Marshal, as we have said, did not betray anybody, but he had fallen into an agitation of mind, which did not add to the clearness of his perceptions. Annoyed by the suspicions of the royalists, he endeavoured to tranquillize them by means of a proclamation, whose violence only added to their alarm; and thus, whilst he did not succeed in winning their confidence, he saw advancing with giant strides, the man whom he had so terribly insulted. Here were causes sufficient to shake a stronger head than his. And though the measures he had taken in recalling the half-pay military to active service, and ordering certain military movements, might be inefficacious, yet they contained no taint of treason, and should the soldiers on seeing Napoleon abandon the royal cause, the fault could not be attributed to the Marshal. What was needed was a guarantee for the fidelity of the army; but Napoleon, to whom the army was to be opposed, possessed the affections of the soldiers, consequently Marshal Soult did neither better nor worse than another might have done in his position. His sole error was having promised too much to the court, and raised too great expectations of what his energy and capacity could effect.

Being summoned before the council, his demeanour was conformable to his position, that is to say, very embarrassed. He was questioned almost in the same manner as if he were arraigned as a criminal, and replied without manifesting any indignation at the suspicions of which he was the object. He enumerated in detail the measures he had taken, several times protested the purity of his intentions, and ultimately almost established a belief in his innocence, but if his auditors thought somewhat better of his fidelity, they thought less of his talents, and having often repeated when he did not know what else to say, that if a doubt were entertained of his loyalty he was ready to give in his resignation to the King, he was in some sort taken at his word, and without further delay conducted to Louis XVIII. This prince understood nothing of the administrative measures then under consideration, but with a clear perception of the truth, he saw that the War Minister had certainly not performed miracles, neither had he been guilty of treachery. He also saw that it was necessary to sacrifice somebody to the anger of the royalist party. He allowed the Marshal to speak as long as he pleased, then the offer of his resignation being renewed, the King profitted by the opportunity, told him that he esteemed his services highly, that he would always retain a favourable recollection of them, but as

the cares of office seemed at the actual time to press too heavily upon him, he would relieve him of the burden, and appoint his successor. The Marshal, surprised at being taken at his word when he expressed a wish to retire, showed a disposition to retract what he had said, but the King took no notice, and the Marshal was obliged to consider as definite a resignation that was only offered for form's sake. The Marshal quitted the King's cabinet very discontented at leaving his portfolio behind him, and was reconducted to the gates of the Tuileries by MM. de Blacas and de Vitrolles, still making protestations of loyalty. He found around the gates a terrified crowd, that uttered cries of "*Vive le roi*" when any person of distinction issued from the palace; when the Marshal appeared this cry was repeated. He replied by waving his hat adorned with white plumes, and exclaiming "*Vive le roi*." He then threw himself into his carriage and drove to the War Office. He thus found himself dismissed after having continued three months in office, and accused of treason by the very persons for whom he had sacrificed his past career, and compromised himself with Napoleon, whom he had so violently insulted in his last proclamation, and only too happy would it have been for him, had he been wholly compromised with the latter, for he would not then have incurred the weighty responsibility of acting as Major-General on the fatal day of Waterloo.

Less ceremony was used with M. d'André. His fidelity was undeniable, though some fools affected to doubt it, and he was dismissed with the simple explanation that the King's interest required it. These proceedings took place on the 11th of March, and it was necessary to fill the two high posts thus left vacant. Here was an opportunity of profiting by the sage advice of M. Lainé, and satisfying public opinion. But M. de Montesquieu, who acted for M. Lainé, was only looked upon as a timid man—a doubtful merit—since he had advised concessions, and had consequently very little influence. As the danger augmented, the ultra-royalists acquired greater ascendancy, and unwilling to acknowledge that their great error was having alienated public opinion from their party, they fancied that their safety could be secured by the exertions of talented men, endowed with that diabolical skill which they acknowledged Napoleon to possess, even whilst they questioned his genius, and they sought such men in every direction. There was an old War Minister, who during ten years had received, transmitted, and got the imperial orders executed, and who since his return from Blois had not ceased to address to the Court his most humble assurances of fidelity. This was General Clarke, Duke de Feltre. Hitherto his humility but not his services had been accepted. The royalists resolved to have

recourse to him, for he ought to know if anybody did, how Napoleon might be beaten with his own weapons. He was sent for, and was so anxious to accept office, that he forgot the danger he incurred. As he did not refuse to compromise himself at such a time, his fidelity was put beyond doubt, and he was immediately sent to the War Office to replace Marshal Soult.

As no desire was entertained of conciliating public opinion, and as the royalists only saw in what was going on, a struggle in which whoever possessed the largest share of those dark talents attributed to Napoleon, would gain the ascendancy, it was no wonder that they thought of making M. Fouché Minister of Police. Hopes had always been held out to him of obtaining this post, but he had never got the appointment, and was even at last harshly refused. The frequently interrupted communications were again resumed. M. Fouché replied with great protestations of respect for the Bourbons, but declared that he could not accept any office, and that in the actual state of things it would be impossible to avoid a serious crisis. Disappointed in their efforts to obtain the services of one so experienced in police affairs, the royalists made a great descent, and cast their eyes on one much lower in social importance, in intellectual endowments, and in reputation, but they found in the new candidate, to compensate for all these deficiencies, an intense hatred of Napoleon. It was to M. de Bourrienne that the royalists now turned their attention. He had long before lost Napoleon's confidence, and had on that account been made Post-Master General. The direction of the Police was now confided to him, with the title of Director-General, for it would be impossible to give him the title of minister. The royalists felt assured that this man would pursue the imperialists without mercy, and neither shelter nor spare them.

The two changes we have just related were a strange mode of replying to the advice of MM. Lainé and de Montesquiou who perseveringly demanded that four ministers should be dismissed, and replaced by four respectable and popular men. But the violence of party feeling increased as the public danger became more imminent, and with the violence of party feeling the blindness of party spirit became greater. The royalists did not believe that the impending danger could be averted by inspiring the public with confidence, on the contrary, they believed that the general safety could only be effected by the exercise of profound craft, and the most skilful plotter, however despicable his character, was the man in whom they were willing to confide. Deplorable blindness, which proves, not the perversity of the Bourbons or the emigrants,

who for the most part were honest folk, but the perversity of party spirit, which is always great in proportion to the want of sound sense.

This change of officials took place on the 11th and 12th of March, and a partial success obtained at the same time, called up a transient gleam of hope. Generals Lallemand, Lefebure-Desnoëttes, and d'Erlon, had, as we have said, set out for Le Nord, in order to put their useless and imprudent attempt into execution. Lefebure-Desnoëttes made arrangements with the Count d'Erlon, who was to bring the infantry from Lille to Compiègne, and with the brothers Lallemand, who were to bring from the department of Aisne to La Fère all the troops they could induce to accompany them. Having come to an understanding on these points, he left Cambray on the morning of the 9th with the Royal Chasseurs, formerly Chasseurs-à-cheval of the Guard, leaving orders with the Royal Cuirassiers—formerly Cavalry Grenadiers—to follow. The horse Chasseurs, accustomed to obey blindly a general who during ten years had led them to battle, followed as they were accustomed to do, and on the morning of the 10th of March, appeared before La Fère, whose gates were opened as might be expected to the French troops. The brothers Lallemand had already endeavoured to seduce the artillery regiment that was stationed at La Fère, by saying that a revolution had been effected at Paris in favour of the Empire, that the Bourbons were dethroned and thrown into prison, and that the time was come to make a movement in favour of Napoleon. The regiment of artillery would have been only too happy to listen to the brothers Lallemand and follow them, but General Aboville, who was in the town, and a strict observer of military duty, resisted, and Generals Lallemand, fearing to lose time, had set out for Compiègne with Lefebure-Desnoëttes, hoping to meet the Cavalry Grenadiers, and especially the Lille infantry, led by Count d'Erlon. Having arrived at Compiègne at the head of the former Chasseurs of the Guard, consisting of a thousand splendid horsemen, Lefebure-Desnoëttes and the brothers Lallemand attempted to seduce the 6th Chasseurs, whose officers hesitated and finally refused. Having failed in their attempt on this regiment they were still obliged to await Count d'Erlon, of whose coming there was yet no indication. The latter, at the very moment when he was putting his infantry into motion, had been surprised and completely paralyzed by the arrival of Marshal Mortier from Paris. The Marshal told him to keep quiet, and allow revolutions to take place without compromising himself, and in fact to retire for the moment from public life, lest he might become the object of legislative severity. The Count d'Erlon had consequently been rendered

powerless to act, and had even been obliged to conceal himself to escape legal punishment.

This intelligence confounded Generals Lallemand and Lefebure-Desnoëttes, who perceived but too late that in such serious circumstances where the minds of men fluctuated between duty and passion, the appearance of any other than Napoleon to influence their opinions would embarrass rather than persuade them. They consequently did not know what to do, when Lion, the second in command, seeing them in this perplexity, questioned them sharply and forced them to declare their intentions with regard to the compromised corps. They acknowledged every thing and proposed to him to accompany them to Lyons, the only alternative left them. The Commandant Lion, alarmed at such an enterprise, refused to take part in it, and in some measure extricated them from their difficulty by taking the command of the corps, whilst they attempted to escape. He sent instantly to Paris in the name of the Chasseurs an act of submission and repentance, alledging their ignorance of the intention of the generals who had tried to mislead them.

Intelligence of this abortive attempt being circulated at Paris on the 12th of March, served to counterbalance the effect produced by the disastrous news from Grenoble and Lyons. It is only at the last extremity that political parties despair of safety, and if an unexpected gleam of hope glimmers for a moment before their eyes they cling to it with tenacity, as a dying man does to life when his strength seems for a little restored. The hope awakened on this occasion was of a nature to deceive the wisest, for though the troops who had remained faithful had only resisted giddy-headed men and not Napoleon, still those who were inclined to flatter themselves might conclude that under energetic leaders, they would resist Napoleon himself. The reports from Franche-Comté, and in particular from the staff of Marshal Ney—his defection was not yet known—were also favourable. The royalist officers that surrounded the Marshal gave the most flattering accounts of his conduct. Marshal Oudinot, who had set out for Metz, declared that he had every where found the infantry of the old Imperial Guard animated by the best sentiments. Of all this intelligence a tranquillizing combination was formed which people began to believe and to make others believe. It was said that from Cannes to Lyons, Bonaparte had taken every body by surprise, that no preparations had been made for resistance, and that he had triumphed as he had so often done by taking his enemies unawares and confounding them. But henceforth he would meet an energetic and invincible resistance. He was to be attacked in flank by Marshal Ney, and

he would not be able to overcome the bravest of the brave. Marshal Oudinot was to march from Metz to attack him in the rear. Lastly the troops assembled at Paris and in the environs were to compose an army of 40,000 men, commanded by the Duke de Berry in person, with Marshal Macdonald as head of the staff, and under the eyes of the prince and the worthy Marshal appointed to assist him, every one would do his duty. There was at this time great talk about the firing of the first shot, which was looked upon as the decisive remedy that was to save the monarchy; for were the conflict once commenced, the troops it was said would be obliged to fight. At Paris the means of firing the first shot was afforded by the household troops, consisting of 5,000 brave men devoted to the royal cause, and who, there could be no doubt, would fire. The royalists flattered themselves that they would have 30 or 40,000 men, whilst Napoleon would be at the head of only 8 or 10,000, and however great a general he might be, he could not conquer with numbers so disproportionate.

These were specious reasons, and party spirit is often satisfied with less valid. The Duke de Berry was nominated commander of the army of Paris, which was to encamp before Villejuif. Marshal Macdonald, who had just performed prodigies of valour at Lyons and given unquestionable proofs of fidelity, was appointed his major-general. The Duke d'Orléans was sent to Le Nord, to organize an army of reserve, with the troops who in that department had lately shown such good dispositions; he was to lead them to Amiens or St. Quentin, and after having provided the necessary *matériel* to bring them to Paris to form the Duke de Berry's left wing, and fight at his side. Marshal Oudinot received orders to put the infantry of the old Guard in motion if he still retained his faith in them, and to direct his course so as to traverse the road leading from Lyons to Paris; he was authorized to promise the rank of officer to every soldier that pledged himself to fire.

At the same time, registers were opened at Paris for the enrolment of volunteers. Ardent royalists were to be seen every day parading the streets of the capital waving white flags and uttering cries of "To arms," against the usurper, the tyrant, who was to bring upon France the double scourge of despotism and war. Though these demonstrations did not make a very great impression, still "Le Censeur," which had appeared as a volume to evade the censorship of the press, endeavoured to point out all the dangers resulting from Napoleon's return, exercised a certain influence over the young liberals, who though they were not violently attached to the Bourbons, preferred them to Napoleon, and were ready to support their opinions by force of arms. The law students had enrolled

themselves in large numbers. It was hoped that the National Guard, as anxious for peace as the young students were for liberty, would serve the royal cause with the same zeal. The royalists endeavoured to encourage each other and recover from the dejection created by the intelligence received from Grenoble and Lyons.

In order to propagate these sentiments more effectually, a meeting of the Chambers was convoked. This meeting took place on the 13th of March. The Duke de Feltre, the new War Minister and M. de Montesquiou, Minister of the Interior, were the most conspicuous personages on this occasion. The War Minister proposed a motion declaring that the garrisons of Antibes, La Fère and Lille, that the Marshals Mortier and Macdonald deserved well of their king and country. He also proposed that the soldiers who distinguished themselves under existing circumstances should be recompensed by the nation. He related on this occasion the attempt of General Lefebure-Desnoëttes and the Brothers Lallemand, which he stigmatized as infamous; he declared that the troops showed the most excellent dispositions, that they would fulfil their duty, and that he would be himself the first to set them the example. He added that if Lyons had not resisted, it was solely for want of artillery.

These explanations, hopes and promises of devotion were warmly applauded, because of the great need there was of believing them. One member proposed that the Charter should be put under the special protection of the army and National Guards, another that the arrears of the Legion of Honour should be immediately paid up. All these propositions were almost unanimously voted. The almost childish address of the War Minister was succeeded by the wise and dignified discourse of the Minister of the Interior, who, though he could not give office to the heads of the constitutional party, still thanked them for their noble conduct on this occasion. He particularly praised the liberal writers, who, forgetful of their dissensions, had written in defence of the King and liberty, that is, of the common good.

As this scene appeared to produce a good effect, a still more solemn one was prepared. It was announced that on the 16th the King and the Princes would meet the Chamber of Deputies, in order to renew their alliance with the nation, and to give formal assurance of their fidelity to the Constitutional Charter. As the King's indecision and the perverse tendencies of the Princes prevented them from joining the constitutional party, M. de Montesquiou and M. Lainé were anxious that by repeated demonstrations they should conciliate public

opinion, the only force that could be effectively opposed to Napoleon.

The King prepared a speech which he drew up himself carefully, and learned by rote that he might deliver it with more effect. This speech was considered a master-piece by the council, and was indeed couched in terms as dignified as they were skilfully chosen. Encouraged by the approbation of the council, Louis XVIII, wearing the insignia of the Legion of Honour and surrounded by the Princes, passed from the Tuileries through a double line of National Guards and soldiers of the line. The Duke of Orleans was in the royal carriage, and the King did not forget to draw his attention to the fact that he wore the medal of the Legion of Honour. "I wish," said the Duke, "that it were for the first time." As the King passed along he was affectionately greeted by the crowd, chiefly composed of Parisian citizens, the National Guard cried "Long live the King," but the regular troops were silent. The Duke de Berry and the Duke d'Orléans observed what passed, but the King took no notice, still repeating to himself the speech he was about to deliver.

Having arrived at the Bourbon palace, Louis XVIII entered the hall and ascended the steps of the throne, supported by MM. de Blacas and de Duras. As the monarch entered, the members of both Chambers rose quickly, and cheered him warmly. The Deputies to the left were the most enthusiastic in their applause. All wished for peace, the Charter, and the King, and all wished to prove to him, that if he were true to them, they would be faithful to him. Three or four times they rose and cried "*Vive le roi.*" These exclamations which were warmly seconded by the royalist deputies, moved Louis deeply, and might almost have made him believe that his crown was secure. Unfortunately these were but the cries of enlightened and truly patriotic citizens. The rest of the nation, carried away by the indignation of which the Bourbons were the involuntary cause, was hurrying towards newly created abysses!

When the King had recovered his composure, he delivered the following address in a clear and well-modulated voice.

"Gentlemen,

"At the present crisis when the public enemy has advanced into one portion of my kingdom and threatens the liberty of the rest, I come amongst you to bind more closely those bonds which by uniting us, constitute the strength of the state. I come to express to you, and through you, to all France my feelings and my wishes.

I have returned to my country, and reconciled her with all foreign Powers, who, you may be assured, will be faithful to

those treaties by which we have won peace ; I have laboured for the happiness of my people ; I have received, and do every day receive the most touching proofs of their affection ; can I, in my sixtieth year, do better than finish my career by dying in their defence ?”

Fresh acclamations broke forth at this. “It is not you,” cried the Deputies, “it is we who ought to die for the throne and the Charter !” The King resumed,

“I fear nothing, therefore, for myself, but I fear everything for France. He who comes amongst us to light up the torch of civil discord, brings with him also the scourge of foreign war ; he comes to impose an iron yoke upon our country ; he comes to destroy the constitutional Charter that I have given you, the charter that will constitute my noblest title in the eyes of posterity, that Charter so cherished by Frenchmen, and which I again solemnly swear to maintain. Let us rally around it, let it be our consecrated standard ! The descendants of Henry IV will be the first to take their places, and they will be followed by all good Frenchmen. And now, gentlemen, let this assembly of the two Chambers support authority efficiently, and this truly national war shall prove by its successful issue what a great people can do, when united in love for their King and for the fundamental laws of the state.”

These words were scarcely spoken when the Count d’Artois rose, and respectfully seizing the King’s hand, said, “Permit me, Sire, in the name of your family, to unite my voice to yours, and assure you of our frank and cordial union with your Majesty, at the same time that we swear to be faithful to you and the constitutional Charter.” “Yes, yes,” cried the Duke de Berry and the Duke d’Orléans, “we swear it !” At this unexpected scene, the two Chambers rose to applaud an unanimity of sentiment, that would have been most salutary had it been manifested earlier, and to thank royalty for seeking from the nation that support, which they most warmly promised him, but which, alas ! was not at their disposal ; and the Chambers, in their excessive prudence, had not sufficiently opposed royalty to gain for themselves that popularity by which they could now defend and save it.

Louis XVIII retired amid the general emotion, deeply moved by the success, both of his own discourse, and that of the meeting, a success, whose utility, a few days before, might have been most useful, but which was now more than doubtful.

After the meeting, the National Guard was reviewed by the princes, in order that trust-worthy men might be chosen from its ranks, to form the *mobile* battalions. The Count d’Artois used all the art he was master of to win the favour of the armed citizens of Paris, but when the well-disposed were summoned,

very few appeared. Indeed, the feelings of the citizens had been too deeply wounded to allow them to feel very ardent devotion for the royal cause. They dreaded him that was approaching, but did not love those that were about to leave. However, they preserved an appearance of loyalty, and the princes were tolerably well-received, though not as they had been by the Chamber of Deputies. These different manifestations, and the unsuccessful attempt of the brothers Lallemand, inspired a little hope, whilst confidence was felt in the numbers and fidelity of the troops that were to be assembled at Melun, under the Duke de Berry, Marshal Macdonald, and Generals Belliard, Maison, Hayo, &c., &c. The Bonapartists, on the contrary, disheartened by the adventure of the Lallemands, which they looked on as an alarming proof of the feelings of the army, kept themselves concealed, their timidity increased by the mere name of Bourrienne, the new Prefect of Police.

In the meantime, Napoleon had arrived at Auxerre on the 17th, and was preparing to march to Paris. The troops from Grenoble and Lyons, together with those brought from Franche-Comté, by Marshal Ney, amounted to about twenty thousand men, with sixty pieces of ordnance. His forces had also been increased by the 14th regiment of the line, which, sent to Auxerre to oppose, had joined him with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur !*" Intelligence had reached Auxerre that an army was being formed at Melun. There were rumours of forty thousand troops of the line, of the household troops, of the National Guard, under the immediate command of the Count d'Artois and several Marshals, and it seemed probable that the combat so desired by the royalists, and so dreaded by Napoleon, would take place beneath the walls of Paris. It seemed very possible, indeed, that amongst the five or six thousand men composing the household troops, a sufficient number would be found to commence the conflict, which would give a more serious aspect to the whole affair. Napoleon was not much disturbed by these rumours. He said, in his own mind, that the troops would not be more faithful to the Bourbons at Paris than they had been at Grenoble and Lyons, that his approach would confound the government, and that the King would take flight, as those Prefects had done who had wished to remain faithful to him. Besides, emissaries who had come from the neighbourhood of the capital, said that they had not met any soldiers on their way, and that at Melun they had only seen some half-pay officers, not very well disposed towards the government they were called on to defend. Napoleon did not attach much importance to the reports in circulation, but he was too experienced a commander to despise them, and, consequently, determined to remain two or three days at Auxerre to concentrate his forces,

and then to advance *militairement* on Paris. He waited the arrival of Marshal Ney with the corps from Franche-Comté, and, perhaps, with the Old Guard, which was said to have escaped from Marshal Oudinot, and he would thus be able, in these two days, to give the necessary stamina to his army. That his infantry might not be too fatigued, he determined to embark them on the Seine at Auxerre, and send them by water to Montereau. He did the same for the artillery, having hired all the vessels on the Seine. He sent the cavalry by land to Montereau, and so prepared everything, that his assembled troops might enter the forest of Fontainebleau on the 19th.

Having arranged all this with his usual promptness and precision, he employed the remainder of his time in receiving mayors, sous-prefects, and commanders of divisions, all of whom he addressed in the same terms he had used in other places. In the evening, at the Prefect's table, and in a smaller circle composed of Drouot, Bertrand, Cambronne, and the Prefect himself, he expressed himself in that concise, expressive, and caustic style which was peculiar to him. "I have allowed it to be reported," he said, "that I am leagued with the European powers, but I am not. I am not leagued with any one, not even with those who are accused of conspiring for my cause at Paris. Whilst in Elba, I saw the errors that were committed, and determined to profit by them. My enterprise seems an act of extraordinary daring, whilst it is in reality the result of rational reflection. There could be no doubt but that the soldiers, peasantry, and middle classes, from the insults they had received, would welcome me with delight. The gates of Grenoble would have opened *had I but knocked with my snuff-box*. Louis XVIII is certainly a wise prince, whom misfortune has enlightened; and had he been alone, I should have had much more difficulty in wresting France from his grasp. But his family and friends destroy any good that he can do. They fancy they are returned to their paternal inheritance, and can do as they please, and they do not see that they have entered on my domains, which cannot be ruled like theirs." The Prefect, having remarked that the Bourbons had restricted themselves to the strict observance of the law, Napoleon replied, that it was the spirit, and not the letter of the law that ought to guide a government. "The laws of the present time," he said, "are framed in the spirit of the past, which must necessarily revolt the present generation. That is the sole cause of my success. Last year it was said that I recalled the Bourbons, this year they recall me; so we are equal."

Napoleon passed the evening thus, conversing with his accustomed vivacity, showing plainly the faults the Bourbons had

committed, and cheerfully acknowledging his own, but declaring that he was changed, that he would be no longer found either an absolute master or a conqueror, for, he said, he could correct himself, and was not like the Bourbons, who, during twenty-five years, *had neither learned nor forgotten anything*.

Marshal Ney arrived the next day—the 18th. Napoleon expected him with impatience, and was even surprised that he had not come earlier. The Marshal was, indeed, late, for he had been detained by the issuing of some necessary orders, and he felt not a little embarrassed as he approached head-quarters. There were two reasons for this: his conduct formerly at Fontainebleau, and lately at Lons-le-Saulnier. The manner in which he had acted at Fontainebleau, except for its harshness, might be excused, in consideration of the force of circumstances; but his late change, though it might be explained in the same manner, had been so very abrupt, that it embarrassed him, even in the presence of Napoleon, who had profited so much by it. The Marshal, in his own justification, said everywhere what he had already said at Lons-le-Saulnier, that he had yielded to the wishes of France, which had been so unanimously declared at Grenoble, Lyons, Maçon, Chalons, &c., but that he had not yielded to an individual man, to one especially that had led the French to Moscow; that times were changed, and France now needed peace and liberty, which he meant to tell the Emperor at their next meeting, and that if his words were not heeded, he would immediately retire to his estates, and abide there for the remainder of his life. Such were the sentiments that Ney had expressed on his route, which he had repeated, on his arrival, to his brother-in-law, and which he was about to address to Napoleon himself. However, as he came nearer, his courage failed by degrees, and fearing that he would not dare, would not know how to say all he thought, he drew up a written statement of his opinions and conduct, from the time at Fontainebleau to the events at Lons-le-Saulnier. He read this to his brother-in-law, who found nothing in it to correct, and then repaired, paper in hand, to Napoleon, a few minutes after his arrival.

Napoleon's profound sagacity had divined all that the Marshal would feel inclined to say, and what he had already heard from many lips, was sufficient to warn him that Ney would meet him both with excuses and remonstrances. He wished to dispense with the first and avoid the latter. He met him with open arms, exclaiming, "Let us embrace, my dear Marshal." Then as Ney was unfolding his paper, he would not allow him to read it, but said, "You need no excuse; your justification, as well as mine, is to be found in the force of circumstances, which are stronger than man. But let us speak

no more of the past, and only think of it in as far as may guide us to act better for the future." Then without giving the Marshal time to speak, he explained to him the actual state of affairs, and his own intentions, which left nothing to be desired, for he admitted the necessity of peace and moderate liberty, and was willing to grant both. He said that he accepted the treaty of Paris, and had caused it to be made known at Vienna, and he expected that this communication, and Maria Louisa's intervention, would prevent a fresh struggle with Europe. He intended when he arrived at Paris, to assemble the most enlightened men of the capital, and consult with them as to the changes to be made in the imperial code. It was unnecessary that the Marshal should add anything to these declarations, as they contained all that he desired, and showed the wants of the actual time more clearly than he could express them. However he repeated all he had just heard, that he might be able to boast of having said it, and Napoleon listened with patience to what was only the repetition of what he had just expressed. The conversation was therefore all that it ought to be. However, although Ney was not as astute as Napoleon, he saw plainly that the latter would not allow himself to be bound by conditions, and Napoleon saw still more clearly that there had been a desire entertained to fetter his actions. Both were, consequently, less satisfied than they affected to be. When Ney retired, he told the officers and his brother-in-law that he was very well pleased with the Emperor, who had been most friendly and reasonable. His companions applauded loudly, and declared they had nothing more to desire since they had got back their Emperor, and got him back improved by experience. Though Napoleon, on the other hand, divined from Ney's looks and words, that he sought to excuse the violation of his military duty, by the loudly proclaimed intention of restraining the imperial power, he affected to be unconscious of it, and pretended to be perfectly satisfied with the Marshal. However, after the first outburst of feeling was past, he gradually began to treat Ney with a somewhat imperial haughtiness, and made an appointment to meet him at Paris, as though he did not need his assistance to enter the capital.

Everything being arranged, Napoleon left Auxerre on the morning of the 19th, to put himself at the head of his troops, that had received orders to march to Montereau. Towards night he was on the borders of the forest of Fontainebleau, surrounded by his soldiers. Great rumours were afloat there concerning the movement of troops before Paris, but Napoleon thought little of the intelligence, and advanced into the forest accompanied by a few horsemen. At four o'clock on the morn-

ing of the 20th of March he entered the court-yard of the castle of Fontainebleau, where eleven months before (on the 20th April) he had spoken his farewell to the Imperial Guard. He was received by a group of cavalry that had escaped from the army at Melun. His countenance gleamed with satisfaction as he entered this palace, where the first Empire had ended, and where it seemed the second was about to commence. This was certainly a brilliant compensation made him by fortune, and for a moment joy usurped the place of prudence in that great mind, which—as we shall soon see—had been cured of all its illusions in the island of Elba.

Meantime, the greatest confusion reigned at the Tuileries. The hopes with which the royalists had flattered themselves had not lasted long, and though it had required three months to deprive Marshal Soult of all influence, the War Minister, Clarke, needed but eight days to lose the confidence that had been reposed in him. When in addition to Napoleon's triumphal march through Burgundy, news arrived of Ney's defection, it was plainly seen that it was folly to hope for safety from any Minister of War whatever, and the royalists abandoned themselves to the most profound despair. The ultra-royalists saw no resource but to emigrate again to those countries where they had always found shelter. But if affairs wore a gloomy aspect in France, the accounts from Vienna were most consolatory, for it was announced that the Congress assembled anew at Vienna had fulminated a literal sentence of death against Napoleon. Unfortunately the royalists were compelled to seek abroad that most dangerous support—foreign aid—which whilst it procured them some material strength, deprived them of all moral force.

In justice to M. Lainé, M. de Montesquiou, and all those who thought the royal cause might be saved by uniting the Bourbons with the liberal party, it must be admitted that they did not despair of their policy, and that even to the very last day they had struggled, at the risk of falling into Napoleon's hands, before they had been able to accomplish the desired reconciliation. M. Lainé and M. de Montesquiou insisted, in order that the coalition might be complete, that the ministers should be chosen from amongst the constitutionalists, and M. de Lafayette put at the head of the National Guard, by which the liberals, armed with the Charter, might be opposed to Napoleon. The constitutionalists ratified these proposals by showing a willingness to unite at the last moment, and on the 19th M. Benjamin Constant published a very violent article in the *Journal des Débats* against Napoleon, and declared a formal and irrevocable preference for the Bourbons and the Charter.

At this time, the Ministers' council could scarcely be re-

garded as the King's council, for as is usual at a political crisis, a crowd of busy-bodies had surrounded the members of the Government, forced their way into the assemblies, took part in the debates, and assumed as much authority in public affairs as those who were responsible for them. These are the last moments of power when all command and none obey, and which may be looked on as the commencement of its death agony. Royalists of every political shade had invaded the two or three first floors of the Tuileries, where they might be seen moving about, talking and declaiming against M. de Montesquiou and M. de Blacas, to whom all existing troubles were attributed. The first was become an object of aversion since he had counselled moderation. He was now described as a fickle-minded man, whose reputation for talent was solely due to women's prattle, but that he was in reality incompetent to discharge the duties of office. The second was obnoxious to the ultra-royalists as the King's favourite. They believed him to be the cause of the King's inertia and vacillation of mind. The moderate royalists blamed him as much as the others, because he would not listen to them, and said that he was like a wall raised around the King to prevent his hearing good advice; and indeed his chilling haughtiness favoured the idea, though in reality he never failed to inform Louis XVIII of all he heard. It must be added that in times of danger the royal favourites, or those who seem to be so, are blamed for all public misfortunes; they are punished for the favour they enjoy by being accused of every misdeed that occurs, even of those they seek to prevent.

The outcry against these two personages was therefore extreme. M. de Montesquiou, without being in the least disconcerted, persisted in advocating the system of concession, whilst M. de Blacas maintained a haughty cold silence. The ultra-royalists, who persisted in seeing no fault in the Government but its too great indulgence, considered these concessions as an augmentation of this weakness, which would sink the government in public estimation, without producing any sensible amelioration in the actual state of things. In their opinion nothing remained to be done but to leave Paris and retire to foreign countries, where their cause would receive the support of the European Powers, the only support on which they could count for the future. They said, with ill-concealed satisfaction, that the Coalition would punish this ungrateful nation which they had not been able to rule, because it could only be held in check by the iron hand of Napoleon or of Europe. They added that it would be an advantage to get rid of the Charter, which they considered as an essential cause of the new dangers with which legitimacy

was threatened. The error committed was in their opinion, not that the conditions of the Charter had not been observed, but that it had been ever granted.

However, even the ultra-royalists did not agree amongst themselves. Some, with M. de Vitrolles at their head, felt the greatest repugnance to applying for aid to foreigners. They had recently experienced the oppression of foreign influence, for it was this influence that had prevented them from giving free scope to their passions, and they were by no means desirous of coming under it again. To escape this dilemma, they proposed that on leaving Paris, (which all considered inevitable) that they should not retire to the north towards Lisle or Dunkirk, but to the west, towards Angers, Nantes, and Rochelle, which would bring them to Vendée, into the midst of the old royalist soldiers, who had again taken up arms during the last ten months. They hoped to assemble fifty thousand soldiers in that quarter, and supported by Nantes, Rochelle, and Bordeaux, and getting assistance in money and war *matériel* from England, they would be able to hold out there for a long time; win over a part of the usurper's forces, and give Europe, without being apparently leagued with her, time to solve the fundamental question between the Rhine and the Seine. The Duke de Bourbon had already left for Angers and Tours, and there was no doubt but that he would raise Vendée.

The accounts from Bordeaux announced that the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême had excited the greatest enthusiasm there, and on the whole the west was considered the safest place of refuge, for even were they forced to leave, they were near the sea, and could return to England whence they came.

Many specious reasons could be adduced in favour of this plan, but as assistance from the Chouans would be as unpopular as from foreigners, there was some difficulty in choosing between two unpopular courses. M. de Montesquiou, who was become the habitual opponent of M. de Vitrolles, said with the air of one weary of silly advice, "Well, Sir, the King of the Chouans will never be King of the French." To which M. de Vitrolles replied, that the King chosen by the Austrians, English, and Russians, had just as little chance. These two men disliked each other to such a degree, that they could never meet without mutual insults, M. de Vitrolles calling M. de Montesquiou a thoughtless and impertinent court abbé, for which in reply he was told he was a tiresome and dangerous intermeddler.

As the plan of concessions was abandoned, M. de Montesquiou saw no other resource than for the Bourbons to retire towards the northern frontier, to Dunkirk or Lisle, and await on French ground the issue of the conflict between Europe and Napoleon, without themselves taking any part in it. This was the

advice that the Duke d'Orléans, Marshal Macdonald, and all sensible men had given to Louis XVIII, in case, as seemed most likely, that the capital should be abandoned to Napoleon. But this project was not more agreeable to the old monarch than that of going to La Vendée. The habitual indolence of Louis XVIII made the idea of leaving Paris insupportable, and every plan beginning with a removal was disagreeable to him. To go and fight in Vendée like an adventurer, did not seem to him suited to his age, health, or dignity. He did not consider it possible to take refuge in a fortress, for in the first place it would be necessary to find a fortress where devotedness to the royal cause prevailed, and secondly it would require a sufficient garrison for its defence, which could not be found in the three or four thousand horsemen to which the household troops would be reduced should the King be obliged to abandon Paris, and such a town as Lisie would require twelve or fifteen thousand chosen infantry for its defence. And to be besieged in a fortress where he would be ultimately obliged to yield, would be, he considered, rather a grotesque termination of his career.

To remain at Paris was the project most consonant with his wishes, and if he could not do that to retire to London. His natural indolence induced him to form a secret resolution of remaining at Paris till the last moment, for he hoped but little from a second emigration. "We were well received the first time," he said, "because our misfortunes were looked upon as the inevitable consequences of the Revolution; but now our misfortunes would be attributed to our want of tact, we should be reputed men of little sense, and importunate guests." He was, consequently, determined to remain to the last, listening to every proposal and agreeing to none, whilst he left to M. de Blacas the ungracious task of objecting to all that was displeasing to himself.

In the midst of this tumultuous court, where the framers of projects were sometimes met by the King's indifferent and ironic glance, or the curt objections of M. de Blacas, there was one man—Marshal Marmont—who could not possibly keep quiet in so serious a state of things. Thoughtless, vain, restless, and as usual, mischief-making, he commanded at this juncture the household troops, a post which was indeed due to his extraordinary bravery. He too was anxious to save the King, and asserted that he had found the means. He had conceived an intense hatred against M. de Blacas, because of the freezing reserve with which this Minister met his views, and though he did not join his most violent enemies, he still echoed their cries, and accused him of all the evils that had befallen the monarchy. He had even carried his imprudence so far as to propose to M.

de Vitrolles that M. Blacas should be carried off forcibly, that he might no longer influence the King, and that they should then seize on the Government, and save the monarchy without M. de Blacas, and if necessary without the King. When he and M. de Vitrolles should have placed themselves at the head of the Government, they were to fortify the Tuileries, lay in a supply of provisions and ammunition, shut themselves up there with all the faithful royalists, and await the coming of Napoleon, who would be not a little embarrassed by the prospect of besieging an old King in his palace, a proceeding that would excite the indignation of Europe. M. de Vitrolles told him that the time for carrying off favourites had passed away with favourites themselves; that M. de Blacas was not one, and that his abduction would only make them hateful and ridiculous, without being of any service to the King. When he imparted the second part of his plan to Louis XVIII in confidence, the monarch replied in anything but a flattering tone, "You propose that I should ascend the curule chair, as antiquated an idea as any of those of which my poor emigrants are accused."

As in all desperate situations the aid of quacks is willingly sought, the royalists betook themselves again to M. Fouché, for his advice if not his aid, for as we have said, when the choice lay between having recourse to a regicide or making concessions to the constitutionalists, they always preferred the former.

M. de Dambray was, therefore, commissioned to call on M. Fouché, and received the royal authority to make him certain proposals. M. Fouché was endowed with a genius for intrigue, which had carried him so far against the Bourbons as to urge the brothers Lallemand to their foolish enterprise, and he was now glad to see the King's chancellor and discuss his propositions. When M. Dambray having in the King's name asked his opinion and advice, which was equivalent to saying that they were still willing to accept his aid, he said what everybody knew, that it was too late, that the fatal impulse had been given, and that the army would desert to the last man; that Napoleon would be in Paris in a week, and that nothing remained but to abandon the capital, place the King in safety, and wait the issue of events. M. Dambray exclaimed against such dreary forebodings, and insinuated that perhaps M. Fouché would not indulge in such dreary prophecies, only that he desired to see the events accomplished which he foretold; but the latter replied with unparalleled impudence and vanity, that he was disliked by and disliked Napoleon, and was as little desirous of his return as the royalists themselves, but that he was resigned to what could not be avoided; that had the Bourbons taken his advice a little earlier, he would have spared them and France this new and dangerous crisis, which could no

longer be avoided, and in which it would be necessary to aid to get through it successfully; nor need any one be surprised to hear within a few days that he, the Duke d'Otranto, had become Napoleon's Minister; that he would become his Minister to escape his tyranny, and accelerate his fall, that this was the mode of escape which he proposed to himself, and that perhaps when disembarassed of this dangerous madman, he would be able to do more for the Bourbons than he could at the actual time.

One scarcely knows whether to be more surprised at the cynical impudence of such declarations, or at the imprudence of confiding them to any one, or at the childish vanity that flattered itself to be able to foresee and rule such distant events. M. Dambray allowed himself to be entrapped by this seemingly profound policy, and retired surprised and overpowered by the affected superiority of his interlocutor. He told the King and the Count d'Artois of what had passed, and both, particularly the latter, were annoyed at having sought the aid of M. Fouché's genius so late. However, his repelling the advances of the court seemed suspicious, and it was thought that he would not reject offers made in all sincerity, were he not engaged with the enemy. As his assistance could not be had, it was resolved to render him harmless by securing his person. Neither M. de Bourrienne's good sense nor scruples could prevent the police agents being sent to arrest the Duke d'Otranto. It was a useless piece of folly which, at least, ought not to have been attempted without a certainty of success. But if M. Fouché took part in every commotion, he had the tact to be prepared for every event, and had secured a retreat in the mansion of Queen Hortense, which was next to his, and when the police-officers arrived, he, under pretence of wanting to withdraw for a few minutes, made his escape through the garden.

This would have been a laughable adventure had it occurred at a less critical time. On the morning of the 19th, news arrived that Napoleon was approaching Fontainebleau, and now the inevitable moment had arrived when Louis XVIII should come to some determination. A man of his habits and tastes had not much to choose between. It was too late to seek the constitutional party, with whose leaders he was but slightly acquainted, and whom he could not summon to his aid without exciting the anger of his friends, to a degree exceeding his power of resistance. Marshal Marmont's proposal of enduring a siege in the Tuileries, he looked upon as folly; and that of M. de Vitrolles, to retire into Vendée, he regarded as worthy of the Count d'Artois, which, on the King's part, was saying enough. No alternative remained but to retire towards the north, without crossing the frontier. This plan, which had been

suggested by the Duke d'Orléans and Marshal Macdonald, was more in unison with the King's ordinary prudence, and he consequently preferred it to the others. The Duke d'Orléans had gone to Flanders. Louis XVIII felt the greatest esteem for the prudence, loyalty, and coolness shown by Marshal Macdonald, who was still in Paris, though appointed to command the army at Melun under the Duke de Berry. He sent for him to ask his advice. The Marshal told the King that he felt no confidence in the army that was being assembled at Melun, that though the household troops were brave and devoted, they were inexperienced, and would not be able to stand against the imperial troops for two hours; that the number of volunteers in the National Guards was too insignificant to be taken into account, whilst the troops of the line would certainly pass over to the enemy as soon as they came within range of the cannon. So little confidence, indeed, did the Marshal feel in the soldiers, that he had not ventured to assemble them at Melun, lest, when congregated together, they might give utterance to their sentiments. For this reason, he had only sent the half-pay officers thither, who were formed into battalions *d'élite* by Marshal Soult, but who already gave vent to alarming expressions, and threatened every moment to revolt. These things being told in all sincerity, the Marshal advised the King to retire to Lisle, and there await the issue of the struggle that was about to commence between Europe and the revived Empire. The King considered the Marshal's advice excellent, and fully coincided in his opinion, but he did not think it would be easier to make an effectual resistance at Lisle than at Paris, and his wish was simply to retire to his asylum at Hartwell, where he had enjoyed perfect repose during six years, and where, thanks to the errors of his brother and friends, he feared he would be obliged to end his days.

But Lisle was on the road to London, and as it would be better to remain at the frontier, if possible, he agreed to the Marshal's plan, and desired him to see to its execution. But there was one thing that made him feel anxious, and this anxiety was shared by the Marshal. Memory, that dangerous faculty of the Bourbons, told him that Louis XVI., in seeking to escape, had been arrested at Varennes, and brought back by force to Paris. He dreaded that in a popular tumult, excited by the inhabitants of the faubourgs and the half-pay officers, his carriage might be stopped, and his departure prevented. The Marshal, who participated in his fears, arranged with him that the troops should be sent to Villejuif, under pretence of forming them into *corps d'armée*, and these out of the way, the household troops should be assembled in the Champ de Mars, under pretext of being reviewed, but in reality to escort the

royal family, that then they should suddenly cross the Seine, and proceed towards the north by the road of La Revolte. The King arranged all these details with Marshal Macdonald, but said nothing of his plans to Marshal Marmont, whose indiscretion he dreaded; he simply ordered that the household troops should be kept ready to march at a moment's notice.

On the morning of the 19th, things had come to such a state that nobody thought of making any further objection or suggestion, but only looked forward to Napoleon's arriving within the next twenty-four hours, and of escaping from the effects of his ferocity, which each pictured to himself in accordance with the amount of his own hatred. Louis XVIII. was thus freed from all opposition, for even his brother, the Count d'Artois, and his nephew, the Duke de Berry, did not, in presence of the impending danger, advance an opinion opposed to his. On the morning of the 19th, therefore, everything was prepared in secret for the departure of the royal family, either during the day or night, when there would be no longer a doubt about Napoleon's approach.

In conformity with the adopted project, Marshal Macdonald ordered the immediate departure of the troops for Villejuif, and sent the royal volunteers, commanded by M. de Viomesnil, to Vincennes, announcing, at the same time, that the princes and he would proceed to Villejuif to take the command of the army. This was only meant to deceive the mass of the people, but every one at Court was aware of the preparations for leaving Paris. Consequently, many private individuals took their departure the same day. Money was wanted, but could not be easily procured from so scrupulous a Minister as M. Louis. However, it was got in the most regular manner possible. The *domaine extraordinaire*, which was appropriated to defray the expenses of the civil list, had not yet been touched. It consisted of exchequer bills to the amount of six million francs, and these were cashed some days before the King's departure. The civil list became debtor to the *trésor extraordinaire*, and converted the bills into specie. As it was the beginning of the year, the civil list, which was large, might take an advance of several millions, by which five or six millions more might be raised, making, in all, from eleven to twelve million francs. Of these, four millions were given to the treasurer of the household troops, and about three millions to M. de Blacas, for the expenses of the King's household. Some millions were divided between the Princes, the principal gentlemen of the Court, and those Generals that were to accompany the royal family.* The

* The account of these sums, regularly presented, is to be found in the archives of the Empire.

next proceeding was not so regular. The crown jewels were packed up, and placed amongst the baggage of the royal fugitive. In a political sense, the Bourbons considered they had no orders to give, and gave none. They contented themselves with telling the Ministers to follow the King, but gave no intimation of their design to the Chambers. As the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême were in the south, where great zeal was shown for the royal cause, and the Duke de Bourbon in Vendée, it was decided that M. de Vitrolles, who had always felt great confidence in the Western provinces, should proceed thither, to act as responsible minister to either the Duke d'Angoulême or the Duke de Bourbon, and try, under the authority of these princes to form a special government for these countries. He was to take with him letters of authority from the King, and was to leave for the South at the same time that the royal family set out for the North.

During the entire day of the 19th, an anxious, curious, and evidently well-meaning crowd filled the Place du Carrousel, looking at the carriages that entered and left, and suspecting, from the numerous departures from the Faubourg Saint-Germain, that a more important one would soon proceed from the Tuileries. Although there were many half-pay officers in this crowd, come to watch what was going forward, a general feeling of sincere interest was felt for the royal family, and cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" were occasionally heard. In the course of the day, M. Lainé came, in the name of the Constitutional party, to renew, once more, the offer of making some opposition to the enemy, by giving M. de Lafayette the command of the National Guard. He was received politely, and though he was not told of the approaching departure of the Court, it was intimated to him that it was now too late to attempt anything. In the afternoon, the King arranged with Marshal Macdonald that he would drive out for a little while, in order to try the disposition of the populace, and see whether he would be permitted to leave his capital. Marshal Marmont had received orders to assemble the household troops in the Champ de Mars, which he was only able to do partially, as the orders had been issued so unexpectedly. However, the greater number were brought together, and it was arranged that the King, under pretence of reviewing them, should leave the Tuileries, to which he would return if all seemed quiet, but if the populace appeared hostile, he was to cross the Seine by the Jena bridge, traverse the wood of Boulogne, and reach the Saint Denis route, ordering his body guards to follow.

He left the palace between three and four o'clock, and found the crowd assembled on the Place du Carrousel, inquisitive, but quiet, and even affectionate. They made way respectfully for

his carriage. He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, found tranquillity everywhere, and then returned to the Tuileries, intending not to leave until the evening, which would give him a little more time to prepare.

Towards evening, Napoleon's arrival at Fontainebleau was announced, and there was no doubt but that he would be at Paris the next day. It was, therefore, determined not to delay the departure any longer. At eleven o'clock, when the crowd had somewhat dispersed, the gates of the Tuileries were closed, and the royal family got into their carriages. They proceeded towards Saint-Denis without meeting resistance or inquiry, for the streets of the capital were quite deserted at that hour. Marshal Macdonald ordered such troops as had not yet left for Villejuif to proceed towards Saint-Denis, but without the least hope of saving them from the contagion of desertion, or securing their fidelity to the King. It was midnight when the royal fugitives passed through Saint-Denis, without meeting any other accident than some unseasonable cries from a battalion of half-pay officers proceeding in the same direction. Thus, after a Restoration of eleven months, the unfortunate Bourbons became again exiles, a consequence less of their own errors, than of those committed by their friends.

The next morning, the 20th of March, as soon as day dawned, anxious crowds assembled round the Tuileries to observe what was going on. Servants in livery were visible, but not a single officer, or one member of the Body Guard; as usual, some of the National Guards were stationed outside as sentinels. The white flag still floated from the principal dome, and some few cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" were heard, but not one ventured to say, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" although there were a great many half-pay officers among the crowd. Soon the fatal secret was declared, and spread through Paris in a moment. The heads of the different parties were the first that learned the intelligence, and hastened to talk it over together. The Royalists were in despair, the Constitutionals were deeply annoyed at having been entrapped into compromising themselves without necessity, and the Bonapartists were delighted, because, since the unsuccessful attempt to arrest M. Fouché, they had lived in constant alarm, nor could they believe themselves safe until Napoleon should be settled at the Tuileries. Some called on old Cambacérés to ask what was to be done. He advised them not to anticipate Napoleon's wishes, as he would not be pleased with any one that would act without or before him. When they mentioned the public treasury, the post-office, and all that ought to be saved from the general confusion, "Don't you interfere," he said, "anything is better than to assume the authority that belongs to the Emperor." He spoke in the

spirit of the Old Empire, but the New was to be entirely different.

Still M. Lavalette would go to the post-office, which he had directed so long, merely to get information, not thinking that he was thus preparing that sentence of death that was to be pronounced against him at a later period. The moment he arrived there, the clerks surrounded him, begging him to resume his former place as their *chef*, and even M. Ferrand, the director appointed by Louis XVIII., requested him to take his place, and give him an order to get horses. This old royalist was convinced that it was by a conspiracy, and not through their own fault that the Bourbons had fallen, and M. Lavalette's appearance, though the result of accident, confirmed this opinion. M. Lavalette had had no part in any conspiracy, not even in the silly attempt of the brothers Lallemand, and did nothing more than send a courier to Fontainebleau to inform Napoleon of the evacuation of the Tuileries.

The moment the King's departure was known, the Place du Carrousel was thronged with thousands of young officers, who, for the last year, had filled Paris with their opposition in word and deed. General Exelmans was one of the first that appeared. For some time they contemplated the silent and deserted palace, over which the white flag was still floating; they entered, the servants obsequiously opening the doors, and ordered the white flag to be lowered, and the tricolour to be hoisted in its stead, to the great joy of all present. They then traversed the city, seeking the ancient ministers and dignitaries of the Empire, MM. de Bassano, De Rovigo, Decrès, Mollien, Gaudin, Queen Hortense, and Joseph's wife, the former Queen of Spain. In an instant, the palace was filled with Napoleon's old officials, all impatiently waiting the arrival of their master. A great number of military men of every rank had gone to meet him on the Fontainebleau route.

In fact, Napoleon had arrived during the night at Fontainebleau, and rested there for some hours while awaiting his cavalry; he then received M. Lavalette's courier, and soon after saw M. de Caulaincourt hastening to him in the first post-chaise he could procure. Napoleon clasped that faithful servant in his arms, and held him for some time pressed to his heart. He determined to set out on the spot, and enter Paris on the same day, that there might be no delay in placing himself at the head of the Government. Besides, the 20th of March was the birthday of his son, and he had a superstitious feeling concerning anniversaries, which is very common amongst those who have made large and successful demands on fortune.

Having given some orders about the marching of the troops, he left Fontainebleau at two o'clock, in a post carriage, ac-

accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, and his faithful companions Bertrand and Drouot. He was joined at Villejuif by the greater number of the troops destined for the army at Melun. The staff of this army had, as we have already said, been sent to Saint Denis. The soldiers were, consequently, without commanders, and could the more easily follow their own inclinations. When Napoleon had received their enthusiastic congratulations, he continued his journey, escorted by a number of officers from different regiments on horseback. His progress being retarded by this crowd, it was nine in the evening when he arrived at Paris. In order to avoid the narrow streets of the centre of the capital, he drove along the outer boulevard, and then along the quays to the Tuileries. The people of Paris were not aware of his arrival, so that this strange and extraordinary imperial restoration had no other witnesses than the few idlers and the crowd of officers assembled on the Place du Carrousel.

His carriage had entered the palace yard before it was known whom it contained. A moment was sufficient to spread the intelligence. Then Napoleon, snatched from the arms of M.M. de Caulaincourt, Bertrand, and Drouot, was borne forward in the arms of the half-pay officers, who exhibited a frantic joy. A combined and intense cry of "*Vive l'Empereur*," had carried the important intelligence to the throng of high functionaries that filled the Tuileries. They immediately rushed towards the staircase, where they formed an opposing current to that of the officers, who were ascending, and an almost alarming struggle followed, for both parties were nearly stifled, and so was Napoleon himself. He was borne in this manner to the top of the staircase, and for the first time in his life, overcome by his emotion, he shed tears. Placed at length upon his feet, he walked straight forward not looking on either side, abandoning his hands to those who pressed, kissed, and bruised them, with the testimonies of their affection.

After a few moments he recovered himself, recognized his most faithful servants, embraced them, and without taking one moment's rest, retired with them to organize a government.

Thus in twenty days, from the 1st to the 20th of March, that strange prophecy was fulfilled, which said that the imperial eagle "*would fly without pause from steeple to steeple even to the towers of Notre Dame*." Nothing in Napoleon's entire career was more extraordinary, nor apparently more difficult of explanation, though in reality capable of being easily explained. The unfortunate Bourbons who fled, imputed this revolution not to their faults, but to a vast conspiracy, which according to their report was spread throughout France. But as we have seen, there was no conspiracy. There had been indeed, an

insignificant plot, devised by some young officers, the dupes of M. Fouché, but this project when put into execution, even aided by the powerful stimulant of Napoleon's disembarkation, failed completely. But this was wholly unconnected with the Isle of Elba, for M. de Bassano, who was aware of its existence without being mixed up in it, had informed Napoleon of the public discontent, without offering any advice. Napoleon, upon whom this information produced very little effect, was expecting to be quickly carried off by force from the Isle of Elba, to see his companions in exile die of weariness or want before his eyes, and believing that the Congress was dissolved, he had determined to set out, moved thereto especially by his intense activity of mind, and by his extraordinary daring. He trusted to his good fortune to traverse the sea in safety, and he hoped to march triumphantly through the interior of France, sustained by sentiments that the Bourbons had deeply wounded. His profound discernment had unerringly foreseen that the national sentiments, represented by the army and the principles of '89, represented by the peasantry and the inhabitants of the towns, would burst forth at his appearance, and that having overcome the first difficulty, he would win over the people and the army, and advance with rapid strides to Paris, accompanied by the soldiers that had been sent to oppose him. He had therefore embarked, confiding as usual in his presiding star, crossed the sea without opposition, and disembarked without encountering any impediment upon a coast, along which were stationed a few excise officers; then having to choose between two routes, that of the Alps, beset with physical impediments, and that of the sea shore, rendered difficult by moral obstacles, he selected the former—meeting at La Mure a battalion that hesitated, he turned the scale in his favour by boldly presenting his bare breast to the men. On that day France was reconquered, and Napoleon virtually remounted his throne.

Thus an act of foresight that consisted in reading distinctly the heart of France, whose sentiments were insulted by the emigration, and an act of daring that won over a battalion that vacillated between duty and feeling were, combined with the errors committed by the Bourbons, the true causes of this extraordinary, and yet we must say, common-place revolution, however extraordinary it may appear. Would it, in fact, be possible that the old *régime* and the revolution could find themselves again brought face to face in 1814, without immediately grappling with each other, and engaging in a formidable and decisive struggle. Certainly not, and a fresh struggle between these two powers was inevitable. Napoleon, it is true, by engaging in the contest, gave it European, that is to say, gigantic proportions. But for him this struggle would not, perhaps,

have occurred so soon; it would not perhaps have provoked foreign intervention, and in this sense, being inevitable, it is deeply to be regretted that it was aggravated by his presence. But this is a doubtful point, and it is probable that foreigners on seeing the Bourbons defeated by the regicides, would not have been less tempted to interfere than on beholding the provoking countenance of the conqueror of Austerlitz.

Be this as it may, amid the delirious joy of one party, and the natural consternation of the others, enlightened patriots, who were desirous of moderate liberty, intermediate between the old *régime* and the revolution, limited their last contest to peaceful and legal struggles, and it must ever be a cause of regret that this conflict was not allowed to decide the deadly conflict between France and Europe. Consequently the *bourgeoisie*, understanding the sentiments of these patriots better than those of any other class, without regretting the emigrants, without rejecting Napoleon, whose great deeds they admired, were restless and disquiet. No tears were seen in their eyes, neither were there any traces of joy on their faces; they scarcely exhibited any curiosity, so clearly did they foresee a repetition of the sad events they had already beheld, and which excited in their minds a sentiment of profound alarm. Events soon justified these sad presentiments!

BOOK LVIII.

ADDITIONAL ACT.

Pacific and liberal language of Napoleon in his first conversations—He chooses his ministers on the very evening of the 20th of March—Prince Cambacérès is provisionally invested with the administration of Justice—Marshal Davout is appointed War Minister—The Duke d'Otranto has the direction of the police—General Carnot is made Minister of the Interior, and the Duke de Vicence Minister of Foreign Affairs—Count de Lobau is appointed commandant of the first military division, with orders to re-establish discipline in the regiments, nearly all of which were to traverse the capital—On the morning of the 21st of March, Napoleon sets to work, and seizes the different branches of the Government—Would he take advantage of the impulse communicated by his late success, and advance immediately to the Rhine?—Peremptory reasons against such a determination—Napoleon resolves to pause and organize his forces, offering peace to Europe on the basis of the Treaty of Paris—Orders given to General Exelmans to pursue the fugitive Court of Louis XVIII at Lille—Cold, but respectful reception of the troops—A council is held, at which the Duke d'Orléans and several marshals are present—The Duke d'Orléans advises the King to repair to Dunkirk and take up his abode there—Louis XVIII at first approves this advice, then changes his opinion and retires to Ghent—The troops and the Marshals accompany him to the frontier, but refuse to go further—Dismissal of the household troops—The north and east of France become tranquil—Brief appearance of the Duke of Bourbon in Vendée, and hasty retreat into England—The policy of the Vendean chiefs is to await the general war before taking up arms—The Duchess of Angoulême stops at Bordeaux, where the populace seem disposed to take her part—General Clausel is commissioned to recall Bordeaux to the imperial authority—M. de Vitrolles attempts to establish a kingly government at Toulouse—Journey of the Duke d'Angoulême to Marseilles—This prince assembles some regiments for the purpose of marching on Lyons—The disturbances in the south cause no uneasiness to Napoleon, as he believes that France has been definitely pacified by the departure of Louis XVIII—Though always expressing the most pacific sentiments, Napoleon, certain of being engaged in war, commences his military preparations on a large scale—His plan is conceived and arranged between the 25th and 27th of March—Formation of eight corps d'armée, under the title of *corps d'observation*; of these, five which were intended to be brought first into action, are stationed between Maubenge and Paris—Reconstruction of the Imperial Guard—To avoid having recourse to the conscription, Napoleon recalls the *semestriers*, the soldiers who were absent on unlimited leave, and flatters himself to be able by this means to assemble 400,000 men in the *cadres* of the regiments on service—He defers to a later period to put the conscription of 1815 into execution, for which he believes he does not need the passing of a new law—The half-pay officers are employed to form the fourth and fifth battalions—Napoleon mobilizes 200,000 of the *élite* of the National Guards, intending to confide to them the defence of the fortresses and some portions of the frontier—Creation of extra workshops for the fabrication of arms and clothes—The dépôt is re-established at Versailles—Arming of Paris and Lyons—The navy is called upon to contribute to the defence of these important points—Having given these orders, Napoleon sends some troops to General Clausel to subdue Bordeaux, and sends

General Grouchy to Lyons to repress the attempts of the Duke d'Angoulême—Reception on the 28th of March of the great bodies of the state—Renewal under a more solemn form of the promise to maintain peace and make radical changes in the imperial institutions—Prompt repression of the attempted resistance in the south—Entry of General Clausel into Bordeaux, and embarkation of the Duchess d'Angoulême—Arrest of M. de Vitrolles at Toulouse—Campaign of the Duke d'Angoulême on the Rhone—Capitulation of this prince—Napoleon makes him embark at Cette—General submission to the Empire—Continuation of Napoleon's preparations, and formation of a 9th Corps—State of Europe—Refusal to receive the French couriers, and extraordinary excitement of the public at Vienna—Declaration of the Congress on the 13th of March, by which Napoleon is outlawed—This declaration is sent by extraordinary couriers to all the French frontiers—The King of Rome is taken away from Maria Louisa, and she is obliged to choose between Napoleon and the Coalition—Maria Louisa renounces her husband, and consents to remain at Vienna under the guardianship of her father and the allied sovereigns—On learning the definite success of Napoleon, and his entry into Paris, the Congress renews the alliance of Chaumont by the treaty of the 25th March—The Duke of Wellington, though he has not received instructions from his Government, does not fear to pledge England to the proposed conditions, and signs the treaty of the 25th of March—Plan of the campaign, and design of marching 800,000 men against France—Two great junctions of the troops, one in the east, under Prince de Schwarzenberg, and another in the north under Wellington and Blücher—Departure of Lord Wellington for Brussels—The Treaty of the 25th of March is sent to London—State of the public mind in England—The mass of the English nation, disgusted with war, displeased with the Bourbons, and impressed by Napoleon's repeated declarations, wish that his pacific dispositions should have a trial—The Cabinet, determined to ratify the engagements contracted by Lord Wellington, but embarrassed by the state of public opinion, resolve to dissimulate with the Parliament, and send the members a false message, announcing simple precaution, whilst they secretly ratify the treaty of the 25th of March, and thus pledge themselves to war—Discussion and adoption of the message to Parliament, in the belief that precautions alone are contemplated—Two members of the British Cabinet are sent to Belgium to make arrangements with Lord Wellington—State of the Court at Ghent—Violence of the Germans, and threats to partition France—Lord Wellington endeavours to calm the excitement, and spite of the impatience of the Prussians, succeeds in preventing hostilities before the concentration of all the allied forces—Napoleon, confronted by the declarations of all Europe, having no further motive for dissimulation, determines to tell the entire truth to the nation—M. de Caulaincourt's report is published on the 13th of April, and in it are fully exposed the offences offered to France—Review of the National Guard, and energetic language of Napoleon—Napoleon redoubles the activity of his military preparations, and causes decrees relative to France's arming, to be inserted in the "Moniteur," proceedings which had hitherto been carried on in secret—Sadness of Napoleon and the public—Napoleon resolves at length to keep the promise he has made, of modifying the imperial laws—He does not hesitate to grant a constitutional monarchy—His opinions on the different questions connected with this serious matter—He does not wish to convoke a Constituent Assembly, for fear of having, in the midst of war, to contend with a revolutionary assembly—He resolves to draw up, or cause to be drawn up, a new constitution, and present it for the acceptance of France—Having learned that M. Benjamin Constant has remained concealed at Paris, he sends for him, and commissions him to draw up a new constitution—Napoleon appears to agree on every point with M. Constant, except the abolition of the act of confiscation, the hereditary peerage, and the title of the new constitution—Napoleon insists on calling it "An act added to the Imperial Constitution"—The bill is sent to the Privy Council, and M. Benjamin Constant is appointed Privy Councillor, for the purpose of supporting his own work—Completion and promulgation of the new Constitution, under the title of "An additional Act"—Character of this act.

BOOK LVIII.

ADDITIONAL ACT.

The palace of the Tuileries, on the evening of the 20th of March, presented a scene of confused and noisy delight, which respect, diminished by revolutionary principles, no longer restrained. Here were fortuitous meetings between persons who had not seen each other for a year, and who never expected to meet in that palace again. As soon as anybody appeared who had been long forgotten, or who possessed the rare merit of not having sought the favour of the Bourbons, he was received with loud applause, reverence for the place and the master who had returned there, being no check on these demonstrations. The crowd of lookers-on exhibited a profound feeling of interest as the Queen of Spain and Queen Hortense passed between their serried ranks. The latter, as we have said, had remained at Paris, protected by the Emperor Alexander; she had obtained for her children the province of Saint-Leu. The Emperor who had been most amiable in his manner to all comers, was harsh to her. "You in Paris," he said on perceiving her, "you are the last person I should have expected to meet there." "I remained," she replied, "to take care of my mother." "But after the death of your mother?" "After her death, I found in the Emperor Alexander a protector for my children, and I endeavoured to secure their future prospects." "Your children! poverty and exile would have become them better than the patronage of the Emperor of Russia." "But have not you, Sire, allowed the King of Rome to owe the duchy of Parma to the generosity of this prince?"

Not being able to reply to so strong an argument, Napoleon resumed: "And your law-suit! who advised you to that proceeding?" (The princess had instituted a suit against her husband in the French courts, to obtain the guardianship of her children). "You have been persuaded to make an exhibition

of family misfortunes, which ought to have been kept secret, and you have lost your suit." But Napoleon, quickly regretting this severity, opened his arms to his adopted daughter whom he loved, embraced her and said: "I am a good father, you know it. Let us say no more on these subjects. And you have been present at poor Josephine's death. Amid our many misfortunes, her death pierced my heart."

This short explanation being finished, Napoleon became again, for the Queen Hortense, the most affectionate of fathers, and continued to show himself such during his abode in France.

The Prince Cambacérès next appeared, broken down under the weight of years, and scarcely capable of experiencing an emotion of joy; with him came M. de Bassano, far more delighted at again beholding his master, than at the prospect of recovering his former position. Napoleon received the former with the consideration that he had always accorded to his profound good sense, and the latter with expressions of the warmest friendship. He conversed a long time with both. Then came the Dukes de Vicence, de Gaëte, de Rovigo, Decrès; the Counts Mollien, Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely, Lavalette, and Defermon. A murmur of approbation, always proportioned to their recent conduct, greeted these diverse personages. When Marshal Davout appeared, whose memorable defence of Hamburg and his proscription had rendered dear to the Bonapartists, uproarious acclamations burst forth, when it became necessary to remind the applauders that they were not in a public assembly.

Napoleon had not seen the Marshal since their sad separation at Smorgoni in 1812, when he left the Russian army. The Marshal had retired first to the Lower Elbe; he was afterwards shut up in Hamburg, where he had kept the tricolour flag flying to the end of April, in opposition to all the armies of Europe, and when he returned to Paris, Louis XVIII had already occupied the throne two months. Napoleon embraced the Marshal, complimented him on his glorious defence of Hamburg, spoke of his justificatory memoir, which he praised very much, and added pointedly, "In reading this memoir, I saw with pleasure that my letters had been useful to you."

The Marshal had, in fact, quoted in his justification some passages from the terrible letters that Napoleon had written to him from Dresden, omitting those parts that commanded excessive severity, which indeed, had never been put into execution. "I only quoted," replied the Marshal, "a very small portion of your Majesty's letters, because you were absent, I shall now quote the entire." Napoleon smiled at this reply, and testified the highest esteem for the Marshal.

There appeared soon after, a personage of a very different caste, whom stupid-minded courtiers hurried to present to the Emperor as one whose adhesion was of vast importance; this was the Duke d'Otranto. By dint of asserting himself to be a person of great importance, M. Fouché had actually become so in the eyes of the public, and he was believed to be the author of that pretended conspiracy, whose triumph seemed now to be accomplished; a ridiculous chimera, in whose existence the Bonapartists had the folly to believe, which the fugitive emigrants determined to punish by the shedding of blood, and for which the heads of illustrious men were destined to fall! The courtiers had boasted to Napoleon of M. Fouché's services, and even of the dangers he had incurred, and on seeing him appear, they exclaimed, "Allow the Duke d'Otranto to pass," as if this gentleman were about to bring chained to the feet of Napoleon all the parties of whom he was supposed to be the secret mover. Napoleon was not the dupe of the common illusion, but feeling the necessity of keeping on good terms with everybody, he received M. Fouché as an old friend of the Revolution and the Empire; but there was a shade of difference between his present manner and that of former times; he was at the same time less familiar and less severe. M. Fouché told Napoleon that he had done wisely to return, for France desired his presence. He then related in a certain careless way that it was he, the Duke d'Otranto, who had made the troops march from Flanders to operate a diversion in his favour, and if this movement had not succeeded, the failure was attributable to the giddiness of those who had undertaken to execute it.

Napoleon listened complacently to all that M. Fouché and others said to raise their own importance. "I see," he said, "that there has been a conspiracy, and," he added smiling, "I am willing to believe that it was in my favour. As for me, I have not conspired with any body. My sole correspondents have been the public journals. When I learned through the press how the army and the holders of national property were treated, and in fact all those whose interests were bound up in those of the Revolution, I had no longer a doubt about the sentiments of France, and I resolved to come and deliver her from the influence of the emigrants. Besides I was certain that my enemies intended to carry me off to some tropical clime. I selected the moment when the Congress was about to be dissolved, and when the nights were still sufficiently long to favour my escape. Having crossed the sea, I presented myself before the soldiers, and asked would they fire upon me. They replied by exclaiming, '*Vive l'Empereur!*' The peasantry caught up the cry, adding, '*à bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres!*' They accompanied me from city to city, and when they could

go no further, they confided to others the duty of escorting me to Paris. After the Provençaux, the Dauphinois—after the Dauphinois, the Lyonnais—after the Lyonnais, the Bourguignons, have formed my cortège, and the real conspirators who have won me all these friends, are the Bourbons themselves. We must now profit by their errors, and by our own," he added, bowing his head with a modest smile. "We do not intend to repeat the past. I have dwelt a year in the Isle of Elba, and *there as in a tomb, I have heard the voice of posterity*. I know what ought to be avoided, I know what ought to be desired. I had dreamed a magnificent future for France; on the morrow of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, such dreams were pardonable. There is no occasion to tell you that I have abandoned these ideas. Alas! it would be no longer excusable in me to frame such bright illusions, after the experience I have had. I wish for peace, and I who would never have consented to sign the Treaty of Paris, I pledge myself, now that it is signed, to execute it faithfully. I have written to Vienna, to my wife, and my father-in-law, to offer peace on these conditions. The hatred of the allies against us is unquestionably very great, but by allowing each to keep what he has taken, interest will perhaps silence the voice of passion. Austria has powerful motives for dealing gently with us. England is overwhelmed with debt. Alexander through vanity, the Prussians through hatred, will be alone tempted to recommence hostilities, but it is not certain that they will do so. We shall, however, be ready, and if after appearing before Europe with the Treaty of Paris in our hand, we are not listened to, we shall beg the aid of heaven, and I hope we shall be once more victorious.

"But," continued Napoleon, "it is not peace alone that I wish to bestow on France, I wish to give her liberty. Our duty is to do firmly and thoroughly all that the Bourbons have not been able to accomplish. They have sapped the security of the legitimate interests of the Revolution, and have insulted our glory whilst affecting to court the chiefs of the army; we must re-establish these interests, and revive this glory. We must do more, we must give freely that liberty which they gave by compulsion, and which whilst they gave with one hand, they withdrew with the other. I wished for unlimited power, and I needed it, when I sought to reconstitute France and to found an immense empire. But I do not want it now. Let me only be allowed to pacify or conquer our foreign foes, and I will content myself with the authority of a constitutional king. I am no longer young; I shall soon have lost the vigour of youth; besides the measure of authority wielded by a king of England will be sufficient for my son. But we must avoid blunders, we

must not stumble in our attempts at liberty, for that would revive in France the necessity and desire of absolute power. As for me, the sole glory to which I aspire, is to uphold the principles of the Revolution, to secure our independance by policy or victory, and then to prepare a constitutional throne for my son. I shall consider myself sufficiently powerful if I succeed in this two-fold task. After having given my first cares to the reorganization of our army, and the re-establishment of our relations with Europe, I will, with you, apply myself to the revision of our laws, and seek to accommodate them to the state of public feeling. And without further delay, we shall to-morrow restore the liberty of the press. The liberty of the press!" exclaimed Napoleon, "why should I henceforth fear it? *After what the journalists have written during the last year, they can have nothing more to say of me, but something still remains to be said of my adversaries.*"

These remarks which we have condensed, were addressed sometimes to one person, sometimes to another, always with infinite tact, a perfectly natural manner, and a convincing air of sincerity. These observations were so suitable to the position of affairs, and so consonant with the feelings of the listeners, that no person thought of questioning their sincerity. The more clear-sighted would no doubt, had the emotion called up at the moment permitted them to reflect, have asked themselves whether it would be possible for Napoleon to endure submissively the sharp shocks of liberty. But even the most clear-sighted, stunned by the events that were passing around them, and by Napoleon's miraculous return, thought more of enjoying the present than of penetrating the future, to seek there cause of grief.

Be this as it may, though Napoleon was eloquent and fond of talking, he was not in the habit of wasting his time in empty speeches. What he had said was necessary, in order that the opinions he entertained might be generally known. But there was an affair quite as necessary and as pressing, which was to form a Ministry. In former days, when Napoleon was everything, both the aggregate and the detail of the Government, it was easy to construct a Ministry. But now when the country was to be associated in his acts, when it was necessary to prove to the people his intentions by the choice he made, it was needful that he should exercise much reflection and discernment in the appointment of ministers who were not to be mere clerks.

After having had a conference the same evening with Prince Cambacérès, whose good sense he had always appreciated, and with M. Bassano, whose fidelity had never faltered, Napoleon filled up the list of his ministers with his accustomed prompti-

tude. There were several gentlemen, whom it was merely necessary to restore to their former places, for they were competent to fill them under any *régime*. These were the Duke Decrès, who was appointed Minister of Marine, the Duke de Gaëte, Minister of Finance, Count Mollien, First Lord of the Treasury, and lastly, the Duke de Vicence, who was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. About these appointments there could be no hesitation. It was not so for the departments of War, the Interior, the Police, and the administration of Justice. The appointments in these departments should be new and characteristic. The Duke de Feltre had followed the fortunes of the Bourbons, he was therefore out of the question. But his place could be advantageously filled by one, whom the voice of the public would have nominated, had a moment of doubt intervened. This was the defender of Hamburg, Marshal Davout. He was an upright dispenser of justice, unbending and unremitting in the discharge of his duties, as well as an intrepid warrior; and to all these high qualifications, he added the singular merit of being the only Marshal that the Bourbons had proscribed. Napoleon determined to offer and make him accept the war portfolio.

For Minister of the Interior, Napoleon would have wished M. Lavalette, whose rectitude of feeling equalled the perspicacity of his intellect, and to whom during twenty years he had been in the habit of speaking without reserve. But it was remarked to Napoleon, that to so important a post he ought to appoint a more distinguished person, one who would seem to indicate the changes he proposed, and the illustrious Carnot was named. He was the type of honest revolutionists, and joined to his anciently-acquired merit of having organized the victory of Fructidor, for which he was afterwards proscribed, the additional claim of defender of Antwerp, and author of the "Mémorial to the King." No sooner was he named, than Napoleon acquiesced in the choice. Carnot had won his heart by asking service in 1814, and by boldly resisting the Restoration; but he feared the republican memories attached to his name; "For," he said, "France is now enamoured of a constitutional monarchy, but she has not ceased to fear a republic."

But as Napoleon was desirous of appointing Carnot to the Ministry, he devised a means of avoiding the difficulties attached to his name, by giving him the title of Count, a recompense he well deserved for his noble conduct at Antwerp.

The Police Department was not less important than that of the Interior, and Napoleon would willingly have reinstated the Duke de Rovigo in his former office, though he had been often importuned by his frankness. But no sooner was his name mentioned, than there arose a universal cry, not against the

Duke de Rovigo personally, but against the ancient imperial despotism of which he was the living representative. Napoleon did not persist, but received with a very bad grace the name of the Duke d'Otranto, which rose simultaneously to the lips of all present. He considered M. Fouché as something more than a restless intriguer; he saw in him a secret enemy, capable of the most dangerous machinations. He was told in reply, that M. Fouché besides being a regicide, had become still more incompatible with the Bourbons, since he had run the risk of imprisonment. "It is possible," replied Napoleon, "that he has quarrelled with the Bourbons, but it is not certain. In any case, he has not quarrelled with the Duke d'Orléans, nor with the republic, nor with some fanciful regency of Maria Louisa that he has devised, and the plan of which he has been hawking about for the last year." In reply to this, it was said, that as the Duke d'Otranto was irrevocably separated from the Bourbons by the blood of Louis XVI, and by the late attempt to arrest him, he might be firmly attached to the Empire by the portfolio of Police; besides that he alone possessed sufficient address to guide and restrain the newly-awakened parties without offending them; in short, that he was a necessity.

This last merit, the offspring of chance alone, was the only one that Napoleon admitted, and he yielded, but, however, without hoping to receive such important services from M. Fouché as were promised. He felt that it would be dangerous to change him into a declared enemy by refusing him the post he so ardently desired. However, he determined to give him an overseer, by appointing his enemy, the Duke de Rovigo, chief of the gendarmerie. He thus rewarded a faithful servant, at the same time that he placed him as sentinel on a minister on whose fidelity he could not depend, but whom he was forced to accept.

The Chancellor was still to be appointed. Napoleon wished to give this post to Cambacérès, at least for a time, as he alone possessed sufficient tact and authority to influence the magistrates, who whilst they were disturbed, divided and discontented by the retrograde policy of the Bourbons, were alarmed by the enterprising genius of Napoleon, and were still hesitating between the different masters to whom they had been subject during the last year. Such a choice was sure to be approved, provided that Napoleon could induce the timid High Chancellor to take any part in the government.

The persons whose consent was necessary were at that moment within reach of Napoleon, they were actually in the saloon of the Tuileries. He took advantage of the opportunity, and with one exception, did not allow them to leave till they were appointed. M.M. Decrès, de Gaëte, and Mollien, con-

sented to return to their former posts, where every one expected to see them. The Duke de Vicence, who was even more than usually inclined to augur badly of the future, had not sufficient confidence in the continuance of peace to undertake to maintain it. He consequently resisted Napoleon's entreaties, and left the Tuileries without accepting the direction of Foreign Affairs. Prince Cambacérès, disgusted with men and things, had no inclination to enter the ministry, which, indeed, for an ancient grand dignitary was a lowering of position. It is true that under the Constitutional government that was announced, a responsible minister would be superior to even the ancient dignitaries of the Empire. These were not considerations calculated to influence the Prince, but he nevertheless yielded through a spirit of obedience and devotedness to Napoleon, and received the title of Prince High Chancellor, *provisional administrator of justice*.

Napoleon next took Marshal Davout aside, and told him his intentions. The Marshal declared himself anxious to be again on active service at the head of the troops, and as a further objection to a ministerial appointment, adduced the little sympathy that existed between him and the soldiers, with whom his severity was proverbial. "It is exactly that severity," said Napoleon, "joined to your well known probity of which I have need. For the last year the army has been deteriorated by gifts. The Bourbons have lavished promotion. All those, and they are not few, who have adopted my cause, will expect to be favoured in their turn, and will be no less avaricious than the others. I must have an inflexible minister whose impartial justice, influenced alone by zeal for the public welfare, cannot be accused of any tendency to royalism. Your position places you above suspicion, and you can render me important services that I cannot expect from any one else." As the Marshal still objected, Napoleon added, "You are a man on whom I can depend, I may tell you everything. I have allowed it to be believed that I am in treaty with some of the European powers, and above all that I have secret communications with my father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria. There is nothing of the kind. I am alone, alone against all Europe. I expect to find the entire continent united and implacable. We must fight to the death, and consequently make formidable preparations within the next three months. I must have a minister as indefatigable as honest, and, besides, when I set out for the army, I must leave in Paris a man to whom I can safely entrust unlimited authority. You see that we cannot consult our tastes, but only conquer or die. Our very existence depends on it." After hearing these frank and energetic words, Marshal Davout obeyed in a soldier-like spirit, and accepted his appointment

as Minister, exchanging with Napoleon a warm clasp of the hand.

Napoleon then entered into conversation with the Duke de Rovigo, and with his wonted tact spoke of the Ministry of Police in such a manner as to induce him to refuse it. In fact this faithful servant saw that he could no longer undertake the office, and stated the reasons himself which would prevent his accepting it. Napoleon affecting to yield to his wishes, gave him the command of the gendarmerie, and put himself consequently under the surveillance of M. Fouché. Lastly, Napoleon spoke in private with the Duke d'Otranto. And will it be believed, that the latter did not wish to become Minister of Police, an office for which he was so well suited, but wished to be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs? M. de Talleyrand had acted as intermediary between the Bourbons and Europe, M. Fouché wished to fill the same post with regard to Napoleon: He had the presumption to believe that he would be able, by his intrigues abroad, either to reconcile the European powers with Napoleon, or if that were impossible, induce them to accept some one that he would choose, Maria Louisa, the Duke d'Orléans, or somebody else. He imagined that this would be the surest path to the high position to which he aspired, ever since the era of revolutions had recommenced. He had therefore the boldness to insinuate that he would be more useful abroad than at home. Napoleon read M. Fouché's boundless vanity at a glance, but did not laugh, for misfortune had taught him self-restraint. He excused himself for not being able to place him at the head of Foreign Affairs, by mentioning the Duke de Vicence, before whose claims all others should withdraw. He then spoke most graciously of the services that he could render in the Ministry of Police, which post M. Fouché accepted when he saw that he could not obtain any other.

It only remained to obtain the consent of the future Minister of the Interior. But the eccentric Carnot was not at the Tuileries. As he lived alone in one of the suburbs of Paris, and had no knowledge of public events but from common report, he was still ignorant of Napoleon's arrival. It was late, and Napoleon desired that he should be summoned for the next morning.

Thus ended the 20th of March, a day that had commenced in the Forest of Fontainebleau, and ended at Paris with the formation of a Ministry in the midst of the old imperial court. It was decided that the "Moniteur" should announce on the following day the appointments that had been made with the exception of those of M. Carnot and M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Bassano, ever devoted to the Emperor, resumed his old position of Secretary of State, M. Lavalette returned to the

post office, and the former presidents of the Council of State were restored to their posts.

The following day—the 21st—after a few hours' repose, Napoleon resumed that active correspondence, by means of which he imparted such vitality to the springs of government. He first traced out for Marshal Davout the plan by which he could discharge the functions of an office, which approaching events would render so important. He ordered him to proclaim throughout France, either by telegraph or express, the events of the 20th of March, in order that the troops and local authorities that had not yet declared their opinions, might come to a decision. He desired him to send active and intelligent officers into those departments where the prefects were likely to resist the re-establishment of the Empire, that the troops might be used against them; to despatch orders to the governors of frontier fortresses to hoist the tricolour flag, and close the gates against the enemy who might be tempted to take them by surprise. He ordered the Minister of Police to turn his attention immediately to the prefects and sub-prefects, and retain them in their office or dismiss them according to their behaviour; and the Duke de Rovigo, the new commander of the gendarmerie, was ordered to assume as soon as possible, the command of a troop so valuable by its intelligence, vigilance, and devotion to its duties. He sent for the Count de Lobau, whose good sense, tact, and influence with the army were well known, and conferred on him the command of Paris and of the troops that would pass through it. This was an arrangement worthy of Napoleon's vast intelligence. The revolution that had replaced him on the throne was a strictly military one. The greater number of regiments had declared for him in presence of officers, some of whom, though devoted to his cause, were undecided how to act, and others, though but few, who were hostile to his cause. Against the latter the soldiers were in a state of revolt, which it was necessary to terminate at once, in order to avoid falling into a state of absolute anarchy. The Count de Lobau was admirably well chosen to put an end to such a state of things. Besides the command of the first military division, Napoleon gave him dictatorial authority over the troops passing through the capital, with permission to change the officers or reconcile them with their soldiers, and to restore order and discipline in the army. Napoleon's plan was to bring almost every regiment successively to Paris, at least for some days, that they might all pass under the gentle but firm hand of Lobau. He advised him to commence the revision at once, for out of the fifteen or twenty thousand actually in the capital, and the almost equal number about to arrive, it was necessary to select twenty thousand to

send to Lille to oppose either any royalist attempt on the part of the fugitive princes, or any possible though improbable attack of the Anglo-Dutch army quartered in Belgium.

The precautions which it was necessary to take in this direction, gave rise to a question, which though of no weight with Napoleon, he discussed on this morning with the new Minister of War. Ought he, as some critics* have since asserted, to have continued his triumphal march towards the north, and carry even to the banks of the Rhine, the revolution that he had effected from the Loire to the Seine, and thus at a single blow recover the ancient frontiers of France, at the same time that he recovered France herself? The plan looked alluring, for amidst the prevailing enthusiasm, he was certain to meet no obstacle as far as Lille, and might flatter himself to be able to overcome all that he should meet from Lille to Cologne. But however dazzling such a project might be, it could not for an instant shake his newly-acquired but deep-rooted prudence.

In the first place, as Napoleon was advancing towards Paris, he had received information from the south, which though not alarming, deserved attention. He was told, as was true, that Marseilles was in a state of excitement, and that the people of Lower Provence were advancing towards Grenoble and Lyons under the command of the Duke d'Angoulême. On the morning of the 21st news came from Bordeaux and the west. It was announced, that under the influence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, Bordeaux imitating the example of Marseilles, was attempting to excite the departments beyond the Garonne to revolt, and was not unlikely to succeed; that the Duke de Bourbon, who was at Angers, was encouraging a rising in La Vendée; that Marshal Saint-Cyr, endowed with extraordinary powers by Louis XVIII, had hastened to Orleans, whence he had banished the tricoloured cockade assumed by the troops at the instigation of General Pajol, that he had caused this General to be arrested, and had again hoisted the white flag on the banks of the Loire. And lastly, he was told, which was of more importance, that he could not trust the Parisian National Guard. This guard, composed of citizens of the capital, were not glad to see the fall of the constitutional throne of Louis XVIII, and dreaded war beyond everything else. If the disposition of the Parisian National Guard could be deduced from the expressions of some of the officers, there was every reason to suspect them of hostile intentions.

* This remark is directed against Marshal Marmont, who with his usual thoughtlessness, has asserted, in his Memoirs, that Napoleon ought not to have stopped at Paris, but profiting by the general enthusiasm have advanced to the Rhine. It will be seen by what follows, that his opinion was rash, and void both of reason and knowledge of the existing state of things.

In all this there was no cause of serious uneasiness to a mind so firm as Napoleon's. He was well acquainted with the good sense of the National Guards of Paris, and knew that though discontented at the first moment, they would soon join him when told of his pacific and liberal intentions, especially when he would have removed some officers, who wished to make a noise, and render themselves of importance. As to the royalist attempts in the west and south, he was convinced they would be counteracted by the effects of his entrance into Paris; but in any case, he could not believe that the Bourbons, who were not able to resist him when masters of Paris, could now, fugitives at the very extremity of the kingdom, influence troops that failed them when in possession of the entire sovereign authority. However, it would have been giving them too great a chance, to withdraw from the capital before taking firm hold of the reins of government, or to hasten rashly through Belgium and the Rhenish provinces with the only organised troops that were at his disposal, and leave at Paris only ministers that had been appointed but the day before, and some dispersed and disorganised regiments, and expose himself to the risk of seeing the Bourbon authority, which he had overturned on his way, recover existence in his rear. But then there were still more important objections to be made to such a project.

In the first place, it would not be possible, in collecting all the disposable troops between Paris and Lille, to assemble more than twenty-five or thirty thousand infantry, four or five thousand cavalry, and fifty or sixty pieces of badly mounted artillery. Was it known in what state Belgium would be found? The people would be certainly well disposed towards us, but the troops would be faithful to their sovereign, and three or four times more numerous than those we could bring with us. There were, in fact, in the environs of Brussels twenty thousand Hollando-Belgians, thirty thousand English and Hanoverians, whom we in marching on Liege would throw back on thirty thousand Prussians. We would thus find ourselves in presence of eighty thousand enemies, whilst our troops amounted to only thirty or thirty-six thousand. A little further on were twenty thousand Prussians, eighteen thousand Bavarians, twenty or thirty thousand Wurtembergers, Badeners, Hessians, &c., &c.; and on arriving at the Rhine, we should have found ourselves opposed by one hundred and forty, or one hundred and fifty thousand enemies. This would be going a distance to seek a defeat, which only possible on the Meuse, was almost certain on the Rhine. Our forces would become more scattered, when they were only too much so already; the difficulty of reorganising the army, already very great, would be increased, by carrying its empty *cadres* from Lille, Mezières, and Nancy to

Cologne, Coblenz, and Mentz. Besides, throwing the allied forces back one upon the other, would be to defeat the plan on which Napoleon founded his greatest hopes, and which consisted of profiting by the dispersion of his adversaries, to throw himself into the midst of them, and conquer them in detail. And lastly, and above all, by commencing hostilities at once, he would lose those three months, which he was certain of having at his disposal, by not taking the initiative, three months of more importance to us than to the enemy, for they had something whilst we had nothing, and these three months, employed as Napoleon knew well how, would serve to compensate for the immense disparity between the French forces and those of allied Europe.

As yet we have not spoken of Napoleon's new position with regard to France, which was indeed, one of the most difficult imaginable, and absolutely forbade all immediate operations beyond the frontiers.

In what character did Napoleon appear when he landed at Cannes? As a liberator who was come to free France from the emigrants, but not to attack either her liberty or peace. Peace and liberty were the two words that pervaded his speeches from the time he left Grenoble. It was easy to pronounce the words, but not so easy to gain credence for them. To attain this, he had constantly declared, and even written to Vienna, from the different towns through which he passed, that he accepted the Treaty of Paris, and would observe it faithfully, though he had not signed it. This declaration was most agreeable to all who heard it, for they saw that if there were any chance of preserving peace, it was by the immediate announcement of his readiness to accept the arrangement of the powers, that is, the old frontier of 1789, a little extended towards Landau and Chambery. Now, if on the very day after his arrival at Paris, he had advanced at one bound to the Meuse and the Rhine, he would necessarily be looked on as the same man who had led the fortunes of France to Moscow, and brought them back by Leipsic to the heights of Montmartre; he would be again looked on as the conqueror, and if the conqueror, the despot, who had destroyed the country and her greatness. Morally speaking, not one would take his part, and as for material aid, he would be supported by some skeleton regiments stationed on the remote Rhine, where the difficulty of recruiting them would be tripled.

If, therefore, to military and administrative motives be added political reasons, it may be affirmed that there was not only good cause, but even an absolute and indisputable necessity for his remaining at Paris.

Napoleon's determination was therefore taken. Having

arrived at the capital of the empire, he resolved to seize the reins of government, and make proposals of peace to the Powers, proposals based on the Treaties of Paris and Vienna; he was resolved to endure the humiliating refusals, to which in all probability he exposed himself, which refusals far from concealing he would announce publicly, in order to enlist the national pride on his side; he would profit by the delay caused by these conferences to collect troops with his usual activity; he would keep his forces between the capital and the northern frontier, to facilitate his operations; then while he affected the most perfect inaction, he would suddenly descend on the enemy, and appear unexpectedly in the midst of their dispersed cantonments. These were sensible, solid ideas, worthy of the military and administrative genius of Napoleon.

Having entrusted the Count de Lobau with the task of assembling the troops actually in Paris, or that were to arrive there, he ordered him to inspect them rapidly, and to restore union and discipline in the regiments. He ordered him to raise immediately a body of twenty thousand men, to be commanded by the brave and sensible General Reille, who was to advance to Lille, where it was said that Louis XVIII intended to fix himself with his household troops, and perhaps a reinforcement of foreign soldiers. Fortunately, Marshal Mortier commanded at Lille under the superior command of the Duke d'Orléans. There was no doubt but that the Marshal, though he would receive Louis XVIII, as was his duty, would refuse admittance to Prussian or English forces, and that the Duke d'Orléans would be guided by Marshal Mortier, and that consequently Lille, though it might afford a temporary resting place to Louis XVIII, would not be given up to the enemy. However, not only this fortress, but all those along the northern frontier should be watched, and this General Reille could do with the twenty or thirty thousand men that would be successively placed under his orders. As General Reille could not be ready for three or four days, Napoleon ordered General Exelmans to collect all the available cavalry at once, and follow the fugitive Court with three thousand horse. General Exelmans' orders were merely to use every possible means of getting this Court out of the kingdom, with as little violence as possible, except perhaps getting possession of the little treasury of Louis XVIII, and the crown diamonds, that were packed in his travelling waggons. It was certain that General Exelmans, notwithstanding his personal wrongs, would not use unnecessary rigour in the execution of his orders, and this was what Napoleon wished, as he considered it due to himself that his conduct should contrast strongly with that of those who had set a price upon his head.

Before deciding anything with regard to the south, he wished to know the exact state of affairs in that quarter. Besides he would require time to collect other troops independent of those that were to be given to General Reille, at the same time that the state of public feeling at Lyons and Grenoble gave him full security as to anything that would be attempted on that side. As to the west, he sent an officer to Orleans with orders to Marshal Saint-Cyr, to restore the command to General Pajol, under threats of the most severe punishment, and he sent General Clausel to Bordeaux, with orders to proceed thither with all the troops he could collect on his route, and expel the Duchess d'Angoulême from the town, who all respectable as she was, could not become a very important enemy.

The morning of the 21st* being spent in these necessary arrangements, he employed the remainder of the day in reviewing the troops that were in Paris, together with those that had followed him from Grenoble, and those that had time to come from Fontainebleau. This afforded him an opportunity of showing himself to the Parisians who had not seen him yet, and to give utterance to sentiments which not being restricted to the circle of his private conversations, might be re-echoed from Paris throughout Europe.

On the Place du Carrousel were assembled about twenty-five thousand men, consisting of those troops that had come from Grenoble to Fontainebleau, those of the camp of Villejuif, and especially of the battalion from the Island of Elba, which in twenty days had achieved the prodigious march of two hundred and forty leagues on foot. The Parisian National Guard had not been summoned, because some of the officers should be changed before the Guard could appear on an occasion that celebrated the re-establishment of the Empire. But the populace hastened thither, and of course amongst the most zealous were to be found those who hated the emigrants, those who always admired the imperial glory, and many prompted by curiosity, whom the wonderful expedition from the Island of Elba had roused from their indifference. Indeed, any government, however poorly supported, can get up a brilliant festival, for every government has its partisans, who will be present on such occasions, whilst its adversaries are absent, and partisans applaud so loudly that one may be induced to believe it the universal cry of the citizens. Besides in the present case, the events which had just taken place were sufficient to excite the coldest-hearted people. The inhabitants of the suburbs came to the Place du Carrousel to applaud the man, who possessed in a higher degree than any other, the power of influencing their imaginations, and especially to cheer those eight hundred Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Guard, who, having accompanied their

general into exile, had brought him back triumphant, to place him on the throne of France. These old soldiers, covered with wounds, exhausted from fatigue, and with their shoes in tatters, produced the most lively impression on all present, and many amongst them replied, not with cheers, but tears, to the applause of the crowd. The earnest gaze of the spectators was turned from them only to seek the popular *redingote* of that wondrous man who had just accomplished a miracle worthy of his former fame. They perceived that he had become fatter, but his complexion was embrowned, which counteracted the effect of his increased stoutness; and his genius lighted eye still glanced, as ever, keenly round.

He ordered the troops to form a serried mass around his horse, with the officers in front, and then, with his sonorous voice, addressed to them a few passionate and energetic words. "Soldiers," he said, "I have returned to France with eight hundred men, because I calculated on the love of the people, and the recollections of the army. I have not been mistaken. Soldiers, I thank you. The glory we have won is yours and the people's. Mine is to have known and understood you. The throne of the Bourbons was illegitimate, because that, having been overturned twenty years ago by the nation, it was restored by the hands of foreigners, and only offered the guarantees of an arrogant minority, whose pretensions were opposed to your rights. The imperial throne can alone guarantee the interests of the nation, and the noblest of these interests, your glory. Soldiers, we are about to march for the purpose of expelling from France those princes who have been the accomplices and instruments of our enemies, and, having arrived at the frontier, we shall pause there. We do not wish to meddle in the affairs of other nations, and woe to those who would attempt to meddle with ours!"

Then, calling forward the soldiers of the Elba battalion, Napoleon resumed: "Soldiers, behold the officers who accompanied me in my misfortunes! they are all my friends: they are dear to my heart! Every time I looked at them, I fancied I beheld the entire army; for amongst these eight hundred heroes, each regiment finds a representative. Their presence reminded me of those immortal victories that can never be effaced from your memory or from mine. In loving them, it was you I loved! They have brought back to you intact, and still glorious, those eagles that treason had for a moment veiled with a funeral crape. Soldiers, I restore them to you. Swear that you will follow whithersoever the interests of France may call them."

"We swear!" replied the soldiers, waving their bayonets and brandishing their swords.

The emotion excited was great, because the sentiments to which Napoleon appealed were deep-seated in the breasts of the men who listened to his impassioned discourse. Napoleon returned to the palace, attended by a multitude of persons. His looks were animated, and he seemed, as it were, haloed by a new prestige. The high functionaries who had not presented themselves the previous evening, either because they were not aware of Napoleon's arrival, or because they still hesitated as to the line of conduct they should adopt, appeared on the 21st; and the Emperor was, in some sort, universally recognised and proclaimed. Carnot, torn from his retreat, had arrived at the Tuileries, and, influenced by a sentiment, shared in by all his friends—that of combining with Napoleon to defend in common the cause of the Revolution—had accepted the office of Minister of the Interior. He did not like the title of Count; but the gravity of public affairs did not allow him to make a difficulty about it. The Duke de Vicence accepted, in like manner, the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Napoleon's ministry now formed, he immediately set about his immense task.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged in these primary cares, Louis XVIII had continued his retreat to Lille. As we have seen, the ultra-royalists had endeavoured to draw him into Vendée, whilst the moderate royalists, anxious to conciliate the feelings of France, had wished to bring him to Lille, in order that he might witness, without passing the frontier, the struggle that was about to take place between Europe and the revived Empire. Having no great faith in the shelter that a French city might afford him, and disliking an abode in Belgium, Louis XVIII preferred the country where, during six years, he had enjoyed perfect repose. Finding himself, as soon as he had passed Saint-Denis, freed from fools and sages, he had followed his inclination, and taken the route to Abbeville, which led to Calais, and from Calais to London.

Meanwhile the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, who remained at the head of the household troops, had marched at the head of the infantry towards Beauvais. Nothing could be more mournful than the picture presented by the household troops at this moment. Composed of men devoted to the royal cause, but, for the most part, unaccustomed to military duty, and inadequately equipped, the household troops formed a long line of stragglers, who, for want of money, had placed themselves and their baggage on carts. The company of mousquetaires, commanded by Marshal Marigny, was more properly organized. This company was composed of carefully-selected old soldiers, well-fed and well-clothed, as the household troops in the Marshal generally were. The others presented a more wretched

desolate appearance. But the troops assembled at Saint-Denis presented a still more mournful aspect.

We have already said, that in order to conceal the approaching departure of the royal family, the troops intended for the army at Melun, had to be sent on to Villejuif; but the king having left without encountering any opposition, the troops had received orders to fall back upon Saint-Denis. They had not obeyed, as we have seen; and only a very small number of those who had been sent to Saint-Denis, appeared there. Amongst those were a great portion of the artillery, a battalion of half-pay officers, and some young law-students, who had followed Louis XVIII under the name of royal volunteers, and who represented the virtuous youth of the country, that hoped for liberty from the Bourbons, and did not expect it from the Bonapartes. Marshal Macdonald had repaired to Saint-Denis to collect these *débris*, and conduct them to Louis XVIII; but, having arrived on the afternoon of the 20th, he found the battalion of half-pay officers in open revolt, and endeavouring to induce the artillery to join them, and even pillaging the baggage of the royal cortège. The Marshal tried to stop this scandal, but, though personally respected, he was obliged to withdraw and rejoin the household troops whom he met *en marche*, and in the state we have described. He afterwards left the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, to join the king, and try to persuade him to follow the advice he had constantly given, of retiring to Lille.

Having arrived on the evening of the 21st at Abbeville, he presented himself to the King, with whom he found M. de Blacas and Prince Berthier. His Majesty was perfectly calm, and seemed to feel more sensibly the inconveniences attendant on his abrupt removal from his home comforts than the loss of the throne. Entertaining but little hope, attributing his fresh misfortunes to his brother and the other emigrants, and convinced that Europe would take very little interest in people who had not known how to take care of their own affairs, Louis XVIII was more anxious to return to his asylum at Hartwell, than solicitous by a prudent line of conduct to redeem a future that promised so little. He spoke only of the fatigue he experienced, of his gout, of the annoyances to which the loss of his baggage exposed him, and listened with an absent air to all the Marshal said to induce him to return to the Lille route.

This brave and prudent soldier, who combined with great personal bravery and vast military experience, sound political sense, reminded the King of the bad effect produced by the compliments he had paid the Prince Regent on leaving London, and the reproach universally addressed to the Bourbons, of preferring foreign countries to France, and par-

ticularly England to every other country. He pointed out the disadvantage of justifying these prejudices by showing so great a desire to cross the frontier, and to cross it in order to reach London. He insisted pertinaciously that the King should retire to Lille, and should remain at least on the extreme verge of France. At Lille he would be in safety, and in case of necessity, need only travel two or three leagues to get outside the limits of the French territory.

Louis XVIII replied, very appositely, that he would not be safer at Lille than elsewhere, because there was need of a garrison, and that every garrison would act as the troops whose services he had endeavoured to secure had already done, and that to summon the English or the Prussians to Lille would be in the eyes of France, the worst of all proceedings. But the King set a proper value on the remarks of so loyal a servant as Marshal Macdonald, and consented to follow his advice. He only asked time to take a little refreshment; and requested the Marshal to precede, promising to join him in a few hours. During this interview the Marshal alone had spoken. M. de Blacas, who thought each alternative equally objectionable, had scarcely made an observation, though it was evident that he preferred the proposal of going to Lille. The unfortunate Berthier, as astonished to find himself where he was, as the public was to see him there, betrayed, in his dejected and mournful countenance, the perplexity of his mind. Thus was an honest man bitterly punished for his desire of being on good terms with every régime, and, spite of his antecedents, wishing to hold office under every government.

Marshal Macdonald immediately took the road to Béthune, in order to announce the approach of the royal family at Lille. He arrived on the morning of the 22nd of March before this town, which was occupied by the Duke d'Orléans, who had ordered the gates to be closed. We have said that this Prince had been put in command of the troops in the north, with directions to form a reserve of them, and support the Duke de Berry's left, should an engagement take place before Paris, and to cover the retreat of the royal family should they be obliged to abandon the capital. This Prince, the only member of the royal family who was at all popular with the troops, had found them quiet, but evidently ill-disposed towards the royal cause. He had taken the precaution to keep the soldiers separated, in order to retard the manifestation of their sentiments. He had sent to Lille those whose sense of discipline seemed least shaken, and had shut himself up in this town with six or seven thousand men and Marshal Mortier, who was also determined to give the King shelter at Lille, but to refuse ~~no~~ ^{no} ~~asylum~~ ^{asylum} to the Prussians and English. Having learned, on the morning of the

21st, by telegraph, that Napoleon had entered Paris, he had forbidden all external communication, with the two-fold intention of preventing Bonaparte emissaries from entering the city, and the soldiers from deserting.

The orders of the Duke d'Orléans had been so punctually executed, that the keys of the town had been deposited with the staff, and the keepers of the keys being absent, there was no one to answer a summons. Marshal Macdonald, not knowing how to make himself heard, was obliged to write a note with a pencil, fasten it to a stone, and fling it to the sentinel that guarded the rampart. As the Marshal announced himself on the superscription, the sentinel sent the note to the nearest post, whence it was forwarded to the staff. The gates were soon opened, and the Marshal was conducted to the Duke d'Orléans, who informed him of the true state of things, and told him that the King would receive a short but respectful hospitality from the troops, on the express condition that he would not attempt to introduce into the town either the English or the household troops.

Louis XVIII arrived in the afternoon, and was received with all the honours due to a sovereign. The pious and loyal population of Lille uttered loud cries of "*Vive le Roi !*" whilst the troops, drawn up in line, and presenting arms, observed a sullen silence.

No sooner had Louis XVIII arrived at Lille, than he wished to learn from the Prince and the Marshals the line of conduct he ought to follow. In presence of the King, M. de Blacas, Prince Berthier, and Marshals Macdonald and Mortier, the Duke d'Orléans, with perspicacity of thought and language, showed the exact position of affairs. He very much commended Marshal Macdonald for having advised the King to remain as long as possible on French soil; but he showed, at the same time, that the city of Lille would not be habitable more than a few hours, and that the spectacle before their eyes, of a population clamorously sympathetic and troops coldly respectful, was the true expression of the position of affairs. He added that the troops were masters of Lille, and would not permit the slightest annoyance to be offered to the King; that it was a point of honour with them; but that they were impressed with the idea that the royalists were inclined to give up the town to the English; and that, influenced by this feeling of distrust, they would never consent to allow the household troops to enter, still less would they submit to leave the city, supposing that a wish were entertained to get rid of them. And even if the royal party succeeded in removing the troops, it was not with twelve hundred men of the National Guard, and three or four thousand limping cavalry of the household troops that a fortress

could be defended, where at least twelve thousand of the best infantry would be required to make a proper defence. Besides, the troops would, for some days, be content to form the guard of the King, but would not wish to fill that office long: that the wisest determination would be to go to Dunkirk, whose population was as loyal as that of Lille; that a small garrison would suffice there, which the household troops, converted into infantry, would supply; that at Dunkirk there was the neighbourhood and proximity to England in case of need. Another advantage resulting from this choice, independent of being still on French soil, was, that the King would be further removed from the theatre of war, and would probably retain in his party Calais, Ardres, Gravelines, which would furnish an opportunity of supporting a few ships; that in this way, a little maritime kingdom would be formed, where the white flag would continue to float, without any appearance of complicity with the foreign flag that was about to invade France.

Marshal Mortier warmly supported these prudent counsels, Prince Berthier offered no opposition, and M. de Blacas approved. Marshal Macdonald, in adopting the project, raised an objection on only one point—the precipitation of the movement, which would give the King the appearance of a fugitive, either a prey to fear, or expelled from Lille. The Duke d'Orléans replied, that they were twenty-five leagues distant from Dunkirk, and that what was very easy of accomplishment on that day might be difficult on the next: whereupon the counsel that advised immediate departure seemed to prevail; but the extreme weariness of the King called for some hours' rest.

Orders were given that preparations should be made for the departure of the royal family; but the King, fatigued and perplexed, deferred it to the morrow. The Duke d'Orléans and the Marshals employed the remainder of the day in visiting the troops and speaking to them. "The King is safe amongst us," replied the officers; "but we know that the emigrants by whom the King is surrounded intend to deliver up the place to the enemy. And if the household troops appear before the town, we shall fire upon them."

Spite of every assurance to the contrary, it was impossible to dispel these prejudices; and what contributed to enroot them still more in the minds of the troops, were the remarks of the King's attendants, who said it would be better to put an end to the comedy of an affected respect for the sovereign's person, which only covered an approaching treason, and that the simpler proceeding would be to introduce ten thousand English into the place. These imprudent observations obtained credence, and the assertions of the Duke d'Orléans were regarded

as the offspring of his credulity. It became evident that the royal party could scarcely pass a day or two in this equivocal position.

The following day, the 23rd, there was a false alarm. Some couriers having appeared within sight of the Lille ramparts, a report was circulated that it was the King's household troops that were approaching. The troops in the town became immediately very much excited, and declared that they were determined to fire on the new-comers. The Duke d'Orléans and the Marshals found great difficulty in appeasing them, and they appeared still convinced that the place was about to be given up to the English. In a town where such feelings prevailed, it was impossible for the King to remain longer. The Duke d'Orléans, M. de Blacas, and Marshals Berthier, Macdonald, and Mortier, with whom the King had consulted on the previous evening, were summoned in the morning, and unanimously recognized the necessity of quitting a city guarded by troops who treated Louis XVIII with respect, but who were devoted to Napoleon, and who were ready, at the first opportunity, to proclaim the imperial authority. There was no difference of opinion, except as to the place whither the King ought to retreat. The Duke d'Orléans, supported by the three Marshals, again strongly recommended Dunkirk. The King did not reject this advice, but said that in the actual state of things, he thought it would be dangerous to travel twenty-five leagues on the French frontier; and announced his intention of first taking the Belgian route, and perhaps journey to Dunkirk through Belgium. The Duke d'Orléans advanced many reasons for not abandoning, even for a moment, the native soil; but these producing no effect on the King, Marshal Macdonald, in a respectful but firm tone, declared that, to his great regret, he would be obliged to leave his Majesty; that he would never emigrate, especially to a country filled with the allied troops. He added that he had been faithful to the King so long as His Majesty remained in France, but that he could not accompany him beyond the frontiers, neither would he offer his sword to the man who had come to disturb the public peace, but that he would await in retirement the dawn of happier days. Louis XVIII listened with perfect politeness to this frank declaration, thanked the Marshal for his noble conduct, freed him from his oath, and bade him an affectionate adieu. Marshal Mortier spoke in the same tone, received the same reply and the same testimonies of regard, and announced that with Marshal Macdonald he would accompany the King to the frontiers. Prince Berthier was silent; but, taking Marshals Macdonald and Mortier aside, he told them that, as captain of a company of the body-guards, he was obliged to accompany the King to the

place of his retreat ; and that, when he should have fulfilled his duty, he would return to France. He even desired them to announce his intentions at Paris. The King, turning to the Duke d'Orléans, asked him, in a pointedly sarcastic manner, what he intended to do. The Duke replied coolly, that he entertained the same opinion as the Marshals, but that, as Prince of the Blood, he could not pursue the same line of conduct ; that is to say, he could not remain in France : that he would accompany the King to the frontier, and then ask permission to leave him, as he did not wish to go into Belgium, where the adverse armies were assembled. The King, in a tranquil tone, said he did well, and gave orders for his immediate departure.

On the afternoon of the 23rd, Louis XVIII left Lille, and directed his course towards Belgium. The populace expressed intense regret ; the troops observed a respectful demeanour, but appeared much relieved at being freed from so embarrassing a deposit. The Duke d'Orléans and the Marshals escorted the carriage of the King on horseback to the frontiers, a distance of about two leagues. There they received his thanks, made their adieux, and returned to Lille for the purpose of surrendering their command. The Duke d'Orléans wrote to all the generals under his command, releasing them from their military obligations, and restoring them to themselves and their country. Marshal Mortier then informed him of a circumstance which he had had the delicacy to keep secret, which was, that he had received from Paris powers and orders to act as he should think most advisable for the defence of the frontier, for the expulsion of the Bourbon princes, and even for their arrest should it appear necessary. The Marshal had not wished to embarrass the princes, nor even to hasten their departure by declaring the new duties that had been imposed on him by one, who was again become master of France, and he only made the announcement when their determination was taken, and even being put into execution. The Duke d'Orléans set out for England, Marshal Macdonald for his country-seat, and Marshal Mortier sent intelligence to Paris, by telegraph, that Louis XVIII. had left Lille, and that the place was not, and never had been in danger. He transmitted the command to General the Count d'Erlon, who had been obliged to conceal himself since the affair of the brothers Lallemand. Amidst these sudden revolutions, which disturb and often mislead the most upright, it becomes a pleasing task to the historian to record scenes, where everybody, princes, marshals, soldiers, all, fulfilled duties that appeared almost conflicting, with delicacy and exactitude.

Meanwhile, the King's household troops, worn out with

fatigue, had dragged themselves as far as Abbeville, having at their head the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry; and, close on their heels, General Exelmans, with three thousand cavalry, who watched their progress without attempting to molest them. From Abbeville they advanced towards Lille; but having on the way learned the King's departure, they directed their course to Béthune. There the princes became fully aware of the impossibility of leading these troops into a foreign land and supporting them there; they therefore resolved to dismiss them. Three hundred men, fit for service, were retained. The support of these was not beyond the means of the royal family; they accordingly accompanied Marshal Marmont into Belgium, where they were to form the body-guard of Louis XVIII. The others took their way in different directions. The Princes crossed the frontier with the intention of joining the King.

Whilst Louis XVIII thus evacuated France, and put a term to the very slight uneasiness that was felt at Paris concerning the northern provinces, affairs wore an equally tranquil aspect in the east. Marshal Victor, who had been ordered to organize a *corps d'armée* in Champagne and Lorraine, had been obliged to abandon the undertaking. Marshal Oudinot, abandoned by the grenadiers and chasseurs royaux—the ancient imperial guard—had also abandoned his command, and had seen, in every direction, the tricolour flag waving. The old imperial guard had advanced spontaneously towards Paris. In Alsace, Marshal Suchet, bowing before the revolution that had taken place, had hoisted the tricolour flag throughout the province, and put our frontier fortresses in a state of defence against external foes. We have already described what had occurred between Grenoble and Besançon; consequently any uneasiness that might be felt about the fortresses was nowhere realized, and the enemy, spite of their desire, had not been able to surprise any.

In the interior, the progress of the imperial authority was neither less general nor less rapid. Marshal Saint-Cyr, who had left Paris on the 20th of March with M. de Vitrolles, who had repaired to Orleans, where General Dupont commanded. Finding the troops in a state of demi-revolt, he had ordered the gates to be closed, the tricolour flag to be pulled down, and General Pajol, the author of the movement, to be thrown into prison. But some officers, who had been sent from Paris, having found admission into the city, and entered into communication with the 1st cuirassiers who were garrisoned at Orleans, that regiment spontaneously mounted their horses, attacked the prison, set General Pajol at liberty, and put to flight Marshal Saint-Cyr, who retired in great haste towards the Lower Loire. General Pajol then took the command, and ordered the re-establishment of the imperial authority to be proclaimed at Orleans and in the environs.

This important portion of the Loire was thus reconquered. At Angers, the Duke de Bourbon, after a conversation with M. d'Autichamp and the principal Vendean chiefs, had arrived at the conclusion that if the ancient agitators of Vendée were disposed to resume their former practices, the inhabitants of the country districts, though royalists, no longer possessed the ardour that would induce them to brave the horrors of a civil war, of which they retained a painful recollection. Feeling that his presence was more embarrassing to the people than useful to the royal cause, the prince had followed the advice unanimously given to him, and withdrew. Commandant Noireau, an officer of gendarmerie, having learned the state of affairs, offered him passports, on condition that he would make use of them immediately. The prince, without hesitation, accepted the offer. He embarked at Nantes, and left the district, not restored to Napoleon, but in a peaceful disposition.

General Clausel, who had been sent to the Gironde, had stopped at Angoulême, and there, in the Emperor's name, received the submission of the neighbouring departments; then, calling together a portion of the gendarmerie, he marched to the Dordogne to assemble the troops, and fulfill his mission with regard to the city of Bordeaux.

This city was in a state of terrible agitation, owing to the presence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, and of MM. Lainé and de Vitrolles. The population, royalist, through interest and through conviction, were plunged in grief by Napoleon's return, which implied a fresh blockade of the ports. They consequently rose at sight of the Duchess d'Angoulême, who had come with the Prince, her husband, to celebrate the 12th of March, and promised to support the Bourbon cause. These warm demonstrations of feeling took place in presence of two regiments—the 8th and the 62nd of the line, then garrisoned at Bordeaux, and who witnessed this scene in a rather alarming silence. There was every reason to believe that at the first appearance of the tricolour flag, displayed on the right bank of the Gironde, the troops would declare their sentiments and suppress a vapoury insurrection.

M. de Vitrolles, having communicated the King's intentions to the Princess, took his departure for Toulouse, in order to make that city the centre of the royal government in the south. He had effected levies of men and money, and, acting on his own authority, had placed Marshal Pérignon at the head of the royalist troops, and endeavoured to keep up a correspondence between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was staying, and Marseilles, whither the Duke d'Angoulême had hurried. The Prince arrived at Marseilles, and we may divine, from the spirit that prevailed in that city, to what vehement demonstra-

tions the population gave expression. They had always hated the Empire, and now, seeing themselves again threatened with starvation, after having fancied rather than enjoyed abundance, they abandoned themselves to a species of fury, and received the Duke d'Angoulême with an almost delirious joy.

Marshal Masséna exercised his military command in the midst of this excited people, with the disdainful coldness of a soldier, who had formerly succeeded in subduing the Calabrians, and who took little heed of the outcries of a mob. As he accompanied the Prince on the day of his arrival, a crowd of women of the humbler classes, with children in their arms, flung themselves on their knees before his horse, and cried in the unsophisticated phraseology of the district, "Marshal, don't betray this good prince." He took no notice of these demonstrations, for, not liking either the dynasty that was departing, nor that which was returning, and deploring all the French blood that would flow in consequence of these new convulsions, he was determined to confine himself to the strict observance of his military duties. He had given two regiments, the 83rd and 58th, together with a column of volunteers, to the Duke d'Angoulême, and with these the Prince was to endeavour to recover Grenoble and Lyons, as he ascended the course of the Rhone. Marshal Masséna did not accompany him in this expedition, but remained to preserve order at Marseilles, and more especially to watch Toulon, determined to show no mercy to any one that should attempt to give up that great military arsenal to the English.

Such was the state of things in the different parts of France on the 23rd and 24th of March. Napoleon, having learned the retreat of Louis XVIII, and the submission of the northern and eastern provinces, became quite satisfied as to the safety of the frontier fortresses; and having no doubt but that La Vendée would submit, at least for the present, he was not at all alarmed by the insurrection in the south, although it extended from Bordeaux to Marseilles. He had only been anxious about the fortresses; for it would have been a great misfortune if such places as Lisle, Metz, or Strasbourg, had fallen into the enemy's hands. Now that he was reassured on this important point, and freed from the King's presence, which at worst would be nothing more than an inconvenience, he considered that he had recovered entire possession of the Empire. Could he accommodate his authority to the newly-acquired spirit of independence in the people, and could he appease or conquer Europe, he was certain of recommencing a new reign, less brilliant perhaps, but not less prosperous than the former, and certainly more deserving of praise, should he be able to substitute the sanguinary magnificence of war for the salutary enjoyments of peace. But he had always entertained doubts, though he did not give them utter-

ance, as to the pacification of Europe; and in reality, he reckoned on a short and vigorous campaign, carried on with the resources, which restored France, and three hundred thousand soldiers returned from abroad, offered to his powerful genius.

He had been but a few days in Paris, when he found his presentiments correct; for while all submitted at home, abroad every thing assumed an aspect of unprecedented violence. As the Bourbons were about to retire, they had published a most important declaration, issued by the Congress of Vienna. At first the authenticity of this document was doubted—a doubt that Napoleon encouraged, because advantageous to him, though, in the resolutions and style, he easily detected the rage of his enemies—a rage he had himself excited by more than fifteen years' abuse of victory. This document declared that the powers assembled at Vienna, considering that Napoleon Bonaparte, by violating the treaty of the 11th April, had destroyed his sole legal claim to existence, and attacked the peace of Europe, they declared him an outlaw—a decree that subjected him to be treated as the meanest criminal. The evident conclusion was, that whoever could seize his person ought to shoot him immediately, and would be looked on as having rendered an important service to Europe. Such conduct towards a great man, who had certainly disturbed the peace of Europe, but whose power had been flattered and extolled, and whose ambition had been rivalled by every living prince—such conduct, we repeat, was unworthy of the century; and pride, ambition, and terror can alone explain, but cannot justify the act.

Napoleon did not allow this document to be published for some days, waiting until France should be made acquainted with the entire state of affairs. By comparing the declaration of the 13th of March with some other manifestations, he saw the realization of all that he had foreseen, and the necessity of preparing without a moment's delay for a formidable struggle. Fresh manifestations, the natural consequences of the declaration of the 13th of March, left him no doubt on this point. M. de Caulaincourt had no sooner taken possession of his official residence than the foreign embassies came to demand their passports. Of some, such as the English and Russian, whose heads were absent, the secretaries took it upon themselves to make this demand; but of others, such as Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, Holland, &c., the ambassadors came in-person, and persisted in leaving, notwithstanding all M. de Caulaincourt's efforts to retain them. With M. de Vincent, the Austrian ambassador, he had a long conversation, and sought by every means to convince him that France was desirous of peace, and was even determined to adhere to the Treaty of Paris; but it was with difficulty he even obtained a patient hearing, and by

no arguments could he persuade the ambassador to take charge of letters from Napoleon to his wife and father-in-law. However, M. de Vincent, anxious to leave Paris at once, consented that one of the secretaries of the Austrian legation, who was to leave a day later, should undertake to deliver the two letters. Napoleon had determined to take an humble tone for the time, but this was a part that M. de Caulaincourt did not wish to over-act: he contented himself with stating his master's pacific intentions clearly; and, without putting any obstacle to the departure of the representatives of the different Courts, he sent them their passports the very day they demanded them.

Though no opposition was made to their departure, M. de Vincent's permission was profited by, and the secretary of the Austrian legation received two letters, one for Maria Louisa, and the other for the Emperor Francis. Queen Hortense, who was on the most friendly terms with the officials of the Russian embassy, since Alexander had, publicly, declared himself her protector—wrote a long letter to that monarch, in which she endeavoured to give him the most favourable idea of Napoleon's newly-acquired intentions, both as regarded his home and foreign policy. This letter she gave to M. de Boutiakin, secretary to the Russian legation, and one of the many foreigners whose goodwill her graceful manners had won for herself, if not for her cause. Through the same channel, Alexander was informed of the secret alliance that was formed on the 3rd of January, between Louis XVIII, England, and Austria, against Russia and Prussia. To this were added some papers that M. de Blacas had left at Paris, and which would leave Alexander no doubt of the feelings with which he was regarded by his allies. Queen Hortense took advantage, also, of the departure of her brother's steward for Vienna, to write to several persons there, Maria Louisa in particular, and to inform them, in the most glowing terms, of Napoleon's triumphant restoration to the imperial throne, of the people's enthusiastic love for him, and their hatred of the Bourbons, and the consequent necessity Europe was under of avoiding a sanguinary struggle, by approving a deed that was now accomplished, and which would neither disturb the peace, nor interfere with the partition that had been made at Vienna of almost all the states of the universe.

Although the departure of the legations wore an unfavourable aspect, it might be accounted for, at least to a certain degree, for though accredited to the court of Louis XVIII, they were not to that of Napoleon. This, indeed, need not have prevented their awaiting fresh powers, but still their eagerness to depart could not be construed into a declaration of war; and it was of the utmost importance that such a declaration should not be anticipated, but rather allow all the blame to fall upon the

Congress of Vienna, which was not more popular in Europe than in France. The only way to meet the conduct of the foreign embassies in a dignified and inoffensive manner was to recall the French ambassadors, who could not, in honour, be allowed to remain at the Courts of princes who had broken off their connection with us. Besides, these ambassadors were, for the most part, chosen from amongst the emigrants—the implacable enemies of the Empire. M. de Caulaincourt addressed a circular to the officials of embassies, in which he announced that their powers were withdrawn, and that they were, consequently, recalled, and should return immediately. At the same time he authorized them to declare that France would not take the initiative in hostilities with any nation, and would strictly observe all existing treaties.

Nothing else could be said or done in the actual state of things. A different course of action, however, was to be pursued with each Court, and some indirect measures to be adopted towards some—measures that could not be neglected whatever might be the result. For example, the Court of Vienna, besides being the seat of the Congress, might be considered in the light of Napoleon's parent court, to which it might not be impossible for him to gain access. It was well-known that Austria was discontented with Russia and Prussia, with both of whom she had been inclined to go to war, and that she had often regretted having increased the power of Russia so much. The prospect of having at Paris a son-in-law, whom misfortune had corrected, and whom new institutions would restrain, and who would be succeeded by the son of an archduchess, brought up by her with pacific views, was likely to cause serious reflection, and gradually lead Austria to adopt opinions very different from those which dictated the declaration of the 13th of March. There was one man who could make such views effective, and that man was M. de Talleyrand. Could he be won, it would not be impossible to gain over the Court of Vienna itself. Napoleon did not yet know how far M. de Talleyrand was pledged to the cause of legitimacy, nor how much he had declined in favour at the Austrian Court, by yielding to his jealousy of M. de Metternich. In any case M. de Talleyrand would be a valuable acquisition, and he, it was hoped, might be won by the influence of a singular man, one who was well known in society, though not in politics, who had often been employed in secret negotiations, and who, gifted with rare intelligence and daring, presented one of those contradictory characters that are sometimes met with, and who combine unusual clearness of intellect with irregularity of conduct. This man, who possessed over M. de Talleyrand an influence resulting from his intimate acquaintance with all the secrets of his life, was M. de Montrond; and if there were any

one that could succeed in reaching Vienna, and obtaining an audience of M. de Talleyrand, and even carrying off Maria Louisa and her son, it certainly was he, with his great tact, his numerous connections, and unparalleled daring. He had been imprisoned at Ham by Napoleon, for some satirical remarks: he had escaped, had returned to France with the Bourbons, and was now, from the mere love of adventure, ready to undertake anything, even for the advantage of his old persecutor. It was the Duke d'Otranto, an experienced master in secret diplomacy, who had thought of employing M. de Montrond, and Napoleon, compelled by circumstances, had consented. M. de Caulaincourt entrusted this singular envoy with letters for M. Meneval (who was still with Maria Louisa), and several other influential persons. He was authorized to treat, on any terms, with M. de Talleyrand, M. de Dalberg, and some others. He was also empowered to present himself to Maria Louisa, and furnish her with the means for flight, if she were disposed for it, and for this purpose he was provided with the necessary credit, that want of funds might be no restraint on the inexhaustible fertility of his imagination. It was by such obscure paths that Napoleon was compelled to find an entrance to cabinets that he had once domineered and trampled upon. M. de Montrond left at the same time as the couriers that were sent with the circular that recalled our embassies; but, foreseeing that he should find all the frontiers impassable, he had procured the passport of an abbé attached to the Roman legation, and so succeeded in deceiving the European authorities and reaching Vienna, which our couriers were not able to do.

Independent of this secret mission, etiquette and policy required that some of our diplomatic agents should not be recalled. M. Serurier, the French Minister at the United States, was left at his post, both because America had always been friendly to the Empire, and that M. Serurier had discharged his duties with great good sense. The Secretaries of the Legation at Rome, Switzerland, and Constantinople, were ordered to retain their places, and even received the title of *Chargé d'Affaires*. Now that Switzerland was reconstituted, she appeared jealous of her neutrality—a feeling that was deserving of all consideration from us, as it protected an important portion of our frontier. It was well-known that the Court of Rome was displeased by the obstinacy of the Bourbons in revoking the Concordat, and she was now promised not alone that her wishes on this point would be gratified, but that the possession of her old dominions, including the Legations, should be guaranteed. M. de Rivière, who had been appointed ambassador at Constantinople, by Louis XVIII, was detained at Toulon, and M. Ruffin, our former *Chargé d'Affaires* received instructions to flatter Sultan

Mahmoud in every possible way. The miraculous return of Napoleon might well be supposed to have impressed the excitable imaginations of the superstitious Turks, and won them back to the imperial cause. Lastly, although M. de Laval was recalled from Madrid, still, as it was known that the two houses of Bourbon had quarrelled because of Mina's being arrested on French ground, an officer was dispatched to treat of the exchange of such prisoners as had not yet been restored to their country, and this officer was authorized not to confine himself to the apparent object of his mission. Even should the coalition be general, it was something to have America, Switzerland, the Holy See, Turkey, and Spain neutral, if not friendly.

Napoleon submitted to adopt all these expedients, that he might be able to say to himself that he had not neglected anything, and to prove to France that he had sacrificed all personal pride in order to preserve peace. But it was on his sword alone he counted to conquer the adverse feelings of the European powers. He, consequently, profited by the submission of the northern and eastern provinces, to turn his attention to the immediate arrangement of his military preparations. Having arrived on the evening of the 20th of March, the very next morning he had requested Marshal Davout to repair to the War office. He pointed out to him the most skilful officials of that vast department, and ordered that they should come to the Tuileries to receive the first orders from himself. As he knew by experience that the formation of the *corps d'armée* was of more importance than recruiting regiments, because the corps once formed, all the rest—men and materials—would follow as a matter of course; he commenced by ordering their formation, and appointing to each a complete staff.

Of the troops that had been cantoned in the department of the Nord he composed the 1st corps, making Lille their headquarters, and Count Drouet d'Erlon their general-in-chief. The troops that had left Paris under the command of General Reille, were to constitute the 2nd corps, and to assemble at Valenciennes. This corps was to be the largest, because it was intended to be the first to encounter the forces of the enemy. Although it was Napoleon's intention to commence operations at Maubeuge, he stationed this corps at Valenciennes, a little to the left, that he might the better conceal his plan.*

The 3rd, commanded by General Vandamme, and stationed around Mézières, consisted of the troops that had been dispersed through the Ardennes and Champagne. The 4th, under the command of General Gérard, was stationed near Metz, and con-

* Napoleon's letters of 25, 26, 27 and 28th of March prove that he had mentally arranged the plan of this campaign at this very period.

sisted of the troops of Lorraine. The 5th, intended for General Rapp, was to assemble at Strasbourg, and to be formed of the Alsatian regiments.

These different corps possessed the advantage of protecting each of our frontiers, and of being able, from their situation, to aid in a concentration of forces, which Napoleon intended to render both rapid and unexpected, by means of combinations, of which we shall speak in their proper place. He had already decided that Maubeuge should be the point of concentration; and he resolved to put his plan into execution not only by making the wings cover the centre, but by making the rear cover the van. For this purpose, he determined to form a 6th corps, composed of the troops which would be assembled at Paris, and which could advance rapidly to Maubeuge, through Soissons, Laon, and La Fère. This 6th corps was confided to General Count Lobau, who commanded the first military division. We have already mentioned, that in order to re-establish discipline, he had arranged that almost every regiment should pass through the hands of Count Lobau, at Paris. There would be, consequently, great numbers of troops at Paris, from which it would be easy to form a numerous and well-disciplined corps, which, leaving Paris at the same time that the 1st corps would leave Lille, and the 4th Metz, would form a compact mass with the 2nd and 3rd at Maubeuge. Thus did Napoleon, with superior skill, manage so that the different arrangements rendered necessary by circumstances, should all tend to one end.

To the 6th corps Napoleon joined the imperial guard, which he intended to reorganize on a most extensive scale. The old guard he re-established on the basis of four regiments of four battalions (grenadiers and chasseurs included), and the young guard on the basis of twelve regiments of two battalions, with the addition of a powerful cavalry, and the old reserve of artillery that had signalized themselves in every battle of the period. Napoleon considered that with the 6th corps and the Guard, he would have a reserve of fifty thousand men, which, joined to the four corps stationed between Lille and Metz, would allow him to take the initiative at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men (more or less, according to the time he should have to prepare); and as he showed no inclination to commence hostilities, least of all at Maubeuge, his plan could be thoroughly prepared whilst remaining perfectly secret.

The 5th corps, stationed at Alsace, (that is, without the circle of these combinations,) was to protect the Upper Rhine, and become a second point of concentration, in case the brunt of the war should fall on that quarter. This corps was to join the troops which were destined by Napoleon to guard the Alps, and to act against Switzerland in case she should not observe her

neutrality, or against Italy, if, as was to be feared, Murat should not be sufficient alone to occupy the Austrians. As this corps was stationed beyond the operations of the Nord, it would be necessary to confide the command to a man, capable of acting alone, and not needing to be led by the hand. Napoleon chose Marshal Suchet. He intended to form at a later period a 7th corps, to protect the Maritime Alps, and lastly, an 8th, which, if it were not needed to restrain the Spaniards, who were not much to be dreaded at the moment, it might restrain the south of France, where the sentiments of the people wore a suspicious character. He intended that the 7th corps should be commanded by General Clausel, who was at this time occupied in reducing Bordeaux.

Napoleon immediately commenced the formation of these corps, to which he gave the title of *corps d'observation*. For their complete organization he had three entire months, which would deprive his preparations of every appearance calculated to excite alarm. The generals he appointed, Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, Rapp, and Suchet, were admirably chosen, both in a military and political sense; and these were now ordered to repair, without delay, to their different stations, and to summon all their troops from the fortresses. For this purpose, as each regiment marched to head-quarters, it was to place all its disposable men in the two first battalions, and leave the *cadre* of the third in the fortresses as a depot. Having a great number of officers on half-pay in his service, Napoleon ordered the immediate formation of a fourth, fifth, and sixth battalion in each regiment. When the men, collected in the way we shall explain immediately, would have reached the depot, the third battalion was to be immediately completed, and sent to join the *corps d'armée*. The same was to be done with the fourth and fifth, according as men should come to the depot.

This simple organization being decided on, nothing remained to be done but to arrange measures for recruiting. For this purpose, Napoleon made the following arrangements.

On the 20th of March, 1815, there were a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, and fifty thousand on a six months' leave of absence, who would, at the first summons, raise the effective forces to two hundred and thirty thousand men. This was not much, but even this number would not have existed, had not M. de Talleyrand requested Louis XVIII to arm. Fortunately, France had a much greater number of soldiers who had returned to their homes. If the reader recall what we have already said (vol. 18) of the organization of the army under the Bourbons, he will understand perfectly the explanation we are about to give.

At the time of Napoleon's abdication, there was in France

and Europe the following number of French soldiers of all arms, some constituting *corps d'armée*, others in garrison in the fortresses, or prisoners in the hands of the enemy. During the campaign of 1814, Napoleon had sixty-five thousand men under his own command, General Maison had fifteen thousand, Marshal Soult thirty-six thousand, General Decaen four thousand, Marshal Suchet twelve thousand, Marshal Augereau twenty-eight thousand: the whole amounting to a hundred and sixty thousand combatants, composing the active army. There were ninety-five thousand in the fortresses of the interior, which brought up the whole effective force on French ground to about two hundred and fifty-five thousand. There were twenty-four thousand men in garrison in Catalonia, thirty thousand in Piedmont and Italy, more than thirty-two thousand defending the Adige under Prince Eugene, or returned to France under General Grenier. In Hamburg, Magdeburg, and other German fortresses, there were sixty thousand men, and forty thousand in the fortresses ceded by the convention of the 11th of April, such as Antwerp, Wesel, Mentz, &c., which made the garrisons of Spain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium, amount to a hundred and eighty-six thousand men. Nominally, a hundred and thirty thousand prisoners were to return from Russia, Germany, and England, though the real number was considerably more. Were all these collected in France, she would possess a formidable army, since, independently of the forty thousand men, veterans, gendarmes, and staffs that must always be added to the total amount of the French army, she would have from six hundred to six hundred and ten thousand men, the greater number tried soldiers, and of whom, at least, half had borne part in all our wars. Had Napoleon been able to assemble all these around him in 1815, both he and France would have been invincible. But we must explain what had become of all these men since the peace.

After the abdication at Fontainebleau, the spirit of desertion, as we have already mentioned, had revealed itself in the army. Some soldiers, from a feeling of patriotic displeasure, others from hatred to the service, of which they had experienced only the severities, had abandoned their standards, which the military authorities took little trouble to defend. It is estimated that at this period, from a hundred and seventy to a hundred and eighty thousand deserted, either of the troops stationed in France, or those that had returned from abroad. This would leave four hundred and twenty thousand in the ranks; but, as we have seen, the budget of the Restoration would hardly allow one-third of these to be paid. The surplus must be got rid of in various ways. Of these, twenty-five thousand, who, by the cession of territory, were become foreigners, were sent home. The con-

scripts of 1815 were dismissed by an ordinance, which caused a further reduction of forty-six thousand. Lastly, a hundred and fifteen thousand men, of every age, were dismissed, who either had served their country for a sufficiently long time, or whose health had been more or less injured in the service of the State. The effective force was thus reduced to two hundred and thirty thousand; and, small as was the number, it was found impossible to pay the expenses; and the Minister of War gave fifty thousand more leave of absence for six months, which left but a hundred and eighty thousand actually under arms.

This was the exact state of our forces on the 20th of March, 1815: a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, and fifty thousand on leave of absence, whom an order from the War department could immediately reassemble. The first thing to be done was to recall these fifty thousand men, which would bring up the effective force to two hundred and thirty thousand, a number that would not suffice for the formation of the three first battalions, each consisting of five hundred men, and still less would it allow the formation of the fourth and fifth battalions. Recourse must be had to some other means. Conscription, which Napoleon had made hateful, and which had been imprudently given up by the Bourbons, could not be employed again without awakening the most painful remembrances. There were the numbers of soldiers that had returned to France, and were now dispersed through its whole extent. Of these, the best as to feeling and experience were certainly those who had been prisoners of war. But the greater number of those who had returned lately were already enrolled; for it was to make room for these that some of the others had been dismissed. The hundred and fifteen thousand who had been definitely dismissed could not be recalled, since they were absolutely restored to their liberty, nor could those disbanded in quality of foreigners be summoned, as they had left the country. There only remained those who had deserted, and, as a last resource, the conscripts of 1815. Those who had deserted were reputed as on leave of absence without pay—a subterfuge devised by the authorities, to avoid being compelled to punish them.

These could be recalled, and of the hundred and sixty thousand that were still French subjects, it was hoped that eighty thousand would return to their standards, by which our army would amount to from two hundred and thirty to three hundred and ten thousand, or to three hundred thousand exactly. But this number was far from being sufficient, and it would be necessary to fall back on the conscription of 1815. This conscription had been levied by a decree of 1814, which decree had not been revoked. It was therefore perfectly legal to put it into operation, at least when authorized by a decree of the Council

of State, which might be easily obtained. Here were abundant means of recruiting the army without levying a fresh conscription. These conscripts, who had been dismissed by a royal ordinance, numbered about a hundred and forty thousand. Allowing for losses through time, and for the bad feeling of some provinces, their number could not be less than a hundred thousand, which would increase the army to four hundred thousand, the greater number of whom had seen service, or been at least for some time under arms; a very great advantage, which would add considerably to the effective force of our arms.

To render this army sufficient to oppose the coalition, all the troops composing it should be on active service, and none called on to do garrison duty. Another resource that presented itself, and by which Napoleon immediately determined to profit, was to call out the National Guard, but in such a way that none but men fit for service should be chosen, and those only in provinces of assured patriotism. The state of our laws at this time favoured such an arrangement. The local authorities, whose duty it was to make the selection, could, when choosing the *compagnies d'élite*, called grenadiers and chasseurs, (a mode of proceeding borrowed from the foot regiments), select young and vigorous men, some of whom had seen service, and who were neither married nor necessary to the support of their families. This had been done in 1814; and it was seen at Fère-Champenoise what National Guards chosen in this manner were capable of. A valuable addition to the army could thus be obtained, by increasing the *compagnies d'élite*, and this operation would be much facilitated from the great number of retired soldiers dispersed through the country districts, and the still greater number of holders of small portions of national property. With well-organized recruiting companies in each arrondissement, it would be easy, in choosing the old soldiers, and citizens of undoubted patriotism, to form battalions of five or six hundred men each, fit for service. The great number of half-pay officers added to this facility of forming battalions, presented an opportunity of draughting them into good *cadres*.

Napoleon calculated that, by thus enrolling the thirtieth part of the population, very nearly a million of men would be collected, and that by confining this appeal to the frontier provinces irritated by the late invasion, and near the fortresses that required to be guarded, he could easily raise four hundred battalions, which, did they consist but of five hundred men each, would amount altogether to two hundred thousand. It would not be difficult to induce the inhabitants of Lorraine to defend Thionville, Nancy, and Metz, nor the Alsatians to arm for Strasbourg, the inhabitants of Franche-Comté for Besançon, those of Dauphiny for Grenoble, Embrun, and Briançon. In confining

himself, for the present, to Ardennes, Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, Auvergne, and Dauphiny, he was sure to have two hundred thousand men in the *compagnies d'élite*, and thus the army of the line would be disposable for active service. Besides that, these men would form excellent garrisons in the fortresses, some of them, such, at least, as were best drilled, might aid the army as bodies of reserve, or even fight in the ranks. The army thus compensated for the regiments left in depot, and amounting to four hundred thousand men, would, in Napoleon's hands, suffice to over-power the Coalition, provided he could obtain time to realize the projected levies. France could then meet Europe at the head of six hundred thousand men, four hundred thousand on active service, and two hundred thousand in garrison. This would be sufficient for one campaign, however bloody it might be, and should the result be favourable, it was not probable that the Coalition would attempt a second. It would, consequently, be possible, by not being too exacting, to obtain a moderate peace, infinitely more advantageous than that of Paris.

Such were the principles on which Napoleon founded his plan of national resistance against foreigners. The great number of retired soldiers, the inhabitants of the country districts irritated against the clergy and nobility, and the many officers on half-pay, rendered this plan more easy of accomplishment than it would be in ordinary times.

Napoleon, who, from his long administrative experience, knew exactly how and when every thing ought to be done, gave his orders accordingly. Had he undertaken every thing at once, necessary as expedition was, besides causing great confusion, he would have excited the public mind more than would be prudent. He did not desire to conceal anything, but he did not wish that the morrow of his arrival should be, as it were, the signal for a general levy; for his desperate appeal to the people's patriotism would be looked on rather as the effect of his military tastes than the result of necessity.

For this reason, he commenced operations by ordering the men on leave of absence for six months to join their regiments. The soldiers who had retired without permission were to be recalled a few days later, and then the Council of State was to decide whether the decree by which the conscription of 1815 had been raised was still in force. The local authorities and gendarmes would not have sufficed for the accomplishment of the three measures had they been attempted simultaneously; and, therefore, a few days' interval between each was not too much. Besides, the men on leave of absence for six months and those who had retired without leave, were all, more or less, accus-

tomed to warfare, and might join the ranks immediately on their arrival, provided that they had arms and ammunition.

As Napoleon had determined to reorganize the Imperial Guard, he ordered the *cadres* to return to Paris, and in order to furnish the old soldiers with an additional motive for again entering the service, he announced that all able-bodied men who had borne arms, and who should demand admission into the Guard, should be draughted into the twelve regiments of the Young Guard that were about being enrolled. This would be sufficient to attract twelve or fifteen thousand additional men.

Not wishing that a single corps should be employed in accessory service, Napoleon ordered that all the disposable vessels should be sent from Toulon to Corsica to bring back three regiments of infantry that were in that island. He took advantage of the respect still shown by the English to the white flag, to allow it to float from the masts of the navy, at the same time that the crews were ordered to resume the tricoloured cockade. Thanks to this ruse he was able to bring back these three regiments, the nucleus of the 7th corps, which, from want of resources, was still but a name.

Having thus provided for the infantry, he turned his attention to the cavalry, which, there was no question, would be a magnificent corps, could horses be provided. As those who were expected to enlist in the cavalry had served before, there was every probability that all the men would be well drilled—a circumstance of much more importance in that branch of the service than in the infantry. Of the hundred and eighty thousand men composing the effective force as it existed on the 1st of March, about twenty thousand were cavalry. Napoleon determined to increase these immediately to forty, and as soon as possible to fifty thousand. The late government had contracted for four thousand horses. He ordered the immediate fulfilment of these contracts, and then re-established the great depot at Versailles, which, under General Bourcier's direction, had been of such utility to him in 1814. He ordered this general to repair immediately to Versailles, and take possession of such localities as he had occupied a year before, and collect a large supply of military equipments and horses. He opened a credit of several millions for him, that he might be able to pay ready money for the horses brought by the peasantry.

If the cavalry regiments sent their yet unmounted men to Versailles, they would be certain to find there every thing they wanted; and as the active army was to assemble between Lille and Paris, they would not have far to go to procure accoutrements and horses. Napoleon hoped to procure two or three thousand trained horses belonging to the dismissed royal household troops. He also intended to take some thousands from the

gensdarmes, but for which he would pay immediately. He next sent several cavalry officers, provided with money, to the country districts, and these he expected would return with from ten to fifteen thousand horses. From what he had seen on his march from the Gulf of Juan to Grenoble, he was convinced that with money, horses might be found every where. It was his maxim that, in extreme cases, success was to be obtained by adopting a variety of expedients; for if one should fail, another might succeed.

As the artillery requires more time to take the field than any other branch of the service, he ordered that this force should immediately leave the arsenals and proceed to join the different *corps d'armée*. A large number of artillery horses, the remains of our military staff, had been left in charge of the peasantry. Napoleon ordered that these should be collected, and gave directions for the purchase of a number of horses sufficient to supply a powerful artillery, which he intended should not be less than three pieces to every thousand men. He finally gave orders for the formation of a park of a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery at Vincennes, which was to form the customary *corps de réserve* of the Guard.

Having completed his plan for the organization of the army, Napoleon next turned his attention to the fortifications. The fatal day of the 30th of March, 1814, having shown him the part the capital was called on to play in the defence of the Empire, he determined to surround Paris with works as solid as could be made in three months, and to cover these works with a powerful artillery. As experience had also shown him the importance of such places as La Fère, Soissons, Château-Thierry, Langres, and Bèfort, in case of an invasion, he determined to fortify them as well as the shortness of the time would allow; and as there were many other points that might be made temporarily useful, he formed a commission of generals, who were to make a rapid survey of the frontiers, and report not only what towns, but what passes through mountains or forests, could be made capable of resistance. He ordered that the large fortresses long looked on as the bulwarks of the country, should be repaired, supplied with arms and provisions—in a word, put into a complete state of defence.

The navy, in its actual state, could be of no use, for even if a naval victory were won, it would not protect Paris. Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, determined that the sea forces should aid the movements of the army, by which two advantages would be gained: the sailors, thrown idle by the blockade of the seas, would obtain employment, and the services of sixty thousand brave and patriotic men would be secured. Of these he determined to form twenty regiments, under the com-

mand of naval officers ; a part to be left on the coast in defence of our ports, and thirty thousand to be sent to the capital, to aid in its defence. He also determined to distribute some thousand naval gunners amongst the fortifications of Paris, with two or three hundred cannons of large calibre, to be brought from Brest, Cherbourg, Dunkirk, and other maritime places.

The clothing and arms of the different regiments were still to be provided for. Want of time made it difficult to procure clothing. Money would lessen these difficulties. Napoleon summoned the contractors who usually supplied the army, and paid in ready money the sixteen millions that were due to them, and which the Restoration had neglected to pay. By this means Paris and other large towns would soon be filled with extra workshops, which, by means of zealous overseers, would soon supply the most pressing wants. Napoleon required for each soldier of the line only one capote, a pair of pantaloons, and a vest ; and he selected a uniform blouse that should suffice for the National Guard in defence of the fortresses.

It was still more difficult to procure arms. Napoleon remembered how, in the last campaign, there were twenty thousand men from the suburbs whom want of arms had prevented from assisting in defence of the capital. He hoped, as we have seen, that by calling in the deserters of 1814, together with those on furlough for six months, that he could raise the army to three hundred and ten thousand men, and to four hundred thousand by the addition of the conscripts of 1815. Lastly, he expected by the aid of two hundred thousand of the National Guard, to raise the number of the defenders of the country to six hundred thousand ; and by the addition of the sailors, to raise the entire to six hundred and sixty thousand.

He would, consequently, require at least six hundred thousand muskets by the commencement of June—the time he expected hostilities to commence. There were about two hundred thousand in depot, or in the possession of the soldiers. There were a hundred and fifty thousand new muskets in the magazines, thanks to the Duke de Berri, who had incessantly urged the necessity of manufacturing fire-arms. There were, therefore, two hundred and fifty thousand still to be got. The soldiers who had returned from abroad, had brought with them a great number of muskets, which, with a little repair, might be made serviceable ; but these muskets were scattered over the frontiers, and most frequently in places where it would be impossible to construct manufactories. Napoleon determined that these should be brought to Paris, where there were already forty thousand needing repair, but where the means of manufacturing and repairing would soon be increased by the erection of new workshops. He divided the others amongst the fortresses from

Grenoble to Strasbourg, and from Strasbourg to Lille. He expected that in two months he would have two hundred thousand repaired, and fifty thousand manufactured. He flattered himself that he should thus procure the six hundred thousand he needed. His plan was to urge on the manufacture of at least three hundred thousand during the latter six months of 1815, in order to keep up a supply, and to arm fresh soldiers. For this purpose he ordered the erection of numerous extra workshops in Paris and the environs, in which he employed cabinet-makers, locksmiths, and even watch-makers, all directed by artillery officers. He paid the State contractors eighteen hundred thousand francs that had remained due to them, and placed as much money at their disposal as they needed.

It was M. Louis, the talented finance minister of the Restoration, who, without knowing for whom he was working, had prepared the funds which Napoleon was about to employ in the defence of the country. Thanks to the peace and to the courageous maintenance of indirect taxation, M. Louis had re-established the collection of the ordinary taxes, and so considerably enriched the treasury. Besides, by acknowledging the debts of the State, and by the happy combination of the *reconnaissance de liquidation*, he had obtained the valuable assistance of the floating debt, which permits the yearly revenues to be anticipated, and places all the resources of a state at the disposal of the treasury. When this talented minister retired, he left, besides the regular and easily collected ordinary taxes, the possibility of raising fifty or sixty millions by anticipating the revenue by means of exchequer bills. This resource, together with the current taxes, sufficed for the first months, the expenses not being at that time, what they have since become. In three months there would be either peace, or a decisive battle; and were this battle successful, there would be no difficulty in replacing that portion of the revenue that had been expended in advance. Thanks to Baron Louis' prompt and successful re-establishment of credit, M. Mollien and M. de Gaëte had found everything on the best footing, and the means of expending fifty millions beyond the actual receipts. This was all that Napoleon's creative and economical genius needed in order to supply the first expenses, and to prevent the necessity of having recourse to extraordinary or unpopular expedients.*

* There is nothing more difficult in times of revolution, than to induce governments that replace one another to do each other justice, and in no case is this more difficult than in financial matters. Calumny, and that sometimes of the deepest dye, is all the justice that can be expected from them. I have seen strange examples of this in my time, but none more extraordinary in the quickness of the reprisals, than those of the years 1814 and 1815. When the Baron Louis succeeded M. Mollien, and M. de Gaëte, he made a most unfair report of the state of the Imperial finances, and handed in a most unjust balance-sheet

Thanks to these combined resources, Napoleon was almost certain of having, within a few months, four hundred thousand men on active service, and two hundred thousand in garrison, all provided with what they needed; and the longer the war was deferred, the greater the probability of seeing his armament completed. In all great administrative enterprises, it is that forethought which, comprehending the whole as well as the details, forgetting nothing, deferring nothing, because nothing has been forgotten—it is this forethought, we repeat, which

representing the state of the treasury. Eleven months later, he met with the same kind of justice. During the Hundred Days all expenses were met by the resources he had created, though great care was taken not to admit it. When Napoleon was at Saint Helena, where he generally showed tolerable impartiality, and would have shown more, if his great mind had not been ruled by the bad habits of the times, Napoleon, talking *en passant* of the finances of the Hundred Days, said carelessly, that Count Mollien, (of whom he spoke at other times with well-merited praise) very cleverly employed forty millions, which Baron Louis had used in *stock-jobbing by means of the reconnaissances de liquidation*, had succeeded in meeting all the extra wants of the time. Such is the heedless and unjust manner in which Napoleon spoke of one of the greatest financial operations of the age. These forty millions—Napoleon does not estimate the sum high enough—constituted the floating debt, the vast resource which Baron Louis had procured for the state, and the pretended *jobbing* with the *reconnaisances de liquidation*, was only a temporary expedient, blameable of course in ordinary times, but necessary in the infancy of public credit. When Baron Louis put in the market the *reconnaisances de liquidation*, which were nothing else than our exchequer bills, unknown at that time, he thought it right to keep up their value, by purchasing them when they began to fall in price, and thus succeeded in keeping up their credit, and in maintaining them at par. This could no more be called *jobbing*, than the repurchasing of the scrip of *le caisse d'amortissement*, which Napoleon had often done, when he sold quantities of national property, or of the *communes*. Baron Louis bought up very few of these *reconnaisances de liquidations* when their credit was good, indeed he did nothing but what was absolutely necessary. Now that exchequer bills, thanks to a systematic financial system, are always at par, it is not necessary to have recourse to such expedients, and should circumstances make them fall below par, the minister would be blamed, who instead of keeping up their value by redeeming them as they fell due, would try to buy them up at a reduced price. He would be looked upon in the same light as a merchant who bought up his own dishonoured bills, and speculated on his own loss of credit. But at the present time public credit is established, and at the time of which we speak, ministers were involved in all the difficulties of endeavouring to establish public credit. We have not allowed ourselves these reflections, in order to assert truths admitted by all who understand finance, but to show once more what justice men show each other, and what, on the other hand, should be the justice of history. The resources created by a talented minister, and which supplied Napoleon's expenses in 1815, were qualified by him as a *sum kept in reserve for stock-jobbing*, and he thus retorted the calumnious report that had been made ten months before, of the state of his finances. However, a time always comes when every thing and every man are put in their proper light, and history is only too fortunate, when instead of having to destroy an ill-deserved fame, or pronounce a long-deferred condemnation, she has but to unveil the merits of men who have mutually misunderstood each other. As for me, always anxious to do justice, I feel like those jurymen who congratulate themselves on having to pronounce an acquittal, and not a condemnation, and I believe that I do justice to both régimes when I say, "Count Mollien created the machinery of the Treasury—Baron Louis, the credit."

secures a successful result, even in the sometimes very short time that can be consecrated to the development of great designs. It is when the whole is not seen at a glance, nor all the details foreseen, but left to develop themselves with time—it is then that there is danger of delay, because those details which were not taken into account, not having been provided for at the same time as the others, have yet to be attended to; and thus the whole may be retarded by an apparently insignificant omission.

Any person, who has any knowledge of the administration of States, will easily perceive by the sketches we have given of Napoleon's preparations, that nothing necessary to a great armament had been forgotten; all had been calculated before-hand, all made clear, and with a certain security in the means of accomplishment that could only be designed by the highest genius perfected by vast experience. It must be added, that in the execution of these measures, he had carefully kept political considerations in view. Thus the immediate formation of the *corps d'armée*, which was so essential to their proper organization, and which was made as inoffensive as possible by being called *corps d'observation*, together with the recalling of the men on six months' furlough, the immediate institution of the fourth and fifth battalions, the re-establishment of the depot at Versailles, the transporting of arms to where they were to be repaired, and lastly, the formation, in the ministry of the interior, of those *bureaux* in which the National Guards were to be enrolled—all these were urgent measures, which admitted of no delay. But they possessed the advantage of being capable of being put into immediate operation. In ten or fifteen days, when the real state of affairs would be known, when the declared hostility of Europe need no longer be concealed, and when, far from fearing to disturb the public mind, it would be necessary to call forth all the energies of the people, and make them aware of their danger, then, those other measures, such as the summoning and selecting of the old soldiers that had deserted, the mobilization of the National Guards, the decision of the Council of State as to the conscription of 1815, the levies of horses, the erection of extra workshops, and the throwing up of earth-works around Paris, which could not be executed in secret, could be attended to without the loss of a single day; for they necessarily gave precedence to the others, and the attention they would at a later period attract, would be harmless, since policy would itself then demand publicity rather than secrecy.

It was on the 24th of March, four days after his arrival, that Napoleon received certain information of the Bourbons having left the country. It was on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of March that the resolutions of which we have just spoken were con-

ceived, and immediately transmitted to the heads of the War department, even before Marshal Davout had time to make himself acquainted with the men and things that constituted his ministry. Meanwhile, measures for the armament of France were decided and ordered, so that the Minister had only to put them into execution under the direction and superintendence of his indefatigable master. Applying the same impulsive force to the Ministry of the Interior, he directed Carnot's attention to General Mathieu Dumas, as the most competent person to direct the *bureaux* of the National Guard. This gentleman possessed that rare combination of military and civil qualities, specially adapted to the two-fold nature of the militia that he was appointed to organize. Napoleon ordered General Mathieu Dumas to prepare at once, and as quietly as possible, every thing connected with the mobilization of the National Guards. He next turned his attention to the revision of military promotions made by the Bourbons, and which had been so lavishly bestowed that it would be impossible to keep them up. He laid down a few true and equitable principles on this subject, and entrusted the application of them to a commission of Generals possessed of the public confidence. He reserved the decision relative to the Marshals for himself. In the decree published at Lyons he exempted thirteen persons from the general amnesty, and amongst these were Marshals Marmont and Augereau. He could not persevere in his enmity against Augereau, who, being Governor of Caen, had expiated his faults by publishing a most violent proclamation against the Bourbons. But Marshal Marmont's name was left on the list: the execution of the decree was, however, deferred. Napoleon determined to erase from the list of marshals the names of Oudinot, Victor, and Saint-Cyr, who had zealously espoused the cause of the Bourbons; but he gave them pensions commensurate with their former services. He did this not so much to punish these men, as to make vacancies for others who would devote themselves to the defence of France. Three other marshals, Berthier, Soult, and Macdonald, were in pretty much the same position. Napoleon deferred his decision concerning them. He was so much attached to Berthier, that it gave him great pain to act with severity towards that old servant, and he sent him word that he would freely forgive his weakness as a father, on condition of his immediately returning to Paris. He believed that Marshal Soult would not be inflexible, as he supposed him very much irritated against the Bourbons, who had recompensed him so badly, after having placed him in circumstances that involved a self-contradictory line of conduct. He took no measures respecting him nor Marshal Macdonald, whose nobility of character he was well able to appreciate. His plan was to induce both to come to Paris, and

then offer them employment, confirming them in their dignities. As for Marshals Lefebvre, Suchet, Davout, Ney, and Mortier, who had already declared for the Empire, and Masséna, of whom he had no doubt, he had already employed some of them, and intended to give the others appointments suitable to their deserts. With regard to Ney, he adopted a measure advantageous at once to the public service and to the Marshal. Ney was quite embarrassed by the contradictory manner in which he had acted at Fontainebleau and at Lons-le-Saulnier, and thought that the looks, if not the words, of every one he met, expressed the reproaches he felt he deserved. This false position had a bad effect both on his thoughts and words. To excuse his own faults, he was constantly blaming others; saying, at one time, such things of the Bourbons, at another of Napoleon, as not only detracted from his own dignity, but which might make it difficult to employ him. As Napoleon did not wish to lose the Marshal's services, he thought it better to remove him from Paris, and therefore ordered him to inspect the frontier from Dunkirk to Bâle, with power over all the civil and military authorities, and with express orders to report every thing connected with the defence of the country or the state of the army. Ney, notwithstanding his characteristic faults, was extremely shrewd with regard to every thing connected with his profession, and would be most useful on the frontier, whilst at Paris he would only injure the public interests and his own.

All these different arrangements with respect to the general armament of France had, as we have already said, been planned and ordered from the 25th to the 27th of March. Meantime, frequent intelligence had been received from the south of the Empire. Napoleon had been informed that all was becoming quiet in the west, at least for the moment, but that the royalists were making some progress in the south, especially between Marseilles and Lyons. Though he felt no uneasiness about this, he wished to put an end to demonstrations that might interfere with his preparations for war. He ordered General Morand to send two columns along the Loire, one on the right, the other on the left bank, each to be composed of one regiment of infantry and of two regiments of foot, and to repress every insurrectionary movement. He also desired that he should summon three regiments of infantry from the coast, and send them to General Clausel, to aid him in subduing Bordeaux. He also summoned General Grouchy, who had publicly quarrelled with the Bourbons, because of the dignity of Colonels-General being transferred to the Princes of the Blood, and sent him to Lyons to arrest the progress of the Duke d'Angoulême. He desired him to act with vigour and promptitude, but by no means to treat the Prince as it had been intended to treat him. "But,"

asked the General, "if the Prince fall into my power, what shall I do?" "Take him, but treat him with every respect," said Napoleon; "for I wish that Europe should see the difference *between me and the crowned brigands who have set a price upon my head.*" These words, which showed how much he was irritated, referred to the declaration of the 13th of March, which had been published in the names of the sovereigns assembled at Vienna. Napoleon was silent a moment, and seemed to reconsider his resolutions. "The Prince," he said, "may be made a means of exchange with foreign courts, and be, perhaps, given in exchange for my wife and son." But he soon abandoned this idea, for the Duke d'Angoulême was not of sufficient importance to be made the object of such an exchange, and repeated his former instructions. "Get the Prince out of the country," he said: "if you take him, treat him with the utmost deference; write immediately to me, and we will give him up safe and sound in exchange for the crown diamonds, which I had in my possession last year, but which I did not hesitate to resign, and which do not belong to Louis XVIII, nor to me, but to France."

This said, Napoleon dismissed General Grouchy, and gave him, as companion of his expedition—not that he doubted him—General Corbineau, in whose promptitude, sincerity, and intelligence he felt the most perfect confidence. He desired the latter to remain constantly beside General Grouchy. At the same time, he sent off one of the divisions of the 6th corps, under the Count Lobau, by post. This division was particularly well suited to the south, as it was composed of regiments that had been most forward in declaring for the Empire. They were the 7th of the line (the regiment of De la Bédoyère), the 20th, and 24th from the garrison at Lyons, and the 14th, that had come to meet Napoleon between Fontainebleau and Auxerre. These four regiments would suffice to disperse the southern insurgents, and that easy task accomplished, they were to form the nucleus of the 7th corps, destined to defend the Alps.

Napoleon's attention was not exclusively occupied by these military measures. He was obliged to think also of the home policy, and to declare under what form of government France was to be placed. During the review of the 21st, and one or two which had taken place subsequently, he had addressed the troops in language similar to that he had used at Grenoble, Lyons, and Auxerre. He was come, he said, to restore the national glory, to revive the principles of 1789, and to bestow on France as much liberty as was suited for her. These professions, which had been addressed to some provincial municipalities, and to a few soldiers, must now be repeated, with suitable solemnity, before more dignified assemblies, before the great bodies of the

State, and this in a manner that would precisely define his engagements with the country.

Napoleon had appointed Sunday, the 26th of March, for the reception of the great bodies of the State, when discourses, which had been previously arranged, would be delivered on both sides. But on the day before, he sought to impress the public mind by an act that would plainly declare his actual sentiments.

No government had ever repressed the manifestation of public opinion more than his. In the commencement of his reign he had led public opinion captive by the personal admiration he inspired, and in later times, an inexorable police suppressed in journals and in books every thought that opposed his opinions. Towards the end of his reign, Napoleon became conscious of the inconvenience of such an oppressive system, and often spoke of it to the Duke de Rovigo, Minister of Police, who fully agreed with him. One great evil resulting from the system was, that no one had faith in the declarations of the government, even when perfectly sincere. In time of war, for example, to want of faith in the French government, was added implicit belief in foreigners; and whilst our bulletins were not credited, no doubt was ever entertained of the veracity of those of the enemy, which were infinitely more false than ours. Deeply touched by this state of public feeling, Napoleon, in 1813, wrote to the Duke de Rovigo, "As we are not believed, we must no longer speak in our own name, but, assuming that of others, tell the whole truth, our only safeguard now." In consequence of this resolution, Napoleon despatched no bulletins in 1813 or 1814, but had articles inserted in the "*Moniteur*," which commenced thus, "We have heard from the army that," &c.

This painful experience had opened Napoleon's eyes on the subject of the liberty of the press. However, had it been suddenly proposed to him in 1813 or 1814, to expose himself freely to all the violence of the journalists—a violence that is most formidable when restraint is suddenly exchanged for unrestrained liberty, he would most certainly have refused, as one refuses to undergo a painful operation, of whose necessity one is not convinced. But he was now returned from Elba, where, during an entire year, he had been the target at which the journals of Europe had hurled their abuse. After such a trial he had nothing more to fear, and as he himself very shrewdly remarked, *that there was nothing more to be said against him, whilst a great deal still remained to be said against his opponents.*

Though still aware of the inconvenience resulting from the liberty of the press, his two-fold experience as sovereign and exile, had changed his opinion on the subject. But he was influenced by a still more powerful motive, a motive that coloured

every thing connected with his home policy, which was, to do in all things the opposite of what the Bourbons had done. His only excuse for expelling them, at the risk of a fearful war, was, that his government was to be the antithesis of theirs, and the corrector of their errors. They had not shown sufficient interest for the glory of France; he must, therefore, exalt it more than ever. They were opposed to the interests of the Revolution; he must declare such interests sacred. They granted liberty hesitatingly, and bound by many restrictions; he must give it freely, fully, without any restraint, and at the same time, with seeming pleasure and confidence, whatever might be the result, for nothing could be so bad as to have it said that he trod in the footsteps of the Bourbons, and that, consequently, it was not worth the trouble to get rid of them, at the risk of a revolution, and of what was worse, a universal war. It was evident that the censorship of the press had been an infringement of the Charter, and totally opposed to the government it was meant to inaugurate, Napoleon determined to annul it by the simple insertion of an order in the "Moniteur."

He merely introduced some precautions in the details, which the Legislature has since then consecrated as wise and necessary. He required that each journal should publish the name of the principal person connected with the publication, who should be responsible for the articles that appeared in the paper—a person since named the responsible editor. This precaution had been suggested by M. Fouché, who, flattering himself that he could mould men as he pleased, thought that by making certain persons responsible for what appeared in the journals, he would have them all in his power. Napoleon did not expect this, but he was determined to run every risk; and on the 25th of March announced in the "Moniteur" the abolition of the censorship of the press.

Napoleon could not include amongst the great bodies of the State which he was about to receive, the two Chambers which had been dissolved by the decree of Lyons. Their place was supplied by the Ministers, who were received as a body, which gave them an importance they had never before enjoyed, by the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Cour des Comptes, the Court of Appeal, &c. Prince Cambacérès spoke for the Ministers, and in their name entered into all the engagements necessary for those exercising the executive power. Having congratulated the monarch, whom Providence, he said, had twice raised up—the first time to deliver France from anarchy, the second to save her from counter-revolution, Prince Cambacérès summed up the principles of the executive power in the following words. "*Your Majesty has already traced the path that your Ministers have to follow; you have already, by your proclamations, informed the world of*

the maxims by which you wish your Empire to be governed. The Bourbons promised to forget every thing, but did not keep their word. Your Majesty will remember your promises; you will forget the violence of parties, *and only remember the services rendered to the country.* You will also forget that we have been *masters of the world, and will only go to war to repel an unjust aggression.* You will not seek arbitrary power, you will respect persons and property, and allow the free communication of thought; and we shall be happy to assist you in the accomplishment of a task by which you will gain the best and noblest glory."

More than this could not be expected from any government, until liberty had been secured by law, the best of all securities. "*The sentiments you express are mine,*" said Napoleon, and immediately gave audience to the Council of State.

This body proposed establishing the principles, in virtue of which Napoleon had commenced his reign, and in virtue of which the Council of State had not hesitated to resume its functions, as though nothing had intervened between the April of 1814, and the March of 1815. The following are the reasons adduced.

In 1789 France abolished feudal monarchy, for which it substituted a representative sovereignty founded on equality of rights, and a just participation by the citizens in the government of the State.

In 1790 the Bourbons affected to adopt the new principles proclaimed by the nation, but by their silent resistance soon provoked and merited a downfall, which a series of national decisions had afterwards confirmed.

In the years VIII and X, France after long and severe agitations had confided her government to Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned *already by the hand of victory*, and entrusted the care of her destinies to him under the successive titles of First Consul and Emperor. The people had twice confirmed these delegations of sovereignty by their votes.

In 1814, the Allied Powers profiting by a moment of disaster, penetrated into our capital, and the Senate gave up the national constitutions they were bound to defend, and depending on foreign aid abolished the Empire, and recalled Louis Stanislaus Xavier to the throne. In doing this, that body had assumed rights to which it had no claim. It had, however, attached as a condition to his return, the formation of a Constitution by which the rights of the nation would be partly secured, and which the monarch was bound to accept before ascending the throne.

Louis XVIII had not fulfilled even this preliminary condition, for having entered Paris under the protection of foreign bayonets, he dated his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, thereby annulling all anterior acts of the nation. He

gave an imperfect constitution, made still more imperfect by the manner of its execution; he humbled the glory of France, favoured the pretensions of the old nobility, allowed the claims to national property to be disputed, deprived the Legion of Honour of its allotted funds, and lowered the value of the insignia by making them too common, and in a word, had put in peril all that the Revolution had made sacred.

All, therefore, that had been done since 1814, may be considered as null in principle, as bad in effect, for the Senate did not possess the right to abolish the Empire, and even admitting that it had, Louis XVIII had not fulfilled the conditions in virtue of which he had ascended the throne. In fact, the government of the emigrants had acted in a manner consistent with the illegality of its origin.

Napoleon, by his miraculous return from exile, and received on landing by the unanimous acclamations of the people and the army, had re-established the nation in its most sacred rights, and he alone was lawful sovereign, for no power is legal but that conferred by the nation.

However, time and the actual state of France, made modifications necessary in the institutions of the first Empire. Napoleon had promised that these modifications should be made. He would keep this engagement, and would have the promised modifications confirmed in an assembly of the representatives of the nation, convoked for the month of May. Until the meeting of this assembly, Napoleon and his ministers would govern in conformity with existing laws, and the Council of State, which he had previously commissioned to watch over the application of these laws, had come to offer him its loyal and constitutional assistance.

It was Thibaudeau who had been successively Conventionalist and prefect, that had aided in the construction of this closely reasoned, but artificial logic, to which indeed no answer could be made, if the legitimacy of governments were made to consist in certain conditions dependant on their origin, and not in their form and mode of proceeding. Governments, indeed, spring from all the sudden changes of revolutions, and it is difficult to mark the precise signs that legitimize their origin. They are sometimes the result of popular feeling, sometimes the offspring of victory, sometimes of defeat, and sometimes spring from the revival of affection in a nation, disabused of its errors, for a dynasty which their common misfortunes has made it regret; and each form of government must be accepted, imposed as it is by necessity, and each in turn asserts its own legitimacy, alleging theories admitted by some, disputed by others, and concerning which the world will never agree. Without denying all that there is of respectable, august, and solid in titles founded on a long hereditary

transmission, we must, however, say that for persons of plain good sense, governments that were the result of necessity at their commencement, become legitimate with time, when the nation for which they were established, finding them suited to its habits and intelligence, and acting in conformity with its general interests, support them with a well-weighed and abiding approbation. This is practically, if not theoretically the best founded legitimacy, for though a government had been proclaimed by a whole nation, men and women, old and young, voting before mayors and notaries, or even did it descend in uninterrupted succession from Mount Sinai, it loses claim to existence once it jars with the faith, manners, honour, or interests of a nation. It is by its deeds, and by its deeds alone, that a government is to be judged, or its legitimacy determined. Beyond that, all is artificial and mere sophistry. But no better reply could be made to Louis XVIII, dating his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, than by asserting the sovereignty of the people, exercised by writing "yes," or "no," in miserable registries in the offices of mayors or notaries. One was as good as the other.

Napoleon appreciated these theories at their just value, but he adopted the conventional reasoning to reply to the royalist logic, and gave his consent in the following terms.

"Princes are the first citizens of a state. Their authority is more or less extensive according to the interests of the nation they govern. Sovereignty is hereditary only because the interests of the people require it. I know of no legitimacy not contained in these principles.

"I have renounced all ideas of the vast empire, of which in fifteen years I had only laid the basis. Henceforth the consolidation and happiness of the French Empire shall be the object of all my thoughts."

What was really of importance in all these manifestations, was the formal renunciation of the ancient system of a warlike and conquering empire, the renunciation of arbitrary power, the promise of exact conformity to the laws, and the pledge to give institutions which would guarantee the liberty of the nation, and the protection of her interests. Napoleon was ready to enter into this engagement at once, were it only to justify himself for having thrown France into a new revolution; but it was only natural that having been at Paris but six days, that the necessity of seizing the reins of government, of establishing relations abroad, and preparing the re-organisation of the army, and expelling his rivals from the country, should have occupied him exclusively. This latter part of his task was not yet completed, for the south was still to be delivered from royalist in-

surrections; he was earnestly engaged in doing this, and needed only a few days to be completely successful.

Indeed, the re-establishment of the imperial authority met with but few serious obstacles, though there was some great but not extensive excitement, that passed away quickly. In the west, the Vendean leaders, stunned by the second downfall of the Bourbons, had a confused idea of being in some way implicated in the catastrophe, but did not dare to think of a revolution, whilst they saw, the rural districts so depressed, the cities so joyous, and when they considered the enemy with whom they had to do, an enemy that would treat them with leniency or severity according to their conduct. Some professional Chouans, and a few Vendean or Breton peasants, full of their ancient zeal, were quite ready to rise, but their generals, unsupported by England, unaided by her money and armaments, above all, in the absence of a European war, dared not think of a civil one.

General Morand consequently met no opposition in Vendée, and having unfurled the tricolour flag on both banks of the Loire, he hastened to the assistance of General Clausel, who had not indeed, any great need of his aid. The latter general having assembled at Angoulême some detachments of National Guards and gendarmerie, advanced towards the Dordogne, first sending on a confidential officer to strengthen the garrison of Blaye. This garrison consisted of some companies of the 62nd regiment quartered in Bordeaux. This regiment immediately on hearing of the events in Paris, sent a detachment of one hundred and fifty men to join General Clausel at Cubzac. This illustrious general, therefore, arrived on the banks of the Dordogne with a hundred gendarmes, one hundred and fifty men of the 62nd, and three or four hundred National Guards. The bridge of Cubzac having been cut away, the General took his station on the right bank, whilst the Bordelais volunteers occupied the left. Having borne some ill-directed discharges of cannon, he succeeded in forming a passage by the help of boats collected here and there, and commenced a parley with the leader of the Bordelais volunteers, who had hastily evacuated the *entre-deux-mers*—(as the land enclosed between the Dordogne and the Gironde was called). The volunteers were commanded by M. de Martignac, afterwards Minister of Charles X., and who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries for his amiability and eloquence. General Clausel informed him of what had taken place at Paris, and which had been kept secret at Bordeaux, in order to prolong the delusions and opposition of the people. It was not difficult for the General to convince M. de Martignac, that it would not be possible for him to make any serious resistance, and that attempting it would only injure an

important and interesting town. M. de Martignac promised to repair to Bordeaux, and be the bearer of the General's communications, and to bring back quickly an answer dictated by necessity.

The General followed M. de Martignac closely, and encamped with his little troop at Bastide, on the right bank of the Gironde, and opposite to Bordeaux in a diagonal direction.

The greatest confusion prevailed in this town at the time, as M. de Vitrolles, in passing through on his way to Toulouse, had communicated to the authorities the orders of Louis XVIII, to which he had added his own advice. The principal object of the Royalists had been to defend the banks of the Loire from Nantes to Auvergne, profit by the mountainous country between Auvergne and Cevennes, to take up a position there, and to keep possession of both banks of the Rhone, as far as Arles, Marseilles, and Toulon. They had written to England for arms and money, and to Ferdinand VII for Spanish soldiers. By this imprudent appeal to foreigners, our ports were as open for the British flag as for that of the Bourbons, and the Royalists thus ran the risk of renewing the scenes of 1793 at Toulon. But passion and necessity do not reason, especially when patriotism is blinded by party spirit. All this, however, had not prevented the loss of the Loire, and the Loire being lost, an effort was made to preserve the line of the Garonne, prolonged by the Southern Canal as far as the Rhone; that is, as far as Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nismes, Marseilles, and Toulon. Great hopes were entertained that the Duke d'Angoulême would be successful on the banks of the Rhone.

As the Royalists had possession of the line of the Garonne, the Duchess d'Angoulême did all in her power to preserve it. She had been joined by M. Lainé, who assisted her as far as he could. It would have been a great advantage had M. Lainé succeeded in enlightening the Bourbons at Paris, and thus prevented the revolution of the 20th of March, which could produce nothing but misery. But as Napoleon had got again possession of the French throne, and as a last and desperate struggle with Europe was inevitable, the wisest and most patriotic course would be to join him as quickly as possible, that he might have the entire strength of the nation under his command. A few amongst the sensible and intelligent population of Bordeaux understood this; but the mass, irritated by the sufferings of twenty years, and afflicted at seeing the sea again blockaded, sympathized both through self-interest and through conviction, with the Duchess d'Angoulême, and were ready to aid her at the expense of their lives. Under such circumstances, every thing depended on the conduct of the troops. These consisted of two regiments—the 62nd of the line, and the 8th light

infantry. These troops took exactly the same attitude as that assumed by the garrison at Lille : that is, they treated the august daughter of Louis XVI with the most profound respect, but showed unmistakeably that Napoleon possessed their affections.

M. de Martignac, having come to Bordeaux to announce the arrival of General Clausel, and to present his propositions, the barracks were visited, and the soldiers spoken to ; but though the Duchess d'Angoulême took part in this herself, the result was not at all satisfactory. The troops declared unanimously that they would not allow any one to fail in respect to the princess, but that they would not fire on General Clausel, nor permit others to fire on him. After such a declaration, nothing could be done but to retire, which was the opinion of the most rational amongst the National Guard. The more ardent portion of the population who had enlisted as volunteers, wished to persevere ; but their opinion could have no weight, as they would themselves have been obliged to fly before the regular troops after exchanging a few shots.

M. de Martignac returned to General Clausel, and assured him of a speedy surrender, provided he did not precipitate events, and allowed the Duchess d'Angoulême sufficient time to leave the city. General Clausel, appreciating the difficulty of the position, promised to remain at Bastide until prudence should have prevailed over passion. On the 1st of April, he took up his position on the right bank of the Gironde, whence he could tranquilly observe the tumult that reigned at Bordeaux. Opposite to him, on the other side of the river, the National Guard and volunteers were drawn up under arms. It was already known that the Duchess d'Angoulême was about to abandon the city, and for this the volunteers blamed the National Guard—some battalions in particular, that had the reputation of being too moderate. A collision soon followed ; an esteemed officer of the National Guard was killed, and the men, excited by the violence of the volunteers, declared for an immediate surrender. The Duchess d'Angoulême embarked ; and General Clausel, having got possession of the bridge of the Gironde, entered Bordeaux, and without a single act of severity, quietly re-established the imperial authority in the town.

M. de Vitrolles, as we have already said, had tried to establish at Toulouse a Royalist government, which was to serve as a connecting link between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was exerting herself, and Marseilles, where her husband, the Duke, was making preparations for an offensive campaign. M. de Vitrolles levied taxes and raised troops, formed battalions of volunteers, and placed them, together with the few detachments of the Line that still supported the Royalist cause, under

the command of Marshal Perignon, who resided in Languedoc, and who was neither of an age nor character to serve the Royal cause effectually. In addition to these measures, M. de Vitrolles got up a "Moniteur," which was to contradict all reports favourable to the Imperial cause, and to propagate such as were favourable to the re-establishment of the Bourbons. This little Toulouse government sent out expeditions, some of which proved successful, others unsuccessful, against neighbouring towns, which, according to information received from Paris, had displayed the tricolour flag. M. de Vitrolles had reckoned upon being able to maintain his position here, with the assistance of the Spaniards, but M. de Laval had sent him word from Madrid, that though Ferdinand VII felt a deep interest for the house of Bourbon, he was himself so embarrassed that he could not spare a single regiment.

The news of General Clausel's entry into Bordeaux put an end to this Royalist attempt of uniting Bordeaux and Marseilles. General Count Delaborde, who had fought so well against the English in Spain, was in Toulouse, only waiting an opportunity to raise the Imperial standard. General Charton had been sent to him by the War Minister, conferring upon him extraordinary powers, and orders to dispel this Royalist phantom, that was so uselessly disturbing the country. A part of the 3rd regiment of artillery was at Toulouse, the greater part having been sent to Nîmes, on the service of the Duke d'Angoulême. One company of this regiment, whose fidelity was suspected, had been sent back to Toulouse. General Delaborde profited by this circumstance, and with the assistance of some half-pay officers, opened a communication with this regiment, persuaded the men to mount the tricolour cockade, and then, placing himself at their head, arrested Marshal Perignon and M. de Vitrolles in the Emperor's name. The Marshal he allowed to return to his estates, but kept M. de Vitrolles prisoner until the government should decide his fate. This little revolution, executed on the 4th of April, did not cost a single drop of blood, and was the signal for hoisting the tricolour flag along the Pyrenees, from Bayonne to Perpignon.

The Duke d'Angoulême had Provence, and both banks of the Rhone as far as Valence under his authority, and he had some prospect of success in these parts.

By his visit to Marseilles and Toulon, and his return through Nîmes, this Prince had given additional impetus to the Royalism of the south; which, indeed, did not need any. Marshal Masséna did not interfere, contenting himself with maintaining the public peace until party spirit should put our ports in danger, and giving up a portion of the troops to the Duke d'Angoulême, only keeping what would be necessary to defend

Marseilles and Toulon against any attempt of the English. He had left Toulon in the care of the 69th and 82nd regiments of the Line, and had led the 16th to Marseilles, to preserve order there, which indeed was not an easy task amid that excited population.

On the other hand, the Duke d'Angoulême having left Nîmes, ascended the Rhone, and sent a second column through the valley of the Durance, with orders to proceed through Sisteron and Gap, to Grenoble. His plan was, that should his party succeed in getting possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne, in the valley of the Rhone, and of Gap and Grenoble in the Alps, to unite both columns before Lyons, and recover this capital of the south, and in Napoleon's rear again raise the white flag that had been lowered for a time. This plan, sketched by Generals Ernouf and d'Aultanne, both of whom had remained faithful to the Royal cause, failed merely for want of means of putting it into execution. Could the troops be relied on? And if they failed, would the excited people of the south be equal to conquering the less demonstrative, but not less firm and courageous inhabitants of Dauphiny, Lyonnais, and Auvergne? This question could only be solved by a practical test. Here, also, help was sought from abroad; for the Duke d'Angoulême had sent an officer in whom he could confide, to ask the King of Sardinia for some thousand Piedmontese.

The Duke d'Angoulême had under his command the 58th and 83rd regiments of the Line, that had been sent in pursuit of Napoleon at his arrival, and had since remained in the valley of the Durance; and also the 10th of the Line, and the 14th of the cavalry chasseurs, that had been brought from Languedoc. The 10th was commanded by M. d'Ambrugeac, and called "the Colonel's regiment:" the officers were all reliable, though animated by the same feelings as the rest of the army. This regiment showed no symptoms of disaffection, because its members were kept by circumstances in another train of ideas. The presence of the Prince and of numerous Royalist volunteers had led the 10th into a path it would not have chosen for itself. The 14th chasseurs had obeyed, but less ardently, the general impulsion. These troops were joined by a detachment of the 3rd artillery, a company of which had just effected the revolution of Toulouse; and they were also reinforced by bands of volunteers from Nîmes, Avignon, Arles, Aix, and Beaucaire. As little confidence was felt in the regiments of the Line, however well they might seem disposed, an effort was made to weaken or dissolve them by offering sixty francs to every man that would leave the Line and join the Royalist volunteers. It was accepted by some, who, having left their country at fifteen or twenty, had

become in some sort mercenaries, and were willing to fight for any cause, provided it was not that of another country. It was hoped that these well-drilled men would give that consistence to the volunteers in which they failed, not for want of courage, but of experience.

In pursuance of the arranged plan, General Ernouf took the 58th and 83rd regiments, that had remained on the banks of the Durance, and undertook the execution of the expedition, which, proceeding along this river, was to terminate at Grenoble. He was also accompanied by a contingent of volunteers. The Duke d'Angoulême, with the 10th of the Line—the Colonel's regiment—the 14th chasseurs, a troop of volunteers, and four hundred men of the 1st foreign regiment, altogether amounting to about five thousand men, undertook the principal object of the expedition, which was to ascend the Rhone, and successively take possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne. General Ernouf had promised to be as expeditious as possible, and reach Grenoble by the time the Duke arrived at Vienne.

On the 28th of March, the Duke d'Angoulême boldly took possession of the Bridge Saint-Esprit, and leaving a detachment there, entered Montélimart on the 29th. The people of the Lower Rhone were eminently Royalist, whilst those of the Upper were Bonapartist; but there was always a sufficient minority in each place to allow each party to make a demonstration in turn. The Duke d'Angoulême was well received at Montélimart, where he sought to strengthen his position by seizing the bridge of the Drôme.

At the first intelligence of this movement, the authorities of Dauphiny and Lyonnais hastened to collect what troops they had, which were not many, for the greater number of regiments had followed Napoleon to Paris. They had none but the National Guards, who, though most zealous, were not equal to encounter troops of the Line. General Debelle left Valence with some National Guards, and tried to make a stand on the other side of the Drôme, but was repulsed by Count Amédée d'Escars with a detachment of the 10th of the Line, together with some troops composed of volunteers and old soldiers. Though General Debelle had been forced to repass the Drôme, he endeavoured to preserve the line of the river by defending the Bridge of Loriol.

The Duke d'Angoulême, feeling more confident, determined to advance from Montélimart to Valence. He remained a day or two at Montélimart to organize the places in his interest, and on the 2nd tried to force the passage of the Drôme. General Debelle had given the Bridge of Loriol in charge to Noël, the commander of the battalion of artillery, an honest man, who would not re-enter the service until freed from his oath by the

departure of Louis XVIII. He had under his command three hundred men of the 39th, a half-squadron of the Guards of Honour, and four hundred National Guards from the neighbourhood. Noël placed his artillery on the bridge, defended by a detachment of the 39th, and dispersed the remainder of his men along the Drôme to defend the quays of the river above and below Lorient Bridge. He kept this position for some time, and would have succeeded in arresting the progress of the Royalists but for a curious accident, which was interpreted in various ways at the time. The Bonapartists counted with certainty on the defection of the 10th regiment of the Line and the 14th chasseurs, and were ready to receive them with open arms. Some soldiers of the 10th, thinking the moment was come to declare themselves, left their regiments, and sprang on the bridge, holding their muskets reversed. They were received as brothers, and it was thought that the troops that followed were coming in the same spirit. But two companies of the 10th, kept in good order by their officers, fired, and then mounted the bridge with fixed bayonets. The men of the 39th were taken by surprise, and retired in disorder, crying that they were betrayed. By this accident, the Royalists conquered the whole course of the Drôme, and entered Valence on the 3rd of April, with the Duke d'Angoulême at their head, amidst the acclamations of the Royalist party.

The Duke acted at Valence as he had done at Montélimart: he remained there for two days to appoint authorities devoted to his cause, and to await intelligence from the column which, passing through Sisteron and Gap, was to advance on and take Grenoble. But this column had not been so successful as the other.

General Ernouf, following the route by which Napoleon had arrived at Grenoble, had, in passing from the Durance to the Isère, to traverse the long and narrow gorge of the defiles of Saint-Bonnet, the same where the Elba column had narrowly escaped being stopped in its progress. To avoid this danger, the General determined to force the passage simultaneously at two points. The 58th regiment and some Royalists under the command of General Gardanne, were to advance along the high road to Gap, then turn to the left, and enter the defile of Saint-Bonnet, whilst the 83rd, under General Loverdo, leaving the high road that led to Gap, were to advance by a lateral gorge, and reach La Mure through Serres and Mens; thus effecting their purpose by turning Saint-Bonnet.

This plan was followed exactly, and the two detachments advanced towards the appointed places, whilst the Duke d'Angoulême proceeded to Montélimart. General Gardanne, formerly Governor of the pages under the Empire, unwillingly aided the

Royal cause, and served under the Bourbon only because he dreaded Napoleon's resentment for his inconsistent conduct since 1814. He appeared before Gap with troops as discontented, but not so irresolute as himself, and who only waited for a favourable opportunity to change sides. On their way they met the Mayor of Gap, who came in the most friendly manner to offer them provisions, and express his astonishment at seeing them engaged in a warfare so unnatural and useless as resistance to the Empire. The soldiers smiled as they listened, and, looking at each other, asked if it were time to follow their own inclinations. Still the demonstrations of the people around were not yet sufficiently marked to encourage them.

The next day they entered the defile of Saint-Bonnet, and were again met by the Mayor and inhabitants, bringing provisions in abundance, as on the day before, but now crying "*Vive l'Empereur !*" with all their might. At this the soldiers yielded, drew the tricoloured cockade from their knapsacks, fixed them in their shakos, and declared for the Emperor. General Chabert, who now arrived, reassured General Gardanne, by telling him that the past had been pardoned, and thus induced him to follow the example of the troops. The Royalist volunteers, who were allowed to depart unmolested, returned to Sisteron under the command of some officers, who had remained faithful.

Whilst the detachment under General Gardanne behaved in this manner, that under General Loverdo did not act much better. During the 28th, 29th, and 30th of March, General Loverdo, with the 83rd regiment and the two Provençal columns, had advanced towards Serres and Saint-Maurice, and were approaching La Mure in the rear of General Chabert, opposed to General Gardanne. He there learned how the 58th had behaved, and met Generals Gardanne and Chabert, who were come to convert him. Immediately after the landing at the Gulf of Juan, General Loverdo, yielding to his personal feelings, felt inclined to join Napoleon. Since then, placed in the very focus of Royalism, he had become so engaged with the partisans of the Bourbons that he could not free himself with honour. He therefore remained faithful to the cause to which accident had bound him ; and though tempted to yield to the entreaties of Generals Chabert and Gardanne, he retraced his steps, taking with him the highly discontented 83rd. But scarcely had he arrived at Sisteron, when the regiment that had so unwillingly followed its general, deserted to a man, and hastened to join General Chabert on the road to Grenoble. These two regiments were a powerful reinforcement to the partisans of the Empire in this district, and were soon to be sent to oppose the Duke d'Angoulême between Vienne and Valence.

Whilst such untoward events were taking place in the very

bosom of that column that was sent to take possession of Grenoble, and then join the Duke d'Angoulême on the road to Lyons, still more disagreeable events were occurring in his rear. The Duke d'Angoulême had left the people of Languedoc influenced by different feelings, some ardent in the Royal cause, and others inflamed with a revolutionary and Bonapartist spirit. The news from Paris, at first contradicted, was now universally known to be true, and inspired the partisans of the Empire with hope and the desire of triumph. General Gilly, who had been exiled to Remoulins, near Nîmes, was, with many other half-pay officers, only waiting for an opportunity to rise. He came to Nîmes, where, assisted by some of his old companions in arms, he communicated with the 63rd of the Line and the 10th chasseurs, whom the Duke d'Angoulême had left in that town, and induced them to assume the tricolour cockade. This was not a difficult enterprise, for there were no troops to oppose the movement; and as the Protestant population hastened to follow the example of the soldiers, the revolution was accomplished in an instant at Nîmes. General Gilly then, putting himself at the head of the 63rd regiment of the Line and the 10th chasseurs, advanced to the Bridge Saint-Esprit, and took it from the detachment of Royalist volunteers left to guard the position. Thus, what the Duke d'Angoulême had sought to do to Napoleon, befel himself, that is to say, that as he advanced, the work which he had accomplished and left in his rear was destroyed.

Abandoned on the right by the column he had sent towards Grenoble, threatened in the rear by the troops left at Nîmes, the Duke d'Angoulême would have no chance of escape unless able to advance and force the gates of Lyons. But every path seemed to close before him instead of opening. General Grouchy arrived at Lyons on the 3rd of April, and found the inhabitants in an extraordinary state of excitement. From the moment that it had been known in Lyonnais, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne, that the Marseillais, with the other inhabitants of the south, were advancing on Lyons, an inverse movement had sprung up amongst the inhabitants. Besides the jealousy entertained against the southern populations, they were looked on with peculiar prejudice in the district of the upper basin of the Rhone. Of course a great deal of calumny was added to a little truth: they were called fanatics, cruel-hearted, and devastators. Still they were not more hated than feared. In consequence of this, the inhabitants of the Lyonnais, and of the districts for thirty leagues round, rose at once, and numerous companies of National Guards hastened to the defence of Lyons. Lyons alone furnished more than six thousand men, and at least thirty thousand were on their way to join them. Nearly all Dauphiny was preparing to make a descent on Vienne and Valence.

General Grouchy sent the Lyonnais National Guards to Saint-Vallier, and ordered General Piré to lead the 6th regiment to the Roman Bridge, and protect the line of the Isère. He next sent a battalion of the 39th, together with the 83rd, which had just joined the Imperial cause, to Saint-Marcellin. The Isère was thus guarded on all sides, and the Duke d'Angoulême, who had seen the gates of Grenoble closed on his right, and the Bridge of Saint-Esprit taken in his rear, while he had no hopes of taking Lyons that lay before him, saw himself, as it were, enclosed by an iron circle. No course remained but to retrace his steps as quickly as possible, and endeavour to regain Avignon and the road to Marseilles before the Languedocians should come up.

On the 5th of April he determined to retreat, and left Valence at six in the morning. While he was retreating, the Isère was crossed at every point, by the Lyonnais, the 6th light infantry, and the 39th and 83rd regiments of the Line. All the 14th chasseurs on the Bridge of Loriol, and on the Drôme, abandoned the Royal cause. The 3rd artillery showed the worst dispositions, but the 10th regiment of infantry (Colonel General), surrounded by three thousand Royalist volunteers, acted with more fidelity. The Prince arrived at Montélimart on the 7th of April, where he learned that the road to Avignon was occupied by General Gilly's forces, that had passed the Bridge of Saint-Esprit, and been reinforced by a mass of National Guards from Dauphiny. He was evidently doomed to become Napoleon's prisoner, and had no other resource than an honourable capitulation to save himself and his troops. He sent Baron Damas to negotiate with General Gilly. As far as the Prince himself was concerned there would be no difficulty, and General Gilly, interpreting Napoleon's sentiments by his own, said that the Prince should be free on condition of evacuating the country immediately. But unfortunately, General Gilly's officers and soldiers did not share his sentiments, which prevented his dealing as leniently with the Prince as he would wish.

However, the conditions on both sides were stated in such a manner, that after a few objections, every thing was arranged. It was decided that the Prince, with some officers, should be at liberty to retire to one of the ports in Provence or Languedoc, and there embark; that the troops of the Line should again put themselves under the Imperial authority, whilst the Royalist volunteers should be at liberty to depart as soon as they laid down their arms; that the money belonging to the State should be restored to the proper agents; and thus every trace of the Royalist insurrection would disappear. These conditions were accepted and signed on the 8th of April by Baron Damas and

General Gilly, subject, however, to the superior authority of General Grouchy, commandant in the southern provinces.

No sooner were the terms of this capitulation made known than the National Guards, hastened in crowds from Dauphiny, and taking possession of the road to Avignon, became fearfully excited, and demanded loudly that these conditions should not be ratified.

At this moment General Grouchy, having arrived at Valence, was preparing to descend on Montélimart and Avignon, to continue the pursuit of the Royalists. When he learned, on the 9th, that the Duke d'Angoulême was a prisoner, and that the decision of his fate was referred to him, he felt greatly embarrassed. Although greatly irritated against the Bourbons, he was not forgetful of the bonds that subsisted between him and them; and to act with harshness towards the Duke d'Angoulême would be as repugnant to his family traditions as to his natural inclinations. Instead of seizing his person, he would prefer impelling him gently towards the sea, as General Exelmans had impelled Louis XVIII towards the Belgian frontier. And this would have been conformable to Napoleon's instructions: his words to him were "Get the Prince out of the country." But as the Prince was in his hands, he was bound by his very instructions to refer the matter to Paris. He sent a courier to Lyons, that the Emperor's orders might be demanded thence by telegraph. The Duke d'Angoulême and his companions were, therefore, detained at Saint-Esprit until an answer should arrive from Paris. In every other respect he was treated with all the attention due to his rank and gallant conduct. Meanwhile the 10th infantry (Colonel General), and the 3rd artillery, passed over to the Imperial camp.

During this delay the southern insurrection died away, after a few unimportant attempts. As Generals Ernouf and Loverdo had promised the Duke d'Angoulême that they would reach Grenoble at the same time that he would arrive at Vienne, they endeavoured, notwithstanding the number of desertions, to keep their word. Unsupported, except by some Royalist volunteers, they attempted to get beyond Sisteron, in the direction of Gap. General Loverdo encamped on the evening of the 6th at the village of Saulce, situate at the entrance of a defile, formed by a steep rock on one side and the Durance on the other. This defile was defended by a battalion of the 49th, provided with cannon. The peasantry, who hated the Royalists, had assembled on the summit of the rock, prepared to throw down large stones on the assailants.

On the morning of the 7th, the commandant of the battalion of the 49th advanced between the two rival troops, in order to hold a parley. He was answered with a fire of musketry. He

immediately ordered that General Loverdo's column should be attacked with grape shot, whilst the peasantry poured down on them an avalanche of stones. Then the Royalist volunteers, though brave, fled, being neither disciplined nor accustomed to warfare. Some who tried to swim across the Durance were shot from the banks, and the remainder retired towards Sisteron, leaving one hundred and fifty dead on the field.

Whilst these events were taking place on the Durance, Masséna was placed in a very delicate position between the Bourbons, whom he did not love, and Napoleon, towards whom he did not feel much better disposed, but who, he considered, represented the cause of the Revolution, whilst he felt himself bound to the Prince by a sense of military duty. He did not wish either to serve or betray the Prince, but remained at Marseilles to preserve tranquillity and prevent any outbreak. Having learned that a project was entertained of combining the French and English navies, and that, under pretext of uniting the two flags, there was a risk of Toulon's being given up to our rivals on the sea, he thought the time was come to declare himself. He went to Toulon, assembled the troops, and displayed the tri-coloured flag. He then sent an officer to Marseilles, and allowed that city twenty-four hours to lower the white and raise the tri-coloured flag. Threatened by Masséna on one side, and by General Grouchy on the other, Marseilles yielded, and with great regret, proclaimed the re-establishment of the Empire. On the 10th of April, all this part of the south had submitted to Napoleon, who was now acknowledged from Antibes to Huningue, from Huningue to Dunkirk, from Dunkirk to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to Perpignan. The Duke d'Angoulême was still a prisoner at Saint-Esprit; and though he had given unmistakable evidence of courage, he was not free from apprehension, because he judged Napoleon according to the prejudices of his own party. He preserved the dignity that became his rank, piously resigned to whatever might happen, though punished for his unjust prejudices by secret uneasiness.

He was in no danger, as may well be supposed, and had only to suffer the weariness of awaiting the end of his captivity in the midst of an excited people, amongst whom his enemies alone were visible, whilst his conquered friends were obliged to keep themselves concealed.

It was on the morning of the 11th that Napoleon heard how affairs had terminated in the south, the Duke d'Angoulême's captivity, and the capitulation, in virtue of which this Prince was to embark at the port of Cette. He unhesitatingly approved of what had been done, supposing from the despatches he had received that the capitulation had been already executed, or was on the eve of being so. By his orders, M. de Bassano wrote

that the capitulation was approved of, and ought to be executed immediately. As soon as this was known, and no attempt was made to conceal it, many persons attached to Napoleon and the cause he represented, found fault with what he had done, and blamed his want of prudence. Without pretending that he ought to avenge himself for the ordinance of the 6th of March, or the declarations of the 13th, they said that they were engaged in a fearful struggle, during which numerous and strange turns of fortune would occur, that many beloved of France might fall into the hands of the enemy, and that, whilst treating the Duke d'Angoulême with all the consideration that was due to him, it still might not be useless to detain him as a hostage. Napoleon did not deny the apparent advantage of this plan, but still persisted in his design of contrasting his conduct with that of his enemies, and thought this contrast more useful to him than would be the most valuable hostage. He did not regret what he had done, even when, on the evening of this day, a fresh dispatch informed him of what he had not known before, that the capitulation had not been yet executed, and that the Prince was still a prisoner at Saint-Ésprit. There was time still to change his resolution, and adopt the opinion of those who did not approve of the capitulation. He had a long conversation on this subject with M. de Bassano. "Perhaps I ought," he said, "to retain the Duke d'Angoulême as a hostage, that would be useful in our present hazardous and uncertain position. But I will not do so: it is better to let the sovereigns opposed to us see the difference that there is between them and me." This was proper pride, which shows the want Napoleon felt of public opinion, and the progress that morals had made since the bloody catastrophe of Vincennes. He immediately confirmed the orders sent by M. de Bassano; and the next day the "Moniteur" published the letter sent to General Grouchy, in which Napoleon said, that though the royal ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration of Vienna of the 13th, would justify his treating the Duke d'Angoulême as the allies had wished to treat himself, still he would not retaliate, but allow the Duke d'Angoulême to leave as freely as the other members of his family. Napoleon confined himself to obliging the Prince to promise that the crown jewels should be restored, without, however, detaining him till the fulfilment of the promise.

Napoleon was delighted at the prompt and happy termination of the troubles in the south. He had never doubted of a successful termination, but days, and even hours were of great value in his present position; and it was of the utmost importance that his troops should not be exhausted in repressing a civil war. The division sent to Lyons continued its route to help in the formation of the 7th corps, which was to guard the Alps

under the command of Marshal Suchet. Napoleon summoned Marshal Masséna to Paris, in order to seal a reconciliation with this old companion in arms, who was to return to the south if he chose. Marshal Brune was sent, meanwhile, to command at Marseilles, Toulon, and Antibes. Having learned from some intercepted letters the disposition of the Spaniards, Napoleon thought that the 8th corps, intended for General Clausel, and which consisted of twelve regiments, would be sufficiently strong with six. Of these he formed two divisions, of which one was to be stationed at Bordeaux, and the other at Toulouse; more, indeed, to restrain the Royalists than to oppose the Spaniards. Of the six remaining regiments, four were sent as a reserve to Avignon, and two were ordered to Marseilles, where, together with the troops from Corsica, they were to form the 9th corps, which was to defend Var. The regiments at Avignon were to reinforce Marshal Brune or Marshal Suchet, according to the direction the war should take on the frontier. Although Napoleon had advised Murat not to hasten to make a demonstration, he still dreaded some imprudence on his part, and for that reason summoned Marshal Suchet from Strasbourg, where he commanded the fifth corps, and sent him into Savoy to superintend the formation of the 7th. For the same reason he had prepared a reserve at Avignon, and even thought of giving him the entire of the 9th corps, which was to be organized at Var, under Marshal Brune. Napoleon, unceasingly occupied with this general plan, had made a fresh alteration. Five corps, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, together with the Imperial Guard, were to act under his orders on the northern frontier; the 5th, under Rapp, since Marshal Suchet had taken the command of the 7th, was to continue in Alsace. In Belfort, where there is, as is well known, a gorge between the Vosges and Jura chains, he determined to form an intermediary corps from one division of the Line and several divisions of the mobile National Guards. The command of this was given to the general most skilful in mountain warfare, the illustrious Lecourbe, who had not been employed since the process against Moreau. If Switzerland remained neutral, Lecourbe was to go either to reinforce the 5th corps in Alsace, or the 7th near the Alps, as circumstances might require. If he were not needed at either place, he was to remain where he was, and keep watch on the debouches of Bâle and Poligny.

These additions being made to his plan, Napoleon ordered that those regiments (the 10th in particular), that had taken part in the civil war, with their principal officers, excepting those who had compromised themselves too deeply, should come to Paris. He wished to see them, seal a reconciliation, and attach them to his cause. He also summoned General Grouchy, to reward him in an extraordinary manner; not because this

general had accomplished anything very difficult, but because he wished to show the army, that in the present circumstances, fidelity should not remain unrewarded. By this short expedition, in which scarcely a single shot was fired, and of which the merit, if there were any, belonged to General Gilly, General Grouchy gained a Marshal's bâton, which had never before been given but as a reward for a successful battle. But Napoleon wished to encourage devotion to his cause, and at the same time elevate to a high rank an officer accustomed to command cavalry, as he wished to have a commander for the reserve of cavalry, as death or desertion had successively deprived him of Lasalle, Montbrun, Bessières, and Murat. Alas! he soon had reason to regret this lavish bestowal of favour, in which policy had more weight than sound military reasons.

Napoleon was right in thus hastening his preparations for war, for each day brought fresh signs of the implacable hatred excited against him throughout Europe. We have already seen how, immediately after the departure of the foreign legations, he had sent couriers to recall our ambassadors, and at the same time to order them to declare that France was willing to keep peace with the European powers on the conditions of existing treaties. These couriers, who had left on the 28th and 29th of March, had all been stopped at the frontiers. The courier who had presented himself at the Bridge of Kehl, had been sent back by an Austrian commander, who would not allow him to enter even guarded. Another, trying to pass through Mentz, had been stopped by the Prussian commander, and grossly ill-treated. A third, passing through Switzerland and Lombardy, had not been able to cross the Alps. These were unusual proceedings, even in time of war; for, as Napoleon remarked, war is made only for the purpose of securing peace, and never, even during the most violent hostilities, had communications tending to put a period to the effusion of blood been interdicted. This unexampled species of diplomatic excommunication was evidently personal, and a consequence of the strange declaration of the 13th of March.

Far from seeking to conceal the reception his couriers had met, Napoleon arranged another mission still more remarkable, and whose failure he wished should be still more conspicuous. An occasion presented itself quite naturally. On reascending the French throne, it was etiquette that he should write to the different sovereigns to inform them of the event. Having frequently corresponded with them as ally or master, he could not be accused of the presumption of a parvenu in doing so now. He himself wrote a few lines full of moderation and dignity, in which he declared that he accepted existing treaties, and that, were his sentiments shared by the other monarchs, *justice seated on the frontiers of nations would be sufficient to defend them.* As

the greater number of sovereigns was at Vienna, it was to that capital his envoy ought to be sent, and etiquette required that for this mission he should select one of his aides-de-camp, as such are generally the bearers of royal letters. He chose the Count de Flahault, one of the most distinguished of his aides-de-camp, one of the best connected, and who had been most frequently sent to foreign courts. Simple couriers had been stopped, but it was possible that more respect would be shown to a Lieutenant-General.

Count Flahault left on the 4th of April, passed the Bridge of Kehl, which the cabinet couriers had not succeeded in doing, advanced into Germany, and when he flattered himself that he had surmounted all obstacles, he was arrested at Stuttgart by an order from the Court of Wurtemberg. He was deprived of his dispatches, with a promise, however, that they should be transmitted to Vienna. A commander in the Imperial navy was equally unsuccessful in trying to cross the Straits of Dover. As he had been sent to negotiate on the coast of England, he was not treated as an enemy, but prevented from advancing. His dispatches were taken and sent to London, and he was told that they would be opened at Vienna, whence an answer would be sent if necessary.

In order to explain this strange prohibition of all communication, we must relate what took place at Vienna, when Napoleon's arrival on the coast of France was announced. When Napoleon left Elba, he thought that the Congress of Vienna had been dissolved, or at least that the Sovereigns had left the Austrian capital, and that their Ministers alone remained to arrange some unimportant questions. This intelligence was correct when sent to Napoleon, but the late arrival of the King of Saxony at Presburg, his opposition to the decisions of the Congress, together with Murat's military demonstrations, had delayed the departure of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who would not leave while any difficulty remained to be solved. Therefore, when intelligence of the landing in the Gulf Juan, despatched from Genoa, arrived at Vienna, the Sovereigns, with their Ministers, except Lord Castlereagh, who had been replaced by the Duke of Wellington, were still there. All were at a fête when the news arrived. They were thunderstruck. Let us picture these potentates to ourselves for a moment: some of them had been deprived of their dominions by Napoleon; others kept in continual apprehension of the same fate; and all had been suddenly transformed from conquered to conquerors—from slaves they had become masters, and had not only recovered what they had lost, but had increased their possessions, some by half, others by a fourth or fifth. Let us imagine them now overpowered by an unexpected blow, and al-

most fancying themselves transported back to those terrible years 1809, 1810, 1811, when they were plundered, humbled, and submissive; and we may form some idea of what they felt. Their first sentiment was terror, a terror, alas! flattering to us, for it made them believe that eleven months had been sufficient to restore the exhausted strength of France. This terror was so evident that it excited the malicious mockery of the English diplomatists who, thanks to the ocean, had nothing to fear for their country. But consternation gave place to violent anger against the real or supposed authors of the coming misfortunes. First, all blamed the Emperor Alexander, who had had the imprudence to give Napoleon the Island of Elba by the treaty of the 11th of April. Next the Bourbons were blamed for having, by their maladministration, facilitated his return to France. In fact, there was a general outcry against Alexander's thoughtlessness, and the Bourbons' want of ability. And those who uttered these complaints added that they were themselves to blame for having confided the government of France to such hands.

Alexander was fully aware of the outcry that was raised against him, for the Russians were amongst the loudest in condemning what had been done. He defended himself by saying that the treaty of the 11th of April was unavoidable; that at the time it was concluded nobody had made a serious objection, for all were anxious to get rid of Napoleon at any price, he being then at Fontainebleau, at the head of seventy thousand men, and able to summon a hundred thousand more from the Pyrenees, Lyons, and Italy, by falling back on the south of France; that the Bourbons were alone to blame, because they had refused to execute the treaty, and had induced Napoleon to break it by refusing to pay his subsidy, and finally had opened him a path into France by their bad government. He added that if he had caused the evil he would repair it, by employing his last soldier and his last crown in the coming struggle. He tried to conceal his annoyance by his anger; and from that day forth amongst the allies he was the most violent in language and conduct.

So excited were the members of the Congress, that not one thought of asking himself whether Napoleon had not returned changed, or at least ameliorated by misfortune; whether, for example, he would not be willing to accept, not only the Treaty of Paris, but that of Vienna; in which case nothing need be asked of him but good faith. But the idea of Napoleon inclined to peace, corrected by misfortune, or modified in his views, never entered the mind of any.

They could only see the dreaded leader who had made such fearful use of the armies of France, who had displayed in the heart of Europe the devastating ambition of an Asiatic despot;

and these men, filled with terror, came to the instant resolution of struggling with their adversary unto death. There are moments when fear itself gives birth to heroism. There was now but one thought, one wish—universal, relentless, bloody war, which was to terminate only with the destruction of one party or the other.

However, it was necessary to wait some days before drawing up a declaration; in order to know whether Napoleon had succeeded—of which there was little doubt whether France alone was his aim—of which there was still less doubt; and finally, it would be necessary to wait for fuller information, and not incur the risk of merely beating the air. In fact, many were doubtful as to what might be the designs of him who had escaped from Elba; for the allies in their anxiety not only shifted the blame, but the danger from one to the other. Talleyrand wished to believe that Napoleon had landed in the Gulf of Juan with the intention of proceeding by Nice and Tende into Italy. "Do not mind us," said M. de Metternich harshly to him, "but think of yourselves. Believe me, Napoleon is on the road to Paris; perhaps he is at Lyons this very moment, and will be at the Tuileries in a few days."

Whilst awaiting the solution of these doubts, the allies turned their attention to what was most urgent, and that, for these co-spoilers of Europe, was to take immediate possession of the lands allotted them, and to seize them in the very presence of the former ruler of the continent. For this, the first thing necessary was, to get the King of Saxony's consent to the sacrifices required of him. According to the existing theory of international law—a theory true at all times, but now put forward with a good deal of affectation—no territory could be ceded but what the ceder *abandoned himself, of his own free and unconstrained will*. It was therefore necessary that the King of Saxony should abandon the provinces that Prussia coveted, after which Prussia would yield to Russia what she desired in Poland, and the latter could make the necessary concessions to Austria; and thus the series of stipulated concessions, which were sacrifices for some, aggrandisement for others, would follow in natural succession.

The three plenipotentiaries who had defended the King of Saxony were chosen as envoys, and sent to meet him at Presburg. These were M. de Talleyrand for France, M. de Metternich for Austria, and Lord Wellington for England. They proceeded to Presburg, whither Frederick Augustus had been removed, and found him determined to resist, and very little influenced by the services they said they had done him. Several days of intense importunity having passed without producing any change in the King's determination, the three diplomatists assured him that if he did not formally sign the decisions of the

Congress, that Prussia would take possession of the provinces allotted to her, whilst he should not be put in possession of those left to the crown of Saxony, but remain prisoner of the allies.

Though this unhappy Prince did not yield to these threats, it was evident that he would not resist much longer. The three negotiators then returned to Vienna, to make the final arrangements. They arranged the dispute between Bavaria and Austria concerning Salzburg, and nothing then remained but for the sovereigns to assume the titles of their new states. Alexander immediately assumed the titles of Emperor of all the Russias, and King of Poland. Frederick William called himself King of Prussia, Grand-duke of Posen, Duke of Saxony, Landgrave of Thuringia, Margrave of the two Lusatias, &c. Besides the title of Emperor of Austria, which he had substituted for that of Emperor of Germany in 1806, the Emperor Francis assumed the title of King of Italy, and by a solemn act, which was immediately published beyond the Alps, he constituted the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, which was to consist of the Italian provinces between the Tessino and the Isonzo. By this act, the Italians, like the Poles, were allowed the consolation of forming a separate kingdom. The King of Sardinia, to whom Genoa was conceded, and the King of the Low Countries, whose possessions had been doubled by the addition of Belgium, assumed the titles of their new states, together with the qualifications resulting from them. The sovereigns took care to take possession of their acquisitions in a few days, in order that the war about to commence might make no change in these arrangements, except to make them more secure in case of victory.

Whilst each was thus occupied with his own interests, intelligence of Napoleon's triumphal entry into Grenoble arrived on the 12th of March, and the nature and success of his designs could be no longer doubted. A meeting was immediately held, and to M. de Talleyrand was left the initiative in the propositions to be laid before the Congress. However much displeased with the Bourbons, none disputed his being the representative of Louis XVIII, nor that his sovereign was King of France. As the common interest demanded that the restoration of Napoleon and his family should not be permitted on any account, it became a necessity to support the Bourbons, the only possible dynasty. Although M. de Talleyrand had personal reasons to be dissatisfied with the Court of France, he, for the same reasons as the Congress, saw the necessity of upholding the Bourbons, and, indeed, he was too deeply committed to their policy to hesitate.

Aware that the surest means of rendering Napoleon unpopular in the eyes of France, exhausted as she was by twenty-two

years of warfare, was to prove the impossibility of his reconciliation with Europe, he suggested that the Congress should republish in its integrity, the ordinance of Louis XVIII, of the 6th of March, and treat Napoleon as a malefactor, who, having broken his ban, ought to be instantly put to death, upon his identity being proved. This was a strange proceeding with regard to a man who had reigned so long and so gloriously; but so violent was the general irritation, that none paused to reflect on public acts, nor their mode of execution. M. Talleyrand proposed, therefore, that a declaration should be drawn up to the effect that Bonaparte, having violated the treaty of the 11th of April, and thus destroyed the sole legal title that secured his existence, he should be looked on as an outlaw by all nations, and treated as such in case he should be taken. Alexander's generosity and Austria's moderation ought to have raised some objection to such a declaration, but every objection was overruled in the former by anger, and in the latter by the fear of being suspected; and the declaration, with the exception of one or two offensive terms, was adopted, dated the 13th of March, and sent by a courier extraordinary to Strasbourg, that it might be published along the frontiers, and if not too late, serve the Royal cause, by letting France know how unanimous Europe was in her enmity to Napoleon.

Some days more were spent in awaiting intelligence, sometimes with full faith in Napoleon's success, sometimes doubting this success when there arose the slightest gleam of hope, but during these few days, none thought of anything but immediate and relentless war, Prussia through revival of all her former hatred, Russia through anger at being the dupe of her own generosity, England through fear of losing the great advantages she had obtained, and Austria through the cold conviction of the impossibility of avoiding the struggle, and through fear of exciting the distrust of her allies. This latter Power, though having as much at stake as the others, was the only one that, thanks to the sang froid of the Emperor and of M. de Metternich, was able to judge calmly of the actual state of affairs. Austria was inclined to believe that Napoleon would offer to accept the treaties of Paris and Vienna; she believed, even, that, enlightened by experience, he would consent to territorial losses, and that, covered with military glory, he would now seek that of peace, and endeavour to add an olive branch to the many laurels that encircled his brow. But she was not sure of this. And it was also possible that, inconsolable for having diminished the glory of France by his own fault, he would first allow himself and France some rest, and that, when he had given the European union time to be dissolved, and having recruited his own military resources, whilst those of the enemy would be lessened or dispersed, he would

recommence the struggle, and again be in a position to propose treaties, if not such as those of Tilsit and Vienna, at least such as those of Campo-Formio and Lunéville. This second supposition was as possible as the first, and even were it less likely to be true, in doubt it is better to choose the surest plan, and the surest in this case was, to seek Napoleon's ruin by every possible means. Thus, though not influenced by hatred, like Prussia, nor by wounded vanity, like Russia, nor by avarice, like England, Austria was calmly and coolly resolved. But there was some difference of opinion in her councils as to the surest means of ruining Napoleon. Some Austrian statesmen were of opinion that Napoleon, returning after the Bourbons had reigned eleven months, would be greatly embarrassed by the numerous parties by whom he would find himself surrounded, and that, by merely encouraging domestic factions, the allies would be dispensed from the necessity of employing against him the terrible and doubtful engine of war. But this astute calculation, little in harmony with the violent passions of the time, might cause Austria's intentions to be suspected, and would give room for the suspicion that she wished for some such measure as the regency of Maria Theresa, and thus the union of the Coalition, which was looked on as the safeguard of Europe, would be destroyed. Austria, therefore, adhered calmly, but firmly, to the plan of a destructive war; and that for two reasons: distrust of Napoleon, and the consciousness of the necessity for union amongst the allies.

Exceedingly anxious not to give the slightest cause of offence, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich employed every means to get Maria Louisa into their power, and prevent all imprudence on her part. This was not difficult, as they had the power in their hands, and the Duchy of Parma would provide them with the means of persuasion. It did not need so much, alas! to influence this Princess. She had already yielded not only to her father's wishes, which might be excusable, but also to those of Count Neipperg, who exercised the most absolute dominion over her, and was become her guide, defender, and only friend. In her isolation and her weakness, she had not been able to resist the attentions and personal attractions of the Count, and had quite forgotten her duties, the obligations of her rank, and her sad but glorious destiny. When she heard of Napoleon's first success, she was deeply moved, and yielded to a momentary feeling of regret. But soon, recalling the Austrians' bonds, through which she must break, and above all, remembering her own faults, she chose the tranquil, opulent, and free existence that awaited her in Parma, in preference to all the risks of a stormy career, which, indeed, were more than she had courage to meet. It must be added, in justice to this Princess,

that if she were a weak-minded wife, she was an excellent mother ; and though not endowed with great mental power, she possessed common sense. She believed in her husband's genius, but distrusted his prudence, and had strong doubts as to his being able to retain possession of the throne ; she feared that by returning to him she would only endanger her son's inheritance, without securing him the crown of France ; and thus, fashioning her son's destiny according to her own tastes, she preferred securing him a certain patrimony in Italy to a chimerical grandeur in France ; an undignified calculation, but not incorrect, as events soon showed.

The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich found her already persuaded, and quite satisfied with their policy ; with the understanding, however, that she was to have the Duchy of Parma. The conditions imposed by them were, that she would not leave Vienna ; that she would place her son, for a time, under the guardianship of the Emperor Francis, and remit all communications, whether direct or indirect, which she should receive from her husband, to the Austrian Cabinet, by whom they would be laid, with the seals unbroken, on the table of the Congress. She accepted these conditions, humiliating as they were : she gave up her son to the Emperor Francis, who, indeed, showed the greatest affection for the child ; and, what was more inexcusable, she gave up all the letters she had received from Napoleon. However, in order to make some show of sincerity, she had a conversation with M. Meneval, who was still with her, and who continued Napoleon's faithful friend. She told him that she would not return to France ; that as she had not joined her husband when conquered and a prisoner, she would not do so now that he was victorious and on a throne ; that, weary of excitement, she would retire into private life, and devote herself to her son, and secure him a small but certain inheritance. M. Meneval, having remarked that though the Duchy of Parma had been hereditary, she was only to have a life interest in it ; she replied, that that was all she had been able to obtain, which, of course, was to be regretted ; but that she would be able to save money, and that in twenty years she could, in her duchy, amass a large fortune for her son, which, as simple archduchess, she would never have been able to do ; that besides, he would have several large fiefs in Bohemia, as a compensation for not inheriting Parma ; that he would be an archduke, and what was not usual in Austria, a rich archduke ; that she sought his advantage according to her own views ; that in all she acted as a mother, and, as she considered, an affectionate and devoted one. Thus thought and spoke the wife of Napoleon, not she whom he had chosen in a private station, but she in whose veins the blood of the Cæsars flowed ! M. Meneval bent his head in sad-

ness as he heard her words, but spoke not, merely showing in his manner the respectful disapprobation that he did not wish to express.

In consequence of these resolutions, Napoleon's son was taken from his mother, and, spite of his infantile complaints, carried to his grandfather's palace, which he was destined never more to leave. The letters which Maria Louisa had received through M. Meneval and M. de Bubna were placed before the Congress; for Austria was most anxious to prove to her allies that no secret alliance existed between her and Napoleon. As the reward of this submission, all the Powers assured Maria Louisa the sovereignty of Parma and Placentia for life.

Soon, fresh letters arrived, from which the best results had been anticipated at Paris, but which produced a very different effect at Vienna. The courier sent to Prince Eugène by his steward, and whom Queen Hortense had entrusted with letters for her brother, for Maria Louisa, and other persons of distinction, had been arrested, his dispatches taken and placed before the Congress. When these letters were read, they produced a most unfavourable effect, especially upon the Emperor of Russia. Alexander, who carried every thing to excess, had, whilst in Paris, been a constant visitor of Queen Hortense, and at Vienna made Prince Eugène his daily companion. He had obtained the Duchy of Saint-Leu for Queen Hortense, and had endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to procure a small sovereignty for Prince Eugène. In his anger at Napoleon's return, he persuaded himself that the brother and sister had been aware of the expedition from Elba, that he had been deceived by them, and he gave way to a displeasure that was at once sincere and affected; for it was more flattering to his self-love to appear to have been betrayed rather than duped. He, therefore, spoke of arresting and imprisoning Prince Eugène. After a little reflection and some personal explanations, he was appeased on receiving a promise from Prince Eugène that he would not leave Vienna.

All these letters proved what might have been foreseen, that Napoleon had neither been killed nor arrested on his road; that in return he had not sought to kill the Bourbons, but only expelled them from the kingdom; and had ascended the throne promising to keep the peace and observe treaties. But it was of very little importance to the sovereigns assembled at Vienna whether Napoleon had returned cruel or generous, corrected by misfortune or not, whether he was inclined for war or peace, free or restrained by treaties; even the least prejudiced were convinced that, once re-established on the throne, and his armies recruited, whilst those of the Coalition would be dispersed, he would attempt to recover the French frontiers, by which some of the Allies would be forced to surrender half the

Low Countries, and others half of Poland, Saxony, and Italy. There was no time for hesitation, for the counsels of pride, as well as prudence, recommended the Allies to profit by the dispersion of the French forces, while those of the Allies were still united, and destroy at once the powerful man who, by his coming, made their domination over Europe doubtful, and endangered the lion's share that they had secured at Vienna.

Now that they were better informed, the first violent declaration of the 13th of March gave place to proceedings more practical and serious, though less violent in form. Immediate warfare was agreed to by a treaty, that simply renewed the alliance of Chaumont. This alliance stipulated, as the reader may remember, that each of the four Allied Powers should keep a hundred and fifty thousand men on foot until the object of the alliance had been attained. This contingent was far from indicating all the efforts that were to be made against Napoleon; for it was understood that each Power formally obliged to furnish a stipulated number of men, would also employ all its disposable resources to secure the success of the common cause. It was agreed that the former arrangements for the direction of the Allied forces should be renewed; that one Power should not act without the others; and especially, that no communication should be received from the enemy, without being immediately referred to the Coalition, alone authorised to negotiate in reply. According to this treaty, England was again to furnish the subsidy of six millions sterling, which she had engaged to pay during the continuance of the war, besides a compensation in money for any deficiency in her contingent of a hundred and fifty thousand men.

For her, consequently, the engagement was more burdensome, if not more serious; but her animosities and her interests were so served by the war that the Allied Powers considered themselves under no obligations for her money. She alone was not represented at Vienna by a monarch or a prime minister, for Lord Castlereagh had left for London. But Lord Wellington, who had replaced Lord Castlereagh, confiding in his past services and his popularity in England, did not shrink from the responsibility. Though he had not received instructions—for the time was too short—he did not hesitate as to how he should act. He considered that the state of things that England had brought about in Europe was worth maintaining at the expense of a war: he had a vague idea of increasing his own fame in the coming campaign, and did not hesitate to implicate his government, certain that, whatever might be thought of his conduct, not one in England would venture to disavow his acts.

The representative of France wished to take part in this treaty, that he might the better secure the position of the Bour-

bons ; for he saw that their want of ability had brought them into bad odour, and that though all agreed as to the necessity of dethroning Napoleon, the question of who should replace him was by no means decided. M. de Talleyrand was so interested for the Bourbons, that on this occasion he forgot that sense of propriety which he possessed in so eminent a degree, and did not perceive how ill-placed would be the signature of a French plenipotentiary appended to a treaty which proclaimed an exterminating war against France. He asked permission to sign, but the personal motives of his co-operators saved him from this impropriety. The Allied Sovereigns did not wish that their subjects, and more especially the English people, should think that they were about to make war for the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and desired to seem entirely occupied by the interests of Europe. They, therefore, decided that they should be the sole contracting parties ; but that the other Powers should be allowed to give in their adhesion. The treaty in question, which was, in fact, the renewal of the Alliance of Chaumont, dated the 25th of March, was sent to London to receive the adhesion of Great Britain. Until then it was to remain a secret, not as to its general bearings, but at least as to its details.

Now that the object and means were decided on, the next question was how these means should be employed. Military conferences were held at Prince Schwarzenberg's house, at which Alexander insisted on being present. The plan of the campaign was discussed by Prince Schwarzenberg on the part of Austria, the Emperor Alexander and Prince Wolkonsky for Russia, M. de Knesbeck for Prussia, and Lord Wellington for England. They were anxious to commence hostilities at once, and especially Lord Wellington, who already put forth his pretensions to play the principal part in this campaign. But in order to act with more certainty, it was decided that nothing should be done until considerable forces were assembled, so that each of the allied armies should be sufficient to meet the enemy alone. The allied forces were divided into three principal columns. The first was destined for operations in Italy, where the Austrians supposed that Murat would act in concert with Napoleon. The Austrians, in their zeal for all that concerned that country, offered to send a hundred and fifty thousand men there. This body of the allied forces received orders to enter Savoy by Mount Cenis, after having conquered Murat.

The two other columns were to operate against France, Paris being the final object. A column composed of Austrians, Bavarians, Badeners, Wurtembergians, Hessians, and Russians, and consisting of two hundred thousand men was to appear on the east, between Bâle and Mentz. This column would not be able to act on the offensive until joined by the Russian contingent of

eighty thousand men, that, having to pass through Galicia, Bohemia, and Franconia, could not possibly arrive before the middle or end of June.

The last column, though the first in importance, was to commence operations from the north. It was wished that this column should be composed of English, Belgians, Hanoverians, and Northern Germans, especially Prussians, and placed under the command of Lord Wellington, in whose prudence the most perfect confidence was felt. In this case, the northern column would have consisted of two hundred and fifty thousand men, which would complete the number of six hundred thousand active troops, that was hoped could be assembled, without counting the Russian, Austrian, and German reserves, which would raise the entire number from seven hundred and fifty to eight hundred thousand combatants. The Prussians, whose pride was overruled by their hatred, would have willingly given the command to Lord Wellington, but Blücher's self-love presented an obstacle to this arrangement. It required great tact to overcome this difficulty. It was arranged that the Hollando-Belgians should furnish at least forty thousand men; and as they had a more than ordinary interest in the war, they were to be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, notwithstanding the merit and the well-founded pretensions of the brilliant Prince of Orange, son of the new King of the Low Countries. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers could have no objection to serve under the British generalissimo. Lord Wellington would thus have forty thousand Hollando-Belgians, about twenty thousand Northern Germans, and if to these, sixty thousand English were added, he would have under his command a hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, without counting the twelve or fifteen thousand Portuguese he hoped to obtain from the Court of Lisbon. He did not expect any aid from Spain. But it would not be prudent to meet Napoleon with a hundred and twenty thousand men: still it was believed that Blücher was too ardent to allow Lord Wellington to take the field first, and it was supposed that he would advance with a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand Prussians, that his desire to fight would make him compliant, and induce him to place himself, though not avowedly, under the direction, if not under the orders of the English general. Lord Wellington would thus find himself at the head of two hundred and forty thousand men; and this body, advancing from the north, whilst that commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg advanced from the east, the result would be, as in 1814, for each urging the other towards Paris, Napoleon would be finally stifled there, by the hundred-armed Coalition. A second Russian army, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, was to follow the first, whilst the

Prussian reserve would soon join Blücher. The Allies would thus have an additional hundred and fifty thousand men; and they did not doubt that, with six hundred thousand, they would overpower Napoleon, whom they did not suppose would be able to raise more than two hundred thousand in the then exhausted state of France.

These calculations, which were a little, though not much exaggerated, were considered correct, and the proposed plan was immediately adopted.

The Austrian troops were already marching towards Italy, for on this point there was no need of urging the Austrian Cabinet. It was arranged that the second Austrian army should be sent as quickly as possible to Bâle, and that the Bavarians, who had already thirty thousand men, should hasten to raise fifty thousand more; that the Wurtembergians, Badenens, and Hessians should also be urged on; and that England, in addition to her financial largesses to the greater Powers, should be requested to accord some help to the Allies of the second order, and that she and the Low Countries should not lose a day in collecting a body of forces capable of opposing Napoleon, in case he should anticipate the expected period of hostilities, that is to say, the middle of June. Lord Wellington wished to leave immediately, that he might consolidate the Belgian, Dutch, Hanoverian, and German troops assembled in the Low Countries. He also wished to be nearer London, in order to support the courage of the British government, and get the engagements ratified which he had entered into without authority. He was requested to give some good advice to the Bourbons, who had retired to Belgium; and all wished him success in the coming struggle. The Sovereigns determined to remain at Vienna until the arrival of their troops, which they hurried as much as possible, determined, as soon as all were in marching order, to follow Prince Schwarzenberg's head-quarters, as they had done during the campaign of 1814.

Meantime, M. de Montrond, charged with a secret mission, arrived safely at Vienna, thanks to his address, courage, and numerous disguises. His first visit was to M. de Talleyrand, to whom he was bound by the ties of an old friendship. He was too sagacious not to see at once how deeply this distinguished man was pledged to the cause of the Bourbons, and how useless it would be to seek to win him over. He checked himself when he saw how decided M. de Talleyrand was, but he wished to learn whether the other legations, less interested in the dynastic question, were as impracticable as the French minister. He addressed himself to M. de Nesselrode, whom with the others he sought to persuade that the revolution of the 20th of March not only responded to the feelings of the

army, but to those of the French people both in town and country, that numbers were ready to fight for Napoleon, and that consequently a struggle with him would be most formidable; that it would be wiser to calculate the difficulties before commencing a war which would cost more than its object would be worth, if that object were the restoration of the Bourbons. M. de Montrond was sufficiently intimate with these diplomatists and possessed sufficient tact to induce them to explain their views to him. They seemed neither surprised nor discouraged, though fully aware of the importance of his communication. They told him that no one at Vienna was ignorant of the gravity of the coming struggle, but that all were determined to push it to the last extremity, that is to say, to the downfall of Napoleon, that as far as he was concerned, a definite resolution was already taken, but as to who should succeed him, though the allies would prefer the Bourbons, they were ready to do whatever would be considered best.

Napoleon's strange envoy having become subsidiarily envoy of M. Fouché, endeavoured to ascertain whether there was any chance for the regency of Maria Louisa. But he found Austria as well as the other Powers, totally opposed to such a measure, and anxious to learn the feelings of that princess herself, he endeavoured to gain admittance to the gardens of Schönbrunn. He succeeded by representing himself as a great amateur of flowers, and obtained an interview with M. Meneval without exciting the suspicions of the Austrian police. He told him that if Maria Louisa would lay aside the restraints of etiquette and trust herself to him, he would promise to conduct her and her son safely to Strasbourg. M. Meneval told him that Maria Louisa was as indifferent about the regency as the Sovereigns themselves, and desired no other future than that which she had planned for herself, and in which her son was not the only actor. M. de Montrond said no more, faithfully presented the letters with which he had been entrusted, and received the answers, which he was determined to deliver as faithfully; but, as he saw that Napoleon's recognition was impossible, excepting that he achieved some extraordinary success, and that no one thought of Maria Louisa, he determined to try before he left whether the practical good sense of the Allies would not approve of the Duke d'Orléans, a prince to whom he was personally attached, and whose exile he had shared in Sicily. He found England still personally devoted to Louis XVIII, Austria obstinately attached to the principle of legitimacy, Prussia indifferent to everything but Napoleon's fall, and the Emperor of Russia alone inclined to a change of dynasty in France in favour of the younger branch of the house of Bourbon. Having obtained this information, M. de Montrond left Vienna without

betraying him whose emissary he was, and without doing him any service—for none could be done—having made an effort for the prince, his friend, and determined to tell the exact truth, an inclination common to all superior minds. M. de Meneval gave him a long letter for M. de Caulaincourt, in which, though speaking with his wonted deference, he gave him the most minute information concerning Maria Louisa and the Austrian Court; all which it was most important Napoleon should know. M. de Montrond hastened to Paris with the information he had so skillfully acquired.

We should not be sufficiently acquainted with the state of Europe, if limiting our observation to what was passing at Vienna, we did not turn our attention for a moment to what was going on in London at this time. Though the Sovereigns at Vienna showed by their conduct and their sentiments that they still entertained an implacable hatred against Napoleon, in England, though none were willing to resign what had been gained, a certain modification of opinion had taken place. Self-interest is unquestionably the spring of action in England as in every other nation, however enlightened; but her resolutions are also modified by a sense of justice, by sympathy for the oppressed, that is say, for those she does not oppress herself, by a certain poetic feeling and an admiration of what is noble in action, and it would be impossible to appreciate the English character without taking these different qualities into account. Though Great Britain was not become the friend of France or Napoleon, it is certain that she was not influenced by the same violent passions as a year before. When the intoxication of victory had calmed down, she had given herself to the enjoyments of peace, and fed her imagination with visions of boundless commerce. The eleven or twelve months' repose she had enjoyed had allowed her to send her merchandise to all parts of the globe, and she fully appreciated maritime freedom so advantageous to her manufactures. The brief reflections she had had time to make, had shown her the immense cost of the late war, and she saw that if it had brought her great advantages, it had also entailed upon her vast expense. Her acquisitions in both hemispheres were more than balanced by the tripling of the National debt, which now absorbed one half her revenue, and by the income tax which, so hateful in principle and the mode of collecting was become a permanent financial necessity. The commissariat, that is the ambulant administration, attendant on the army, had left large debts unpaid in Spain, and another had been contracted in America, whose payment was urgent. In such a state of things no one was desirous of a renewal of war. Besides, for whom and for what was it to be recommenced? There was no danger of losing what had been gained,

for Napoleon had announced his intention of preserving peace on the bases of the treaties of Paris and Vienna, and though his promise may be doubted, his own interest would be a sufficient security. Besides, he had shown his desire to please England by abolishing the slave trade—Napoleon had in fact just abolished it voluntarily. Not knowing for what they were to go to war the English naturally asked for whom. It was evidently for the Bourbons and against Napoleon. Now the Bourbons had sunk in the estimation of the English, whilst Napoleon had risen a little.

The compliment which Louis XVIII had paid the Regent, had certainly flattered the nation, but the people had conceived a bad opinion of the Bourbon government. The government of Ferdinand VII in Spain was esteemed hateful in England, and that of Louis XVIII in France was pronounced to be talentless, stultified and eminently calculated to entail upon his family the misfortunes that had just occurred. Nobody could see the common sense of taking up arms for the Bourbons, for the purpose of imposing on France a government that England would not choose for herself. As to Napoleon, he gained in public opinion in proportion as the Allied Sovereigns lost. He had been censured most for his insatiable and subversive ambition. The English people were greatly displeased at seeing Poland abandoned to Alexander, and Saxony dismembered for the advantage of Prussia, at the annexation of Venice to Austria, and of Genoa to Piedmont, without considering that these sacrifices were the necessary consequence of the arrangements which they had laboured to effect, and without reflecting whether they were not doing themselves precisely that which they blamed in others, they said that the ambition of Napoleon ought not to be blamed by those who were guilty of as great themselves. Besides, as the English are gifted with a strong imagination, his miraculous return from Elba had reinvested Napoleon with his former *prestige*. Napoleon having returned with the apparent approbation of the French people, he was, in the opinion of the English, sheltered by the principle of *de facto* government, a principle which they had now asserted for twenty-five years against many successive ministries. And under such circumstances to recommence a desperate struggle, to perpetuate the income tax, from which they had hoped to deliver themselves, to increase an already overwhelming debt, to bar up the paths of commerce so lately opened, in short to plunge again into the horrors of war within a few months after being delivered from them, and all this for incompetent princes, and against a prince too competent, but without giving themselves time to inquire whether he did not return corrected by adversity; this seemed

to the unprejudiced masses, most irrational conduct, inspired by the inveterate prejudices of the Pitt school.

The English Ministers were conscious of this change in public opinion, and had they been present at Vienna, would not have pledged themselves to the Coalition so readily as Lord Wellington. Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, who were certainly no friends of France, had the greatest objection to recommencing war, and even Lord Castlereagh, though so much influenced by the connections he had formed on the continent, was no less uneasy than his colleagues at the state of public opinion, nor less desirous to conciliate it. The French emigrants who had arrived in London, endeavoured to change the feelings of the British Ministry. The Duke de Feltre, sent over by Louis XVIII, communicated to them not only all that he had learned by a long acquaintance with the Imperial administration, but also the newest and most certain documents which he had been able to collect during his late ministry. He assured them that war could not be very hazardous, since when he left Paris on the 19th of March, there were but a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, of which fifty thousand could not be concentrated on any one point, and that by all imaginable exertions Napoleon could not bring a hundred thousand men into the field, after supplying the fortresses and interior with the necessary troops. To these reasons were added the promises of certain Royalists in the West, who declared that were some troops and *matériel* sent to Brittany and Vendée, the peasantry of these districts would rise as in former times, and effect a serious diversion, which dividing Napoleon's forces, would render them less formidable. It was therefore concluded that a prompt and vigorous effort would destroy Napoleon, and secure to each Power the possession of the advantages acquired in 1814. The English Ministers were still considering the arguments for and against this measure, when news arrived of Lord Wellington having, without permission, engaged them in a new coalition, and then the fear of disturbing the continental union, a feeling of complaisance for their negociator, and Lord Castlereagh's inclination to adopt the continental policy, together with the hereditary bias of the Tory ministers induced them to declare for war. However, as public opinion was so much opposed to this measure, it was necessary to use some deception, and Lord Castlereagh condescended to dissimulate in a way which, thanks to the advance of public morality, no English Minister would now dare to attempt.* The Cabinet, therefore, resolved, when all that had been done at Vienna was

* The dissimulation practised is proved by the recently published Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; as also by unpublished documents connected with the Congress of Vienna, and which are at this moment before me.

known, to introduce some restriction, as it were in deference to British principles, and to announce the contracted engagements gradually, as the course of events might seem to justify the conduct of the Ministers. The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the alliance of Chaumont had been renewed, was ratified with a reservation, however, added to the eighth article. This article, by which Louis XVIII was allowed to join in the treaty, must be understood, they said, as binding the European sovereigns for their common interest to a general effort against Napoleon, but not as binding his Britannic Majesty to go to war for the purpose of imposing any particular government on France. This treaty was brought to London on the 5th of April, there ratified, and then sent back on the 8th with this specious but false reservation, for the desire of the government was to substitute the Bourbons for Napoleon.

In a country constituted as England is, it would not be possible to conceal these proceedings from the parliament, which really exercises the power attributed to the Crown. On the 6th of April, the day after the treaty had arrived in London, it was therefore determined to send a message to the two Houses. The substance of this message was, that in consequence of the events which had lately occurred in France, the Crown considered it necessary to increase the national forces both by land and sea, and to enter into communication with her Allies, in order to concert measures with them for the present and future safety of Europe.

The Cabinet requested that this message should be discussed immediately, which was done, notwithstanding the efforts of the Opposition to delay it. The discussion was animated, and the arguments adduced, strong. In the Upper House, Lord Liverpool represented the Cabinet, and Lord Grey the Opposition. In the Lower House, Lord Castlereagh was the ministerial leader, Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Whitebread represented the Opposition. With a very slight difference the same reasoning was employed in both Houses.

The Cabinet made the following statement. France had been treated most generously in the April of 1814. Instead of destroying this nation, which during twenty-five years had not ceased to disturb the peace of Europe, the Allies had treated her with the greatest consideration. She had been allowed to retain a little more than her frontier of 1790, that is to say Marienburg to the north, Landau to the east, and Chambéry to the south; and she was left in possession of a museum filled with the spoils of the museums of Europe. As to Napoleon, the treaty of the 11th of April granted him conditions that were only too favourable. The English Ministry would not have consented to sign this imprudent treaty were it not that Lord Castlereagh, on

arriving at Paris in 1814, had found it drawn up and warmly supported by the Emperor Alexander. Besides, at that time Napoleon had still a hundred and fifty thousand men at Lisle, Paris, Toulouse, and Lyons, and the danger of a prolonged contest had to be taken into consideration. The treaty of the 11th of April conferred on him the sovereignty of the island of Elba, together with a large revenue; this treaty he had daringly broken by quitting the island, and afterwards seducing an army that detested peace, and only dreamed of promotion and plunder. It is true that it had been said in Napoleon's defence that the treaty had been first broken by others. If this were so, why did he not demand redress? He had said nothing, done nothing. The British Cabinet had accidentally learned that he was in want of money, and immediately insisted that France should pay his subsidy. As to the assertion of his not being closely watched, those who made the assertion forgot that in Elba Napoleon was a sovereign and not a prisoner, for which reason, he could only be watched by a cruising party, and a cruising party, however numerous, might always be evaded. Colonel Campbell lived alternately at Leghorn and Porto-Ferrajo, he was not, unfortunately, in the latter town on the 26th of February, and had he been, he would have met the same treatment as the other Englishmen who had been given into the custody of the gendarmerie; consequently, the British Cabinet was not to blame, whilst the fact was patent that Napoleon had been replaced at the head of the government by the treachery of an army that only cared for war and booty; but Europe could not consent to live in constant alarm merely to procure French soldiers occupation, promotion and money; nor was there any necessity for immediate war, or of imposing any particular sovereign on France; it was only necessary to continue in close alliance with the Continental Powers, the only means of avoiding an insupportable yoke. England would much prefer peace to war, but how could peace be hoped from a man who broke to-day the promise of yesterday; that, besides, it was better to leave the decision of this question to the Continental Powers, that were in more immediate danger than England who had but one course to pursue, to maintain an unchangeable union with those Powers. This message had evidently but one object, to keep up a close alliance with the Continental Powers, and to be in a position to answer their call, should they need the assistance of Great Britain, by land or sea.

It would be impossible to dissimulate more adroitly, under general truths, the essential fact of the war that had been resolved upon at Vienna. But the Opposition did not fall into the snare, and victoriously repelled all Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh's arguments

They first asked whether the government had not already signed a positive engagement to make war with France for the purpose of dethroning Napoleon and restoring the Bourbons. As the Opposition only suspected, but was not certain, that this was true, the question was put in terms that gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of giving an evasive reply, and speaking with a want of candour unworthy of the Minister of a free country. - As indeed these exact terms had not been used, as it had not been formally said, that war would be declared against France for the purpose of replacing Napoleon by the Bourbons, although this was the real object of the treaty, Lord Castlereagh, who had had the treaty of the 25th of March in his possession for two days, replied with ill-disguised insincerity, that England had not signed any treaty of the kind, and tried to show that none but precautionary measures had been taken, exactly in conformity with the words of the message which had given rise to the discussion.

Though deceived as to facts, the Opposition did not allow themselves to be deceived by arguments. They said that it might have been right to oppose Napoleon to the very utmost formerly, but that, making the evident, though dissimulated, engagement of doing so now, was only yielding to the old aristocratic notions of the Tory party; that the treaty of the 11th of April, the natural consequence of the state of things in 1814, had been shamelessly violated in every possible way; that not only Napoleon's subsidy had not been paid, which reduced him to selling some of the cannon of Elba, but that a doubt was expressed as to whether the Duchy of Parma would be given to his wife and son, the dotation promised to Prince Eugène had been refused, and the question had been almost publicly discussed whether Napoleon himself should not be transported to an island in the ocean; that he had, consequently, every right to break the treaty of the 11th of April; that when he had come to France, he had found not only the army, but the whole nation ready to receive him with open arms; that, aided by the army alone, he would not have reached Paris in twenty days, but he had reached that city attended by the acclamations of the people from town and country; that it was not at the head of a troop of bandits, as was said, for he had come without firing a single shot, but as the true representative of the French Revolution; that on the other hand, not an arm had been raised to aid the Bourbons, which did not prove that the nation preferred them to Napoleon; that the war, which was denied, though it was immediately to commence, was only taking part with the Bourbons, whom the majority of the French nation suspected and disliked, and this against Napoleon, whom the greater part considered as the representative of their true interests; that this inter-

ference in the domestic policy of a free nation was quite opposed to the principles of Great Britain, an interference which a sense of morality ought to interdict, were it even advantageous to British interests, but which should be most carefully avoided when opposed to them ; that Napoleon could not be what he undoubtedly was, a man of great genius, if misfortune had not modified his opinions ; that such a change must have taken place to a certain degree, since he had at once accepted the treaty of Paris, which he had so obstinately rejected in 1814 ; his sincerity had been doubted, and his old ambition blamed ; what had been said of his ambition was, indeed, true, but since the Congress of Vienna, his ambition ought not to be mentioned without adverting to the ambition of those Powers that had seized on Poland, divided Saxony, and deprived Venice and Genoa of their nationality ; that experience had shown that these Powers also were dangerous, and would need restraint as much as Napoleon ; that, consequently, if, profiting by the lessons of 1813 and 1814, he seriously proposed peace, the offer deserved consideration before declaring war ; that he was as good on the French throne as any other ; that to recommence war, double the national debt, perpetuate the income tax, in a word, to brave all the risks of a struggle that would be terrible if France should look on it as a national one, would be sacrificing the true interests of England to old Tory prejudices, and that, however flattering the compliments of Louis XVIII might be, they were not worthy of such a price.

Parliament was evidently influenced by these arguments, which, indeed, had great weight with the public mind in England. Some politicians, who saw that England had gained as much at Vienna as the most ambitious Powers, felt inclined for war as the surest means of securing these advantages ; but even those were doubtful as to the result, and considered it wiser to reflect before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby, who held a position between the Ministry and the Opposition, was the organ of this opinion. In reply to the message from the Crown, the Opposition proposed a resolution equivalent to recommending the government to preserve peace. To adopt such a resolution would be to declare formally against war, and therefore, the majority demanded that events should be allowed to develop themselves before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby said that were the message from the Crown to be considered as a formal declaration of war, he would not vote for it, as he coincided with those who thought it wiser not to reject every overture coming from Napoleon ; he did not believe what had been said, that he had been recalled by the army alone ; that evidently the greater portion of the nation favoured him ; that such being the case, the risks and advantages of war should be weighed ; that peace ought to be

preferred if it could be obtained on a sure basis, and war entered on only when indispensable, and presenting reasonable chances of success ; in a word, that the House ought to examine and reflect, and then send a reply to the message of the Crown conformable to its sentiments, which were averse to recommencing immediately a desperate struggle, but preferred to continue in alliance with the Continental Sovereigns, and to keep up a sufficient force to be able to assist them if necessary. It was for these reasons, and these alone, that Mr. Ponsonby did not join the Opposition. The members of the Opposition, in order to decide the question, appealed repeatedly to the members of the Government ; called upon them to declare the truth, and to avow that voting in the sense of the message was voting for war certain and close at hand.

A decided and repeated negative was given to this by several Members of the Cabinet, who did not hesitate to utter downright falsehood ; conduct which, to the honour of their institutions, it must be said, no British Ministers have since ever carried so far.

The proposal of the Opposition was not supported by more than forty votes, while more than two hundred sided with the Ministers.

The motion being carried, the treaty of the 25th of March was ratified and sent to Vienna, with the illusory reservation of which we have already spoken, whilst two members of the Cabinet proceeded to Brussels to arrange the different points with Lord Wellington. These were desired to tell him that the Cabinet was as anxious for war as he, and would support him most energetically ; that all that had been said was but a trick necessitated by the state of public opinion in England ; that he should explain the real meaning of the reservation added to the 8th article to Louis XVIII, and tell him that it was a mere salve for the feelings of some persons, but would neither prevent the English Cabinet from desiring the restoration of the Bourbons, nor from assisting them as earnestly as before. Lord Wellington was also to be told that the six millions sterling that had been promised should be sent to the three great Powers, but that they must not expect more ; and that, as to the lesser German Powers, an effort would be made to compensate them in money for the deficiency in the promised contingent of a hundred and fifty thousand men. Lastly, Lord Wellington was earnestly pressed to tell his plans and those of the Coalition, that, knowing, his government might feel confidence in advancing them. In order to give an appearance of truth to the statements made in Parliament by the Ministers, the Admiralty gave orders that the English navy should respect the tricolour flag, which, before, was fired on, whilst the white was allowed to pass unmolested. The Admiralty further permitted the merchant vessels of the

two nations to frequent the ports of both countries. This was a feat to be kept up for two or three months, until the commencement of hostilities.

When the emissaries of the English Cabinet arrived at Brussels, they found Lord Wellington quite ready to admit all these little deceptions of form, provided that nothing essential was changed; and he immediately exerted all his energy to prevent any imprudence being committed by the Prussians on the one hand, or the French emigrants on the other. This was no very easy task, as the passions of both were violently excited. The rage of the Prussians was roused to an almost incomprehensible degree. They talked of again entering France, where they would spare neither palace nor cottage. The greater number of their troops was encamped near Liege, and as the inhabitants of this town were favourable to France, the soldiers committed all sorts of violence, exercising a species of inquisitorial police, imprisoning or exiling all accused of connivance with the French, and directing their severity in particular against the Saxon troops, who, since the dismemberment of Saxony, bitterly repented their conduct at Leipzig, a repentance they took no pains to conceal. So violent had been the manifestation of feeling on the part of these troops, that it was found necessary to send them to the rear and disarm them. Blücher wished to select some of the Saxon soldiers, who, in virtue of the late arrangements at Vienna, had become Prussian subjects, and incorporate them with his own army. The Saxons refused to submit to this dislocation, and threatened a desperate resistance, aided by the inhabitants of Liege. Blücher had been advised to defer this measure, but he would not listen to any counsel that suggested moderation. The "*Mercure du Rhin*," a rabid journal, was the organ of Prussian feelings. According to this journal, the French ought not to be treated as ordinary adversaries, but *like mad dogs*, who are dealt with by being knocked on the head. War was, of course, to be declared against Napoleon, but less against him than against the French nation, whose pride and ambition had been disturbing Europe during twenty-five years. France should no longer be allowed to exist as one nation, but be divided into Burgundians, Champenois, Auvergnats, Bretons, and Aquitanians, each with their respective king; whilst Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders should be again incorporated with the German Empire, which should be restored to its ancient unity, by being placed under an emperor; and so Germany was to be treated on a system diametrically opposed to that which was to be applied to France, since her kings were to be removed to give place to an emperor, whilst France was to exchange her emperor for five or six kings; the national property, the fruits of revolutionary pillage, was either to be bestowed on the allied

armies, or serve as security for a paper currency wherewith to pay the expenses of the new war. These extravagant plans, elaborated in articles as revolting in language as in principle, were reproduced each morning in this journal, and circulated all along the Rhine.

To language such as this, the Prussians added military projects not a whit wiser. They wanted to advance immediately on Paris, without considering whether the other armies of the Coalition were ready to support them. They asserted that they alone, aided by a few English, Hanoverians, and Dutch, would be able to overcome every obstacle, and finish the war at once.

Ghent, where Louis XVIII had taken refuge, was the seat of equally irrational excitement. If some of the Ministers, such as M. Louis and M. de Jaucourt, who had accompanied Louis XVIII, saw a lesson for the future in the events that had just occurred, others considered them as only motives for exercising a too-long deferred severity. It was commonly said that the French army was nothing but a collection of brigands, that must be got rid of; that its commanders had been too much flattered—a policy that must be changed by taking off the heads of a few generals and distinguished revolutionists, and thus make weakness give place to energy. These persons considered Napoleon's return as the result of an extensive conspiracy, and the conduct of those who had assisted him as deliberate treachery, and not the consequence of exalted feeling. One unfortunate man, Marshal Ney, was loaded with maledictions, and marked out for signal vengeance. Thus, far from thinking of doing better for the future, the Royalists only thought of vengeance, and of shedding blood that they would never cease to regret.

It must be said, to the praise of Louis XVIII, that if deficient in warmth of feeling, he was not subject to such deplorable excitement, and that, whilst he listened to these follies, he neither encouraged nor repeated them, merely confining himself to hoping that the Allies would soon restore him to the throne. He even admitted the necessity of allowing a larger share of power to his Ministers, and less to his brother, nephews, and others of the Court. Unfortunately, some foreign diplomatists, whose good sense ought to have saved them from participating in the folly of the time, often set the example. One of these, Count Pozzo, wrote a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which much political good sense was joined with the following outrageous expressions: "We left Louis XVIII to confront the demons of the Revolution, and we have made him responsible for our imprudences in addition to his own. Bonaparte arrived while things were in this state, the troops overturned the throne, which they were bound to support, whilst the people were stunned and

stupified; but they will applaud a different scene, in which we, I hope, will soon perform. But we must not content ourselves with the compliments that we expect; we must put the King in a position to dismiss this army and assemble another, and to free France of about fifty great criminals, whose existence is incompatible with peace. The French ought to undertake this task, but it is the Allies who must put them in a position to do so. We are indebted for our safety to our union, and this union is the result of a happy combination of circumstances that may not easily occur again." Such words, uttered by a man of superior intellect, of which he afterwards gave undeniable evidence, shows what blind infatuation animated all Europe at the time.

It was this wild excitement that the sage Lord Wellington was called on to appease, and, as may be supposed, he had no easy task. But as it was principally a question of military operations in which he had great authority and real power, he contented himself with acting prudently in that department, and allowed talkers to prattle as they pleased. He blamed, indeed, the language of the journals published along the Rhine, and expressed his fear that they would be as injurious as the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto. He advised Marshal Blücher to deal leniently with the Saxons, and to defer the incorporation into his own army of such of them as belonged to Prussia. He advised Louis XVIII to rid himself of the influence of his Court, and copy the example of England by choosing a really responsible Ministry, concentrating both power and responsibility. As to the military question, he held conferences at Ghent, with the representatives of the British Cabinet, the Prussian generals, and the Duke de Feltre, War Minister to Louis XVIII. Although in all these conferences the French forces were estimated very low, Lord Wellington saw more reason for prudence than for precipitation. He succeeded in persuading General Gneisenau, Blücher's representative, that it would not be wise to hurry, that it would be better to unite the English with the larger portion of the Prussian army, and thus form a mass of two hundred and fifty thousand men in the north, and wait until an equally large force should be ready to advance, under Prince Schwarzenberg, from the east; and even to wait until it should be sufficiently near to act with effect. Wellington's plan, sketched according to the campaign of 1814, but freed from Blücher's imprudences, was to defer victory that it might be more certain: to advance methodically in two great columns, each of which would be larger than the supposed army of Napoleon; to make the passage secure, by taking possession of all the fortresses on the way, and thus drive Napoleon back on Paris, and overwhelm him with four or five hundred thousand soldiers, and deprive him of the opportunity of employing those military stratagems in which

his genius was so fertile. General Gneisenau, a man of intelligence, saw the wisdom of this plan, and promised, on the part of the Prussian army, as much deference to the counsels of the English general as devotion to the common cause. It was agreed that the concentration of forces destined to operate by the north of France should be executed as quickly as possible; that the English, the Hollando-Belgians, the Hanoverians, the Brunswickers, &c., composing Lord Wellington's army, should immediately assemble between Brussels and Mons, along the left bank of the Sambre, whilst the Prussians should take up a position on the right bank, advancing from Liege to Charleroy without loss of time; that constant communication should be kept up by means of numerous bridges, and that they should be ready to aid each other if, whilst awaiting the other Allies, their terrible enemy should descend on them unexpectedly. From this time forward, Lord Wellington's calm, strong sense took an ascendancy in the Prussian councils, which, unfortunately for us, exercised an immense influence on succeeding events.

Such were the negotiations and military combinations made by the Allies from the 20th of March to the 10th of April. Napoleon had been prepared for this; but when he found that his couriers had been arrested at Mentz, Kehl, and Turin, and that M. de Flahault, though successful in getting as far as Strasburg, was there obliged to turn back, he saw that the passions excited against him were still more violent than he had imagined. And when M. de Montrond, his private envoy, returned, and to the general knowledge of facts added minute details, he would have been indeed pained, but that he was now accustomed to such strokes of fate. From M. de Montrond he learned that his wife, influenced by love of ease, and the mean wish of getting Parma, and perhaps by more unworthy motives, had put herself and her son under the authority of the Congress, and would not return to Paris. He saw that the determination to war against him was carried even to passion, that a political excommunication had been pronounced against him, interdicting the simplest communications, even those which public justice, for the sake of humanity, commands in time of war. He had been prepared for something of the kind, but the reality far exceeded his anticipations; still he was neither surprised nor angry, for he knew that it was he who had filled the vial of wrath that was being poured out on him. There is no more correct judge of his own faults, than a great man, who is conscious of his errors and wishes to repair them. Napoleon was determined, notwithstanding his excitable temperament, not to show the least anger, to bear everything and tell all to the public. Up to this time he had contented himself with saying that he would not interfere

in the affairs of other nations, nor allow them to dictate to France, and more he could not say, not having received any declarations of war. Had he by any act anticipated the manifestations of foreign cabinets, there is no doubt but that his quickness in attributing hostile intentions to Europe, would have been attributed to his own love of war. But after the public and official events that had just taken place, he need no longer hesitate; he must speak out, that France might know to what a state of dependence foreigners sought to reduce her, for she would not even be allowed to choose her own government. It was necessary to speak, that the nations of Europe might know that their blood was about to be again shed, and that not with the view of achieving their independence, or satisfying their ambition, for Napoleon was willing to accept the arrangements made at Vienna, but to gratify the passions of their rulers, and lastly, it was necessary to speak that the English people might know how grossly they had been deceived. It was most urgent now to promulgate the decrees relative to the retired soldiers, the mobilised National Guards, and concerning all the other military preparations; for though the preliminary labour had, up to this time, been carried on in the different departments of the government, an official announcement in the *Moniteur* was become necessary to ensure the obedience of those who were to be summoned to the defence of their country. It was only Napoleon's pride that could suffer from the announcements he was about to make, for his former glory was sufficient to enable him to bear still greater humiliations, and, indeed, that pride which had so often erred, could only interest the world now by humbling itself for a great end, that of showing Europe the justice of his cause.

He commenced by publishing the declaration of the 13th of March, as an official document, though it had been spoken of only in a vague and undecided manner. This was followed by a consultation of the Council of State, which was at that moment the highest moral authority, the Chambers being dissolved. This body, having verified the authenticity of the declaration of the 13th of March, asserted that this document, which had emanated from the Sovereigns in Congress, was at once opposed to justice, truth and good sense, and was in reality an incitement to assassination. The Council further maintained that by the treaty of the 11th of April, Napoleon in the island of Elba, was a real sovereign, the extent of his possessions being of little consequence, and that consequently he might claim the rights of a monarch; that when he landed in the Gulf of Juan, and thus committed an aggression against the sovereign that had been imposed on France, he had only incurred the consequences attached to the rights of war, that is to say, the

diminution or privation of his states, or captivity if conquered, but he had by no means incurred the penalty of death, which was only lawful in the case of combatants on the field of battle who refused to surrender. But by declaring him an outlaw, the King's ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration from Vienna on the 13th, had assumed the character of an invitation to assassination, a crime forbidden in civilized nations; that the declaration of the 13th of March had outraged truth as well as justice; that the treaty of the 11th of April had been violated in every possible manner, that the private property of the Bonaparte family had been sequestered, and the stipulated subsidy refused to Napoleon or his relatives, nor had the sum of two millions which Napoleon had been authorised to distribute to certain military classes, been paid; that there was a hesitation about giving the Duchy of Parma to Maria Louisa, though it had been promised her, and it was altogether refused to her son; that the promised dotation had been refused Prince Eugène; and lastly, that Maria Louisa and her son had been prevented, (which indeed was true for a time) from joining their husband and father in the island of Elba; that consequently it was the conduct of the royal government, and not Napoleon's leaving the island of Elba, that had broken the treaty of the 11th of April; that he therefore was not the aggressor. But he had a still better reason for what he had done, and that was the wishes of France, for he knew how the French nation, clipped of her glory, threatened in her rights, was every moment menaced with subversion by the incessant attacks on the holders of national property, and was desirous of being delivered from the many dangers that lowered upon her; that Napoleon, who was bound by no conditions since the treaty of the 11th of April had been broken, had received the most evident approbation of what he had done, in the reception he had met in France; that therefore, it was not he who was in the wrong, but his adversaries; more especially since they had legalized his assassination, a line of conduct to which he had replied by setting the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty, and by allowing the Duchess d'Orléans, and the Duchess de Bourbon to remain in France.

This declaration, however correct, was in reality nothing more than a recrimination; but it was soon followed by a more important document—M. de Caulaincourt's report of the unsuccessful attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the European powers. In this report, which was inserted in the *Moniteur* on the 13th of April, there was no mention, as may be supposed, of M. de Montrond's secret mission, but only of the couriers that had been sent to announce the Emperor's pacific intentions, and who had been stopped at Turin, Kehl, and Mentz. M. de Flahault's arrestation at Stuttgart, was

mentioned, and the refusal at Dover to receive the message addressed to the Prince Regent, and how this message had been sent to the Congress of Vienna. These facts were related with perfect moderation of language, but with a firmness that showed the absence of all fear. The rejected documents were also inserted in the *Moniteur*, that France and Europe might judge of the conduct of both parties, of those who wished to speak, and of those who would not listen. The conclusion to be drawn from these communications was, that France had no reason either to be sanguine or alarmed, but ought to look on things as they really were, and be prepared to meet hostilities, which though not absolutely certain, were extremely probable.

Napoleon also ordered the debates of the British Parliament to be published, together with the most significant articles of foreign journals, more especially those of the *Mercure du Rhin*. The public were thus warned, and could have no longer any doubt as to the intentions of the Powers. There was nothing now to prevent the promulgation of the decrees relative to arming France, and it became the duty of the army, that had wished for the restoration of the Empire, of the inhabitants of the rural districts, who wished to guarantee the inviolability of national property, in short, it was the duty of all, who wished to see the Revolution avenged for the attempts of the emigrants, to arm in support of the chief they had recalled to the throne. The zeal of these different classes might be reckoned on, and their exertions, which if well directed had every chance of success, provided that fate were not adverse.

Napoleon, therefore, published together with the documents of which we have already spoken, the decrees relative to the recall of the retired soldiers, and the organisation of the mobilised National Guards. These decrees founded on certain laws, whose execution they enforced and regulated, were perfectly legal, and altogether free from that semblance of absolute power, which Napoleon had formerly arrogated to himself. The old soldiers were summoned to defend the cause of France, so dear to their hearts, with the promise of being dismissed to their homes as soon as peace should be established. They were left the choice of returning to their former regiments, or of joining those nearest them. The National Guards were bound to sedentary service, from twenty to sixty years of age. From twenty to forty they might be summoned, according to their age, strength, tastes, and state of their families to join the select companies, and serve in the fortresses or the wings of the active army. A committee of the arrondissement consisting of a sub-prefect, a member of the council of the arrondissement, and an officer of the gendarmerie, was ordered to select the men, who were to ~~pose~~ these select companies, either as grenadiers or chasseurs.

Those who could afford it, were expected to buy their own uniforms, whilst the others would be equipped at the expense of the department. The State would provide arms for all. All officers above the rank of commanders of battalions, were to be appointed by the Emperor, and all under that rank by the committees of the *arrondissement*. Together with these decrees, the Ministers of Police and of the Interior sent circulars to the prefects, in which they sought to excite the enthusiasm of the citizens, and adduced many reasons to show that it was the interest of all to defend the imperial dynasty, and this in terms which came better from their lips than they could from those of the Emperor.

Napoleon needed no stimulus; he worked day and night, either directing or urging the administration with that universal and indefatigable attention which embraced at once the whole and the details. He had not been able to insert earlier the articles relative to the old soldiers and the National Guard in the *Moniteur*, as the publishing such significant documents before foreign Cabinets had shown hostile symptoms, would have the appearance of a provocation rather than a legitimate defence. But fortunately, no time had been lost, for had these decrees been published earlier, there would not have been agents either in Paris or the provinces to put them into execution. The decree relative to the National Guards needed the creation of an entirely new system of organization, and the delay of that concerning the retired soldiers was not of much consequence, for as these men were perfectly well drilled, they could join their respective battalions the very moment of their arrival. As the men on six months leave of absence began to come in, Napoleon ordered that the third battalions should immediately join the main body of the army, even though they consisted but of four hundred men, as they could be completed afterwards. He ordered that the mobilised National Guards should be immediately draughted into the battalions *d'élite*, that each man should be provided with a simple blouse with a coloured collar, an unrepaired musket, and the troop then sent to the nearest fortress, in order that the regular troops might be rendered immediately disposable. The organization, equipment, and arming of the battalions was to be completed in the fortresses. Napoleon, finding that the purchase of horses for the cavalry went on but slowly, and that the dissolving of the household troops had furnished but three hundred instead of the three thousand he had expected, determined to take seven or eight thousand horses from the gendarmerie and pay ready money that they might be replaced without delay. These horses were well fed and well trained, and only needed being accustomed to fatigue. He renewed the order for officers to

seek horses all through the country, and purchase them with ready money. He repeated that he could have bought as many as he wished between Cannes and Grenoble, that great numbers might be got in the rural districts, and that it was only by employing many plans that the necessary supply could be obtained. Meantime he did not neglect the depôt at Versailles, of which he took the whole charge upon himself. The military workshops were so well managed that they produced each day a thousand new muskets, and repaired two thousand. The clothing establishments produced each day a thousand uniforms. It was by constant supervision and by paying ready money that Napoleon succeeded in producing such satisfactory results.

Not content with giving publicity to the manner in which the Sovereigns had acted towards France, he determined to make a personal manifestation, and that in presence of the Parisian National Guard who, on his arrival at Paris, he had been advised not to trust. This guard was composed of commercial men, more or less wealthy; honest citizens, in a word, who would prefer correcting the Bourbon faults by legal resistance, than dethroning them for the advantage of Napoleon, from whom they expected war and a very small share of liberty. Napoleon had returned without their assistance, and almost against their will, he had returned as it were by a miracle, and without shedding a drop of blood he presented himself improved in all essential points; he had repelled the emigrants, restored the principles of 1789, again revived the glory of France so dear to the citizens of Paris; and lastly he was threatened by Europe, who sought to destroy him by means that were at once revolting to morality and subversive of the national independence. These were motives sufficient to win him favour in the eyes of the Parisian *bourgeoisie*, and let us add, in the eyes of all good citizens. They certainly would not have allowed him to return, they would have prevented his return at any risk had they been able, but being returned, and in possession of supreme power, giving unmistakable signs of intending to maintain a healthful policy at home and abroad; now, too, that he was proscribed by Europe in a manner that seemed a denial of the just rights of France, it was both good sense and true patriotism to support him.

In every large body there will be always found many shades of opinion more or less great according to the spirit that prevails, and it is sufficient to silence some and allow others to speak, in order to change the apparent or even real sentiments of the whole. Besides that, the fact of Napoleon's peaceful re-establishment and promises had greatly calmed the National Guards, many of the officers had been changed, and great pains had been taken to rouse the zeal of those who detested both

emigrants and foreigners. The Parisian National Guards were consequently much better disposed to give the Emperor a favourable reception than they had been on his arrival.

On Sunday, the 16th, the forty-eight battalions of the guard were drawn up on one side of the Place du Carrousel, and on the other the numerous and well drilled troops who were passing through the capital on their way to the frontiers. Napoleon had kept the supreme command of the Parisian Militia for himself, and had made General Durosnel, his aide-de-camp, only the second in command. He rode along the ranks with an imposing air, the result of natural firmness of character, and twenty years command of the greatest armies in the universe. The warm acclamations of an ardent minority, which were not contradicted though not joined in by the greater number, gave an almost enthusiastic air to the whole review. After having rode along the ranks of the forty-eight battalions, Napoleon called the officers in a circle round him, and addressed them in the following terms :

"Soldiers of the National Guard of Paris, I am glad to see you. It is now fifteen months since I organized you, that you might watch over the peace and security of the capital. You have fulfilled my expectations ; you have shed your blood in defence of Paris, and if the enemy has entered within your walls, it was not you, but treason that was to blame, and still more that fatality which at that time overshadowed all our undertakings.

"The royal authority was not suited to France. It gave the people no security for their dearest interests. It had been imposed on us by foreigners, and would have been, had it continued, a monument of shame and misfortune. I am come, supported by all the strength of the people and the army, to wipe away this stain, and to restore to the honour and glory of France all their former splendour.

"Soldiers of the National Guard, this morning's telegraph announces that the tri-coloured flag floats from the walls of Marseilles and Antibes. A hundred cannon fired on our frontiers will announce to foreigners that our civil dissensions are at an end ; *I say foreigners, for as yet we have no enemies.* If they assemble their troops we shall assemble ours. Our armies are composed of heroes that have distinguished themselves in a hundred battles, and who will oppose a barrier of iron to the enemy, whilst the numerous battalions of the grenadiers and chasseurs of the National Guards will protect our frontiers. I shall not interfere in the affairs of other nations, but woe to the governments that attempt to interfere with ours !

"Soldiers of the National Guard, you have been compelled to display colours that had been rejected by France, but you still cherished the national colours in your hearts. You swear

to make them your rallying point, and to defend the Imperial throne, the natural and only security of your rights. You swear never to allow foreigners, whose masters we have so often been, to interfere in our government. In short, you swear to make every sacrifice for the honour and independence of France!"

This discourse, so well suited to the auditory, and which so plainly showed the difficulties of the actual position of affairs, was warmly applauded by the officers, to whom it was addressed. "We swear! we swear!" they cried as they waved their swords. Napoleon then saw twenty thousand of the National Guard, and almost as many regular troops, defile before him, and had every reason to congratulate himself on the proceedings of that day. He had told France what he wished her to know, he had made his peace with the Parisian National Guard, that is, with the rational and sincere portion of the population who exerts so decisive an influence on the fate of every government.

The next day, the 17th, he left the Tuileries, and took up his abode in the palace of the Elysée, which he found more agreeable in spring, and where he could refresh himself occasionally during his immense labours by a stroll through its shady retreats. He had also changed his bearing towards his subjects. He had always been simple, natural, and even familiar, but never very accessible. But now his changed position required that he should be so, that he might be able to influence those whom he wished to win to his cause and to his new opinions. At the palace of the Elysée, where Queen Hortense did the honours, he could more easily invite to his table those whom he wished to influence, not only by the superiority of his genius, but by the powerful charm of his wit.

His brother Joseph had returned most apropos from Switzerland, for he was to have been arrested the very day of his departure by order of the Coalition. Napoleon installed him at the Palais Royal with the title of "Prince," and with a suitable income, and with the express recommendation to act with economy and reserve. These precautions were necessary, as this brother's presence already excited a certain degree of distrust. Every thing that recalled the ancient empire was feared, and more especially those family royalties which had mainly contributed to raise Europe against France. Napoleon had sent a frigate for his mother, who had gone from Elba to Naples, for his sister, who was detained at Leghorn, and for such of his brothers as had been able to escape the Allies. It was a pleasure for him to have them near him, but he was anxious that they should not in any way offend the newly awakened spirit of France, and meant that they should adopt that simple mode of living which he practised, as much through

taste as policy. But each succeeding hour Napoleon became sadder, but concealed his feelings, and his partizans became depressed, they scarcely knew why, but did not possess the same power of self-control as he.

Napoleon's triumphal return to France had made a powerful appeal to the public imagination, but all those whose passions, interests, or prejudices, were gratified by the re-establishment of the Empire, had been carried away by an irresistible burst of enthusiasm. But this exultation had not lasted long; soon the great difficulties both at home and abroad became apparent; at home, the disunion of parties, and the absolute opposition in their views; the Bonapartists merely wishing for the continuance of the Empire, whilst the Revolutionists only intended to make use of Napoleon for a time, and get rid of him when he had repelled the enemy. Abroad, the frenzied desire to destroy the formidable man, who had again made himself master of the power of France, and even to destroy France herself, whose ever-reviving energy made her abhorred by her enemies. Although Napoleon's partisans had formerly felt unbounded confidence in his good fortune and genius, and although this confidence had partly revived under the influence of late events, still a secret uneasiness oppressed them when they thought of the incredible eagerness with which the Powers of Europe were arming against us, and they asked themselves would France be able to resist so many enemies, could she in less than a year, recover strength to oppose them all, and would Napoleon's genius be able to crush them, for nothing less than total destruction could disarm their implacable hatred. And he himself, though endowed with unconquerable firmness, was no longer under the influence of that calm daring with which a succession of successful enterprises had inspired him in former days. He was thoughtful and even sad, but was able, thanks to his great mental vivacity, to conceal it from all. But his spirits sank when he was alone, or when with only five or six persons, such as Queen Hortense, Prince Cambacérès, M. de Caulaincourt, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Carnot, who from their more intimate intercourse were warmly attached to him. With those, who were always ready to counsel, but never to reproach, Napoleon spoke with the most perfect frankness, and even most nobly whenever his own errors were the subject of conversation. He said that the negotiations that had been attempted abroad, were scarce deserving the name, that in two months all Europe would be in arms against him; and he should be obliged to meet the enemy with troops so far inferior, though revived by a year's repose, that it would require a miracle to conquer. He considered that the Sovereigns whom his downfall had raised to a position they had never before enjoyed, would not wil-

lingly consent to resign it, and if conquered in one campaign, would at once commence a second, and that consequently France must look forward to a struggle to the death, a struggle that the army and some frontier provinces would sustain with vigour, and perseverance, but which the nation, prejudiced against the wars of the first Empire, would most unwillingly support, as it would consider itself as again sacrificed for the benefit of a single individual. By this we see that Napoleon was not deceived, that he did not mistake the rejoicings of the soldiers at the return of their old general, nor the delight of the holders of national property, at seeing themselves secured in their possessions, nor the satisfaction of the Revolutionists, freed from the insults of the emigrants, as the serious and unanimous consent of the nation. He had no faith in the enthusiastic effort of 1793, nor in the sincere and generous one made in 1813; he had no confidence but in his soldiers, and if he entertained any hope, it was in the unforeseen chances of war, which would afford an opportunity to a man of genius like him, to change the whole face of affairs in a day. What gave him most pain, though he could not complain of its injustice, was the incredulity which his promises of peace and liberty met with from all. "Yes," he said, "I entertained vast designs, but can I do so still? Can any one suppose that my thoughts are now directed to the Elbe, the Vistula, or even the Rhine? It is indeed a sad thing to give up our geographical frontiers—the noble conquest of the Revolution—and could they be regained by the loss of my life and that of my soldiers, the sacrifice would soon be made. But there can be no question of such patriotic ambition, since I am willing to accept the Treaty of Paris. We only seek our independance, and to avoid a counter-revolution effected by foreigners. I ask of fate but one or two victories, to re-establish the *prestige* of our arms, and recognise the right to be our own masters, and this once done I am willing to accept peace even on moderate terms. But, alas! neither Europe or France believe this." It must be understood that Napoleon spoke thus only amongst his most intimate friends, with whom he also discussed another and not less important subject, the new constitution that was to be given to France. At Grenoble, Lyons, and every other place through which he had passed, he promised to make important alterations in the imperial laws. France had taken him at his word, and it would be impossible to retract now. The nation, no longer able to endure that a single individual should possess the power of transporting the fate of France to Moscow, was almost unanimous in its desire, for what since that time has been called a constitutional monarchy, namely, one where the monarch would be represented by responsible ministers, responsible to Chambers that could refuse or grant their confidence

to these ministers, and could oblige them to govern openly, and make a daily report of their proceedings. Whether this constitutional monarchy was agreeable or not to Napoleon, he was determined to make a trial of it, being too wise to struggle against necessity.

Independant of the intrinsic merit of the institution itself, there was a more pressing reason for its adoption in the present state of things. In order to excuse himself for having expelled the Bourbons, and exposed France to a fearful war, it was necessary that he should prove himself to be different to them. Being the personification of the national glory, and of civil equality, there was no fear of his appearing the flatterer of foreigners, or the accomplice of the clergy or nobility. But there was one thing he did not represent, and which the Bourbons did represent more than he, and that was liberty, and it is a fact that the nation could more easily believe that he was become pacific than liberal. Having expelled the Bourbons at the risk of such great dangers to France, he was bound to give her liberty; and that not as Louis XVIII had done, unwillingly and hesitatingly, and afterwards seeking to resume the half, but fully and freely. Therefore, we repeat, that his resolution was already formed, under the dictates of prudence, if not of inclination.

As to the merit of the institution itself, which could not be altogether agreeable to him, for a will like his could ill brook restraint, he seemed to be fully converted, especially on the important point, the free discussion of the proceedings of those in power by a daily press.

Certainly if there is anything that at first view is repulsive to men of sincerity, it is the daily hearing of mingled truth and falsehood, with a superabundance of the false; to hear ignorance and dishonesty presume to dictate to the most honest and wisest men, and disfigure facts, shamelessly, cynically, and without measure. But the opposite condition, that is, the compelled silence of an enlightened nation, is more to be deplored than any inconvenience arising from excessive liberty. Power, protected by silence, may do what it will, and he who can do what he will, is very likely to do it; therefore, on reflection, we find that we have but this alternative, either to grant liberty of discussion, or allow opportunity for doing wrong; which is the wiser there can be no doubt, for experience shows that it is better that those who govern should be judged unjustly, than allowed an opportunity of acting with injustice. Besides, the opposite system gradually engenders so much distrust, that it is more difficult for a government to defend itself against false reports, or the calumnies that circulate from one person to another, than against the open attacks of the press. Indeed,

under the régime of silence, calumny is ever welcome to the distrusted public, and this evil undermining slowly and unseen, becomes thus the punishment of absolute power, and is at the least as dangerous when it infects the masses, as the unrestrained license of the press. The latter may be overcome by a contradictory reply, but it is impossible to reach the other in its hidden retreat. Without taking into consideration, that a day will come, and that ever the luckless day of misfortune, when all barriers being removed, long restrained passion pours forth on you the accumulated wrongs of twenty years, and overwhelms you when there is not one disposed to listen to you, not one willing to defend you.

Such had been Napoleon's experience, and destined to extremes in all things, his experience in this had been both complete and terrible. Holding during his former reign, all the organs of public opinion in his own power, he had seen such distrust arise amongst the people, that he could no longer contradict a false, or support a true assertion, and this to such a degree, that his power was as it were dumb; and more reliance was felt in the false bulletines of the enemy, than in those of the government that spoke the truth. Thus as we have seen, Napoleon ceased to send bulletins in 1813, and 1814, and contented himself with inserting in the *Moniteur*, letters purporting to be written by officers in the army to different persons of the State. In the day of trouble, when he was alone, or almost alone at Fontainebleau, Napoleon heard that cry of malediction rise, that afterwards accompanied him to Elba, and which did not leave him a single moment of repose, mingling with its just reproaches, the vilest and most revolting calumnies not only on his public acts, but even on his private life. His pride, which was as great as his genius, had floated, as we may say, over this sea of infamy, and after all these horrors—though his faults still remained patent—he had lived to see his glory revive, and bring back the people and the army to his feet.

Having escaped this storm, he saw clearly, and loudly proclaimed that it was but false prudence to restrain the press, and consequently, as we have seen, he abolished the censorship on the 25th of March.

But where the press is permitted to write freely on public affairs, it is but a step further to allow them to be discussed in an assembly, and Napoleon was inclined to believe that it would be possible to govern, though with Chambers that would attack, torment, and dismiss his ministers. Experience has shown that even if the calumny of the press may often be unanswered, the calumny spoken in the forum is instantly refuted in the presence of those who had heard it, and further accompanied by the solemn reparation of public justification. There is no

rational and upright man that would not prefer to have his actions discussed before an assembly bound to hear the defence as well as the attack, and to pronounce immediate judgment, to replying by writing before readers, who had believed the accusation from a malicious feeling, and whom thoughtlessness prevents from reading the defence, and who take no trouble to judge truly because that they are not expressly bound to do so.

Consequently, once that liberty was granted to the press there could be no objection to freedom of discussion, and free assemblies followed as a matter of course. All the time that Napoleon was waging a fearful war against England, he was closely observing her institutions, because he sought the revelation of her plans in the discussions of Parliament, and he was far from feeling that repugnance to the English constitution that is felt by narrow or timid minds. He could see nothing in such a constitution but obstacles to his will, and for the moment at least, he was willing to encounter many and powerful ones, he was satisfied to have his ministers attacked, his laws rejected, and to hear resolutions formally carried. "Formerly," he said, "such opposition would have interfered with my plans, but now my only plan is to gain one battle, recover our independence, avenge the insult of having had two hundred thousand foreigners in our capital, and then to make peace! Peace being obtained, and that on the sole basis of our independence, we shall have nothing more to do than to rule our fair empire of France, and it will be no humiliation to me to hear the objections or even refusals of her representatives. Having conquered and ruled the world, there will be nothing so terrible in submitting to a contradiction. In any case, my son will accustom himself to it, and I shall endeavour to prepare him by my instruction and example: but all that I ask of Heaven and France, is to allow me to conquer once, and only once, these arrogant monarchs that were once so humble!"

Napoleon was sincere when he spoke thus, but he did not know himself? When he should have conquered Europe that once, which he had implored God and men so earnestly to allow him, would he be able to endure contradiction, not only a just and moderate contradiction, but also that ridiculous opposition, that often appears in a revolting form in some free States; could he smile then, and wait a tardy vindication from time? Nobody could tell how that might be, and he no more than another; but he considered that his very position obliged him to make a complete change in the imperial institutions; for not being able to give peace, he ought at least to grant liberty. His supporters, that is to say, the Revolutionists, all men of sense, and the youth of France, all wished for full and entire

liberty, and would not by any means be satisfied with civil equality, or what was called the principles of eighty-nine. This Napoleon was determined to grant, for whether convinced or not of the intrinsic merit of liberty, he was at least convinced of its necessity. What effects it might produce hereafter, he could not tell, nor did he care to inquire, for his mind was occupied by something very different from a desire to know whether he would be more or less inconvenienced by new institutions hereafter; he was interested in another question, whether he should be able to conquer Europe, which was indeed of vital importance to him and his supporters, all soldiers, revolutionists, and holders of national property. That was the sole subject of his thoughts, one that effaced all others. He was prepared to do everything to please those who upheld him, as their zeal would be in proportion to his concessions, and with the clear-sightedness of a superior mind, he did not hesitate to do what he could not avoid. He was therefore determined to give a fair trial to constitutional monarchy, and even hoped it might succeed, for its failure would have been a triumph to the Bourbons. However, he was not without fear as to the result of the first attempt. If free assemblies are an excellent instrument of government in a country where they have existed for ages, they are at the commencement of their existence doubtful and often dangerous. When the art of guiding them has become a true science, in which those leaders excel, who to large political views, unite the talent of addressing public assemblies, and especially when they have existed a sufficient length of time to be accustomed to the shock of circumstances, and to have accustomed the people to look unmoved upon their stormy agitation, then they are not to be feared, and present more resources in time of danger, than an absolute government, that has no bond in common with the nation. But when free institutions are but a day old, when the nation possesses no men trained to the trade of guiding them, when their début is made in the midst of a formidable war, the enterprise is dangerous, and one that filled Napoleon with fear.

In modern times, the British Parliament, either from habit, or confidence in the protection of the sea, preserved a becoming deportment during war. In ancient times, the Roman Senate, an institution no less deserving of admiration in another sense, sold the ground on which Hannibal encamped. But this was an old assembly, accustomed to govern Rome in good and evil fortune. Nobody could hope to assemble a Roman Senate, or a British Parliament in France in 1815. Napoleon saw that in the coming struggle great trials must be endured, and that with the loss of self-possession all would be lost. But if, on the other hand, the public remained as tranquil as after Brienne,

Craonne, and Laon, it would be possible to succeed. Unfortunately, it was not the courage, but the self-possession of the new assemblies that he distrusted, assemblies a day old, divided into numerous parties, that would often consider a reverse but as a happy opportunity of giving vent to their passions. He feared that at the first disaster, the apprehensions of some, the anger or intrigues of others, would create a chaos, by which the enemy would profit to penetrate again into the heart of the country. Therefore, though quite willing to make a trial of liberty, he dreaded doing so at once, and as it were within reach of the cannon of Europe.

This apprehension suggested to him the idea of giving a constitution very similar to that of England, but which was not to come into operation until after the commencement of hostilities. This project did not arise from perfidy, but from a secret presentiment of the danger of convoking an inexperienced assembly, whilst foreign armies were marching towards Paris. Had he been insincere, he might easily have deceived the friends of liberty, by removing all blame from himself, and throwing it on them, by immediately summoning a constituent assembly, and ordering its members to elaborate a constitution in revising the imperial *senatus-consultes*. In the existing state of opinion, with some of the old Revolutionists attached to the constitution of 1791, others to those of 1793, and 1795, and the new liberals preferring the British institutions, the struggle would have been both long and violent, unity of opinion impossible; and, whilst this struggle continued in the political arena, Napoleon, exercising provisionally the fullness of imperial power, might gain battles, put an end to the war, and afterwards turn against the assembly the inconsistency of its views, and the folly of its conduct, dissolve it, and constitute France in any way he pleased.

The success of such a plan was almost certain, but it should be commenced by convoking an assembly, a proceeding that Napoleon dreaded during the first months of a fearful war, whose theatre was to be between Lille and Paris. Besides not knowing what constitution might be proposed to him, he preferred to frame one himself at once, to frame the best possible constitution, and then seek the approbation of the country, after the fashion of the time—by written votes, a deceptive method, but of little importance, if exercised in favour of a popular measure. This was his real plan; but could he, even when acting sincerely, overcome the rooted distrust of all? He was not believed by Europe when he spoke of peace, would France believe him when he spoke of liberty? and would not his prudence be considered as only the wiles of a despot? There was the danger. On the rugged path he had trod since his return from Elba, he was compelled to walk bowed beneath the heavy

burden of his past errors, and perhaps Providence laid on this latter part of his career a punishment often inflicted on illustrious criminals, that of having their sincere repentance disbelieved.

The time was now come for deciding these constitutional questions, and determining what form of government France should have. The public excitement on this subject had reached the acmè. Articles were written representing every shade of opinion, but most frequently the extremes. Old Republicans awakened from a long sleep, and even Royalists, who had formerly considered the slightest wish for liberty a crime, demanded a republic, or something very like it. Others wished for royalty, stripped of the appendages of 1791; and many, particularly young men, who were free from the prejudices of the old and the new *régime*, entertained a penchant for the British constitution, without exactly understanding its mechanism. However slight their knowledge, this was the government they preferred, and it must be added that the majority was on their side. The Charter of 1814, a little enlarged, would gratify the general wish.

In general, all who were not obstinate revolutionists, on whom experience had no effect, or royalists, whom party feelings urged to excess, wished for a constitutional monarchy. The illustrious Sièyes, whose great mind had penetrated the profound mechanism of the English monarchy, asked nothing better for France, and though not liking Napoleon, he considered it wiser to join him, that with his assistance the cause of the Revolution and of the national independence might be saved. Carnot, enraged at the events of the Bourbons' twelve months reign, and touched by Napoleon's conduct, and above all by the acknowledgment of his faults, was satisfied to give constitutional monarchy a trial under his authority. Fouché cared little for theories, he feared Napoleon, whose return he had beheld with regret, and though he did not desire his fall, which would immediately bring back the Bourbons, he sought to bind him by guarantees, and looked forward to diminishing his power, by the aid of any opposition party that might spring up in the future Chambers, and whom he hoped by his intrigues to lead. Like everybody else, he wished for constitutional monarchy, but he wished that the power of the monarch should be restricted as much as possible.

The constitutional party—as it was called under Louis XVIII—had been dispersed by the revolution of 20th of March, its principal leaders being compromised, had fled the dreaded vengeance of Napoleon. Reassured by his mode of proceeding, many of them had remained in Paris, where he allowed them to live in peace. Madame de Staël had not left her house; M.

de Lafayette had returned to his château of Lagrange. M. Benjamin Constant, the most active and most compromised of all, particularly by his fierce tirades against the Empire, and especially the famous article inserted in the *Journal des Débats*, of the 19th of March, had got a passport from Mr. Crawford, the American Minister, and remained concealed until such time as it would suit him to make use of it. Late events had detached all these persons from the Bourbon cause, and they were prepared, if re-assured as to their safety, and if what was said of Napoleon's intentions were true, to try that constitutional monarchy under him, which had failed under Louis XVIII. Prince Joseph, regretting that Napoleon had been left the power of doing everything, even to ruining himself, coincided in the opinion of the constitutional party, and even made advances to the chiefs, especially to M. de Lavalette, and Madame de Staël, and sought to make Napoleon do the same, to which indeed he was not disinclined.

The statesmen of the Empire, who were for the most part old revolutionists, disgusted with liberty, or royalists, won over by Napoleon's genius and glory, and who under him had acquired the habit of passive obedience, engendered by absolute authority; these persons felt no inclination to make the proposed essays in liberty, in whose success they felt no confidence. The High-Chancellor Cambacérès, with his practical good sense saw, however, that nothing else could be done; but as since the 20th of March, he had only acted from obedience, he confined his co-operation to the administration of justice. M.M. Mollien, de Gaëte, and Decrès, had resumed with their customary functions, the habit of allowing Napoleon to decide all difficult points himself. M. de Bassano approved, as usual, what Napoleon did, though he did not feel his wonted confidence in the result. M. Molé disliked both the men and measures of the day, and expressed his doubts so that he might seem half to approve, half to condemn. He had accepted only the administration of roads and bridges, a position that did not compromise him much. But still the majority were for a very liberal constitutional monarchy. Many articles and many pamphlets were written on this subject, and even several memorials concerning the new constitution were sent to Napoleon, strange productions for the most part, for in general, persons who present to a prince, plans unasked, are either intriguers, that seek to bring themselves into notice, or dreamers, seeking to give publicity to their fancies. As Napoleon read these *factums*, he sometimes smiled, sometimes got angry, but oftenest became sad at seeing the public mind in such a state on the eve of a fearful struggle with all Europe. M. de Lavalette was his real confidant. Napoleon esteemed old Cambacérès just as much, and had as much affection for M. de Bassano, but his warm feelings, which

must find vent, found but a faint echo in the first, and a monotonous response in the latter. He spoke more freely with the astute, reliable, and independant-minded Lavalette, who advised freely, but never assumed the airs of offended wisdom, when his counsels were not followed. Napoleon often spent the greater part of the night talking with him, even after a day of hard labour.

Sometimes when he read certain papers that gave advice not only in an exacting, but even threatening tone, he became excited, walked rapidly up and down the saloons of the Elysée palace, and declared that France knew nothing of such tribunals, that she had confidence only in him, and that had he given permission, the army and the people would quickly have crushed the royalists, and silenced the fault finders. But before M. de Lavalette could find time to remind him how ill such language became him, he had recovered his self-possession, and smiling at the extravagant productions on his table, and comparing the France of 1800, that implored him to deliver her from babblers, with the France of 1815, seeking unbounded liberty; he began to question whether all that were seriously meant, and whether such variability of opinion could represent real necessities and profound convictions. M. de Lavalette replied with justice, that the sentiments of France ought not to be judged by the exaggerations of a time of excitement, but estimated by her aspect in ordinary times, and it would be seen that she always wished for moderate liberty, which would protect her alike from the rash enterprises of an individual, or the licentious extravagance of the multitude; that she had never changed her opinion as to the principle of liberty; the only question had been about the measure meted out to her; and that reflection would show, that since 1789, her wishes had been the same as they were at the existing time. Napoleon was convinced by these rational observations, but mourned over the variety and confusion of ideas that prevailed at a time when a great military crisis was at hand, and began to question whether embarrassed by the too evident *maladresse* of the friends of liberty, it would be possible to encounter the impending struggle.

"To make a first trial of constitutional liberty," he said, "midst the roar of cannon, and such a roar, the world has yet heard nothing like it." Still he did not think of opposing the liberals, for he had no choice but to join them or the royalists, and as he could not depend on the latter, he was obliged to trust the others. As in time of war he had ever been mild and calm in the presence of danger, so now in his new position he was wonderfully gentle, exhibiting no appearance of anger, but seeking to soothe those who did, and was in reality less anxious about what proportion of power would remain to him,

than concerning the means that would be given him of conquering the external enemy.

We have already mentioned his secret plan, which was not to burden himself with a constituent assembly, though that would be an infallible means to destroy liberty by the ridicule which the consequent confusion of ideas would entail; he intended to take into confidence a few sensible men, with whom he would draw up a constitution, that could not fail to satisfy the true liberals; this he would promulgate solemnly, and then hasten to meet the enemy, but he did not intend to assemble the new Chambers, until he should have driven back the allied army to a sufficient distance from the capital. Accident had unexpectedly provided him with the best possible person for drawing up a constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, that impetuous writer, who on the 19th of March had denounced Napoleon as a calamity to the country, and had promised in the names of the friends of liberty, never to support him again, was still as we have said, concealed in Paris, less desirous of seeking the means of escape, than of discovering whether he might safely remain. For this purpose, his friends had sought the assistance of General Sebastiani, a man of moderation, as all true politicians are, sure that with him M. Constant's secret was safe. When the General heard that he was still in Paris, he hastened to the Emperor, told him that M. Benjamin Constant was in France, and at his disposal. "Ah! you have him!" cried Napoleon, as if he were glad of an opportunity of revenge. The General was surprised, and almost alarmed, but Napoleon quickly added, "You need not be alarmed, I don't intend to injure your protégé; send him to me, and he will have no reason to be dissatisfied." Napoleon saw at a glance that he now had an opportunity of displaying the highest degree of generosity, and at the same time of securing the services of the first writer of the time, and the best suited to draw up his future constitution, by pardoning the most violent of his opponents, and raising him to a considerable post. He no sooner perceived the possibility, than he resolved to put it into execution. It may be asked whether in acting thus he did not display more contempt for human nature than true generosity; but such an inquiry shows ignorance of his character. The feeling that influenced him was identical with the so much lauded clemency of Cæsar, that is a profound knowledge of men, an acute perception of the short duration of their passions, united to great pliability of disposition in their regard, and great power of influencing them. However this may be, Napoleon sent the Chamberlain with a most polite invitation to M. Benjamin Constant to come to him.

Now that forty years of public discussion has instructed us in

the operation of (forgotten but for a moment, I hope) free institutions, and consequently taught us self-respect, few persons could be found who would accept such an invitation, or if they had, it would have been only to ask their sovereign's permission to retain their personal respectability, by not taking part in a government they had so violently opposed. M. Benjamin Constant accepted Napoleon's invitation at once, because he was dissatisfied with the Bourbons for acting so badly to the constitutional party, and deeply impressed by Napoleon's liberal promises, he considered it necessary to support him as the only man that could save France from invasion.

Napoleon had the choice of many ways of receiving this distinguished man, who for the moment was at his mercy. He might have been flattering or harsh, but neither would have been worthy of him. He was simple, polite, and frank.

He did not allude to the past, he only spoke of the business about which M. Benjamin Constant had come. He told him that having promised France a free constitution, he now wished to give it without the restrictions of timid tyranny, or the astute compliance of a wily ruler, who gives at first more than is demanded only that he may have the power of withdrawing everything afterwards; he said that the public mind was greatly excited on this subject, and as was to be expected, not very logical. He did not know whether this would be the final demand of the people, for their opinions had often varied since 1800, when they would not have liberty on any terms, whilst now, they could not obtain too much; but the truth was, that only a minority wished for a free constitution, the mass of the people wished only for Napoleon himself, and only asked him to rid them of the nobles, priests, and foreigners; but that he felt great deference for the opinions of enlightened men, and wished to show that he was as enlightened as they; that he was therefore determined to grant a constitutional monarchy; that he knew well that there was but one form under which that could be given, and that was to have responsible ministers obliged to discuss public affairs openly in the two Chambers; with unrestrained liberty of the press, and no preliminary censorship; that of the last point he was firmly convinced, that it was childish to think of restraining the press, that consequently he would offer no fundamental opposition; and only wished to give it in a suitable form that should not be humiliating to him, that it might be doubted whether he would submit ultimately to the restraints he was preparing for himself, that such distrust was very natural, and would not offend him in the least, that he was quite prepared to endure the inconvenience of the constitutional *régime*, but he hoped that consideration would be shown for him. Formerly he had great designs to whose execution a

constitutional monarchy would be an obstacle, but that now he had but one desire, to overcome the external enemy; it could not be denied that the struggle would be terrible, that negotiations had been mentioned, but in reality there had been none, that it would be absolutely necessary to fight to the death, and he hoped that the proper supplies would not be refused him; that immediately after subduing the enemy he would conclude a peace, and that then when nothing was to be done but to administer the government at home, the assistance of the representatives of the country would not displease him, though sometimes opposed to his views. He added that a man's disposition was not the same at forty-six as at twenty-six; that he felt the change in himself, and that in any case the divided but well supported authority of a constitutional monarchy would be best suited to his son; that he laboured now more for his son's interest than for his own; that consequently there could be no serious disagreement between him and the true friends of liberty, that nothing remained but to consider the form, and he hoped that his dignity and fame which were identical with those of France would be respected.

These words spoken in a calm, firm, and decided tone by a man whose brows were shaded with innumerable laurels, made a deep impression on M. Constant's excitable imagination, and almost completely convinced him, and he blessed the destiny that made him the prisoner of such a conqueror. Napoleon then gave him numerous plans for a constitution, some bearing signatures, some anonymous. Up to this time he had been polite but serious, but he smiled now in taking up several of these plans, of which he first announced the contents and then the name of the author. "This one is by a republican," said he; "this by a monarchist of the Mounier school, and this third by a pure royalist." Then making a summary of the contents, Napoleon laughed at the contrast presented between the ideas and the author's names, for despotism was frequently proposed by republicans, and anarchy by royalists. "Do what you will with all these," he added, "arrange your ideas, probably you have done so already, put them in a proper form, then come to me, and we shall find no difficulty in coming to an agreement." Napoleon then dismissed M. Benjamin Constant without having either flattered or treated him haughtily, but he conquered him by his simplicity, grace, and vast mental power, before which no question seemed to present matter for argument, but to be already decided.

M. Benjamin Constant, besides possessing a clear, piquant and sententious style as a writer, was the best informed man of his time in all that concerned the theory of constitutional monarchy. He was only deficient in that experience which

shows what are the most essential points of this mechanism, for though he was better informed on the subject than any of his contemporaries, he still could not tell exactly what should be insisted on as essential, and what might be yielded without a compromise of principle. But he was not influenced by any of the prevailing errors, and having been the publicist employed by the liberal party against the first Restoration, he possessed an influence as far as regarded the framing of a constitution, greater than that of any other man in France.

As his opinions were already decided, he did not spend much time in putting them into a proper form, and soon sought Napoleon again. He found him as simple and more friendly than before, and at each succeeding interview these two men became more at ease with each other, if not more familiar. Their conversation turned on the details of the future constitution, and never did the least disagreement arise between them. Napoleon admitted without the least hesitation that the daily press should not be submitted to a preliminary censorship, and should be accountable to the legal tribunals alone for any deviations from rectitude. This was yielding at one stroke all the contested points of the question. As we have already said, experience had entirely changed Napoleon's opinion on this subject. As to the two Chambers and the obligations on the part of the Ministers to appear there and justify their acts, M. Constant met with no difficulty from Napoleon, and this was equivalent to sharing the government with the Chambers, and more than sharing it, for if under such a system the monarch reserves to himself the privilege of sanctioning acts, he leaves their direction to the Chambers, which is nothing more than submitting to necessity. In fact it is impossible to govern a country in opposition to the real opinions, the dominant ideas of the nation; if it be attempted for a few days it is soon of necessity given up. It is better, therefore, to submit with a good grace to what cannot be avoided, and accept the most direct means of introducing the general feeling of the nation into the government, which is in other words, making all ministerial acts depend on the vote of the Chambers.

Napoleon agreed also that the Chambers might revise the laws as they pleased, but that the government should not be obliged to sanction the laws so amended; that the Chambers might, not *beg*, as it was expressed in the charter of Louis XVIII, but *invite* the government to propose such laws as might be required by public opinion, and even name the different points of them, but under the express condition that the invitation should not be presented to the Emperor until the two Chambers had agreed on the question. The Chamber of Deputies was to decide the first on all questions of taxation, and the Chamber

of Peers to possess jurisdiction over the Ministers, military commanders, and all persons invested with great authority. This was constitutional monarchy without the least reservation. The next thing to be considered was how the Chambers were to be constituted.

Napoleon agreed that the Chamber of Deputies, which though least in dignity was greatest in influence, should be chosen by direct election. Did time permit, a law might have been drawn up pointing out what classes of citizens should have the right of voting for Deputies. The subject was new and important, and it was difficult in the existing state of knowledge to decide on the different questions that might arise. It was thought better to employ the existing system a little modified. This was Sieyès's system of having the great mass of citizens choose about a hundred thousand electors for life, and these divided into two classes, colleges of the *arrondissement*, and colleges of the departments. This had the apparent advantage of allowing all the citizens to vote, but the real defect, inherent in universal suffrage, of being but an illusion, for the important point to be attained in admitting the intervention of the country in the government is to ascertain the feeling of the enlightened portion who are capable of forming an opinion. However, the hundred thousand citizens, whose names were at that time inscribed on the list, offered a sample of the nation sufficient to represent its real feelings. The plan of having the candidates proposed by the colleges of the *arrondissement* to the colleges of the departments, and by these to the senate, was abandoned as being calculated to produce a misrepresentation of the real opinions of the country by submitting them to the action of two ballots. Napoleon agreed that the colleges of the *arrondissements* should choose without intervention three hundred Deputies, and the colleges of the departments about the same number; which would give an assembly almost equal in number to the English House of Commons. M. Benjamin Constant was satisfied with this basis, which indeed offered a great amelioration, for even the charter of 1814 allowed only the old Legislative Corps chosen by the Senate from the lists drawn up by the electoral colleges. Napoleon also agreed to the total renewal of the second Chamber every five years, an arrangement which experience has since consecrated as the only rational one.

The formation of the second Chamber caused greater difficulty between Napoleon and M. Constant, not that the one would yield less, or the other demand more, but the most serious difficulties arose naturally out of the question itself.

Though not quite decided on the point, M. Constant was inclined to favour an hereditary peerage. He considered that

such an institution would afford the happiest union of stability and independance of conduct, in the formation of an Upper Chamber. Though Napoleon was more convinced of this than M. Constant himself, he had the greatest objection to introduce hereditary rights into the new constitution. In his own concise and figurative language he said, "An aristocracy is necessary, especially in a free state, where the democratic principle has always a preponderating influence. A government that seeks to move in one element alone, is like a balloon in the air, that will be borne along according to the direction of the wind. But on the contrary, one that is exposed to the action of two elements, can use each at pleasure, and is controlled by none. It is like a vessel borne along by the waves, and using the winds only to assist its progress. The wind impels, but does not rule its action." Here is a profound thought ingeniously expressed. But notwithstanding that he held this opinion, Napoleon feared that in the existing state of things, the representatives of the aristocratic principle then in France, could not be brought to bear usefully on his project. "The old nobility," he said, "are opposed to me, and the new are very new. They are not like the English aristocracy, coeval with the English constitution, to whose formation they have contributed, and whose institutions they have not ceased to uphold. Besides," added he, "we have a people extremely prejudiced against hereditary nobility. The sentiments that animate the people at this moment, and made them receive me so enthusiastically, is their hatred of the nobility and the clergy, and if you talk to them of an hereditary peerage, you will only excite their indignation, without the certainty of having created a real aristocracy, with a Chamber of Peers, that for a long time will be composed of chamberlains and generals."

These different considerations perplexed Napoleon very much, for if he were conscious of the necessity of an hereditary nobility, he dreaded its effects on the excitable temperament of the French liberals.

As to general guarantees, he admitted without objection the immutability of the magistracy, the personal liberty of the subject, freedom of worship, &c., only asking that all should be expressed in clear precise terms, that would leave no room for equivocation. One, and one only, he objected to, and that most warmly—the abolition of confiscation. He did not seek to stipulate for the contrary, he only wished that point to be passed over in silence. "I do not wish," he said, "to take anybody's property, nor to imitate the National Convention in anything. But a new emigration is about to commence. If the war continues you will have a rising in Vendée. Whether it continue or not, you will have such assemblings as that at

Coblentz on our frontiers. There is one already forming at Ghent, in which men whom I have loaded with honours and riches are figuring. This combination will increase every day, and if I do not end the struggle in three months, a government will be organised there whose orders will be better obeyed by a certain class of Frenchmen than mine. Do not think that I wish to deprive anybody of his life or fortune. But I must defend myself, and how can I do that against a government that abides abroad, and is obeyed at home, if I have not in my hands some means of intimidation. At this very moment, there are secret orders issued by the former prefects of Louis XVIII, both at Besançon and Marseilles. I shall expel them, but they will remain on the frontier, where they will do as much harm as if in the country itself. I must have the means of restraining my declared enemies, and of winning over the wavering. Be sure, that while I can sequester property without confiscating it, I can influence even Talleyrand himself. However, I am determined when we shall have peace, to restore this guarantee, of whose necessity I am convinced, and I only ask to have it passed over in silence until then."

Napoleon continued obstinate in this, the only point of the new constitution in which he showed a despotic feeling. He was wrong in trying to keep any share of arbitrary power, for possessing greater or less means of intimidation could neither injure nor serve him; it was the battle field alone that could decide his fate. But in justice it must be admitted, that the conduct of the royalists was such as to excuse Napoleon's intentions. They had kept quiet at first, because they were afraid, but taking courage when they found that all parties were allowed to speak, write, and act as they pleased, they went openly from Paris to Vendée and Ghent, evidently preparing civil war in the former province, and exciting royalist movements in the capital. There was no absolute danger for the moment, but should the enemy come up to the walls of Paris, the danger might be serious; and it is evident, however much one may disapprove of Napoleon, that it was only natural that an energetic man, one not accustomed to yield to any obstacle, and living at a time not far removed from revolutionary influences, should wish to possess the means of intimidation, even without the intention of putting them in force.

M. Benjamin Constant said no more on the subject at that time, though he was determined to return to it again. A last question remained, a mere matter of form, but one on which Napoleon was if possible still more decided; this was the title to be given to the new constitution. He wished to grant this new charter in the same way as Louis XVIII had granted his, but without allowing his intention to appear, and appearances.

were all important in this case, as on them depended the recognition or denial of a right. "I have recognized the national sovereignty," he said, "but that is not conferring a favour, for the nation is the real sovereign, and no monarch is firmly placed on his throne, but he whom the people support. I do not mean to follow the example of Louis XVIII, and give the new constitution as if emanating from my sole authority, but if I do not present it as an emanation of my rights, I offer it as the offspring of my good sense. I wish to make it as excellent as possible, and to accomplish such a work, you and I are more competent than an assembly of men who could never agree in their opinions, and who perhaps would convulse the country before coming to a conclusion. When we shall have finished the work to the best of our ability, I shall present it for the national acceptance, in the same way as the old imperial constitutions, that is by votes registered in the offices of the mayors. Some will call this a deceptive method; I admit it. But it is not more deceptive than the convocation of primary assemblies, a method much more complicated, though not more satisfactory. In affairs of this kind, the important point is to do what is right, and as to the form, provided it does not negative the principle, the simplest is what should be preferred. The true acceptance of the people is the duration of the constitution, which is the enlightened assent of the nation ratified by experience."

M. Benjamin Constant was not inclined to dispute this, for he also thought it would be better to avoid a constituent assembly, that might work for a year without result, or primary assemblies, that might cause disastrous confusion. He thought it better to adopt the shortest form of acceptance, provided it involved the recognition of the national sovereignty. However, he wished that the new constitution should differ from the old imperial constitutions, not alone in essential principles—which it did—but in form as well; he wished that the title should be different, in order to inspire confidence, that it might not be confounded with the old *Senatus-Consultes*, which once they had emanated from Napoleon's mind, were converted by the servile Senate into fundamental laws of the state. He said, therefore, that without attaching any real importance to a mere form, it would be necessary by some means or other, to allay the public distrust, perhaps by giving the new constitution a character that would distinguish it from all its predecessors. "No, no," replied Napoleon, "a wish is entertained to deprive me of the past, to make me a different man from what I am, to efface my fifteen years of sovereignty, to blot out France's glory and mine, as if everything in my former reign had been bad. . . . I will not consent to it. I yield to experience, and to circumstances, which will no longer allow such a dictatorship as I have enjoyed, but I will not submit to humiliation. Besides,

believe me, France wishes for her old Emperor, changed a little of course, but still she desires him and no other." On this point Napoleon was inflexible, for he considered that a new form was only meant to humiliate him, by compelling him to disavow his past career. The new constitution was consequently to be considered as a modification of the old, and by no means as inaugurating a new order of things. In this Napoleon was as obstinate for what he called his glory, as Louis XVIII had been for what he called his rights. This was a serious fault, for the constitution of 1815 was totally different from those of 1802 and 1804, and though men in general seek to appear to give more than they really do, Napoleon in this instance ran the risk of seeming to grant less than he really did. Silly precaution, and mournful consequence of pride! In the existing state of public opinion, it would have been far better to promise more than was intended to be given, than to give more than was promised.

The result of this consultation was, the new and unfortunately celebrated title of "Additional Act added to the Constitution of the Empire," a title calculated to persuade the nation that it was getting only a modification, instead of, as was really the case, an entire change of constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, delighted at obtaining what was essential, yielded what concerned the mere form, which was wrong in him, though it was natural that a philosophic mind should attach but little importance to externals. He took his pen and drew up in clear, simple, and elegant language, the best written and best constructed charter that was granted to France during the long course of her revolutions. He saw the Emperor again and again and came to an agreement with him on all points, even on that relating to an hereditary peerage. Napoleon having objected to this last point for the reasons we have already stated, after having again repeated that it involved the risk of making the new constitution unpopular by introducing an hereditary peerage, he changed his opinion after having profoundly reflected on another point, namely, the difficulty of utilizing the nobility in the existing state of France. He said that should he gain three or four battles, and be able to conclude a peace, that perhaps the ancient noblesse would side with him as they had done before, and that an hereditary peerage would be a greater attraction for them than the Senate; that he would thus possess the means of luring them back, and the two classes of nobility, the old and new, fused into one, would perhaps ultimately form a sufficiently imposing aristocratic body. He therefore yielded this point, but insisted on the article relating to confiscation.

The new constitution was drawn up very quickly, for its authors disagreed but on one point, and the editor

wielded a practised pen ; but it was time that it should emerge from obscurity and receive the support of an influential authority. It had been already spoken of by the public, nor were the secret conferences on this subject unnoticed, and some jealous feeling was excited both in the Council of State and amongst certain revolutionists, who having assisted in drawing up the former constitutions, were offended at being refused all participation in this. It was now time that it should be submitted to the Council of State, and it was necessary that M. Benjamin Constant should have a seat in that assembly that he might be able to justify his work.* This created a very natural opportunity of appointing him Councillor of State, and thus in a simple and adroit manner Napoleon conquered his once most violent enemy, and this enemy had the satisfaction of being conquered in a way that reflected no disgrace upon himself. This sudden friendship excites more surprise now than it did then. So many strange changes of opinion had occurred in 1814, and political morality was so little understood that though this intimacy was remarked, it excited neither surprise nor displeasure. M. Benjamin Constant was, therefore, appointed Councillor of State that he might assist officially in framing the Constitution. Some persons, such as Prince Cambacérès, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and the presidents of the different sections of the Council of State, were summoned to the Palace of the Elysée to assist at some preliminary conferences, in which few objections were raised, for indeed, with the exception of the title and the silence on the subject of confiscation, there was no room for objection. However, some few alterations were made, and another article inserted, which, though quite unnecessary, was still in conformity with the passions of the time. The most important of all objects for the Bonapartist was the dynastic question ; the sale of the so called national property for the holders thereof, the abolition of tithes and feudal rights for the agriculturists, and for the revolutionists of every shade of opinion the irrevocable condemnation of the ancient *régime*. A final article, numbered 67, was consequently inserted, in which it was declared that the French people in delegating their power to the authorities appointed by the constitution, did not give them the right of proposing the

* M. Benjamin Constant in his 'Letters of the Hundred Days,' acknowledges the great part he had in the "Additional Act," but does not say that it was the work of his hand. Still there is no doubt the entire was written by him, and that, with the exception of some modified articles, the whole work was his. Besides, it is easy to see from the unity, precision and elegant simplicity of the style, that it was the work of one pen, and that the best of its time. Napoleon's style, which was loftier, was more dogmatic and more nervous.

restoration of the Bourbons—even though the Imperial dynasty should be extinct—nor of re-establishing the feudal nobility, seignorial privileges, tithes, or religious privileges, nor more especially was any power recognised that could attain the validity of the sales of national property, and every one, no matter whom, was forbidden to make any proposal of the kind. The only advantage of this article was, that it enumerated the more essential points in a separate category, and endowed them as it were with a sacred character, sacred indeed only as long as the constitution itself would be esteemed such.

The new Act was then laid before the Council of State. Scarcely any objection was made at the meeting; but in private conversation the title of "Additional Act added to the Constitution of the Empire," was very much criticized as not distinguishing it sufficiently from former constitutions, and which would give an opportunity of introducing other modifications, as had formerly been done by a *Senatus-Consulte*, adopted by the Senate, and sanctioned at the Mayor's offices by some million "ayes," against some million "nos." It was universally remarked that nothing had been said of confiscation, and many persons became alarmed. Everybody even in the general meeting remarked that the abolition of confiscation had been announced in the Charter of 1814, and that the nation would be irritated at not finding it in the "Additional Act," consequently the presidents of the sections, and M. Benjamin Constant in particular, were requested to press the Emperor to consent to fill up this so much to be regretted omission, and which might give room to so much misinterpretation.

A final meeting took place in the Palace of the Elysée, on the evening of the 21st of April, when the constitution was definitely drawn up. The task imposed on the different co-operators in the new constitution, was faithfully performed, and Napoleon was requested to fill up the omission relative to the abolition of confiscation. The article of the Charter of 1814, which abolished this barbarous punishment was referred to. Napoleon replied that it was an act of pure hypocrisy on the part of the Bourbons. He said that their eagerness to nominally suppress confiscation, arose solely from a desire to invalidate the origin of national property, which was the confiscated property of nobles and priests. But their respect for property was but a pretence, for they had taken every opportunity of plundering the holders of national property directly or indirectly. These false appearances should be distrusted, and no credence accorded to fraudulent intentions. As to him, he had no desire to seize on any person's property, but by persisting in their present demand, they would deprive him of the only means he possessed of intimidating the new Coblentz. Though the Council did

not deny what he said of the Bourbons, they persisted in asserting the principle of property, which was sacred in itself, and which it would not look well not to recognize at a time that such pains were being taken to proclaim the rights of citizens, till then unknown, or but partially recognised. At this Napoleon rose with sparkling eyes and menacing gesture, and pacing the room with rapid strides said, that they sought to lead him into a course foreign to his nature, by which they would impart a dangerous vitality to the evil doctrines of the day, which they were encouraging and exciting; that public opinion was becoming worse every hour; that France, the real France, looked for *the old arm of her Emperor, but did not find it*; that he would be left unarmed, a prey to every faction; that both the people and the army abhorred the emigrants, and would blame him for every indulgence shown them, and would not pardon his leaving them riches that would be employed in supporting a foreign war; that circumstances alone must be blamed for this slight deviation from the mildness of the liberal régime; *that they wished to make him an angel, but that he was not one*, and they must be content with him such as he was—a man not accustomed to allow himself to be attacked with impunity. After this outburst, which was but the repetition of what was said every day by men alarmed at the pretended revolutionary movement, Napoleon became calm, but did not yield the point relative to the abolition of confiscation, though he solemnly promised that this article should be recognized, after the establishment of peace. He acted like all rulers who promise to renounce the exercise of arbitrary power, when the existing necessity shall have ceased, that is when the evil has become incurable, both with regard to themselves and their victims.

All yielded before Napoleon's anger, M. Benjamin Constant as well as the rest, for he was anxious to see published in the *Moniteur*, a work of which he was proud, and which might have done him lasting honour, but for this one omission.

On Sunday the 23rd of April, the *Moniteur* published the new constitution under the title of "An Act added to the Constitutions of the Empire." The preamble was very skilfully drawn up. It told how the Emperor, profiting by experience, had at different times modified the preceding constitutions, particularly in the years VIII, X, and XII, always, however, submitting these modifications to the consent of the nation; that in those days, solely occupied with the project of establishing a vast federal system in Europe—this was the title Napoleon gave to his plan of universal monarchy—he had been obliged to defer many arrangements necessary to the liberty of the nation; that having been induced to abandon this vast federal system, and devote himself to the welfare of France, he

was determined to modify the imperial constitutions, preserving all that was good in the past, and borrowing from the advanced intelligence of the country all that could tend to secure the rights of the citizens, and *this by giving the greatest possible extension to the representative system ; by combining the highest possible degree of political liberty, with the energy necessary to make foreign nations respect the independence of the French people and the dignity of the crown.*

According to the terms of the new constitution, the Emperor, was invested with the executive power, and exercised the legislative power in concurrence with two chambers. One of these, the Chamber of Peers, was hereditary, the members, whose number was not fixed, to be appointed by the Emperor. The other, the Chamber of Deputies was to be elective, and to consist of six hundred and twenty-nine members, elected for five years by the two series of colleges ; those of the departments and the arrondissements. At the expiration of five years, fresh elections were to be made. The commercial interests were to be represented by twenty-three members, chosen after a special fashion. The Chamber of Representatives was to appoint its own president, subject, however, to the Emperor's approbation. The Chamber of Peers was to have supreme jurisdiction over ministers, military commanders, &c. The Chamber of Representatives was to have the initiative in all questions relating to finance, and levying of troops. The budget was to be voted every year. The Chambers were to have the power of amending the laws, and could even propose laws, in virtue of their initiative, and these laws, if approved by the Chambers, might be submitted to the Emperor. The Ministers might be members of either Chamber, or might take a seat there, though not members, and were bound to appear before the Chambers when called upon, and explain their acts. They were responsible to the Chamber of Representatives, by which they might be impeached ; but were to be judged by the Chamber of Peers. The Emperor could dissolve the Chamber of Representatives, but he was bound to summon another within six months at the latest. The appointment of magistrates was permanent ; the military tribunals were to have jurisdiction only over military misdemeanours. Personal liberty was guaranteed to all Frenchmen. They could neither be imprisoned, nor exiled arbitrarily, and should only be subject to their natural judges. A state of siege could only be proclaimed in case of foreign invasion, or civil war. In the latter case, a state of siege could only be declared by passing a law, or if the Chambers were not sitting, by issuing a decree, which should be converted into a law as soon as possible. Every Frenchman should have the right of printing his opinion without a previous censorship, and was

answerable only to the law of the land. Misdemeanours of the press were to be tried before a jury. The right of individuals to petition was recognized. Equality and freedom of religious worship was established. Lastly, the dynasty, the national property, the abolition of titles and ancient privileges were placed, as we have seen, under a special guarantee, since the members of both chambers were forbidden to propose any measure inimical to them.

All enactments made by former *Senatus-Consultes* that were opposed to this new act were annulled. The others remained in force. The present Additional Act was to be presented for acceptance to the French people in the offices of mayors, advocates, &c., where they would express their approval or disapproval by *aye* or *no*, inscribed on registers kept for that purpose. The revision of the votes was to be made in an assembly of the *Champ de Mai* composed of all the members of the electoral colleges that should happen to come to Paris.

Never before had so much liberty been accorded to France, liberty as great as could be reasonably expected, and complete, with the exception of the article relative to confiscation, the consideration of which was adjourned. It was not from any covert motive that Napoleon was so liberal, but because his great mind saw that as he was obliged to grant liberty, it would be necessary to grant it as fully as possible, and being at that time entirely occupied by one idea—that of conquering Europe, arrayed against him—he felt that this once obtained, the more or less of power he would enjoy, would be but a secondary object; besides, he considered that in the working of the constitution, more would be conceded to him than to another, thanks to his glory, genius, and strength of will; besides, he thought less of himself than of his son, whom he did not desire to see possessed of more power than that enjoyed by a king of England.

We are now to see how this liberty was received, and the following recital will show that in politics as well as in everything else, it is not sufficient that a remedy be good, but that it also be applied at a proper time.

BOOK LIX.

THE CHAMP DE MAI.

Publication of the Additional Act—Effect it produces—It is very badly received, though the most liberal and best edited constitution that France had ever got—Reasons of this reception—France has no more faith in Napoleon when he speaks of liberty, than Europe when he speaks of peace—Rage of the royalists, and indifference of the revolutionists—The constitutional party is the only one that receives the Additional Act favourably, and yet it is distrustful—M. de Lafayette's important position on this occasion. The constitutional party will adhere but on certain conditions, demand that the Chambers be immediately summoned. Napoleon wishes to defer the Chambers meeting during the first operations of the campaign—He is forced on, and resolves on putting the Additional Act in force, by summoning the Chambers even before the act is accepted—At the same time he summons the electoral body to the Champ de Mai—These measures calm the public mind somewhat—Consequence of the proceedings at Vienna and London—Though much excited, the Powers consider the approaching struggle as most serious—Austria tries to get rid of Napoleon by exciting troubles in the country—Attempt at a secret negotiation with M. Fouché—A secret agent is sent to Basil—This secret proceeding is discovered by Napoleon, who seeks to counteract it by sending M. Fleury de Chabillon to Basil—Violent interview with M. Fouché, who is detected in treasonable practices—No immediate consequence from this conspiracy—The Coalition continues, and the British minister is compelled to tell Parliament that it is intended to commence war immediately—The Opposition declares they have been deceived; this is believed by the Parliament, but still a great majority votes for the war—The armies of the enemy march towards France—Murat's adventures in Italy—His unwise enterprise, and his sad end—He flies to Provence—Everybody, and Napoleon himself, consider this a bad omen—Progress of military preparations—Spontaneous formation of federal bodies—Napoleon hopes these will assist him in the defence of Lyons and Paris—Whilst the revolutionists prepare to aid Napoleon, the royalists throw off the mask, and commence a civil war in Vendée—First insurrectionary movement in the four sub-divisions of old Vendée, and combat at Aizenay—Napoleon's prompt measures—He deprives himself of twenty thousand men that would have been most useful against the foreign enemy, and sends them to Vendée—At the same time he orders M. Fouché to negotiate an armistice with the leaders in Vendée—Revolt and spirit of the elections—Reunion of the Chamber of Peers, and the Chamber of Representatives—Disposition of the latter—Though sincerely desirous to aid Napoleon against the enemy, it dreads appearing servile—Its first acts give proof of its extreme susceptibility—Napoleon is very much affected—Champ de Mai—Grandeur and sadness of the ceremony—Address to the two Chambers—Napoleon's severe and dignified advice—His profound remarks on why his government cannot work well with the two Chambers—Sinister omens—He leaves Paris on the 12th June, to put himself at the head of the army—Adieux to his ministers and family—Final considerations on this attempt at restoring the Empire.

BOOK LIX.

THE CHAMP DE MAI.

Never had liberty been so extensively granted to France as by the "Additional Act," and never had it been so badly received. All, both young and old, who after the long sleep of the public mind, had awakened to their love of liberty, and understood it in a different manner, because experience had not yet led them to adopt a common system. It was generally expected that some hundreds of constituents would be summoned to deliberate on the different forms of government, and each fancied that the form of constitution he preferred would emanate from these discussions. The greater number flattered themselves that they would be of the number of these constituents, and even the Council of State had expected to be called on to draw up the new constitution, instead of which, their sanction to a completed work was all that was asked. Thus the mode that was adopted was at once offensive to personal pretensions and to the advocates of certain systems. Besides, all disliked the old Imperial constitutions, which they justly considered responsible for the misfortunes of the first Empire, and a radical change had been hoped for, absolutely different from the old system, both in substance and form.

There was a feeling of general and bitter disappointment when one morning there appeared in the *Moniteur*, completely finished and beyond the possibility of alteration, a simple act, qualified as "additional" to the Imperial constitutions, of which it appeared to be only a modification, whilst the public desired a complete change; and for the stability of this act no other guarantee was offered than its mute acceptance in the offices of the mayors, justices of peace, &c. Instead of the perfectly new order of things that had been expected, a work in which all should join and which should be consecrated by universal approbation, there was given what was considered but an insignificant modification, doled out by the hands of power, and

manifest in a common-judge manner, in which no confidence could be felt, as I offered no guarantee that a succession of additional acts might not be published after the fashion of the ancient *Seigneur-Commissaire*. The people could not but feel and see that they had been deceived in the most unworthy manner, when so little had been conceded, and that little not even secured.

The public was prejudiced by the title of the work before reading it. It would require more knowledge than was then general to see that this contained the principles of a constitutional monarchy, such at least as a legislator could write, as bringing it into operation could only be the work of time. But however well informed the friends of liberty may have been at this time, they were totally devoid of experience. Some were displeased because the Additional Act announced the formation of two Chambers, others because it did not declare something like a republic, and all, as Napoleon had foreseen, were indignant at finding that one Chamber would be hereditary. To the discontent excited by the title announcing a modification instead of a total change, and to the discontent excited by the form, which recalled the charter granted by Louis XVIII, was now added the displeasure felt against the work itself. The old republicans looked on it as a monarchy, the royalists of 1791 as a monarchy with two Chambers, that is the *Mouvier monarchy*, whilst the young liberals, better informed than the other two classes, considered it an aristocratic monarchy because of the hereditary peerage. The journals unanimously repeated the same diatribes, and the royalists, taking courage from the leniency of the Imperial police, joined with the republicans, the enemies of monarchy, with the monarchists opposed to the two Chambers, and with the young liberals, who objected to an hereditary nobility, saying, what indeed ill became them, that the Additional Act was only a charter like that of Louis XVIII, which perpetuated feudal monarchy by two Chambers, of which one was to be hereditary. They thus helped to propagate the idea then prevalent, that Napoleon was not at all changed, that now that he was established in authority he had no idea of keeping the promises he so liberally made at his arrival, that he returned to his old practices, he had drawn the semblance of a constitution from his own personal despotism, enunciated in the same form and almost in the same terms as the Bourbon charter, and ratified in a manner peculiar to himself, that is, by registers in public offices, a manner of proceeding quite as insolent and deceptive as that employed by Louis XVIII. This opinion was at once adopted by all those inclined to distrust Napoleon, and had the bad effect of cooling the zeal of the friends of the revolution and liberty, the only persons inclined to hasten to the

frontiers. Every man that felt displeased or disheartened was not only a partisan lost to Napoleon, but a soldier withdrawn from the defence of the country. Whilst patriots of every shade of opinion excited by the royalists, declared that the Additional Act was nothing but a dark emanation of despotism, on the other hand, those who accused the government of joining the revolutionary party, and who made their affected fears an excuse for keeping aloof until victory should have been pronounced in favour of one party or the other; these men asserted that Napoleon was not recognisable, that he no longer possessed will or energy, that he allowed himself to be led by fools, that he had given an anarchical constitution, and that having once consented to be the instrument of regicides and Jacobins, he would end by being their dupe and victim.

But every body's mind was disturbed by the prospect of the great impending crisis, that now was seen approaching with giant steps in the train of the European Powers. All parties felt that their fate depended on this crisis, and excitement being added to want of judgment, they were more impressionable, and consequently more unreasonable than usual.

Napoleon saw all this, and was much affected by the distrust he inspired. He had foreseen that the hereditary peerage would not please, but he had no idea that the title of the new act would have been so-misjudged. Still he tried to be calm midst the universal anxiety. "You see," he said to M. Lavalette, for whom he frequently sent that he might give vent with safety to the feelings that filled his heart, "You see all are attacked with vertigo. I alone, in this vast Empire, have preserved my presence of mind, and should I lose it, I know not what would become of us!" In fact, he made constant efforts to restrain his excitable nature, checked the slightest expression of anger, listened to the most ridiculous objections with a calmness and patience which he generally showed only in times of great danger, taking care not to increase the conflagration enkindled by the passions of others by the addition of the flame of his own, and thus expiated the faults of his long despotism by sufferings known but to God and a few friends. But, alas! though faults may be expiated in the sight of God, they cannot be in the sight of man. God sees the repentance and is content; but men possess neither his intuition nor his clemency; they only see the fault, and their rude justice will not be satisfied without an evident, complete and terrible punishment! Napoleon was destined to experience the full bitterness of this truth.

The old constitutionalists, and only the wisest of these, were the sole defenders of the Additional Act. They had been flattered and all doubt removed from their minds, by the fact that M. Benjamin Constant had drawn up the new constitution. They

were still better pleased when they read the document itself. Madame de Staël, who was preserved by her rare intelligence and perfect knowledge of England from being infected by the general errors, loudly approved of the Additional Act. It was also approved by the enlightened school of Genevese publicists, who followed the impulse given by Madame de Staël and M. Benjamin Constant. M. de Sismondi, the most learned of these publicists, undertook to defend it systematically in the *Moniteur*. In a series of remarkable articles, he proceeded to prove that the form that had been adopted had no resemblance to the *octroi* of Louis XVIII, for this prince admitted no authority but his own, and consequently reserved to himself the power of resuming what he had given, whilst Napoleon had formally recognised the sovereignty of the nation, had submitted his work to its approbation, and was irrevocably pledged to the nation, were what he did approved; that though the mode adopted for drawing up and presenting this new constitution left a large influence to the ruling power, it was the only method that could be adopted under existing circumstances, as convoking the primary assemblies to elect a constituent body, whose deliberations would be most difficult with an enemy so near, would also give rise to interminable disputes about a work, concerning whose principles all sensible men were agreed; that had Napoleon meant to deceive, he could have allowed this constituent body to enter on endless disputes whilst he went to fight the foreign enemy, and then returning conqueror, he could have held the assembly up to ridicule, dismissed it and resumed all his former authority; that on the contrary, having himself presented a perfect plan, a plan which with the exception of one point left nothing to be desired by the true friends of liberty, he had proved the sincerity of his determination to strip himself of his ancient authority, and to bestow a constitutional monarchy on the country; that by comparing this with all preceding constitutions, it would be seen that it was the best that had ever been given to France, and was in many respects more liberal than that of England itself, that, finally, it was not only natural but necessary to retain the *senatus-consultes*, for as they were formerly annulled in everything contrary to the Additional Act, they were not to be feared in a political sense, and that annulling them altogether would be to crush the civil and administrative legislation, that is the entire organization of the state, at one blow; that a new constitution could not be expected to do more than change the political form of the government, whilst it should be left to time to modify the civil and administrative legislation in conformity with the spirit of the Additional Act.

All that M. de Sismondi wrote was true, but true only for sensible and unprejudiced men. Others, and they were the

greater number, inspired by distrust or displeasure at some clauses of the Additional Act, thought that in the whole document, they could recognise Napoleon's temper and despotism. As to the former, they might, indeed have been right, for though much influenced, he may not have been altogether changed by his misfortunes, but they were wrong with regard to his despotism, for he had given them a better constitution than that of England, and since they had committed the enormous fault of recalling Napoleon, they ought to have made use of him against the enemy, and tried to make the part of constitutional monarch supportable to him. M. de Lafayette was more just, notwithstanding the susceptibility of his liberalism. He disapproved of the form but admired the principles of the *Additional Act*, and complimented his friend M. Benjamin Constant on them. "Your Constitution," he wrote to him, "is better than its reputation, but you must try to make the nation believe in it, and to win that belief it must be put into immediate and vigorous execution."

M. de Lafayette had passed fourteen years on his estate of Lagrange, and though grateful to Napoleon for having liberated him from the dungeons of Olmütz, he could never pardon him for having deprived France of liberty. However, though feeling no ill-will towards a man who had done him an important service, and even admiring both his character and genius, he still had not the slightest faith in his change of opinion. His own opinions were so little subject to change that he could not understand how those of another could alter. However a man so zealous as he, asked nothing better than to make a trial of liberty no matter with whom, whether with Napoleon or the Bourbons. If under Napoleon, political liberty was more endangered, there was also more security for the principles of 1789 and more independence and greatness in the sight of foreign nations. Being perfectly satisfied with the Additional Act, with the exception of one point, he was most anxious to see it put into operation, and was ready to lay aside all distrust, were the Chambers summoned at once. In his opinion, nothing further need be apprehended from Napoleon, were the most distinguished men of the liberal party formed into a public assemblage. When the nation should have profited by his word to repel the enemy, if it were no longer satisfied with him, he could be deposed in favour of his son, and then constitutional monarchy would be secured. Such reasoning had one defect, that it authorized Napoleon to reason in the same fashion and say that, when conqueror, he would dismiss the friends of liberty if he were not satisfied with them, and thus all that would be gained by restraining him by the immediate assembling of the Chambers, would be to lessen his power of acting against

a foreign enemy, without in any way diminishing his capacity for attacking the cause of liberty.

However that may be, M. de Lafayette, as we have said, would be quite satisfied, provided the Chambers were summoned up immediately. There was no person upon whose good opinion so great a value was placed, for amongst the revolutionists none were so respected as he and Carnot. If he had not, like Carnot, had the honour of organising victory, he had that at least of not having voted either the death of Louis XVI nor that of any citizen. Inducing him to support the Empire would be the very best guarantee for Napoleon's liberal intentions. Great efforts were consequently made to win him. Many persons assisted in the task, amongst others General Matthieu Dumas, Prince Joseph and M. Benjamin Constant. General Matthieu Dumas, who was entirely occupied in organising the National Guards for the defence of the country, and who was certainly anxious for liberty, but still more for the success of our arms, took advantage of his old acquaintance with M. de Lafayette to bring him into closer connexion with Prince Joseph. Joseph had been acquainted with M. de Lafayette, but their intimacy had been interrupted by his two successive royalties of Naples and Spain, an intimacy he now sought to renew with the honourable and twofold intention of procuring Napoleon a support and a fresh link with the nation. He met the illustrious patriot of 1789, with the semblance of the frankest liberalism, a principle which indeed he had adopted under his brother's heavy yoke, and which he believed himself to possess in a greater degree than he did, a mistake that materially assisted him in the part he had to play. M. de Lafayette listened with rather haughty politeness to all he had to say, and told him he would believe anything that was wished, provided the Chambers were assembled immediately; but Joseph did not conceal that Napoleon would object strongly to this measure, as he would be afraid to leave a legislative assembly in Paris, whose debates might disturb the public mind whilst he was fighting the enemy.

M. Benjamin Constant also paid his court to M. de Lafayette. "You are my conscience," he said, which meant that he considered him as his excuse for his present conduct. Indeed, M. Benjamin Constant could not conceal from himself that his conduct even amid the bare-faced tergiversation of the time, had been noticed and unfavourably commented on, for it was not easy to explain how he could become councillor of state to a prince, on whose head he had once called down public vengeance. But to have M. de Lafayette for his friend and the approver of his conduct was a sufficient reply to every reproach. M. Benjamin Constant, therefore, sought to persuade him, but M. de Lafayette coolly told him as he had told Joseph, that

he would believe all that was said, and approve all that was done, provided the Chambers were assembled. There was a very serious legal objection to this immediate convocation, as it would be putting the constitution into operation before it had been accepted. Notwithstanding the importance of this objection, it had no influence on M. de Lafayette nor on the patizans of an immediate convocation. Although they blamed a mode of acceptance in which the popular will was treated very lightly, they were ready to treat it with still less respect by supposing it to be known even before it was pronounced. They said that the omission of a mere ceremony was but of little consequence, provided that what the people desired was done. However, this proposal must be approved by him, who alone had the power to decide, and it would not be easy to obtain his consent.

Although Napoleon was determined to put the new constitution into operation, and was even anxious that it should succeed, as the success of the liberal party was identical with his, whilst its failure would be the Bourbon's triumph, he still dreaded assembling the Chambers, fearing that at the first report of the cannon they would lose, not courage, (the Convention had shown the contrary) but presence of mind. He was prepared for terrible vicissitudes, perhaps even to being forced to fight beneath the walls of Paris, to prevent Europe from entering the capital, but he did not doubt but that he would succeed, provided that he could keep the citizens quiet, and induce them to look calmly on all the horrors of a war *à outrance*. With his instinctive clear-sightedness, he foresaw that a Chamber of Representatives summoned at the actual moment, would contain men of every party, to whom one unsuccessful battle—which was possible, even admitting the hypothesis of definite success—instead of furnishing a motive for union and perseverance, would perhaps become a cause of dissention, and perhaps even wrest from him the sword with which he was defending France, and it must be admitted that this opinion was neither unfounded nor insincere, for newly-formed and disunited assemblies are assuredly unfavourable instruments for carrying on war. He therefore wished to profit by the delay naturally resulting from the Additional Act, to defer assembling the Chambers, and thus gain two months during which he would have time to strike the first blow at the enemy, nor was it impossible that his military operations might give rise to events that would terminate the campaign, if not the war, in two months. Then having recovered his ancient influence, and the courage of the nation being revived, the Chambers might be allowed to meet without danger.

When we reflect on the events that succeeded, events that involved what is worse than the defeat of a dynasty—the defeat

of a nation—we perceive the prudence of Napoleon's opinion. But France felt as much distrust of his liberal opinions, as Europe did of his pacific inclinations. In addition to the inconsiderate dislike felt for some parts of the "Additional Act," it was generally looked upon as a deceitful promise, which Napoleon would break on his return from his next victory; and if anything could conquer the universal incredulity, it would be seeing an assembly placed beside the government, watching their movements jealously, discussing, in an opposite interest, public affairs, and ever ready to frustrate any unconstitutional attempts on their part. Such was Napoleon's fearful position for which he had to thank his own past faults; he could not assemble the Chambers without running the risk of having anarchy in his rear, with the enemy in front, nor could he refuse to assemble the Chambers without forfeiting public confidence, without which no troops could be raised.

Joseph, from a sincere zeal, as well as from a desire to make himself of importance, sought to obtain from his brother such concessions as would gain him credit with the constitutionalists, for which reason, he pressed most earnestly for the immediate convocation of the Chambers. Joseph's entreaties were warmly supported by M. Benjamin Constant, who was desirous of pleasing his friends, especially M. de Lafayette, who profited with great *façesse* by the desire that was shown to obtain his approbation. Both said that the "Additional Act" had not been successful; that nobody believed in it, that something more decisive should be done, that the presence of six hundred representatives and two hundred peers around the throne could alone obtain credence for the Imperial promises. Napoleon defended himself warmly. He said he knew that the "Additional Act" had not succeeded, that its title, for which he was in fault, and the hereditary peerage, for which M. Constant was to blame, had ruined it in the public opinion; that the public mind was running after chimeras, instead of looking for what was tangible and healthy, that this erroneous tendency was increasing daily, that no sacrifices whatsoever would restrain it, and that for the sake of trying to remedy an evil which time alone could cure, he would not encumber himself with a constituent assembly, when in addition to his other difficulties, he was about to meet in conflict all the armies of Europe. For several days he resisted the entreaties with which he was assailed, and which proceeded principally from the constitutional party, who were most anxious to find new excuses for their adhesion, and at the same time to surround themselves with a numerous assembly where they hoped to rule.

Still the entreaties which were not less than the resistance, were supported by the unheard-of violence of the periodical

press, particularly the royalist writers, who condemned the "Additional Act" for not explicitly recognising the sovereignty of the nation. Unfortunately men, calling themselves patriots, allowed themselves to be entrapped by these declamations. Napoleon was not deceived by this, but he needed the assistance of the revolutionary and liberal party to oppose the royalist party at home, and the allied army abroad, and it was all important to him not to allow that zeal to cool, by which the old soldiers, and especially the mobilised National Guard were impelled towards the frontiers. What impelled these honest men to hasten to fill the deficiencies in our regiments, or to defend the fortresses, was hearing constantly dinned into their ears that they must hasten to the frontier to expel the foreigners, the Bourbons, the nobles, and priests, in fact the counter-revolution. Now if the revolutionary and liberal party by whom these things were said, should become silent through discontent, the consequence might be a frigidity which would deprive the army of all support, and leave it alone in its struggle with the enemy; this army was undoubtedly brave, but numerically insufficient to resist combined Europe. This consideration exerted a daily increasing influence on Napoleon, who saw a mournful want of popularity succeed by degrees to the enthusiasm with which the friends of the revolution had received him on his disembarkation. However, this reason might not have been sufficient to influence his determination, had not another been added.

Whilst at home, aided by the distrust he had inspired, it was sought to represent him as an incorrigible despot, acting artfully for the time, but only waiting an opportunity to resume his old practices; abroad he was represented as a fierce tyrant, surrounded by soldiers as fierce as himself, and not daring to move a step beyond the ranks, and inspiring terror and fear; in a word, that he was hateful to the French people, on whom he was come to impose his iron yoke again. It was in vain that he appeared at the almost daily reviews on the Place du Carrousel, where every one might approach him, notwithstanding the detailed accounts published in the *Moniteur*, it was repeated that he never appeared abroad except surrounded by soldiers. The constant repetition of this falsehood ultimately influenced public opinion in Europe, and it was believed that to overthrow the despot, all that was needed was to conquer one or two hundred thousand mamelukes, when France would be found eager to cast off his tyranny. This second falsehood needed refutation as much as the first. Whatever might be the disadvantage of convoking the Chambers at once, it would have the double advantage of putting an end to these false reports at home and abroad, proving that Napoleon had been serious in granting the "Additional Act," since, without waiting for the legal delays he had

put the people in immediate possession of their rights; and this step also proved that he did not fear to come in contact with the people, since he surrounded himself with their representatives. "Well," he said, to Joseph and M. Constant, who still persisted in demanding the anticipated execution of the "Additional Act," "I have decided, I will assemble the Chambers, and thus put an end to all doubts as to my intentions. I will prove my confidence in a nation, that it is said I fear, by surrounding myself with its representatives." One difficulty alone remained, that of anticipating the popular desire, by dispensing with the acceptance of the Constitution before putting it into execution. A decree was drawn up, preceded by a preamble, which accounted for this proceeding by attributing it to Napoleon's desire to be surrounded by the representatives of the nation, and to see them near his person for a few days before leaving for the army. To this skilfully-written preamble, succeeded the decree convoking the electoral colleges for the purpose of immediately choosing six hundred and twenty-nine representatives. This same decree also announced that those colleges whose presidents had been formerly appointed by the Emperor, should at the approaching election have the power of choosing for themselves. This decree was published on the 30th April, and it was hoped that a month would be sufficient for the electoral operations, and that the representatives would be able to meet the electors in the great assembly of the Champ de Mai, on the 26th.

He did not confine himself to this important concession. In order to prove that it was intended to put the nation in full possession of its rights, a new decree was made, which gave the communes the right of electing their mayors and municipal officers. This permission was confined to those communes where the prefects had exercised the right of electing the mayors, and the reason given for the decree was, that the new prefect might possibly be ignorant of the respective merits of the candidates. As this was the case with the greater number of communes, and especially the smaller, the appointing of municipal authorities was almost entirely placed in the hands of the patriotic party. A large number of these were holders of national property, and this, as a party measure, was very well devised.

However great the ill-humour of the opposite party might be, it was necessarily lessened or silenced at least for some days, by measures which put the Additional Act into such immediate and effective operation. It could now be hardly said that it was but a snare, a vain promise whose fulfillment was deferred until the establishment of peace, but which in reality would be indefinitely postponed. Nor could he who freely placed himself in the midst of the representatives of the country be depicted

as a fierce tyrant obliged to hide himself from the world. Thus Napoleon at once proved both his sincerity and moral power.

M. de Lafayette was now fully satisfied and said so. Joseph had been commissioned to offer him a peerage; but he refused, saying, that he would not accept any appointment but from the nation, and intended presenting himself to the electors of Marne. M. Benjamin Constant, in the greatest spirits, told him how the Emperor's repugnance had been overcome, and in return for that service, asked his influence with one of the electoral colleges, to secure his return as one of the members of the second Chamber. M. de Lafayette consented, for at this moment he was not in a mood to refuse anything. He was also asked to perform another service, one which his patriotism could not refuse, and which he undertook with the greatest pleasure. His friend, Mr. Crawford, the United States' Minister at Paris was about to return to America, where he had been appointed Minister of War. He was to pass through England where he had both friends and influence. M. de Lafayette induced him to undertake to deliver some letters written in favour of peace, and addressed to some of the principal men in England. Madame de Staël, who from her long opposition to the Emperor could not be suspected of partiality wrote most pressing letters to the British Ministers, with whom her brilliant talents and great fame might have some influence, and besought them to withdraw from the Coalition. Napoleon, she said, was no longer a despot living in isolation, but a liberal monarch supported by all France. Both the people and the army were devoted to him; the struggle would be fearful, and for the sake of humanity and liberty it would be better to accept Napoleon, corrected, restrained by legal institutions, and really desirous of peace if not of liberty, than to shed torrents of blood in a possibly unsuccessful attempt to dethrone him. Well-received, listened to, believed and taken at his word he would grant both the peace and liberty he had promised. And opposed by the Allies, but successful in the battle field he would not accept the Treaty of Paris, nor perhaps think himself bound by the "Additional Act." Consequently the interests of Europe, of humanity and liberty united in recommending a pacific policy. Madame de Staël's reasoning was, as may be seen, as specious as it was clever and patriotic.

Whilst the constitutional party thus repaid Napoleon's sacrifices with the warmest support, an event of great importance occurred in the provinces which displayed the feeling entertained about resisting foreign invasion, a subject that interested Napoleon more than any other. Although the long silence of the first Empire had been succeeded by political

activity and a love of contradiction, still in the provinces threatened by the enemy, the prospect of danger silenced the spirit of opposition and dispute. For example, the inhabitants of Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté and Dauphiny took part in the preparations for defence with the greatest zeal. The old soldiers joined their regiments, and the men selected for the mobilised National Guards immediately obeyed the summons of the officers appointed to organize them. Whilst the eastern provinces showed such excellent dispositions, those of the west were less zealous though from different motives. It has been seen by what passed at Angers, Nantes, Mans, and Rennes during the eleven months of the Restoration that the citizens of these towns had been both offended and alarmed by the position the nobility and peasantry had assumed, especially at their audacity in taking up arms in the midst of peace. Since the 20th of March, power had again passed into the hands of the *bourgeoisie*, at which they rejoiced more from the sense of security induced, than from a wish to gratify any ambitious views. But great excitement prevailed at Quimper, Rennes, Mans, Angers, &c., in consequence of the proceedings of the Vendean leaders, their evident connection with England, and the appearance off the coast, of English vessels laden with arms together with acts of violence committed in the country districts. The inhabitants of Nantes in particular, who had formerly suffered so much between the attacks of the Vendéans on the one side, and the slaughters of Carrier on the other, could not see the renewal of civil war without horror. The people were in the greatest excitement, and the rumoured assassination of an old man produced a profound impression on the honest inhabitants of Nantes, who conceived the idea of forming an alliance with the principal cities of the five departments of Brittany, by which they promised mutual assistance in case of internal or external danger, and this alliance was to be called the Breton Federation, in imitation of the federation of 1790. No sooner did this project become known, a project so well suited to the existing circumstances, than it was generally adopted, and several hundred inhabitants of Nantes set out for Rennes, where the same idea had been adopted and where they were anxiously expected. They were received with enthusiasm, fêted and lodged by the principal citizens, and some intelligent men were commissioned to draw up the compact by which the Bretons bound themselves to repress the enemy at home and abroad. Nothing could be more sincere than the conduct of the honest Bretons at this time, or freer from party spirit. They did not mean to overawe power or oppress the upper classes of the nation, but to defend themselves against the incendiarism and assassinations of the old chouanism

and also to prevent the landing of the English. The prevailing tone of these meetings was extreme liberalism. It was agreed to draw up a preamble in which the objects of the association should be explained, to which some articles would be added determining the engagement of the confederates towards each other. The first stipulation was that the confederation should not form a body distinct from the other citizens acting independantly with separate uniform, arms and commanders, but that they should be incorporated with the existing and legal institutions of the National Guard, which as it existed throughout the empire, they could at any time join and so become useful whenever danger threatened. They should be bound to place themselves at the disposal of the public authorities and immediately obey their commands to join either the mobilised or sedentary batallions, and should a deficiency, occur in the legal *cadre* of the National Guards, the confederates were bound individually to go whithersoever the mayors, prefects, or sub-prefects summoned them to repel any attempt against public order. They also bound themselves to another duty, altogether moral, which was to efface, as far as in them lay, those false notions by which it was sought to deceive the simple peasantry, and to lead them both by word and example to fulfil their civic duties; in a word the confederates put themselves at the disposal of the Imperial Government both for the internal and external defence of the country.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages attached to every political association, the Confederation, influenced by a deep sense of the public danger, and divested of all personal views, being nothing more than auxiliary to the existing authority, was less objectionable than others, and might even be of great advantage to the country.

The preamble and act were drawn up, and both were about to be submitted to the Prefect. The government, as we have seen, had no part in this movement, which was quite spontaneous, and resulted solely from the fears of the most independant and most honest of the Breton population. Though Napoleon had long been popular in the western provinces, where he had restored tranquillity, still, his wars in 1812 and 1813 had lowered him in public opinion. He was considered as most dangerous, and his return had been welcomed only because it would put an end to the influence of the emigrants, and in the hope that he would be checked by restrictive laws. For this reason, and not wishing that the new federation should assume a Bonapartist character, the Emperor's name had not been mentioned. Sensible men pointed out the danger of forming such an association, independant of the government, and which could render no real service, except acting under the jurisdiction of the government, and

could hope for sanction only on these conditions. The preamble was then revised, and made to correspond with the wishes of those good citizens, who were willing to assist Napoleon, but on condition of a true and rational liberty.

The greater number of the towns of Bretagne sent deputations to Rennes, and several days were passed in fêtes, rejoicings, and promises of mutual assistance. In a short time, more than twenty thousand confederates were assembled in the departments of the Lower Loire, Morbihan, Finisterre, Côtes du Nord, and Ile-et-Vilaine, which composed Old Brittany. No sooner was this proceeding, on the part of the Bretons, known, than it produced a great sensation in the neighbouring departments, and, by degrees, throughout France. The Angevins, threatened by the same dangers as the Bretons, prepared to follow their example. It was not the Chouans that the Burgundians hated, but the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, and they also sent deputies to Dijon to sign the act of federation, and adopted, without alteration, the original text of the Breton federation. Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais and Dauphiny were inclined to do the same. Amid this general movement, particularly in the provinces threatened by civil or foreign war, it was not possible that the great city of Paris should remain indifferent and inactive. But there are many Parises in Paris; and while the nobles regretted the Bourbons, and the middle classes regretted peace, the humbler classes were inflamed with a brutal hatred against what they called the nobles and priests, and by a patriotic dislike of what they called the foreigners; they had always regretted not having had muskets to defend the walls of the capital in 1814. Amongst these, were men compromised by the disorders of 1793; young men inspired by sincere patriotism, and honest soldiers retired from service, all of whom excited the inhabitants of the faubourgs to imitate the example of the people of Brittany and Burgundy. This movement commenced in the faubourgs Saint Marceau and Saint Antoine, and soon spread through all the others. The Parisians adopted the act of the Bretons, but wished to have a preamble of their own, for, though all followed the plan invented by the Bretons, each province wished to adduce a motive of action consonant with its own particular views. The confederates of Paris addressed themselves to Napoleon himself, asked for an audience, desired to be passed in review, and authorized to present him an address.

These different confederations had come into existence during the last days of April and the first of May. The Additional Act had been published in the meantime, and had caused some discontent, but its effect being corrected by the decree summoning the Chambers, had not lessened the enthusiasm of those provinces threatened with foreign or civil war, and they continued to form

federations. The government, we repeat, had no part either in the arranging or propagation of these provincial federations. The men who composed them were influenced by a variety of motives. Those who were satisfied to get rid of foreigners, and of a counter-revolution effected by foreigners, at any price, met the spontaneous union of the more zealous portion of the people with delight. Those, on the other hand, who regretted the sacrifices Napoleon had made to liberal opinions, thought, or affected to think, that the revolutionary party was prepared to seize all authority, and expressed the greatest horror of these federations. They considered this movement, especially at Paris, where it was nearer to them, as an abomination and a serious danger. If Napoleon either encouraged or suffered them, they were resolved to look on him as a dishonest and hapless instrument of the Jacobins. As to him, he smiled at their fears, allowed them to say what they would, and was himself quite content with the movement that had taken place. He loved order from inclination, good sense, and interest, and did not feel the least inclination for what was called Jacobinists, but he understood them, and had not the same horror of them that some felt; on the contrary, he was glad that so many vigorous arms had risen in defence of the country, some of which would restrain the Chouans in Bretagne, and would dispute the entrance to the capital with the English, Russians, and Prussians. They might be an embarrassment in time of peace, but he cared little for what would happen, provided the enemy were expelled, after which, he was certain, in cases of popular commotion, of the aid, not alone of the army, but of the Chambers, that might indeed be more liberal than he, but would never go so far as to favour democratic enterprises.

He, consequently, felt no hesitation in permitting or even aiding these federations. As we have said, he found them very useful in supporting public opinion against the royalists in Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, &c., and very useful at Paris for the defence of the capital. This last point was to him the most important of all. His plan was, as we have seen, to protect Paris by solid earthworks, as there was not sufficient time to construct defences in masonry; he intended to bring up two hundred cannon from the navy, and to have them worked by sailors, to have two hundred field-pieces worked by young lads from the different military schools, and he considered that if to the fifteen or eighteen thousand men from the dépôts, he could add twenty-five thousand more from the faubourgs, all strong men, and all for the most part old soldiers, that Paris defended by forty thousand infantry and ten thousand gunners would be impregnable, and that then, unrestrained, he could with his regular army overcome every coalition. He did

not reckon on the National Guard, not because that he doubted their courage, but because he suspected their inclinations, and with his usual clear-sightedness saw, that though necessity compelled them to rally round him for an instant, that they still secretly regretted the Bourbons and peace. He had not even determined whether he would leave them arms, but he deferred his decision on that point to the last moment. As to the Federalists, he was resolved to enroll them regularly, find them reliable officers, and even incorporate them with the National Guard, by which he would make use of them in the hour of danger, and if necessary transfer to them the muskets of these guards. He determined not to arm them for the present, in the first place, because he required time to know and to organize them, and besides that he was not sufficiently rich in war material to be able to lavish muskets so freely.*

He confided to the brave General Darricau, the task of organizing them under the title of sharpshooters, attached to the Parisian National Guard, in which character they were to be employed for the external defence of the capital. He even consented to review them on a Sunday, and to receive the address they wished to present him. He chose the same day for reviewing the 10th regiment of the line, a regiment that had made itself remarkable by being the only one that had fought for the Bourbons. This regiment was neither differently constituted, nor influenced by opinions different to those that had inspired, the 7th, 58th and 83rd infantry regiments that had joined Napoleon so enthusiastically in Dauphiny. But the peculiar circumstances in which the 10th was placed, had kept the men some days longer in the service of the Bourbons. The 10th did

* There are few subjects upon which a greater variety of opinions has been expressed, than about the formation of the Federalists of 1815, and Napoleon's feelings towards them. Some accused Napoleon of having excited them for the purpose of employing them against the royalists; others say that he was afraid of them, and on that account would not arm them, and thus deprived himself of the important aid of the patriots. Both assertions are equally false. Napoleon knew nothing of the formation of the confederates, which indeed had no other origin than the fears of those who in the west were called "blues." Once in existence, Napoleon was not displeased at the circumstance, though he saw very clearly that the ultra-liberals might at a later period make use of them to his disadvantage. At the moment, he did not feel alarmed at any excess of patriotism in those who supported him against foreigners, and men were what he wanted above all things. His dominant, and I will say his only passion, was to conquer Europe once more. Nothing else was of importance to him. What he valued in the institution of the federalists was, that it gave twenty-five thousand good soldiers for the defence of Paris. The want of muskets alone prevented him from arming the Parisian Federalists immediately, and so little fear had he of their being armed, that it was his firm purpose, as we see by his correspondence, that were Paris in danger, the muskets of the sedentary National Guard should be transferred to the active National Guard, entrusted with the external defence of the city. It was a plausible pretext for transferring the arms of one corps to the other without offending any body.

not enjoy a good reputation in the army, and were even accused of treachery at the bridge of the Drôme, a crime of which they were quite innocent, as we have already sought to prove. Napoleon had ordered this regiment to Paris that he might see the men, and that he might address them in one of his soul-stirring speeches.

Sunday, the 14th of May, having been appointed for reviewing the Federalists and 10th regiment, great excitement was caused at Court by this act of twofold temerity. Those who regretted Napoleon's condescension to the revolutionary party were shocked, and said, when he was not present, that he was abandoning himself to the rabble, and that it would soon be impossible to be of his party. Those on the other hand, who were sincerely attached to Napoleon, and who sought no false pretext to abandon him, were seriously alarmed at his meeting the 10th regiment, in whose ranks, it was said, an assassination had been plotted. These latter, through real alarm about Napoleon, kept so close to his person on that day as to annoy him.

Napoleon unmoved by the affected lamentations of one party, or the exaggerated fears of the other, descended into the courtyard of the Tuileries and commenced by receiving the Federalists. They numbered thousands; men without uniforms, and some badly dressed, but the greater number old soldiers on whose tanned faces energetic feeling was unmistakeably writ. He turned several times to those near him, and ridiculing the fears of certain persons, said smilingly. "It is such men I want, who will fight unto death before the walls of Paris." He then listened patiently to the discourse which the appointed spokesman of the Federalists read as best he could. "Sir," he said, "we received the Bourbons coldly because they had become strangers to France, and because we do not like kings forced on us by enemies. We have received you with enthusiasm because you are the man of the people, the defender of the country, and because we expect from you a glorious independence and rational liberty. You will secure us these two precious possessions, you will consecrate the rights of the people for ever, you will reign in virtue of the Constitution and the laws. We come to offer you our services, our courage, and our lives for the defence of the capital.

"The greater number of us have fought under you for liberty and glory; almost all of us are old defenders of our country, and the country may with confidence give arms to those who have shed their blood for her. Sire, give us muskets, and we swear to fight only for the country and for you. We are not the instruments of any party, the agents of any faction. We have heard the summons of our country, we have hastened to

obey the voice of our sovereign, that is sufficient to show what the nation may expect from us. As citizens we obey the magistrates and laws; as soldiers we obey our leaders. We only seek to sustain the national honour, and to render the entrance of an enemy into this capital impossible, should the city be again threatened with such an insult."

The Emperor replied in the following terms:—

"Federal soldiers, I have returned alone because I relied on the people and the army of whose attachment to their country's honour I was convinced. You have justified my confidence. I accept your offer; I will give you arms. I will give you as officers, men covered with honorable scars, and who are accustomed to see the enemy fly before them. Your strong arms habituated to the hardest labour are well suited to carry muskets. As for courage, you are Frenchmen! You will instruct the National Guard. I shall feel no anxiety about the capital when I know that you and the National Guard undertake its defence, and if it is true that foreigners persist in the impious project of attacking our independence and honour, I shall be able to pursue victory without a feeling of solicitude about my capital. Federal soldiers I am glad to see you, I have confidence in you. *Vive la nation.*" When he had finished this allocution, the Federalists defiled before him, and if men are to be judged by their dress, it was a painful spectacle. It was indeed painful to see this Emperor, once so powerful and so proud, surrounded by magnificent troops, and to behold him now obliged to accept as defenders of the country, men who had neither uniforms nor muskets! These soldiers were certainly as good as any others, and he did well to receive them, but what can be said of a policy that had reduced him to such extremities?

Having reviewed the Federalists, Napoleon advanced towards the 10th, ordered the men to form into a square, and then, alighting from his horse, he placed himself in the centre. An anxious group of officers pressed round him; he desired them to retire, and kept only two or three aides-de-camp near him, and then in a sonorous voice addressed these energetic words to the Duke d'Angoulême's regiment:

"Soldiers of the 10th, you alone of the entire army have dared to fire on the tricolour flag, the sacred standard of our victories which we have borne into so many capitals. For such a crime, I ought to erase the number of your regiment from the army list, and expel yourselves from its ranks. But I am willing to believe that the fault was your officers' and not yours, and that it was they that misled you. I will change your commanders, I will give you better, and then place you in the van of the army. You shall be present wherever a shot shall be fired; and when, by devotedness and courage, you shall have

washed out your shame with your blood, I will restore your standards, and I hope that in a short time you will be again worthy to bear them."

The soldiers whom Napoleon had addressed so harshly, replied with loud cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*," and extending their hands towards him they declared that not they but their officers were in fault, that they had followed them unwillingly; but the moment they found themselves free, they had declared their true opinions, and that wherever they were placed they would prove that they were not inferior to the other soldiers of the army. Far from being received with musket shots, Napoleon had met nothing but enthusiastic acclamations and proofs of fidelity. It is not by flattery, but by energetic exhortation that men can be ruled and led to great deeds.

It was thus that Napoleon acted towards the nation at this time; and, to give the public the necessary impulse, he had determined to tell the whole truth. Formerly he concealed everything, now he concealed nothing; he permitted the publication of articles from foreign journals, in which he himself was violently attacked, or which showed a senseless hatred towards France.

France could now see plainly, that the expulsion of the Bourbons and the re-establishment of Napoleon, in giving some additional guarantees for the social principles of 1789, but involving doubts as to political liberty, would also cause a terrible effusion of blood. But it was now her duty to stand by what she had done, or allowed to be done, and those good citizens who would have wished to see Napoleon stopped on his road from Cannes to Paris, because that with the Bourbons liberty would be more easily obtained and peace more certain, now that Napoleon had returned, with evidently wise intentions, considered it their duty to support him to the utmost of their power, to avert the danger and shame of a counter-revolution effected with foreign bayonets. Every day, addresses arrived from the municipalities, tribunals, and electoral colleges, all expressing a desire to find, under Napoleon's rule, liberty at home, and independence abroad, and these demonstrations involved the obligation of restraining and supporting him. This two-fold sentiment was expressed in all, though the form varied according to the greater or less enlightenment of the quarter whence the addresses came. These sentiments were universal; they animated the electoral colleges, where, midst the excitement of the royalist and revolutionary press, preparations were being made for elections stamped with the Bonapartist and liberal character of the time. The liberty of the press was complete, and still, though no restraint was put on printing, M. Fouché had seized a number of the *Censeur*, a celebrated journal of the

time, and which, as we have already said, was printed in volumes to escape the censorship during the first Restoration, and which breathed the honest liberalism of youth. Napoleon learned the commission of this act through the remonstrances that reached him, and ordered the restoration of the volume, though filled with fierce invectives against himself. He thus showed that he was sincere in his determination to respect the liberty of the press; and this toleration, far from injuring, rather served him, for the more the people were left to themselves, the more frankly they testified the two desires that animated them—a desire for well-regulated liberty, and the determination to make foreigners respect the national independence. As an incentive to public feeling, a kind of club had been allowed to form in the café, called the Café Montansier, Place du Palais Royal, where many officers and old revolutionists assembled, and whence were heard to issue alternately, patriotic and military songs, or virulent declamations against foreigners, the Bourbons, emigration, &c., &c. The excitement against all these was very great, both in the faubourgs of Paris, and the eastern and western provinces, the former threatened with a civil, and the latter with a foreign war; and notwithstanding the evident disapprobation of the Additional Act, it seemed probable that Napoleon would not want support, if he continued faithful to the two conditions he had imposed upon himself—to defend the country and establish liberty.

Whilst in France every effort was made to render the war a national one, the European Powers dreaded lest it might become such, and many consultations were held to consider what line of conduct should be pursued. Napoleon's envoys were still repulsed, and one sent from Paris had been arrested quite recently. When M. de Flahault, commissioned to announce the re-establishment of the Empire to the Sovereigns assembled at Vienna, had been arrested at Stuttgart, the French Cabinet sent another, well selected indeed for the office; this was M. de Stassart, a Belgian, attached to Maria Louisa's service, and who, since the return of that Princess to Austria, had become one of the Emperor Francis' chamberlains. This gentleman was about to leave Paris, whither he had come on private business. A man in his position, and returning to his Court, had better chance than another of passing the frontier. He was entrusted with two letters, one from the Duke de Vienne to M. de Metternich, and another from Napoleon to the Emperor Francis. It was no longer a question of war or peace, or of any political consideration, but of the most sacred domestic rights—the claims of a husband on his wife, of a father on his son, and Napoleon addressing himself directly to his father-in-law, demanded his wife, or at least his son, whom there could be no

legitimate motive for refusing to deliver to him. The Duke de Vicence made some reflections on the strange prohibition of diplomatic intercourse, so strangely persevered in, and again renewed the oft-repeated offer of accepting peace on the terms of the Treaty of Paris. M. de Stassart, more fortunate than the couriers of foreign affairs, who had been stopped at Kehl and Mentz, or than M. de Flahault, stopped at Stuttgard, succeeded in getting as far as Lintz, where he arrived at the end of April, and was stopped under pretence of an irregularity in his passports; he was obliged to give up his despatches, which were sent to Vienna, and placed on the table of the Congress. These letters told nothing but what was known before. However, none of the members were now swayed by the same feelings as when they signed the celebrated declaration of the 13th March against Napoleon, nor were they uninfluenced by the opinion pronounced against this declaration both in England and France.

It was therefore thought better to draw up another not more pacific than the first, but less fierce and more rational. This was intended as a reply to the English Opposition, who asserted that war was renewed solely for the advantage of the Bourbons; and was also intended to allay public feeling in France, in order to prevent the war assuming a national character there. The latter motive had the most weight, for though the English and German gazettes represented Napoleon as unsupported, except by the army, the European public began to see that many interests were bound up with his, and not interests alone, but convictions, especially those of the many who were indignant at Europe pretending to impose a government on us. It was, therefore, sought to produce a document which would answer all these objections, but the result was not very successful. Every exertion was made to find suitable terms to declare that no intention was entertained to interfere in the government of France, nor to impose on her any particular monarch or system of government, that the Allies confined themselves to the desire of excluding one man, and this for the good of all, since long experience had proved that this man was incompatible with the general peace. Although excluding one monarch, when there were but two to choose from, was in reality imposing the other upon the nation, still the secretaries of the Congress succeeded in expressing these ideas so as not to jar with the rights of nations; and to avoid all objections from the British Parliament, no mention was made of the Bourbons. But this omission excited the Courts of Spain and Sicily immediately. The British Embassy, too, thought that omitting all mention of the Bourbons was treating them with too much indifference, and might give an opening to dangerous pretensions. Lord Clancarty, the

principal member of this embassy since the departure of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Wellington, supported the Spanish and Sicilian Courts when they asked whom the Allied sovereigns meant to raise to the throne of France if they put Louis XVIII aside. Did they think of a regency under Maria Louisa, a monarchy with the Duke of Orleans, or a republic? As it was impossible to give any explanation on these different subjects, the Congress separated without drawing up any declaration as they considered that not inserting the Bourbons' name in the declaration would be a defect, and that its insertion would only excite embarrassing objections.

Two Courts, the Russian and Austrian, and each from different motives, were opposed to any explicit declaration in favour of the Bourbons. Alexander was still as relentless as before towards Napoleon, either because he was piqued by the ridicule he had incurred by the treaty of the 11th of April, or because he did not wish that a personage should again appear upon the stage of the world who would throw all others into the shade. But though still as determined as ever against Napoleon, he was by no means inclined to give him Louis XVIII again as successor. Besides that, Louis XVIII had offended him in many ways, he considered that the second restoration of the Bourbons would not be more permanent than the first. Austria came also to the same conclusion, but by a different process of reasoning. She was quite as determined as Russia to exclude Napoleon, and would not sanction Maria Louisa's regency on any terms, but the Bonapartists once excluded she would prefer the Bourbons to any other. In fact, there was not a purer royalist in Europe than the Emperor Francis. But the Bonapartists could only be expelled by war, to which Austria had strong objections, not through weakness—which is not her ordinary failing—but through prudence. She had just ended a violent struggle, and that with a success that had not crowned her exertions at any time during the past century. By it she had recovered her former possessions in Poland, together with the frontier of the Inn, she had got Illyria and Italy as far as the Po and Tessino. The greatest imaginable success in any future war could not give her more, and would, if successful, only increase the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, always so closely united. Such reflections could not inspire much desire for warfare. Besides, the intelligence from France represented Napoleon as certain of the support of the liberal and revolutionary parties, which placed the greater portion of the national forces at his disposal. Only one thing could deprive him of this support, and that was a combination that could grant such terms to the revolutionists and liberals as would detach them from Napoleon, whom they dreaded, and of whom they had always felt the greatest distrust.

Austria was, consequently, inclined to adopt a policy that would excite domestic troubles around Napoleon, but which without altogether excluding the Bourbons forbade any close connection with them. With such views, M. de Metternich, who was well informed of every thing that occurred at Paris, thought of the Duke d'Otranto, whom he considered just suited to the plots he contemplated. He considered that the best means of exciting confusion in France, was to flatter the vanity and ambition of such a man, and he determined to send a secret agent to ask M. Fouché by what other means than a terrific war the dispute between France and Europe might be terminated. For the mission, M. de Metternich chose and sent to Basle a prudent man named Werner, who was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. At the same time he commissioned the clerk of a banking-house, who was going to Paris on business connected with his firm, to give a letter to M. Fouché informing him of the subject in hand, and requesting him to send somebody to Basle with whom M. Werner might confer. Thus whilst at Vienna the Allies were vainly disputing about the new declaration, M. Werner set out for Basle, where he arrived on the 1st of May, and where he waited the confidential person with whom he was to treat.

It was not without much difficulty that the banker's clerk, bearer of M. de Metternich's letter succeeded in gaining access to M. Fouché, nor did he attain his object without giving some slight indications of the purport of his mission. M. de Caulaincourt learned this, and with his usual fidelity told Napoleon, by whose orders the clerk was arrested, searched, and questioned, when it was found that communications either were, or about to be, established between M. Fouché and M. de Metternich. Although Napoleon had sworn to lay aside the old man, and had done so up to this time, still for a moment he resumed his former self. His excited imagination saw a thousand treasons concealed beneath the detected plot, and yielding to his natural impetuosity, his first impulse was to have M. Fouché arrested, his papers siezed, and his perfidy denounced and punished; a proceeding he expected to be agreeable to the nation, for the public felt but little esteem for this minister, and would approve of his punishment once his crime was known.

This was but a momentary excitement. Napoleon determined to reflect, examine, and make himself fully acquainted with all particulars before coming to a decision. M. Fouché came on business, and as he entered, Napoleon assumed that imperturbable coolness usual to him on the field of battle, spoke to him long and confidentially of the affairs of Europe, especially of the intrigues plotting at Vienna, in order to provoke the confidence of his interlocutor, approaching as nearly as possible the fact whose

avowal he sought. The wily minister did not understand the emperor's tactics, and though he had received M. de Metternich's letter, instead of disarming his master's anger by a sincere avowal, persisted in his reserve. Napoleon was tempted to break forth more than once, but restrained himself, said no more, and dismissed M. Fouché as much deceived as deceiving, and quite unconscious of the examination he had undergone. Napoleon thought the best means of discovering this plot, whose perfidy he exaggerated, would be to send a confidential person at once to Basle, who being provided with the private marks of recognition, which had been discovered, might confer with M. Werner, and thus detect the intrigue at its very source. For this purpose, he chose M. Fleury de Chaboulon, the young envoy who had joined him at Elba, and whose courage and dexterity he had rewarded by an appointment in his Cabinet. He sent for him, traced the plan of conduct he was to pursue, and dismissed him with orders to the authorities on the frontiers to let no other pass but him, but to arrest M. Fouché's real agent, if he should send one, and thus prevent the fulfilment of his mission.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon set out immediately. When he arrived at the frontier he gave the prescribed orders to the authorities there, passed on, and found M. Werner at Basle, where he at once began to act his part most skilfully. M. Werner, completely deceived, told him simply the purpose for which he had been sent. M. Fleury de Chaboulon discovered that what was called M. Fouché's plot was quite a recent affair, indeed it had hardly commenced; that consequently nothing had preceded the present communication, that for the first time in his life, when treason was in question, M. Fouché was not the originator, but the recipient of the proposal, that in short there was no idea of assassinating Napoleon, as that prince had believed, but of dethroning him without having recourse to the dangerous and doubtful chances of war. M. Werner assured M. de Chaboulon most earnestly that no design was entertained inimical to the life of Napoleon, he indignantly repelled such a supposition, but avowed a design against his power, and said that Europe would not suffer him on any terms, to occupy the French throne; but that Napoleon once put aside, France might choose any government she pleased, a republic excepted, that great confidence was felt in the Duke d'Otranto's intelligence and influence, that his hatred to Napoleon was well known, and that his assistance was sought to help in resolving the difficulty of how the world could be spared a new and fearful effusion of blood.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon played the part of agent to M. Fouché very well, and said that that minister had indeed reason to complain of Napoleon, and had felt some resentment against

him, but that he had conquered that feeling for the sake of his country; that in 1814 he certainly had wished for other arrangements than those that had been made, that he had not desired Napoleon's return, but had become convinced how necessary he was, for he alone could place France on a firm basis, unite all parties, and form a durable government; that Napoleon had returned with healthy ideas on every subject, that he was determined to maintain peace, and to give France liberal institutions; that besides it would be useless to think of dethroning him, as the army, the revolutionists, the holders of national property, young men filled with new ideas, in fact, all classes, with the exception of the emigrants, looked on him as the representative of their opinions and interests, and above all, as the representative of national independence; that thousands of volunteers were joining the army every day, that Napoleon was about to add four hundred thousand chosen National Guards to the four hundred thousand of the regular army, and that the struggle with him would be terrible; that the campaign of 1814, in which, thanks to his genius, the Allies had run such risks, would be nothing in comparison to that of 1815, because that instead of opposing forces that had been either beaten or dispersed from Dantzic to Valence, they would meet the whole force of France in Champagne, that it would, consequently, be better to come to terms than cut each others' throats, for the sake of the Bourbons, whom France would not receive when imposed on her by force; that the Duke d'Otranto would be most happy to assist in such an arrangement, and would be glad to learn M. de Metternich's opinions on this subject, that he might endeavour to accommodate his own to them, if, as he did not doubt, they were worthy the sagacity of that great statesman.

M. de Metternich's envoy, who believed he was speaking to M. Fouché's agent, was overwhelmed with surprise at hearing language so unexpected, and persevered with innocent obstinacy in repeating that he was astonished at what he heard, that it was generally thought that the Duke d'Otranto did not like Napoleon, and that he was not at all deceived as to his real worth, that he was also considered a sensible man that would readily agree to any rational arrangement; but that since he showed dispositions so different from what were expected, he—M. Werner—had nothing to say, as he was come rather to receive than to make proposals. After a little further conversation, both agreed to return to their superiors, tell them what they had heard, and then meet again with instructions better adapted to the real state of affairs. M. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had been well instructed by Napoleon, insisted on M. Werner's getting better information as to the Sovereigns' opinions on several important subjects, such as the transmission of the crown to the

King of Rome, in case Napoleon should abdicate, and a regency under Prince Eugène, in case Maria Louisa would not return to defend the rights of her son. The two envoys then separated, proposing to meet again at Basle in a few days.

Meantime Napoleon had another and more important conversation with M. Fouché. Whether the obstinate silence of the Minister of Police excited an irritation that Napoleon could not conceal, or whether as some say M. Real had warned M. Fouché, the latter told Napoleon, with affected indifference that an obscure person had brought him a letter from M. de Metternich to which he had not attached any importance, and of which consequently he had made no mention. Napoleon in going to receive M. Fouché, left M. Lavalette who remained in the next room where all that passed could be heard. The Emperor could scarcely restrain himself at this proof of the duplicity of his Minister of Police, he told him that he knew all, that such a communication from the principal member of the Coalition and containing the offer of sending an agent to Basle, was one of the most important that could happen under existing circumstances, and that it was impossible that it could be forgotten. Then in a harsh and severe tone he added, loud enough to be heard in the next room, "You are a traitor, and if I punished your treason as it deserves, all France would applaud. If my Government does not suit you why don't you say so, why do you persist in remaining my minister?" M. Fouché, like a servant accustomed to his master's violence, and who had long ceased to be well treated, murmured some embarrassed words of excuse and retired. On his way he met M. Lavalette, to whom he said with a smile of indifference. "The Emperor is the same as ever, distrusting every one, seeing treason everywhere and quarreling with every one, because Europe will not bear with him any longer." M. Fouché said no more, as though such treatment, whether deserved or undeserved, could only be treated with indifference.

During two months Napoleon had constantly restrained himself, but lost his self-command on this occasion, in which he committed a great fault, for such things must not be said, or if said, all further connexion with him to whom they are addressed, should be broken off. At the height of his power he might have given vent to this outburst of feeling, with no worse result than making an unimportant enemy; but now, the very accusation of treason made this man a real and dangerous traitor. Besides, Napoleon was unjust to M. Fouché, for though that minister had given cause for suspicion in concealing such serious overtures as those in question, it was evident from what had been learned at Basle that if symptoms of treason existed, none had yet been realized. It would have been better to warn the minister coolly, let him see that his proceedings were known,

but not throw off all restraint, since the serious and delicate state of affairs forbade a severe punishment. Indeed M. Fouché had had the art to make the public believe that he was an independant minister, capable of giving rational advice to his master, and if necessary of opposing him. Had Napoleon punished him, many would think it was because he could not brook advice, and all would believe that fortune herself had abandoned him, were he forsaken by M. Fouché. As he could not punish, it would have been wiser to remain silent. Besides having once given way to his anger, he was not likely to win back M. Fouché by a contemptuous indulgence. Seeing that nothing serious had been done, he was determined to wait, and meantime to keep his observant eye fixed on his Minister of Police. He told what had passed to M. Fleury de Chaboulon, bid him call on M. Fouché and make arrangements with him for carrying on this bizarre negociation at Basle, and to learn what reply M. Metternich would make to the questions that had been proposed to him. M. Fleury de Chaboulon called on M. Fouché, who spoke of the Emperor as of a child that could neither restrain nor guide himself, and who was again preparing his own ruin, and who ought to be served, not for his own sake, but for the common good. Having avenged himself by contemptuous remarks upon Napoleon, he agreed with M. Chaboulon, upon the mode of arranging a second interview, and of turning it to profit by obtaining the best information they could.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned to Basle where he found M. Werner faithful to his appointment. M. Werner still believing that he was treating with the Duke d'Otranto's representative, assumed a more decided tone, and explained himself more explicitly, as to the intentions of the Powers assembled at Vienna. In the commencement, he spoke even more decidedly concerning Napoleon than on the first occasion, making his exclusion a matter of necessity, he being incompatible with the general tranquillity. Napoleon once excluded, he declared that it was the wish of the Sovereigns to come to a friendly arrangement, as they entertained no ill-feeling towards France, nor did they think of imposing a government on her. What the Sovereigns would prefer, and what would be sure to procure better conditions for France, would be the restoration of the Bourbons. If France consented to this, such arrangements might be made as would secure the opinions and interests that had sprang from the French Revolution. The charter should undergo the necessary modifications; the greater number of public employments should be bestowed on all the new families; the emigrants who had returned since 1st April 1814, should have no part in public affairs; a homogeneous and independant ministry should be formed, constituted in such a manner as to be free from all

court influences. M. Werner added that if France rejected the elder Bourbon branch, the Coalition would not refuse the younger, they would even, if necessary, consent to Napoleon's son ascending the imperial throne, reserving to themselves the power of choosing a competent person to act as regent, in case Maria Louisa refused to accept the office. But the absolute and irrevocable condition was that Napoleon should cease to reign and place himself in the hands of his father-in-law, who would treat him with every consideration dictated by honour and family ties.

It was in vain that M. Fleury de Chaboulon repeated what he had said before, dwelling especially on the great forces at Napoleon's disposal. M. Werner listened politely, and only repeated what he had said, that, provided Napoleon was excluded, the Sovereigns would be willing to treat on every other point, even the transmission of the crown to Napoleon's son, they choosing a regent, who would conciliate the interests of France with those of peace. Then, after many superfluous repetitions, the two agents separated, promising to meet again should their superiors consider it useful or right.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned to Paris, and related all that had passed to Napoleon and the Duke d'Otranto, and was ordered to discontinue communications that could tend to no result. Napoleon concluded that opinion at Vienna had been mollified, since the Allies would consent to accept his son; he even conceived a hope of finding them less firm, or less obstinate than he had expected, and trusted that two or three battles would be sufficient to overcome them altogether, which was what he had not calculated on before. On his side, M. Fouché came to the conclusion that Napoleon was the only obstacle to peace, that he, the Duke d'Otranto, had done well in advising Maria Louisa's regency, as such an arrangement would at once put an end to the dangers with which France and Europe were threatened, and that if Napoleon understood his own interests, and those of his dynasty, he would adopt this plan, and abdicate in favour of his son, remaining at the head of the army until all should be arranged with the Powers, and then seek an honourable and peaceful retreat in some corner of the world, the only end he could expect, after having tormented mankind so long. These opinions M. Fouché repeated with thoughtless levity, which could only be explained by his believing that Napoleon was greatly weakened. Some of these remarks reached Napoleon's ears, but he deferred his revenge, saying, that except he proceeded to absolute treason, it was better to allow M. Fouché to intrigue and talk, both of which were an absolute want of his restless nature; that such intrigues or remarks would decide nothing; victory alone could do that; but, were he once more

conqueror, he could subdue or punish him, but if, on the other hand, he were conquered, an enemy the more, even were it M. Fouché, could not make his ruin more certain, which would have been rendered inevitable by defeat. This opinion, though true, was exaggerated, for, even if defeated, the fidelity of those he left behind, might lessen its consequences, or, perhaps, give him time to repair them.

M. de Metternich had not failed altogether, as may be seen, since he had introduced disunion into the French government, and had given M. Fouché an opportunity of convincing himself that Napoleon still detested and despised him, and of making him believe that were Napoleon put aside, everything could be arranged, and arranged by him, the Duke d'Otranto; for the Sovereigns at Vienna were ready to accept him as the instrument of a new revolution. Allowing M. Fouché to see, even in perspective, the possibility of his playing, in 1815, the same part that M. de Talleyrand had played in 1814, was flattering the strongest and most dangerous of his passions, and inspiring him with the desire of gratifying it. The Austrian Minister had not wasted his exertions, though he had no idea of the injury he had done our cause, or the service he had done his own. However that might be, it was still considered necessary, at Vienna, to add some explanation to the declaration of the 13th of March, and to address a fresh declaration to France and to Europe. Up to this time, it had been found impossible to construct a declaration that would satisfy all, some considering it unjust and unwise to pass over the Bourbons in silence, and others thinking it imprudent to announce the intention of imposing them on France. In this embarrassment, the Coalition profited by some circumstances that occurred most opportunely. The treaty of the 25th of March, was, just at this time, brought back to Vienna, ratified by all the Courts. England alone had added a clause to the 8th Article, to the effect, that though the Allied Powers wished well to the Bourbons, their essential and primary object was to secure the welfare of Europe, endangered by Napoleon's occupying the throne of France. It was necessary now to reply to the reservation, and state how far it was adopted. A private despatch was, therefore, sent from cabinet to cabinet, which, because of its easy and unrestrained style, gave a better opportunity of explanation, and of conciliating the finer shades of opinion, than could be done in a solemn declaration addressed to all Europe. Lord Clancarty, consequently, sent a despatch to Lord Castle-reagh, in which he was authorised to declare to the British Cabinet, that the Congress accepted the reservation attached to the 8th Article, and understood it in the same sense as England; that the declaration of the 13th of March, the refusal of all communication with France, and the arrest of her couriers,

simply signified that the actual ruler of that great country was believed to be incompatible with the peace of Europe; that long experience proved what might be expected from him if once allowed to secure his position; that he would profit by the first opportunity to take to arms, and again seek to subject Europe to a yoke she was determined not to endure; that the Allies consequently went to war with him and his adherents, not from choice, but necessity; that they did not, in any way, dispute the right of France to choose her own government, nor did they seek to restrict the exercise of this right; that they confined themselves to requiring that whatever dynasty might be chosen, should give guarantees for the permanent tranquillity of Europe, and this point once secured, they would refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of a great and free nation.

Lord Castlereagh finished by saying, that in order to be certain that he was giving the opinions of the different Cabinets exactly, he had submitted his despatch to their principal ministers, who had unanimously approved and authorised all that it contained.

Whilst at Vienna such efforts were made to unite those who wished for a formal declaration in favour of the Bourbons, and those who only sought Napoleon's exclusion from the throne, the British Ministers were compelled by the Opposition to enter into an explanation, and avowed that their's was a war policy. They were fortunate enough to get Parliament to adopt their views. We shall give a brief account of what occurred in London.

The treaty of the 25th of March, announcing the renewal of the alliance of Chaumont, had been published in the different journals towards the end of April, and caused no little surprise to the Members of Parliament, who had been told that the English Ministers' preparations for war were merely precautionary, and did not imply a determination to make war on France. Were the Ministers acquainted with this treaty of the 25th of March or not, when the royal message had been discussed on the 7th of April? If they knew of it, they had deceived Parliament and sinned against political honesty, which in a free country might permit silence, but cannot countenance falsehood. Mr. Whitbread, one of the most talented and active members of the Opposition, called upon Lord Castlereagh, whilst all the members sat silent and surprised, and asked an explanation of his conduct, and whether the treaty of the 25th of March was authentic or not. Lord Castlereagh, taken by surprise, muttered some words in reply, acknowledged the fundamental principles of the treaty without admitting the exact terms. "What difference is there," cried the Opposition, "between the real treaty and that which has been published?" Lord Castlereagh could not tell of any, since none existed, and replied that the treaty not being yet universally ratified, he was not permitted to

enter into any explanation. The Opposition, however, saw plainly that the treaty was authentic, that the English government had pledged themselves with the other Allies to declare immediate war, that the Ministers had completely deceived them when talking of precautionary measures, for it was impossible to credit that the treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March was not known in London on the 7th of April, that is thirteen days after it had been signed. Lord Castlereagh, not daring to venture on a direct falsehood admitted that he knew of the treaty on the 7th of April. "Then you have deceived us most shamefully," exclaimed the members of the Opposition with the greatest violence; the Minister was greatly embarrassed. And with good reason, for though political morality was then at a very low ebb, Parliament had never been so daringly deceived. Mr. Whitbread then said that as the time for explanation had not yet arrived, it would be better that the sittings of Parliament should be suspended until such time as it would be convenient to tell the entire truth, as otherwise the members might fall into error, and vote contrary to their principles whilst they remained ignorant of the true state of affairs. Lord Castlereagh driven to extremities appointed the 28th of April, to lay the treaty before the House and justify its contents.

On the 28th of April the treaty was laid before Parliament, and gave rise to a violent discussion. Mr. Whitbread having repeated that Parliament had been deceived by the Ministers who spoke only of simple precautions, when they were really preparing for war, then said that this war was dangerous and by no means necessary to the interests of Great Britain, and moved that a respectful address should be presented to the Crown requesting that the best means of preserving peace might be taken into consideration. Lord Castlereagh then spoke, and indulged in some personalities, saying that if Ministers had formerly listened to the advice of Mr. Whitbread and his friends, the struggle against Napoleon would have been abandoned on the very eve of triumph, and England would be far from the magnificent position she had acquired, had she not followed advice very different from that offered by those gentlemen. He then sought by subtleties and semi-falsehoods to reply to the reproach of having treated Parliament with duplicity. What had been said on the 7th of April? That Ministers were about to make preparations to meet whatever events might arise, but they had made no precise declaration of war or peace. They had only promised to protect British interests in the best possible manner, and these interests depended on a strict union with the Continental Powers. As these Powers, from their geographical position, were in more danger than England, it was only right that the question should be decided by them. Far from having advised them to make

war, the danger of such a step had been pointed out to them, but it was unanimously admitted that a general disarmament would be folly in the presence of such a man as Napoleon, and, that as to keep their forces on a war footing would involve the Allies in overwhelming expenses, they had come to the determination of declaring war. Could England then separate from the Continental Powers, and break off an alliance to which the deliverance of Europe was owing, and to which she was still indebted for her safety? Nobody ventured such an assertion. Neither would any one dare to say that these Powers were in the wrong. In short, was it possible for them to exist in a state of perpetual anxiety, and as a consequence of this anxiety keep their forces constantly on a war footing? Was it not evident, for example, that if Napoleon were allowed to secure himself on the French throne, and permitted to assemble three or four hundred thousand men, that he would profit by the first opportunity and again attack his neighbours? It was said indeed that he was changed, and had adopted pacific views; yes, changed in words, to lull the vigilance of the Powers, and those would very be foolish indeed that would put faith in such a change. At the very first favourable moment, as soon as he should perceive a diminution in the forces of the Allies, or the appearance of disunion amongst themselves, he would again spring upon Europe and again subdue her to his yoke. This was a truth which no rational man could doubt. It would, therefore, be wiser to profit by the advantage of being prepared, for there are times when attack is nothing more than defence. It was indeed asserted by some that the man in question would be supported by the great French nation. If it were so, and that the French nation from weakness or ambition would support this man, well then, let her take the consequence! Europe should not be exposed to inevitable destruction because one nation chose to have such a ruler, or because a corrupt army, covetous of riches and honour, chose as its leader a barbarian who sought to renew the wild enterprises of Asiatic conquerors! The Allies did not want to impose a government on France, they only sought to deprive her of the power of injuring others, of perpetually disturbing the repose and political existence of the world.

Such was the substance of Lord Castlereagh's explanations. Though he did not say that war had been irrevocably decided on, he had so amply dilated on the motives for declaring it, that his words were equivalent to a declaration of war. Many members replied to Lord Castlereagh; of these the most distinguished was Mr. Ponsonby, a man of moderate opinions, and who had induced the majority to vote on the 7th of April, in the sense of the royal message, as he considered that it left England still free to declare for war or peace. Mr. Ponsonby had, con-

sequently, a better right than anybody else to complain of having been deceived. It was evident, he said, that on the 7th of April the Cabinet wished parliament to believe that there was still a choice between peace and war, which was not the case, for war had been resolved on, since at that time, the treaty of the 25th of March had been signed at Vienna and had arrived in London. Mr. Ponsonby might have asserted this more positively, had he seen Lord Castlereagh's despatches. The members of the House of Commons believed on that day that they were voting for precautionary measures, when in reality they were voting for war. The House had therefore been deceived by the Ministry. "Now," said Mr. Ponsonby, with an indignation the more significant in a man of his equable temper, "such conduct would not be tolerated in private life, and what opinion are we to form of it, when practised in public affairs, where the interests, not only of an individual, but of a whole country are at stake." Mr. Ponsonby did not consider the reasons for undertaking the war at all sufficient, especially when compared with the risk. "Undoubtedly," he added, "England ought not to separate from the Continental Powers, but she evidently had a right to advise, and was it certain that the British Ministers had, as they boasted, shown their allies all the dangers of this new struggle? These dangers were serious, as they were about to defy at once a great man and a great nation." Mr. Ponsonby added, that he had never esteemed this man in a moral point of view, but nobody could deny his immense genius, nor the energy of the people under his command. To insult such a people, to attribute to them every vice, and arrogate to ourselves every virtue, was not the way to discuss such a subject seriously. It was no less true, that they were securing to the extraordinary man to whom they were opposed, the support of that redoubtable people, by their scarcely concealed attack upon their independence. It was said that no intention was entertained of imposing a government on them, but merely in the general interests of the community, to forbid them one in particular. "If," continued Mr. Ponsonby, "there were three or four other governments besides this interdicted one, from which they could choose, then it might be said that no attempt was made to impose one on them. But every rational man must see that France had no choice but between Bonaparte and the Bourbons, and excluding Bonaparte, was it not compelling them to accept the Bourbons? These latter had been tried, and notwithstanding their moral qualities had offended the nation by their political faults, and it would be insulting the French people beyond endurance to compel them to accept the Bourbons again. It would be carrying Mr. Pitt's policy beyond all bounds, to renew a war for the sake of the Bourbons, who

when almost miraculously restored to their throne, had not been able to maintain their position. If such reasoning were carried out, the august dynasty actually occupying the English throne could not have reigned, for the English people would have been under an obligation to struggle unto death for the re-establishment of the Stuarts. And even were the boasted advantages obtained for Great Britain, by the last peace, compromised, let them be abandoned: but there was no need of making such a sacrifice, for Bonaparte offered peace, offered it with importunity on the conditions of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna. Should then torrents of blood be shed, the national debt be doubled, and the income tax prolonged to infinity, and all this for advantages that nobody thought of contesting? Some said that Napoleon's word could not be relied on; that he was an ambitious, insincere man. But to speak plainly, since the sittings of the Congress at Vienna, had any power in Europe the right to accuse another of ambition? Doubtless the enterprising disposition that Napoleon had formerly shown furnished a just cause of alarm, for men rarely change, but it was also true that as age advances, their conduct undergoes modifications, and men who in early life could not endure repose, at a later period seek and love quiet. Besides, a clear view of his own interest is often sufficient to modify the conduct of a man of genius. Napoleon hated England, but had he not proved his desire to please her by abolishing the slave trade? When he set the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty after a price had been set upon his head, was his conduct not very different from what it had been towards the Duke d'Enghien? This obstinate, incorrigible man was, therefore, not as unchangeable as was said, and if to prevent a pretended danger, he was driven to extremities, and compelled to fight, and the French nation forced to join him, might he not gain two or three brilliant victories, and what would then become of the advantages gained in the last war, which they were so anxious to protect? What would become of these Continental Powers, for whose protection prudence and reason had been sacrificed? In case of such an event, would it not be evident that false calculations had been made, and because certain persons would not believe in a change of conduct if not of disposition, which self-interest had rendered most probable, they would have risked the advantages gained by a long war, and which nobody was disputing, together with the safety of the continental sovereigns, for certainly were Napoleon again victorious, he would not accept the Treaty of Paris. They might, therefore, by excess of prudence, be wanting in real foresight, and create the very difficulty they were seeking to avoid."

Such were the reasons advanced by both parties in the British Parliament, and the entire may be reduced to this: Could Na-

pooleon's offers of peace be trusted? Thus the same doubt that prevailed in France influenced the rest of the world, and war was to be declared against Napoleon, not for what he meditated at the time, but for what he had done or wished to do formerly. He offered peace, he sought it by every means, direct and indirect, asked for it humbly, and was met by universal doubt. This doubt, indeed, was the only reply that could be made to the excellent reasoning of the English Opposition, and though the Parliament appreciated Mr. Whitbread's pacific address it was rejected by two hundred and seventy-two votes against seventy-two.

From this moment, war was proclaimed against us in London in the name of all Europe, and unfortunately, whilst it was only resolved on in London, it was actually commenced in Italy. We have seen how the unfortunate Murat had been brought into connection with the Island of Elba by the Princess Pauline, who had gone alternately from Porto Ferrajo to Naples, and from Naples to Porto Ferrajo. By her zeal, and with the assistance of the Queen of Naples, she had succeeded in reconciling Napoleon to Murat, and prepared their united efforts for the new course of events, which might be easily foreseen, though its details could not be known beforehand. When Napoleon was about to leave Porto Ferrajo, he communicated his intention to Murat, and desired him to write to Vienna and announce his intention of observing the Treaty of Paris. He also advised him not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to wait until France, replaced under the Bonaparte sceptre, could give him assistance; he was to fall back if attacked, that he might have the advantage of distance and concentrated forces on his side, and to fight rather on the Garigliano than on the Po. This advice was worthy of him that gave, but quite above the comprehension of him that received it. Murat's imagination took fire when he heard of Napoleon's landing and entry into Grenoble. He felt no doubt of his brother-in-law's success, and in his excitement, almost forgetting the Austrians, he only thought of the danger of seeing Italy pass as quickly as France under the Imperial sway, and of his again losing the iron crown; for this hapless Prince not only thought of keeping the Kingdom of Naples, but of doubling or trebling his dominions. He did not put an iota of the prudent advice he had received into execution.

On first learning Napoleon's departure, far from sending the message with which he was entrusted to Vienna, and by which it was intended to tranquillize Austria with regard to Murat as well as with regard to France, he betook himself to his usual practices of dissimulation. He sent for the English and Austrian Ministers, and told them that he was quite ignorant of his brother-in-law's intention, a useless falsehood, which nobody

would believe, and he would have done better in admitting what he knew, as it would give him an opportunity of assuring Austria and England that their interests should not suffer. Then, when assured of Napoleon's success, instead of remaining at a distance from the Austrians in the south of the Peninsula, he thought to seize all Italy at once, and proclaim himself king before the Empire should be proclaimed on both sides of the Alps. He determined to commence his march at once, making several excuses to Austria and England, whom he did not wish to offend, and whom he wished to deceive as long as possible. His first step was to take possession of the Marches, as a retaliation on the Pope, who had not recognized him, and he next intended to advance to the banks of the Po, telling Austria and England that he thought it better to take up a position on the line of the armistice of 1814, when it was stipulated that the Austrians should occupy the left bank of the Po, and the Neapolitans the right. Such a proposition could only be sustained by Murat's resuming his position of 1814, that is, by becoming the ally of the Coalition, against France. He said nothing contrary to to such a supposition, and even sent the most tranquillizing assurances to England. Before leaving to put himself at the head of his troops, he confided the regency of the kingdom to his wife, who did all she could to turn him from his foolish enterprise; but he took no notice of her advice, gave her the most extensive powers, and left ten thousand men to protect Naples, a precaution most necessary in the existing state of the public mind, and which ought to have influenced him not to advance northwards, but to concentrate his forces behind the Garigliano. He had still at his disposal fifty thousand men, all well equipped, and making a tolerably good appearance, but deprived of their French officers, who had left the Neapolitan service, some through disgust, others because of the ordinance of Louis XVIII., which recalled them. Murat had also thirty thousand militia, but these could not be efficiently employed in their own country, especially in a war in which the rivalries of contending dynasties would exercise so great an influence. He commenced his campaign with fifty thousand men, including those in the Marches.

This first unwise division of the Neapolitan forces was not the only one. Murat sent a column through the Roman States, to Tuscany, in order to expel the Austrian general, Nugent. This column, consisting of seven or eight thousand Neapolitans, was ordered to pass within view of Rome, advancing through Viterbo and Arezzo to Florence, and to rejoin the principal army at Bologna. The appearance of an armed force so near the Vatican was not calculated to please the Pope, nor to reassure him as to the views of the Neapolitan Court. Murat sent General Cam-

pana to assure him of his devotion to the Holy See, and to implore him to remain at Rome; for this new King of Italy affected to imitate Napoleon in all things, and whilst creating an Italian kingdom for himself, wished that the head of the Catholic Church should remain in his dominions, peaceful, honoured, richly endowed, and nominally free. But it was not easy to persuade the Pope, who had refused to be the subject of the modern Charlemagne, and was still less inclined to submit to a petty Italian prince, whose bravery, devoid of genius, gave him no right to believe himself the founder of an empire. Uninfluenced by Murat's assurances, the Pope left his capital accompanied by several cardinals, and was soon followed by all the most distinguished persons in Rome, amongst whom were Charles IV., King of Spain, and his wife, the Prince of Peace, the Queen of Etruria, &c. All retired to Genoa. The example was followed by the other Italian courts. The Grand Duke of Tuscany went to Leghorn, where he was sure of protection from the English; the King of Sardinia joined the Papal Court at Genoa, where Lord Bentinck was staying.

The Neapolitan troops destined for Tuscany passed under the walls of Rome without entering the city, and proceeded towards Florence through Arezzo. Murat, with the principal corps passed through Ancona and Rimini.

Whilst advancing in this way, he addressed both English and Austrians in the most friendly tone. He said, that his intention in advancing towards the Po, was to place himself in a position conformable to the terms of the armistice of 1814, which was rather an insinuation of alliance than a threat of hostility. But such a comedy could not last long, and the unfortunate Murat was soon compelled to declare his intentions fully, and to let the people of Italy see what crown he ambitioned to place on his head. Napoleon had sent message after message to keep him quiet, and at last sent General Belliard, an excellent adviser both in civil and military policy. But these messages did not reach Murat on his road, and he had nothing to guide him but rumours and some letters from Joseph, who sent him an account from Switzerland of Napoleon's triumphant progress and implored him to join the cause of France.

When Murat arrived at Ancona, he learned that Napoleon had passed beyond Lyons, that the French army joined him wherever he appeared, and that henceforth no doubt could be entertained of his success. This intelligence produced a magical effect on Murat. He saw Napoleon re-established on the throne and again putting forth his hand to seize Italy, and fancy painted the Austrians as quickly expelled from Italy as the Bourbons had been from France. From these imaginings he concluded, that he ought not to allow himself to be anticipated, that he ought

himself to expel the Austrians from Italy, take their place and appear before Napoleon as an auxiliary with twenty million Italians at his disposal, and consequently one whom it would not be easy to dispossess in favour of Prince Eugène. His excitement was increased by the neighbourhood of the Austrians, who had taken possession of the Legations, and whom he should meet on leaving the Marches. He must, therefore, either stop on the frontier of the Marches and there wait the course of events or declare himself at once by attacking the Austrians. Murat, and three of his ministers who accompanied him had a great discussion on this subject. All begged him to take time and not throw down the gauntlet to the Allied Powers. Up to this time he had done nothing that he could not justify to the Austrians or English. He had announced that he was about to occupy the line of the ancient armistice, and would prove his sincerity by stopping in his progress before he had gone so far. He might there await the course of events in France with safety, with the advantage of not compromising either himself or Napoleon, and of not removing the seat of war too far from Naples in case hostilities should commence. These were sufficient and more than sufficient reasons for pausing in his course. But Murat considered that the prestige of Napoleon's fame would make his success as certain in Italy as in France. He fancied that the French Empire would be no sooner established in France than it would again spring up at Milan by a reflex action, and that Prince Eugène would be again proclaimed Viceroy. This last fear tormented him, and he wished to meet Napoleon with the double advantage of having expelled the Austrians and of being in actual possession. Whilst his ministers were making the greatest efforts to prevent his commencing hostilities, and when he seemed half inclined to adopt their advice, he received a letter from Joseph dated Prangins, in which this prince told him of Napoleon's late triumphs, conjured him to adopt his cause, and to aid him in Italy both by arms and diplomacy, and at the same time to endeavour to win the Austrians from the Coalition by assuring them that they should not be molested; he then added these unfortunate words: "*Speak and act as your own feelings dictate, advance to the Alps, but do not pass them.*"* This letter written in the intoxication of joy contained the most deplorable contradiction, for it advised Murat to display a friendly feeling towards the Austrians and at the same time to advance towards the Alps. Yet had Murat read it with somewhat more reflection than it had been written, he would have seen that Joseph did not

* This letter, which has been spoken of as the deciding cause of Murat's conduct, is still to be found in the *Affaires Etrangères*. It is dated Prangins, 14th of March, and contains the passages literally as we have quoted them.

understand the existing state of things. Had Joseph known that the Austrians occupied both banks of the Po, he would not have supposed it possible to act in a conciliatory manner towards them, and at the same time advance towards the Alps. He evidently did not know that the Austrians were on the right bank of the Po, but thought them confined to the left bank as in 1814, which would have permitted another force to advance, without coming into conflict with them, to the foot of the Alps at least in some parts of the chain. Besides it was quite evident that this advice to march to the Alps, but not to go beyond, was not so much an invitation to advance as a recommendation not to violate the French frontier. Unfortunately Murat took no notice of anything but of the advice to march towards the Alps; he wished to seize all Italy at once; he would not listen to the advice or entreaties of his ministers, but passed the frontier of the Legations and drove back the van guard of the Austrian cavalry on Cesena. As the Austrians were not numerous enough to oppose an army of more than forty thousand men, they retired in good order towards Bologna. They were commanded by General Bianchi. The loss on both sides was inconsiderable.

It was on the 31st of March that Murat flung aside the mask, and assumed the Italian crown by his own authority. On the same day, he published a most declamatory proclamation, dated from Rimini, calling all Italians to independance, and promising them a united Italy. In this proclamation, he did not speak of Napoleon, or of France, and that through two very mean motives: first, that he might still keep on terms with the English, and secondly, to avoid any reference to the vice-royalty of Prince Eugène. This was very unwisely done, for it was folly to think of temporising with the English, after breaking with the Austrians; nor was it less foolish to think of forming, at that time, a purely Italian party, independant of Austria or France. Owing to the long wars against Austria, there was, at that time, in Italy, no choice but to be either the partizan of Austria or of France. Besides, though the Italians had been alienated from Napoleon, in 1814, because of all that they had suffered under his rule, they had immediately returned to him; they knew but him, they could only feel enthusiasm for him; and Murat chilled their zeal when he substituted his own for that great name, and did even worse in referring to his defection in 1814, which had been unanimously blamed by all opposed to the Austrian rule in Italy.

This unsuccessful proclamation was his first vexatious failure. Some youthful imaginations were excited by it, but it produced no effect on the mass of the people, who augured but little good from Murat's proceedings. He advanced to Bologna, having

had a skirmish on the way with the Austrian cavalry, and, collecting a few Italians, sought to form a government there, but he met with very little assistance. Still, in this populous and enlightened city of Bologna, animated by Italian patriotism, he might have found many ready to aid him, though displeased at his too evidently self-interested views, but that, with his usual heedlessness, he had not thought of procuring muskets, without which, the greatest enthusiasm, could he have excited it, would have been useless.

Having displayed his empty royalty for some days to the people of Bologna, he continued his march towards Modena and Parma, intending to cross the Po, and assume the iron crown at Milan. This was a strange mode of following Napoleon's or even Joseph's advice, who had so strongly recommended him to act with policy towards the Austrians. The latter, in falling back, concentrated their forces. A sanguinary conflict took place on the Panaro, in front of Modena, in which each side lost about eight hundred men. The Neapolitans, under Murat, behaved very well, and advanced to Modena. General Filangieri, who afterwards distinguished himself, was seriously wounded on that occasion. As the Austrians were not in a position to take the offensive, they recrossed the Po, intending to defend its banks until their forces should be assembled.

Having committed the great fault of attacking the Austrians, instead of remaining in the Marches, and concentrating his forces before the Abruzzi, by which he would have afforded an opportunity for diplomatic or military negotiations, Murat had but one way of repairing his error—if, indeed, it could be repaired—and this was, to recall the troops he had sent into Tuscany, and then, at the head of fifty thousand men, to advance on Parma, Placentia, and Pavia, whence it was only a step to Milan, by crossing the Po in the upper part of its course. He would, by this, have got possession of all the Austrian posts on the Lower Po, and produced a profound impression on the public mind, by entering the capital of Lombardy. This, indeed, had been Murat's plan, especially as it would be following Joseph's advice of advancing to the Alps, but, as he could not avoid mingling intrigue with rashness, he tried to continue relations with Lord Bentinck, assuring him that he only took up arms because Austria had deceived him, by plotting against his crown after having guaranteed its possession to him, but that if England would support him, he would support her. Lord Bentinck, who, though perfectly upright, was not deficient in astuteness, told him, that if he wished to be believed, he must first respect the King of Sardinia's dominions; and Murat had the folly to pause in his progress, and even to turn back. He abandoned the idea of crossing the Po above Placentia, where he would have found the

passage less difficult, and the Austrians weaker, and returned towards Bologna, in order to attempt a passage at Ferrara. He attacked Occhio-Bello on the 8th of April, and after losing a great number of men, was obliged to give up all idea of crossing this great river. He returned to the Legations, not knowing what to do, for he dared not return to Piedmont, because of the English, nor could he force the Po, defended, as it was, by the entire Austrian army. He had proclaimed himself King of Italy, but no popular acclamation confirmed this spontaneous investiture. His defeat had deprived him of the impulse under which he had advanced on the offensive, and, by advancing too far, he had sacrificed the strength which a defensive position would have given him. Reckoning from that moment, he was morally, even before being materially, ruined. He then, but too late, thought of the advice his brother-in-law had given him, and determined to return through the Marches to the Abruzzi route, in order to fight, on the banks of the Garigliano, the decisive battle that Napoleon had advised him to avoid; or, in any case, to let it be as near Naples as possible. He, therefore, fell back through Cesena and Rimini, but the Austrians having had time to concentrate forces to the amount of sixty thousand men, followed him under the command of Generals Bianchi and Neiperg (the latter had left Maria Louisa to serve in Italy). It was, therefore, doubtful whether Murat could reach Capua, or Naples, without being compelled to accept battle. During the execution of this most difficult retreat, his rear-guard was every day engaged in skirmishes, in which Murat sustained the courage of the Neapolitan soldiers by his personal bravery, but which always ended in his losing the disputed position. His troops were soon seriously diminished by demoralisation and desertion. Having arrived with the greater number of his troops at Tolentino, he determined to decide his fate by a desperate conflict. The battle was long, and was well sustained by the Neapolitans, with Murat fighting like a hero at their head. So desperate were his efforts, as he flung himself into the midst of the enemy's battalions, in search of conquest or death, that, for a moment, he believed victory to be within his grasp. But, unfortunately, General Neiperg arrived with fresh troops, and Murat was obliged to yield to the numbers and superiority of the Austrian army.

The vanquished Neapolitans retired along the sea-coast by Fermo and Pescara. But a body of Austrians having made a flank movement through Salmona, Castel di Sangro and Isernia, they were quickly compelled to resume the direct route to Naples. Murat attempted to keep the enemy back, but after the fatal effort of Tolentino, his soldiers deserted in thousands. He soon had no more than ten or twelve thousand men, and when he

reached the neighbourhood of Capua, he left this wreck of his army to Baron Carascosa, that he might not himself fall into the hands of the Austrians. He returned privately to Naples where he was very badly received by the queen, who had vainly sought to prevent his foolish expedition, and to whom he addressed these mournful words, "*Madam do not be surprised at seeing me alive, for I have done all I could to meet death.*" The unfortunate Murat spoke the truth. He had behaved like a hero, but nothing can supply the want of political judgment in a ruler. He embarked on board a small vessel for Provence, whilst his wife treated with the Austrians and English concerning the surrender of Naples. The complete evacuation of Naples by this branch of the Bonaparte family was naturally the principal condition of the capitulation, and the restoration of the Bourbons its inevitable consequence. The queen asked nothing but liberty for herself and her children, but this like many other conditions was violated by the Allies, and Napoleon's sister was taken to Trieste. On the 20th of May all was over at Naples.

Such was the end of Murat's royalty. The termination of his life delayed for a few months, was still more mournful. This unfortunate man was gifted with the most brilliant military talents, he was brave even to heroism, and would have been an accomplished cavalry officer if to the talent of leading his squadrons to the charge, he had added that of economizing the lives of his men. He was good, generous-hearted and possessed of some intelligence, but was attacked by that *maladie de régner* with which Napoleon infected his relatives, and even his lieutenants, and of which the helpless Murat died. This moral pest for a moment changed an excellent man into a faithless and almost perfidious one, and into a disastrous ally for France, for according to Napoleon's opinion Murat was twice the cause of his ruin—by abandoning him in 1814, and by joining him too soon in 1815. This opinion was doubtless exaggerated, for Murat was not of sufficient importance to cause the ruin of France, though he might compromise her seriously. It is certain that if in 1814 he had joined Prince Eugène, instead of declaring against him, a great number of Austrians would have been detained in Italy, by which the invaders of France would have been considerably diminished, or so far restrained that Prince Eugène would have been able to descend by Mount Cenis on Lyons, a proceeding that might have had the most happy results. It is also certain that if Murat in 1815 had concentrated his sixty thousand men in the neighbourhood of Ancona, and there taken up a position of imposing immobility, at the same time giving occupation to the Austrians, the latter would not have had a single soldier to send to Antibes or Chambéry, and thirty thou-

sand men might have been brought from the Vosges to Ardennes, by which Napoleon would have had a much larger body of forces at Waterloo. It is true that though Murat had not twice caused the ruin of France as Napoleon said,* still he compromised her twice by his fatal desire of reigning, which turned a heroic and generous soldier into a mediocre king, a faithless relative, and a bad Frenchman.†

Whatever may be the justice of these different opinions, the war in Italy was finished about the middle of May, and the Austrians were able to lead the greater part of their forces towards France. All the armies of Europe were now advancing towards our frontiers. Besides the troops that the Austrians would be able to bring to the Var and Mount Cenis, seventy thousand more of their troops, forty thousand Bavarians, twenty thousand Wurtembergians, ten thousand Badenians and ten thousand men belonging to the petty princes of Germany were marching towards the Rhine. These were followed by eighty thousand Russians who had already reached Prague, and seventy thousand more who were actually traversing Poland. One hundred and twenty thousand Prussians under Blücher were encamped between the Sambre and the Meuse, besides important reserves on the Oder. Lastly, one hundred thousand English, Hanoverians, Hollando-Belgians, and Northern Germans were concentrated round Brussels under the Duke of Wellington. This latter had advised Blücher to wait for the general assembling of the European troops before attacking Napoleon, but finding about the middle of June that with the Prussians, two hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled, he was tempted to commence the siege of our fortresses, without waiting the arrival of the column from the east. But it had been so generally resolved not to act except unani-

* Ninth volume of Napoleon's Memoirs, page 18.

† Napoleon also accused Murat of being the cause of the Austrians not listening to him in 1815, as they believed that the offensive operations of the Neapolitan army had been caused by advice from Paris. This arose from an ignorance of facts on the part of Napoleon; and very natural, for at St. Helena he had not access to the documents connected with the Congress of Vienna. Long before Napoleon had landed at the Gulf of Juan, the Austrians had divined Murat's intentions from the note he had addressed to the Congress concerning the Bourbons, and were so certain of an attack on his part, that they had ordered, as we have already mentioned in Vol. XVIII, a concentration of one hundred and fifty thousand men in Italy. Besides, the declaration of the 13th of March had been published before the Neapolitans had marched on Cesena, and had no connection with Murat's conduct in Italy. This unfortunate man had no influence on the political resolutions of the Court of Vienna with regard to France, and the consequences of his errors, sufficiently great without being exaggerated, were that he engaged too soon with the Austrians, by which the latter, having decided the Italian question, were able to send fifty or sixty thousand men towards the Alps in time to counteract the efforts of a large portion of our forces. Such is the simple truth, free from all exaggeration, and conformable to our uniform practice when treating of men and things.

mously, that Wellington and Blücher confined themselves to collecting their troops, choosing their positions, and making arrangements for communicating with each other in case of the sudden appearance of the French. All were now moving towards our frontiers, and about the end of June our country was about to be invaded by four hundred and fifty thousand men independant of the Russian and Prussian reserves, or the Austrians who were coming from Italy.

The English were to pay a subsidy of five millions sterling, to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, two millions and a half to be divided between the petty princes of Germany, and another million for the second Russian army; making altogether eight millions and a half sterling, or two hundred and twelve millions five hundred francs. Generally speaking the feeling of the people of Europe against France was considerably toned down, but that of the governments was more virulent than ever. For example, the English did not care to restore the Bourbons at the expense of injuring their commerce and perpetuating the income tax. The Germans had either given up all hope of liberty or had been plundered like the Saxons, and all oppressed by the expenses of war, had no desire to see it renewed. The Belgians regretted the French since the arrival of the Dutch, English, and Prussians amongst them. The Austrians were quite discontented at the preponderance of the Russians. These different sentiments worked on the minds of the people, and caused them to view the Sovereigns assembled at Vienna with a portion of the hatred that a year before had been exclusively bestowed upon Napoleon. The Sovereigns, on the other hand, were more irritated than ever, and could not forgive Napoleon for having disturbed them while enjoying the gratification prepared for their ambition at Vienna. These sentiments were shared by the troops, though condemned to fight again. The Prussian army, as we have already said, was more excited than any other. The officers at Liège, offended by the dislike of the inhabitants, frequently committed outrages on some of the Belgians, who were considered friends of ours, and declared that this time they would not leave one stone upon another in the French provinces. They even threatened to cut the throats of the women and old men, but fortunately were not able to fulfil these ferocious threats. They came into daily collision with the Saxons. The journals of the Rhine continued to indulge in the most exaggerated language. The Bourbons, they said, did not know how to govern, an art that Napoleon understood but too well, for he had drawn more from the resources of France in two months than the Bourbons had done in a year. Therefore, neither the one nor the other ought to be allowed to reign. France ought to have a dozen kings—a project proposed before

—whilst Germany should have the benefit of a single emperor; Alsace and Lorraine should be restored to Germany, and the national property employed in remunerating the German soldiers and paying the expenses of the exterminating war that was about to be undertaken. No proposition should be listened to unless France, as a sign of submission, should first give up Lille, Metz and Strasburg. The French emigrants at Ghent were in constant communication with Wellington and Blücher, telling all they could learn about France, and discussing the important question of a fresh insurrection in Vendée. Lord Wellington, who was attentively watching Napoleon's preparations, was desirous of embarrassing him by an insurrection on both shores of the Loire. Did no other effect result from such a combination than that ten or fifteen thousand men should be detained between Nantes and Rochelle, whilst the combatants were engaged between Maubeuge and Charleroy, it would be a vast advantage for those who would be obliged to bear the first shock of the French armies. But the Vendean leaders, finding the zeal of the people in their province cooled, had resolved not to anticipate the movements of the Allies, nor to make any movement until the latter should have given full occupation to all the French forces.

In compliance with the urgent solicitations of Lord Wellington, the Marquis de La Rochejacquelin was dispatched to give the long deferred signal of insurrection, with a promise of assistance from an English fleet, bringing arms and munitions of war.

Such was the unpromising picture that presented itself to Napoleon towards the end of May. It would be difficult to describe how much he had been affected by Murat's catastrophe. Though the fate of Murat and the Neapolitan army could not be regarded as a présage of what was to befall him and the French army, still he could not avoid looking on the events at Naples as a sinister omen. The late favour that fortune had bestowed on him on his passage from Porto Ferrajo to Paris had not deceived him, and the difficulties that soon arose, together with the increasing animosity of all Europe, convinced him that implacable fortune was not yet appeased, and he now looked on the few days between the 26th of February and the 20th of May as the last gleams of the setting sun. When he saw Murat overthrown, Murat, whose frivolity he had always regarded with a kind of antipathy, but who had led his cavalry so well on the battle fields of Europe, and who was one of his oldest companions in arms, he gave way to the deepest commiseration, and became oppressed by sombre forebodings which he in vain endeavoured to conceal, but which his friends perceived in spite of his efforts at self-control. Though discontented with his brother-in-law he sent a confidential person to console him, and tell him, but with gentleness, how numerous and serious his faults had been, and

to advise him to remain for some time between Marseilles and Toulon in whatever place he preferred. It would not, indeed, be wise to present the vanquished King of Naples to the Parisians, nor to gladden the enemies of the Empire with the view of a victim whom they would only look on as the forerunner of one still more important and more detested.

The royalists, with the usual ill feeling of party spirit, seemed to divine all that passed in Napoleon's mind, and rejoiced greatly. They looked on Murat's fall as the forerunner of Napoleon's. They took no notice of the difference between the men, but remarked, indeed not without some truth, that if Napoleon and the French army were much superior to Murat, Lord Wellington, Marshal Blücher, Prince Schwarzenberg, and the five hundred thousand men under their command, were no less superior to General Bianchi and the Austrian army at Tolentino. Profiting by the liberty accorded them, they enumerated the symptoms that had proceeded Murat's fall, and published them in certain journals; they were unremittingly active, particularly in the south, at Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, whilst the preparations in Vendée gave grounds to apprehend a speedy rising in that quarter.

All this was clearly seen by Napoleon, and he considered that the only remedy for such a state of things was an immediate, vigorous, and successful war. M. Fouché, animated by a love of foreign as well as domestic intrigue, made a fresh attempt to enter into relations with the Powers at Vienna, to whom he sent M. de Saint-Léon a man of talent, professing liberal opinions, intimately acquainted with M. de Talleyrand, and every way suited to set forth in strong terms the danger of an obstinate struggle in favour of the Bourbons. M. Fouché gave him a letter for M. de Metternich, a very sensible and almost eloquent epistle, in which he pleaded Napoleon's cause most warmly, hoping that, should he not serve Napoleon, for whom he did not care, he might, perhaps, secure the regency of Maria Louisa, or promote the interests of the Duke d'Orléans, and thus avert the return of the Bourbons. Napoleon was not deceived, either, as to M. Fouché's motives, or as to the little prospect there was of his success, however he allowed him to proceed with his attempt, as it could neither injure him, nor interrupt any of his preparations. But he saw that his real, his only resource was an immediate attack upon that portion of the allied forces that was within his reach, and he thought of profiting by the circumstance of Prince Schwarzenberg being in the rear of the other column, to fall suddenly on Blücher and Wellington cantoned on our northern frontier. He was already contemplating, as we have said, one of his most profound projects, and if any hope existed for him, it gleamed from within, from his own genius, which showed to

his keen military glance the chances left by the short-sightedness of his enemies. Could he gain one more such victory as of old, the royalists would be silenced, Europe, now heedless of his overtures, would consent to negotiate, and all the difficulties with which his government had to contend, would pass away. He worked night and day in preparing an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men between Paris and Maubeuge, and this mass he intended to hurl like a club at the head of the English and Prussians, the enemies nearest to him. He was most anxious to set out, and hoped that when the votes on the Constitution would be announced in the assembly in the Champ de Mai, the elections over, and the two Chambers assembled, that he would be able to leave Paris for Flanders, there to decide his fate and that of the world in two or three days. Never had he worked with more energy or success. The picked battalions of the National Guard were formed with the greatest expedition, especially in the frontier provinces, where alone he was certain of obtaining one hundred and fifty thousand men. Napoleon sent these battalions clad in a simple blouse with coloured collar to the different fortresses, where their old muskets were to be repaired during the leisure hours of garrison life. Unfortunately the recruiting of the regular army was not so successful. The number obtained by recalling the old soldiers was not as great as had been expected. Many of them preferred serving in the mobilised National Guards, whose service was limited both as to locality and duration, conditions which contributed not a little, to the rapid formation of these battalions. Many also had married, and others, who had only served during 1813 and 1814 had no taste for war, of which they had known nothing but the disasters. From all these causes, instead of the ninety thousand men that were expected from the hundred and fifty thousand that had deserted in 1814, only seventy thousand could be collected, of which fifty-eight thousand had already presented themselves, and twelve thousand were on their way to join. By adding these to the hundred and eighty thousand men that composed the effective army on the 1st of March, and to the fifty thousand on six months leave of absence, who had all obeyed the summons of recall, there was a prospect of raising an army of three hundred thousand men, of whom two hundred or two hundred and ten thousand were to be on active service, and the remainder left in dépôt or in the interior. This, certainly, was not a sufficient number to meet the dangers that threatened France. Napoleon determined to call in the conscripts of 1815, whom the Council of State had declared to belong to government, at least that portion of them that had been incorporated in 1814. A law, commanding the return of the others, was ordered to be prepared for presentation to the two Chambers.

It was calculated, after allowing for losses, that these conscripts would amount to one hundred and twelve thousand men, of whom forty-five thousand could be recalled immediately. The active army would thus amount to four hundred and twelve thousand. It was expected that the mobilised National Guard would amount to two hundred thousand, which, with fifty thousand sailors expected in Paris and Lyons, twenty thousand Federalists in Paris, and ten thousand at Lyons, would be a sufficient number to defend France. There still remained another resource, on which Napoleon had already calculated, and this was to ask the assembled Chambers for an extraordinary levy of one hundred and fifty thousand men to be raised from those that had formerly served. Napoleon would thus have about eight hundred thousand soldiers, who, with unity amongst those in power, and perseverance in action, would leave little reason to doubt of the safety of France.

Still the force actually at his disposal amounted only to three hundred thousand, of whom, as we have said, more than two hundred thousand might be led to the field. There were two hundred thousand well-chosen National Guards to defend the fortresses and defiles of our frontiers. Napoleon had ordered that the forty-five thousand conscripts of 1815, that could be legally raised, should be immediately called out, which would give him the command of two hundred thousand men, a sufficient force, in his hands, to strike a first terrible blow. But this force could not be at his disposal before the middle of June.

He worked incessantly to combine and organise these troops, for which purpose alone he wrote one hundred and fifty letters a day. At one time ordering one or two hundred recruits who had been left in a dépôt to be sent on to join their battalion, at another arranging for cavalry regiments that had men but not horses, or for others that had horses but not men, or who wanted equipments. Napoleon, with his wonderful memory, took note of everything, gave his orders, sent officers in all directions to see that they were executed, received them immediately on their return, listened to their reports, and sent them off again as often as the complete accomplishment of their tasks required. Napoleon had already sent the third battalions from such fortresses as had received a large number of mobile National Guards, and had organised the fourth, which was intended to serve as a dépôt. The fifth battalions of some regiments had been formed, in which case the fourth was immediately sent to join the other battalions. These, however, were the exceptions, for the regiments had, in general, but three battalions, which would have been sufficient had they contained greater numbers; but, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made, very few

consisted of more than six hundred men. Napoleon paid no less attention to the cavalry than to the infantry. Thanks to the depôt at Versailles, to the horses taken from the gendarmerie, and to the purchases made in the provinces, he hoped by the middle of June to assemble forty thousand excellent cavalry soldiers, including the Imperial Guard, all of whom had seen service. The preparing of clothes and repairing of arms engaged no little portion of his attention. Napoleon visited in person the workshops of the tailors, saddlers, armourers, and animated the artisans by his presence. The artillery officers employed in directing the construction of arms, rendered the greatest services. He was able to give new muskets to the entire army, repaired muskets to the mobilised National Guard, whilst he still had one hundred thousand for the conscripts of 1815. Should the war continue until winter, he would be able to supply all wants during the summer and autumn. By his wonderful exertions, Napoleon had in two months—from the end of March to the end of May—raised, equipped, and armed three hundred thousand men, fifty thousand of whom had been on six months leave of absence, seventy thousand were old soldiers, and one hundred and eighty thousand were picked National Guards; an enormous feat, as those will acknowledge who understand administrative difficulties, and which would have been impossible but for the immense number of military men in France at that time.

With a prudence that foresaw all things, Napoleon calculated that if the enemy crossed the frontier, both the fortresses and depôts would be blockaded. He therefore ordered all the depôts to fall back: from the northern frontier on Abbeville, Amiens, Saint-Quentin, Chalons, Bar, Brienne, Arcis-sur-Aube, and Nogent; from the eastern, towards Chalon, Dijon, Autun, and Troyes; and from the southern frontiers on Avignon and Nismes. By this he was assured that should a sudden invasion isolate our fortresses, it would not isolate our regiments, nor deprive them of supplies of men or war materials. A commission composed of Generals Rogiat, Dejean, Bernard, and Marescot—who had been restored to favour, from which he had unjustly fallen, after the capitulation of Baylen—was occupied in putting our fortifications of the first, second, and third rank in a state of defence. The most urgent repairs, with the providing of arms and provisions, had been ordered and were in course of execution. Moreover, the commission pointed out those passages of our frontiers, where an intersected route, or well-placed earth-works, would enable the mobilised divisions of the National Guard to offer an effectual opposition to the enemy. Paris and Lyons, as being the most important posts, were already protected by works.

Napoleon had not forgotten, that if, in 1814, while he was

manceuvring round Paris, that both his crown and France would have been saved, had that great city been able to hold out but one week. He considered Lyons as important in the east as Paris in the north, and ordered that all the preparations that the shortness of the time would allow should be made for the defence of both. We have already seen, that he had been content with earth-works at Paris, not having had time to construct them in masonry. General Haxo had covered the two declivities of Belleville with redoubts, so that the Plain of Vincennes to the south, of Saint Denis to the north, together with all the heights, were occupied, and there is no doubt but that, if Marmont's soldiers had been so supported on the 30th of March, 1814, they would not have yielded. The Canal of Saint Martin, which runs from Villette to join the Seine at Saint Denis, was defended by *flèches* so as to present a well defended line. Preparations were made for inundations at Saint Denis. It was not very likely that the enemy, piercing this line, would dare to venture between the heights of Montmartre and the Seine, as they would risk being thrown into the latter. But in any case, Montmartre, Clichy, and l'Etoile had been provided with strong redoubts, by which they were turned into very solid *réduits*. Lastly, the earth-works were commenced on the left bank, between Montrouge and Vaugirard. The Federalists, with a number of the National Guards, had offered to assist in raising these works. Napoleon accepted their services for the sake of the good example they gave; but he had two thousand well-paid labourers, whose more skilful hands exactly and speedily followed the plan of the redoubts marked out by General Haxo.

As the public were acquainted with all our relations with Europe, Napoleon having nothing more to conceal, had ordered these redoubts to be armed, in the first place, that he might himself preside at the operation, and secondly, to tone down before the appearance of the enemy, the effect that such operations might produce. He reasoned differently now from what he had done in 1814, since, instead of concealing the dangers that threatened the country, he sought to put them in the strongest light. Of the three hundred large cannon that had been ordered from the ports, and which were to be transported by sea to the mouths of the Seine, two hundred had arrived at Rouen, and were *en route* to Paris. They were placed in the unfinished works as they arrived. To avoid any confusion that might arise from the difference of calibre in the distribution of ammunition, Napoleon arranged that the twelve and six-pounders were to remain on the right bank, which was the most exposed, while the eight and four-pounders were placed on the left. He had formed a battery of the large pieces of ordnance that arrived from the ports on the highest points of Saint Chaumont. The schools of Saint Cyr

and Alfort, together with the Polytechnic, every day practised at the guns. A park of two hundred field-pieces was prepared at Vincennes; these were to be employed as moveable artillery, and sent to any point where they might be needed. Two regiments of sailors from Brest and Cherbourg were marching towards Paris. Napoleon had also ordered the revision and complete organisation of the Federalists, whom he formed into twenty-four battalions. Though he could not arm them yet, he gave each battalion a hundred muskets, for the purpose of drilling those who had not served before. His object was to reduce the National Guard by degrees to eight or ten thousand sure men, and to give the fifteen thousand muskets of the others to the Federalists. It was not from any demagogical calculation that he made this arrangement, but from a certain distrust of the National Guard, whom he suspected of Royalist principles, and from his great confidence in the zeal and bravery of the Federalists, whose lives he did not hesitate to sacrifice beneath the walls of Paris. Thanks to all these preparations, in six weeks at the very utmost, that is at the end of June, Paris would be protected against every attack.

With the defence of the capital, Napoleon had combined that of Nogent-sur-Marne, Meaux, Château-Thierry, Melun, Montereau, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube and Auxerre, and placed all under the orders of Marshal Davout, whom he intended to invest with extraordinary powers, and to appoint governor of Paris. The defender of Hamburg, proscribed by the Bourbons, seemed to him to possess in the highest degree the military and political qualities, necessary for such a post. He expected to be able to leave him seventy or eighty thousand men, composed of what would remain of the National Guard, the Federalists, the sailors and the dépôts. With such a force, such fortifications, and such a governor he considered Paris invincible.

Napoleon was occupied at the same time with the defence of Lyons, for which he ordered the different works that were to be executed. Acting on the same principles in this second capital as in the first, he had ordered one hundred and fifty large pieces of ordnance to be brought from Toulon by the Rhone, and to be placed in the works. A regiment of marines was marching to the same destination. The veterinary school at Lyons, like the schools at Paris, was to work part of the batteries. Trusting in the good feeling of the inhabitants, he had fixed the number of National Guard, who were to defend the city at ten thousand. He sent them ten thousand old muskets which were to be repaired at extra workshops that were to be erected in the town. From the surrounding districts, Burgundy, Franche-Comté and Auvergne, all of which had followed the

example of Delémont. It expected to draw ten thousand Federalists with the *detachés* would complete the garrison of Lyons. The superintendence of these details was entrusted to Marshal Suchet. Napoleon recalled him from Alsace, and appointed him to the command of this frontier with these words. "I am committed as to the safety of any place you command, go then and guard the east for me whilst I go to protect the north against all Europe." Marshal Suchet was to have, with the seventh corps, twenty thousand excellent troops, besides twelve thousand furnished by two divisions of National Guards and would consequently be able to occupy Saroy with thirty-two thousand soldiers. Supported by Lyons which was well fortified, he had every chance of repelling the Austrians. On the lower Rhone, in the direction of Avignon was a reserve of four of the six regiments of the eighth corps. With the remaining two and three regiments from Corsica, Marshal Brune was to form the ninth corps which was to watch over Var, Toulon and Marseilles. The latter city was the object of special watchfulness. Napoleon ordered that the Marseillais National Guard should be disarmed, and reduced to fifteen hundred sure men, that the forts of Saint Jean and Nicolas should be armed, and that all ammunition not absolutely necessary should be taken to the arsenal at Toulon. He caused the bridge of Saint Esprit to be cut down, and ordered that the small fortress of Sisteron should be put in a state of defence, to stop the progress of the enemy, should they venture into Dauphiny and Lyonnais after invading Provence. Above Lyons in ascending the Saône Napoleon had placed under General Lecourbe, as we have already said, a supplementary corps that was not counted amongst the nine corps appointed for the defence of the territory, as it had been formed later and consisted of one division of the line. Napoleon had also given him two fine divisions of the select National Guards, and confided to him the defence of the gap of Befort and the passages of the Jura. The army of Alsace, or the fifth corps, joined with Lecourbe, guarded the Rhine. This fifth corps had been formed altogether in the lines of Wissembourg. Picked battalions occupied Strasburg and the fortresses from Huningue to Landau. Other battalions guarded the passages of the Vosges, whilst the light cavalry, aided by the volunteer lancers raised in the district, scoured the country along the Rhine. It was arranged that on the first appearance of the enemy, the tocsin should be sounded, the commandants of fortresses should retire within their defences, the generals and prefects should retreat carrying with them the cattle, provisions, and the *levée en masse*, consisting of all the well-disposed citizens. They were to retire towards the difficult passes whose defence had

been prepared beforehand, make a stand there as long as possible and only fall back at the last extremity, and then join the *corps d'armée* appointed for the protection of the frontier. Free bodies organised in the district itself where there were numbers of old soldiers were to take part in these measures. Lastly, having exerted his genius in order to profit by all the resources of the country, Napoleon thought of another combination, which in certain districts might be of real utility. When looking over the accounts of the War Minister, he had remarked that there were fifteen thousand officers and seventy-eight thousand non-commissioned officers and soldiers pensioned by the State. If few of these could bear the fatigues of bivouacs, or heat, cold, and hunger, many of them could serve in the interior of a town, hold a musket or sword, or be useful in some way. Being attached to the Revolution and the Empire, and feeling no affection for the Bourbons they would serve as a check on the ill-disposed, for which reason Napoleon determined to recall twenty-five or thirty thousand, and distribute them in those towns of whose sentiments he was not satisfied, where they would be ready to rally round the authorities and support them by word or deed as occasion might require. Napoleon did not wish to compel them, but merely to appeal to their zeal; and to render the change of place more easy, he ordered that besides their pay they should receive travelling expenses and rations. He ordered some to be sent to Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Angers, Lille, Tours, Dunkirk &c. Thus not one man in the country, from the youngest to the oldest was allowed to remain idle or useless.

To these measures of a universal and indefatigable foresight, Napoleon added others necessary for the particular organization of the army under his command. It has been already seen that it consisted of five corps; the 1st was stationed in the neighbourhood of Lille under Count d'Erlon, the 2nd near Valenciennes under General Reille, the 3rd near Mezières under General Vandamme, the 4th near Metz, under General Gérard, and the fifth between Paris and Laon, under Count de Lobau. Napoleon intended that the corps under Generals d'Erlon and Reille, and those commanded by Generals Vandamme and Gérard, advancing from different points, should be concentrated at Maubeuge, then strengthening them with the Guard and the 6th corps from Paris, he intended to cross the frontier with hundred and fifty thousand men. The time is not yet come for explaining the measures by which he hoped to surprise the nearest and most considerable portion of his enemies. But having determined to commence operations on the 15th June at the latest, and being then in the last days of May, he traced General Gérard's march, who, as he had to advance sixty leagues to the

point of concentration, would be obliged to put his troops in motion before the others. Napoleon had told him in the strictest confidence the day on which he was to move forward, and he pointed out all the precautions he should take, in order to conceal the real reason of his departure. The Count de Lobau was ordered, as fast as his regiments should be ready, to send them to Soissons and Laon where the 6th corps was assembled. Napoleon was very much occupied with the Guard, which he hoped to raise to twenty or twenty-five thousand men; the organisation of this body was now confided to General Drouot. As usual, the great reserve of artillery was the chief object of Napoleon's care, and he carried his vigilance so far as to inspect in himself and to point out even a defective harness.* As he had not yet a sufficient number of draft horses, notwithstanding the six thousand obtained from the peasantry, he ordered eight or ten thousand to be procured in the provinces neighbouring the *corps d'armée*; for these horses ready money was paid.

So many things could not be accomplished without involving some annoyance. Marshal Davout accustomed to act at a distance from his master, and with a certain independence, sometimes lost temper at finding himself under a surveillance that left him neither liberty nor repose. He was obedient most certainly, but not like the Duke de Feltre, that is to the total annihilation of his own individuality. He was particularly annoyed because Napoleon appointed all the officers himself, but this was a point upon which the Emperor was most tenacious, as at that crisis it was as essential to be assured of the fidelity as of the bravery of the military. It was arranged that three trustworthy persons, the Counts Lobau, La Bédoyère, and Flahault, should revise the selection. The two latter being well acquainted with the sentiments of the young officers, found fault with some of the appointments made by the War Minister, at which the latter was not a little offended. Napoleon had to interfere several times, but we should not mention such things, were it not that these disputes with the Minister of War induced, at a later period, serious consequences. A dispute arose about General Bourmont, whom Marshal Davout would not admit to active service, and for whose fidelity Generals La Bédoyère and Gérard were ready to answer with their lives. Napoleon, after much consideration, adopted the opinion of the two generals, but was obliged to send a formal order to Marshal Davout without which he would not have submitted.

Napoleon chose Marshal Mortier to command the Imperial Guard. He would have wished to recall Berthier, and make

* I give these details from innumerable letters before me at this moment, and in which the most trifling remarks on the different descriptions of *materiel* are noted down.

him Major-General of the army. Berthier, who had been head of his staff in all his wars, Berthier, the correct and unwearied transmitter of his wishes; in short he wished to have his friend Berthier near him. Berthier had yielded to some temptations, but Napoleon let him know that he wished him to forget these errors, as he himself had forgotten them, and bid him come and join him again. Berthier could not resist the appeal, he set out for France, but was so closely watched that when he arrived at Basle, he was obliged to return to Germany, where a deplorable and mysterious death awaited him.

At a loss how to replace his Major-General, Napoleon bethought him of Marshal Soult, the most hard-working of his Lieutenants, who had joined the Bourbons believing that their government would endure, but now finding that he had been mistaken, he was seeking to efface the traces of his error. He felt embarrassed by the violent proclamation he had once published against Napoleon, and now sought to redeem his fault by addressing an equally violent one to the army on the occasion of his assuming the rank of Major-General. Through consideration for the Marshal, Napoleon softened down many of the expressions, and had it then published as an order of the day.

He knew men too well to notice their changes of opinion, especially in such times as those. It was more important to him that men should be good soldiers than consistent politicians. The essential point was not, whether Marshal Soult had served more than one master, but whether he possessed Berthier's clear-sightedness, precision and exactitude. Events would soon show whether Napoleon had made a happy choice. His last measure was to give the regiments their former numbers, which to the great regret of the men had been changed. This restoration gratified them, and placed them in some sort under an obligation to act in a manner worthy of their past career.

Napoleon ordered all his generals to put themselves at the head of their troops, with the exception of Marshal Soult, whom he kept with him, in order to initiate him into his new functions. Napoleon was ready to leave, and only waited the assembling of the Champ de Mai, and the meeting of the Chambers. That moment was approaching. The votes on the Additional Act had been pronounced, the elections were over, and almost all the newly-appointed deputies had arrived in Paris. The violent abuse of the journals, pamphleteers, and newsmongers, against the Additional Act, had been silenced by the elections, which gave a diversion to the public mind, and proved, at the same time, that there was no intention of evading the promised Constitution, since the Chambers had been summoned even before the appointed time. There had been perfect freedom in voting

for the Additional Act, and at the elections. There had been no restraint, either in writing or speaking, nor were the votes of those who gave the most offensive reasons for their political opinions, rejected. M. de Lafayette had accepted the Additional Act at Meaux, but made a reservation in favour of the sovereignty of the people, which, in his belief, had been entrenched on by some of the articles of this Act. M. de Kergorlay voted against it, protesting in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. The government had not defended themselves, as no arrangement had yet been made for the defence of power in a free state. With the exception of the momentary suspension of the sixth volume of the *Censeur*, a suspension immediately removed, as we have seen, by Napoleon's order, personal liberty had not been attacked in any way, and the people enjoyed the varied, confused, and violent liberty of the time of the Revolution. Each had proposed his chimera, and in the form that pleased him; but one ingredient of a revolution was wanting, and that was, excitement; not the excitement of parties (for rarely has there been more) but of the nation itself. The nation took no part in the voting, for, or against, the Additional Act, at the municipalities, notariats, or *justice de paix*, nor in the choice of representatives at the electoral colleges. Disgusted with revolutions and counter-revolutions, the people knew not whom or what to approve, and, in their indecision, remained concealed at home. We are speaking now of the intermediate classes, the wise, discreet, and disinterested portion of the nation. The Bourbons, whom they had not wished for, but whom, upon reflection, they had believed capable of affording them a pacific and liberal government, had, after a reign of eleven months, completely disgusted them. Napoleon, who gratified their pride, and responded to many of their instincts, terrified them, for, without considering whether he were changed or not, or whether he were really inclined to peace and liberty, they plainly saw that his destiny was war, exterminating war, that could end only in the destruction of France, or of Europe. Thus, disgusted by the one, and terrified by the other, the classes of whom we have spoken, shrank back to their hearths, and took no part, either in the adoption of the Additional Act, or the choice of the representatives.

Formerly, when France looked on General Bonaparte as a saviour, three or four millions hastened to record their votes, but now, not more than twelve or thirteen hundred thousand had voted on the Additional Act, and not more than one hundred thousand electors appeared in the electoral colleges.

These limited numbers showed plainly who it was that had presented themselves at the municipalities, the notariats, and the colleges; these were partizans in whom passion never cools. We say too much, perhaps, in saying partizans, for the Bourbon

partizans had not dared to appear at any of these places. It was not that they would have suffered any restraint—far from it. Their adversaries, piquing themselves on their moderation, took very good care not to attack, nor even threaten their safety. But the royalists disliked everything connected with liberal institutions, and, forming the most unjust opinion of their adversaries, they looked on them as dangerous terrorists, and, from want of custom and courage, they neglected to exercise their rights. Only a few of the boldest ventured to vote, and that more from bravado than a desire to exercise their rights. Only three or four thousand out of thirteen hundred thousand voters had registered a “no” against the Additional Act, and a still smaller number had appeared at the electoral colleges to dispute the election of the popular candidate, so that everything passed off with the greatest calmness, and in the most perfect order. Those who had appeared in the greatest numbers were the old revolutionists, the holders of national property, the passionate admirers of national glory, who persisted in seeing it personified in Napoleon, public functionaries dating from 1789, and, lastly, many enlightened men, who considered that the fault of permitting Napoleon’s return having been committed, it was better to defend the national independence in his person, and to give an honest trial to constitutional monarchy, which he proposed in so specious a manner; for those who are not slaves to prejudice, or party spirit, will accept liberty, by whomsoever offered. The choice made by these different classes of electors was, in general, good, and of a moderate character. There being no opposition, the choice, everywhere, fell on civil or military functionaries anxious for the consolidation of the new Empire, on holders of national property desirous to secure their possessions, on revolutionists, such as Barère, who repented the lengths to which they had gone, or on young and upright liberals, like M. Duchêne of Grenoble, whose opinions were sound, but who were deficient in experience. All these had adopted the two prevailing resolutions—to support Napoleon against Europe, but to resist him should he return to his despotic practices. However, these newly-chosen representatives, more attached to Napoleon, through motives of interest, than to liberty, which they professed as a principle, had so often heard it said that, in accepting Napoleon, his glory, and social principles, they ought not to accept his despotism, that they had become very susceptible with regard to the imperial power, and acted more like liberals than Bonapartists, and that to such a degree, as to compromise Napoleon’s cause for that of liberty, though such was not their intention. Such a state of things would require a tact, patience, and dexterity, that were not likely to be found in Ministers meeting free assemblies for the first time.

In obedience to the decree, that invited them to assist at the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, the electoral colleges chose as their representatives, the most zealous, the richest, and most inquisitive of the electors. From four to five thousand of these arrived in Paris, independent of the six hundred representatives. Deputations had also come from the regiments that were to receive their colours at the Champ de Mai. Napoleon had ordered the Ministers and other high functionaries to throw open their houses to the deputies of every kind, and to receive them most hospitably. All uttered the same opinions, that Europe should be opposed, and if possible conquered, as war with her was unavoidable, but immediately after the conclusion of peace, the idea of conquest should be abandoned, and a true constitutional monarchy founded, so that the nation might not be at the mercy of strangers abroad, or of a single individual at home. These sentiments were echoed by the government, whose feelings they expressed, some, indeed, like Carnot with an honourable fidelity to the Emperor, others like M. Fouché, with a scarcely concealed spirit of intrigue. This latter, of his own free will, assiduously cultivated the acquaintance of the electors that had been sent to Paris, the deputies in particular, preferring the younger as more manageable and affecting, as was the fashion of the day, the most unchangeable dislike to the Bourbons, together with the greatest alarm at Napoleon's being at the head of the government saying, that if he had had the patriotism to abdicate in favour of his son, everything—this he knew for certain—would be immediately arranged, that he had received communication, &c. Such assertions made by the Minister of Police had a most dangerous effect, and did no more honour to his sagacity than to his fidelity, for the Sovereigns, firmly attached to the Bourbon cause, would not accept any of his imaginary arrangements, and if they pretended to have no ill-will but towards Napoleon, it was that in getting rid of him, they might at the same time seize the sword of France. The Duke d'Otranto's remarks, spreading from mouth to mouth caused great excitement, and even came to Napoleon's ears, though in a somewhat subdued form. He, however, learned sufficient to see that his Minister of Police was betraying him, but restraining himself better than on a former occasion, he awaited a more favourable opportunity for enforcing his authority, which would have been perfectly right, for no well-regulated state would endure a Minister who denounced the sovereign he served as a public danger. A good citizen might think so, especially before Napoleon's return, but with such sentiments, he ought not to accept the post of Minister of Police.

Had all the reports relative to the Additional Act and the election of representatives been sent to Paris, they might have

been immediately revised, and the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, which was to solemnise the acceptance of the new constitution, might have taken place on the 26th of May, the day appointed. The opening of the Chambers would have followed at once, and then Napoleon could have left for the army. But as some days would be required to collect the *procès-verbaux*, the ceremony was deferred until the 1st of June. Napoleon resolved to open the Chambers three or four days later, and to leave on the 10th or 12th, so as to be in full operation on the 15th. Eighty-seven places of meeting were appointed in Paris for the deputations from the electoral colleges, who were to revise the votes of their departments, and appoint a central deputation for a general revision under the superintendence of the High Chancellor.

The deputations employed the last days of May in these formalities but Napoleon devoted them to the completion of his military preparations. About this time, his mother, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, and his brother Jerome, having escaped the vigilance of the English navy, arrived in Paris. Napoleon advised his brother to forget, and to seek to make others forget that he had been king, and be thenceforward nothing but a soldier, and take the command of a division of the second *corps d'armée*, (General Reille's) which the prince most willingly did. At the same time another member of the imperial family arrived; Prince Lucien, who had so long persisted in living in Rome, far from the favour and authority of his brother, and who only relaxed in his estrangement since the family misfortunes had commenced. He came to Paris for two equally honourable motives, to join his brother, and to plead the Pope's cause. Napoleon felt the greatest pleasure at seeing his brother again, particularly at this time when the fleeting enthusiasm of the 20th of March had passed away, and so many were becoming unfriendly to him. He gave him all possible satisfaction with regard to the Pope. Being determined to observe the treaties of 1814 with regard to sovereigns, for whom he felt no esteem, and who had shown themselves his implacable enemies, he must be much more inclined to do so towards an inoffensive prince whom he loved even when he persecuted him, who was neither his rival nor enemy, and whose moral authority—which was a great consideration—might be used to Napoleon's advantage, if he were only properly treated. He desired his brother to tell the Pope—which was but the repetition of his first instructions—that he did not intend to interfere for the future either in the spiritual or temporal affairs of the Holy See; that he would do all he could to preserve the ancient Pontifical territory, including the Legations, and that in France, he would guarantee him the exercise of his spiritual authority on the basis of the Concordat.

This was all that was necessary to please the Pope and win him to our side should we be victorious.

Napoleon established Prince Lucien in the Palais Royal. He wished to have him appointed representative for Isère, a department devoted to the imperial cause. His private intention was, if Lucien were chosen member of the Chamber of Representatives, to appoint him President of that Chamber, for he had not forgotten how he had presided over the Cinq Cents, on the memorable day of the 18th Brumaire.

Whilst he was thus occupied with these cares, previous to his departure, he received the sudden information of a serious insurrection in Vendée. We have seen how, when the Duke de Bourbon had appeared in that province he had been very coolly received, and that he had been compelled, not by timidity, but prudence to retire into England. We have also seen how Louis XVIII. had sent the Marquis Louis de la Rochefoucauld from Ghent to Vendée, bidding him pass through London, and commissioning him to rouse the zeal of the old servants of the House of Bourbon. We shall now see how Vendée answered this appeal.

The old surviving Vendean leaders, M.M. d'Autichamp, de Suzannet, de Sapinaud, men of experience, in whom royalist zeal was tempered by good sense, finding that the opinions of the peasantry had become strangely modified during the last twenty years, objected to exposing the province to new ravages for a vain attempt at a civil war, which could have no serious result. They asserted that Vendée though able to make a useful diversion, when hostilities should have commenced between Napoleon and the Allies, was yet wholly incapable of resisting him, until he should be first attacked by the Coalition. They were, therefore, determined to wait until the cannon should resound on the Sambre before giving the signal for a revolt on the Loire.

Men of more inflammable temperament blamed this seeming pusillanimity, and wished that the fault of having allowed the Duke de Bourbon to leave, might be expiated by greater zeal. Touched by these reproaches, and their hearts stirred by old memories, the veteran leaders hastened to go through the province, number the peasantry and see on how many fighting men they could reckon, and thus prove the warmth of their loyalty. It was animated by such sentiments that the emissaries of the Marquis Louis de La Rochejaquelein found them. This brother of the illustrious Henri de La Rochejaquelein, not having yet served in Vendée, joined to a desire of upholding the hereditary greatness of his name, an exalted faith in the goodness of his cause and great personal courage, but his prudence did not equal his other qualities. He had received from

the English some muskets and ammunition, with the promise of a large and immediate supply of arms, powder, artillery and money. He had set out with the first installment of the promised aid, and embarked on board a small English vessel, anchored within view of the Sables d'Olonne, whence he wrote to his brother Auguste de La Rochejaquelein to acquaint him with his mission, plans, and expectations.

Upon receipt of this intelligence, an assembly of leaders was held on the 11th of May at Chapelle-Basse-Mer, near the Loire, in the domain of M. de Suzannet, successor of the celebrated Charette. Those present at this meeting were M.M. d'Autichamp, de Suzannet and Auguste de La Rochejaquelein, the third of the brothers of that name. M. de Sapinaud alone was absent. Notwithstanding the reasons these leaders had for deferring the insurrection, they could not resist the intelligence contained in the letters of the Marquis de La Rochejaquelein, promising large assistance in arms, ammunition, money and even men, and the speedy commencement of European hostilities in Flanders. It was therefore decided that on the 15th of May the tocsin should be sounded, and arms taken up throughout Vendée. Each leader was to command in the district with which his family ties and former services connected him; M. d'Autichamp in Anjou, M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein in the neighbourhood Bressuire, that is in Le Bocage, M. de Sapinaud in the district called Le Centre, lying between Mortagneles-Herbiers, Saint Fulgent, and Bourbon Vendée. And lastly, M. de Suzannet was to command in the Marais. It was estimated that M. d'Autichamp would be able to raise eighteen thousand peasants, M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein five thousand, M. de Sapinaud eight thousand, and M. de Suzannet twenty-five thousand, the entire amounting to fifty-six thousand men. Such are the calculations made in time of civil war, that is to say, baseless.

Several officers sent by Louis de La Rochejaquelein arrived between the 11th and 15th of May, announcing his speedy arrival with fourteen thousand muskets, several million cartridges, and a corps of three hundred English artillerymen. This first supply was to be followed by another four or five times larger. Such intelligence confirmed by trustworthy men, decided the leaders of the insurrection, and they kept their word on the appointed day.

During the night between the 14th and 15th of May the tocsin sounded throughout these hapless districts, which twenty-five years before had been drenched with blood and heaped with ruins, and that without being able to check the invincible French Revolution, and with no other result than to render it a little more bloody. The Vendéans were not about to do better this

time, or rather let us say were about to do worse, since for a mere dynastic question, they were about to draw off fifteen or twenty thousand Frenchmen from the formidable rencontre at Waterloo, and thus contribute to the most fearful tragedy in our history. These poor peasants, some excited by their personal recollections, others by the recitals of their fathers, rose at the call of their leaders and presented themselves armed with muskets, sticks and scythes fastened to poles. About a third of them had very indifferent muskets, and very few powder and ball. The most zealous urged on the faltering with encouragements, reproaches and even threats. A great number joined from fear of being called cowards or *blues*. M. d'Autichamp who expected to have been able to raise eighteen thousand men, had found but four, at the utmost five thousand willing to join him; with these he advanced towards Chemillé and Chollet, where there were four battalions of the 15th and 16th regiments of the line, and though most anxious to take possession of these two points which commanded the route from Angers to Bourbon-Vendée, prudential motives induced him to abstain from the attempt. He dreaded meeting three thousand regular soldiers with four or five thousand badly armed peasants. He left some detachments to reconnoitre, and advanced along the Sevre between Clisson, Tiffanges and Mortagne, in order to communicate with M. de Suzannet, join him, and then attempt something with their combined forces.

M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein who, in his country, had never encountered any but gendarmerie and National Guards, flung himself on Bressuire, disarmed the National Guard, seized a hundred and fifty muskets, and having heard that his brother Louis was on the coast with a supply of *matériel*, resolved to hasten thither in order to supply his wants. But considering it dangerous to make this movement while the forces occupying Chollet were in his rear, he determined to advance boldly towards that town, in the hope of joining M. d'Autichamp, and of taking this important post with his assistance.

At this very time General Delaborde, who had the 12th, 13th, and 22nd military divisions under his command, that is the divisions of Bretagne and Vendée, had ordered the troops to concentrate themselves, and desired the colonels of the 25th and 26th to repair from Chollet to Bourbon-Vendée, in order to reinforce General Travot, commandant of the department of Vendée. The 26th was already *en marche*, and was passing through the village of Echanbroignes, where it was surprised on the 17th of May by M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein and his two thousand five hundred peasants, who appeared on his rear on their way to Chollet. Although the men of the 26th did not amount to more than a thousand, they drew up, defended

Echaubroignes, and then forced their way through the insurgents in order to return to Chollet, as they dreaded not being able to advance to Bourbon-Vendée. They had about fifty men killed and wounded, and of the insurgents about double that number were put *hors de combat*. The insurgents had fought in their own disorderly fashion, but with an ardour inflamed by native courage and faith in their cause.

M. Auguste de La Rochjaquelein was now compelled to come to a stand, for his poor followers could never be more than a few days absent from their homes, and believed that they had done sufficient for their cause for the time being, if they traversed a few leagues or once encountered the enemy. He, however, retained four or five hundred of his best armed and most resolute men, with whom he intended to join his brother on the coast.

Meanwhile, M. de Suzannet had left Maisdon, assembled his forces between Macheconl, Clisson, Montaigu, and Bourbon-Vendée, whence he advanced to Saint-Léger to assist M. de Sapinaud, who had assembled his army of Le Centre. When he arrived at Saint-Léger on the 16th, he learned the arrival of M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein off the coast of Saint Gilles with a small English division, and he immediately advanced to meet him. He found him disembarked at Croix-de-Vic, having been aided by the people of the country, who had attacked the custom-house officers and old coast guard. But great was M. de Suzannet's surprise when he found in what he boasted aid from England consisted. There were no artillerymen, there was no money, and only two thousand muskets instead of the promised fourteen thousand. This was supporting the old reputation of England in these parts, that is of making large promises, but forgetting to keep them, a reputation shared in by all the emissaries that appeared in her name, however high their rank. The muskets, powder, and more especially the money, were absolutely necessary to the Vendean insurgents, not that they were avaricious, but as they were armed with nothing but rusty muskets or sticks, they needed weapons to fight and money to procure provisions. Possessed of ready money they might always send forward some peasants to procure bread and meat, and they might thus avoid the pangs of hunger, and support themselves without incurring the disgrace of ravaging the country through which they passed.

M. de Suzannet's soldiers were painfully undeceived, and complained that it was the old trick practised again; that England, as of old, only sought to perpetuate war for the destruction of France. M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein pretended that it was not so, assured them that a large convoy would soon arrive, and at length obtained some credence. M. de Sapinaud arrived with

his two thousand troops as dejected and discontented as those of M. Suzannet, and all retired into the Bocage to avoid the attacks of the *bleus*, who would unfailingly come in great numbers from Nantes and Sables.

M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein had presented himself in the name of Louis XVIII, and united in his person the two-fold character of representative of his king and envoy of the British government. He inherited a great name, possessed zeal and courage, and although inferior in rank and age to the old Vendean chiefs, he was appointed *generallissimo*, thanks to the easy disposition of MM. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud. Though this arrangement was established for the purpose of promoting military unity in the operations, it could not induce concord in sentiment, for M. d'Autichamp, a lieutenant-general and renowned for his former services, could not be pleased at seeing himself placed under the orders of M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein, a simple *maréchal-de-camp* wholly unacquainted with Vendean warfare. But M. de La Rochejaquelein wrote to him, and he submitted like his brothers in arms, to a superior, whom he believed to have been appointed to Vendée by the King.

It was necessary to decide on some plan. The two thousand muskets had been taken by the inhabitants of the Marais and divided between them. About eight hundred thousand cartouches had been landed, and of these one portion was sent to M. d'Autichamp, and the other to M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein under an escort of some hundred men. MM. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud had collected seven or eight thousand men, and were anxious to make some attempt before these should return to their homes. The most useful conquest would be to seize Bourbon-Vendée, which was within reach and was the principal town in the department, or the Sables, a naval port that would be most useful for future disembarkations. M. de Suzannet, influenced by a local feeling, wished to seize the island of Noirmoutiers, which would secure a large and serviceable *réduit* in the middle of Marais. A doubt as to which of these projects should be adopted prevailed, when intelligence of General Travot's having left Bourbon-Vendée arriving, all the Vendean leaders agreed to advance towards that point. They hoped to profit by the absence of this general and take possession of his principal station, or to assail him *en route* if he had not many troops. Pursuing this project they passed the night of the 19th at Aizenay.

General Travot had recalled some detachments from the Sables, and joining these to what he already had, he set out for Saint-Gilles with twelve hundred men in order to prevent the disembarkations that were taking place in the Marais. He met the convoy destined for M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein, captured a part, and then advanced towards Aizenay, where the great mass of the insur-

gents was assembled. Caring little about numbers, and suspecting that the movements of the insurgents were not conducted after a strictly military fashion, he determined to attack them by night at Aizenay. He consequently advanced to that point on the night of the 19th—20th of June, found them in the greatest disorder, some sleeping after a fatiguing march, others eating and drinking after their long privations, but none keeping guard. He fell suddenly with a thousand men on these six or seven thousand unfortunate peasants, threw them into the greatest confusion, killed or wounded three or four hundred, and put the rest to flight. These, at first, took refuge in the neighbouring woods of Aizenay, and then the greater number returned to their homes, as was their wont after a few days' absence, whether conquered or victors.

Meanwhile, M. d'Autichamp remained on the frontier of his district. Having learned that the 15th and 26th regiments of the line had fallen back on Pont-Barré in the direction of Angers, he had seized on Chollet, and then gave his men leave to return to their homes, which they would have done even if he had not given them permission. M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein collected the wrecks of the convoy that had been destined for him, joined his brother, and then returned to Bressuire.

Although the Vendean leaders had retained none but the most devoted men, they had almost become masters of the *Bocage*, that is, of the country lying between Chemillé, Chollet, and the Herbiers, on one side, and Bressuire and Machecoul on the other. The small imperial garrisons had fallen back, some on the Loire, and others on the principal cities of the interior, such as Parthenay, Fontenay, and Bourbon-Vendée. The peasantry, though as courageous as ever, were neither so zealous nor fanatical, and the number of those who took part in the insurrection, was not more than fifteen thousand. The extreme smallness of the assistance sent by England had cooled their ardour, and roused all their ancient prejudices against the British government. In order to correct the bad effect of this, M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein assured them that a large convoy would soon arrive, and it was not without difficulty that he succeeded in making himself believed. The veteran leaders, as of old, were not on the best terms with each other. M. d'Autichamp was not pleased at finding himself under M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein's authority, and the latter, with the assistance of General Canuel, an imperial officer, who had become a furious royalist, tried to submit Vendée to a military organisation, which would have deprived the inhabitants of their natural peculiarities, without imbuing them with the qualities of a regular army. His plan was, to bring the four Vendean armies into somewhat closer proximity, and then to advance altogether to the coast, to

await the convoy of ammunition, arms, and money, which he expected, and whose arrival he was constantly promising, in order to keep up the courage of these poor peasants, who could not fight without arms, or support themselves without money.

Such were the events which had taken place in Vendée during the last days of May. Napoleon was neither surprised nor seriously alarmed by them. With his usual quickness of perception, he saw that the insurrection did not possess sufficient energy to extend beyond the province where it originated, or cause any serious danger in the interior of the country. However, it was sufficient to interfere with his military preparations, and it would be absolutely necessary to send some troops to the frontier of the insurgent country, if he did not wish the evil to spread further. He was, therefore, obliged to sacrifice some of his regiments, a sacrifice greatly to be regretted, and which he was resolved to make as light as possible, for, he said, that one battle gained in the north, would do more towards the pacification of Vendée than all the troops he could send there. He had intended to place General Delaborde at the head of the troops destined for the insurgent province, but that General being ill, he replaced him by General Lamarque. While awaiting the departure of the latter, he sent on General Corbineau, in whose intelligence and energy he had well-grounded confidence. His first instructions to him, were, to concentrate his troops, and resist the entreaties of those towns where the holders of national property had taken refuge, and who were all demanding garrisons. He desired him to tell them that it was their business to provide for their safety by organising National Guards. The points of concentration were Angers and Nantes on the Loire, and Bourbon-Vendée and Niort in the interior. Since the evacuation of our vast conquests, the gendarmerie were very numerous in France, and there was a very large depot at Versailles. Napoleon formed them into five battalions of foot, and three squadrons of horse, and sent them, without loss of time, to the banks of the Loire. These battalions and squadrons, composed of tried soldiers, were to serve as a rallying point to the federalists and National Guards. The next thing to be done, was to prepare columns of regular troops, to penetrate into the interior of the insurgent country to crush the insurrection. The 26th and 15th regiments of the line had fallen back on Angers, Napoleon allowed them to remain there, that they might have time to collect their effective force, and strengthen them by the addition of the 27th. The 43rd was at Rochefort, and the 65th at Nantes. Napoleon ordered that they should be reinforced by two or three regiments from General Clausel's corps, and ordered that the 3rd and 4th battalions of these regiments should be immediately formed. This being done, the columns stationed on the

circumference of the insurgent province, were to enter centre-pitally, and crush the rebels wherever they appeared. Napoleon gave orders that no quarter should be given. These columns were followed by military commissions, commanded to try and execute immediately the principal rebels, who should be taken with arms in their hands. He ordered that the châteaux of the different leaders of the insurrection should be razed to the ground. He wished to terrify these hapless peasants by the examples of an immediate and rapid punishment, and it must be admitted that they had not the same legitimate reasons for revolt as in 1793, since their religion, lives, and properties were respected, and they had even been spared the rigours of the conscriptions, for the levies made in their provinces were so small as scarcely to deserve the name. "When the Vendéans see," said Napoleon, "to what they are exposing themselves, they will reflect and become calm." That the result might be more speedy, he sent the 47th regiment by post to Laval, where the Chouans were beginning to make some disturbance, and a division of the Young Guard, under General Brayer, as a reserve to Angers. Thus, notwithstanding his determination to detract as little as possible from the main body of the army, this deplorable insurrection deprived him of four or five regiments, of several of the third battalions, and a division of the Young Guard, amounting, in all, to at least twenty thousand men; a great loss on the approaching battle-day, when it might have turned the scale of victory. It was a great misfortune, of little advantage to the royalist cause, whilst it ruined that of France at Waterloo!

Napoleon saw, from these movements of the Royalists, that it was intended to aid the enemy without, by insurrections at home, and he was determined not to leave a clear stage to those who, seeking to ruin him, might destroy France. He wished that measures should be taken against those who were ostensibly fomenting civil war. But this was opposed by some of his ministers, who, with justice, refused to adopt again the exercise of arbitrary authority, and this principle was particularly urged by M. Fouché, who sought to win favour with all parties by accommodating himself to their views. It was a very serious question, for on one hand, there was the danger of allowing uncontrolled liberty to adversaries who were only too well disposed to profit by the facilities accorded to them, and on the other there was the risk of returning to the barbarous laws of the Convention and the Directory. Napoleon insisted that a bill should be drawn up, defining in moderate, but decided terms, the different misdemeanours tending to provoke civil war, or conniving at a foreign one, and this he intended should, together with the bills on financial questions, be the first presented to the

Chambers. Meanwhile, he desired the Council of State to seek amongst anterior laws for those that were neither exaggerated nor cruel, and order them to be put in force. He ordered that all who were not habitual residents should leave the insurgent districts, and that a list should be made out of those who had left their ordinary residence, either to command troops, or to join the Court at Ghent, and commanded that they should return to their dwellings immediately, under pain of having their property confiscated. At Toulouse, and still more at Marseilles, daring men, known as implacable enemies of the Empire, were preaching insurrection to an excitable population. Some of these were removed, and the National Guards of these towns were reduced to a small number of reliable men, who might safely be trusted with arms.

"I do not wish to act with cruelty," he said to his Ministers, "but I wish to intimidate, for if, while six hundred thousand men are marching towards France, I suffer such domestic insurrection, we shall have revolts in Paris itself, aiding the allied armies." His Ministers remained silent, M. Fouché as well as the rest, though secretly determined not to execute his master's orders, and that not from any respect for the principles of a rigorous legality, but to serve his personal interest with the Royalists. Sad and deplorable are the times when a civil war connives with a foreign invasion, when men are agitated between the fear of not defending their country to the utmost, and the apprehension of betraying the principles of rational political liberty.

However, Napoleon considered that other measures than intimidation should be used against the Vendéans. He saw plainly that they were not as zealous as formerly, and there was evidently a difference of opinion, and even disunion, amongst them, and thought that political means might be usefully employed. "These unfortunate Vendéans are mad," he said to his Ministers. "During my whole reign I have not interfered with them, I have not disturbed one of their priests or leaders. On the contrary, I have rebuilt their cities, made roads for them, in fact, done everything that the time would permit, and in return, they rise against me when all Europe is opposed to me. Notwithstanding my objection to cruelty, I cannot allow them to go on in this way, and I shall be compelled to visit them with fire and sword. But, after all for what purpose? They cannot decide the question. I am going to fight against their friends, the English and Prussians, and to decide, not only the fate of two dynasties, but of all Europe. If I am conquered, their cause is won, if I conquer, they cannot be victorious. I will eradicate every trace of this hateful civil war, both men and things, I will destroy everything that can induce these poor

deluded peasants to destroy, or allow themselves to be destroyed, by their countrymen, for the gratification of the most absurd prejudices. Consequently their fate depends not on them, but on the Coalition and me. Let them keep quiet, let them not allow their fields to be laid waste, their huts to be burned, and their best men murdered, and all for an object which they cannot attain. Can they not allow mine and a foreign army to decide the question in deadly conflict. Most certainly, men enough will fall, without making it necessary that Frenchmen should cut each others' throats. Let them wait for a few days and all will be decided. You," he said, turning to the Duke d'Otranto, "have known, and have had relations with these Vendean chiefs, there must be many of them in Paris. Get them to your house, by fair means or foul, make them listen to reason, and propose a suspension of arms, which will spare much useless suffering to hapless France. You need not ask for a long truce. In four weeks their cause will be lost or gained, and that by shedding other blood than theirs, and should their cause be lost as they understand it, their true interests will be saved, for by my laws and labours I shall serve them more than the Bourbons ever would, for whom they have been sacrificing themselves uselessly for the last twenty-five years."

The Duke d'Otranto could not receive a more agreeable mission than that of entering into personal relations with adverse parties. He summoned MM. de Malartie, de Flavigny, and de la Béraudière, and sent them into Vendée to propagate Napoleon's sentiments, which he delivered exactly, though in his own style. "Why," he said to them, "will you sacrifice yourselves for the sake of those Bourbons, to whom you owe nothing, and to injure a man who has advanced your interests, and who, perhaps, will not be in power for more than six weeks longer? You are misled by the prejudices of your priests, and the ambition of your leaders. They are leading you to slaughter for their own interest, and not for yours; but if you have the sense not to interfere, you will be rid of the Empire in a short time, or you will be under a yoke not very burdensome to your province. You detest Bonaparte, I do not like him much better; but neither you nor I can do anything. He is going, like a madman, to oppose all Europe; in all probability he will be overcome, in which case we will come to an understanding; and as, should Bonaparte be defeated, he can only be replaced by the Bourbons, we shall make arrangements for their recall, and for making them reign more wisely than before. I do not ask you to lay down your arms, nor to submit to the Empire, but to suspend hostilities. I shall even endeavour to obtain that the Imperial troops shall be withdrawn from your province, that you shall be

masters there, but on condition of your remaining quiet and inoffensive."

These words were calculated to make an impression on the the Vendéans, for independant of the iniquity of their late attempt, and which they did not acknowledge even to themselves, and which was no other than to deprive the French army of twenty thousand soldiers, their attempt at civil war was absurd—extravagant. The three Vendean negotiators were touched by the true and almost cynical language of the Duke d'Otranto, and immediately set out for Vendée, to propose a suspension of arms on the conditions we have mentioned. And, as had been told the Vendéans, they would not have long to wait, for they were on the eve of the 1st June, the day appointed for the Champ de Mai, after which Napoleon would set out for the army, to decide the dispute between him and Europe.

Almost all the registers of the votes on the "Additional Act" had arrived and their revision had commenced. The deputations from the electoral colleges had assembled on the 29th and 30th of May in the eighty-seven places of meeting appointed them, and had begun the computation of the votes. This work being ended, each college appointed five members to revise, under the superintendence of the Prince High Chancellor, the votes received from all the departments. They had also authorized their delegates to draw up an address to the Emperor. These delegates amounting to about four or five hundred, assembled on Wednesday the 31st in the palace of the Corps Législatif, and found that the number of votes not including those of departments whose registers were not yet come in, was 1,304,206 of which 1,300,000 were affirmative and 4,206 negative. The number of votes for the institution of the Consulship for life was 3,577,259, and for the institution of the Empire 3,572,329. The numerical superiority of the affirmatives was the same, but the number of voters had been reduced almost to one fourth, which proves that in 1815 the rational majority of the nation divided between the counter-revolution represented by the Bourbons, and war represented by Napoleon, knew not to whom they could confide her destiny and testified their irresolution by their silence.

The revision being finished, the address was next to be prepared. Several were proposed, but that drawn up by M. Carion de Nisas, with the approval of Government, was adopted. In this, the two prevailing opinions of the day were very warmly expressed; those were, France's determination to fight under Napoleon's orders for national independance, and after the establishment of peace to develope public liberty according to the system of constitutional monarchy. Devotedness to Napoleon

was as warmly expressed as could be desired. M. Dubois d'Angers, whose voice was strong enough to be heard in the largest assembly, was appointed to read this address.

The object for which the Champ de Mai was to be held had changed very much since its announcement at Lyons, when it was intended to present the new institutions to the assembled electors, and to crown the King of Rome in presence of his mother, but by Maria Louisa's refusal, and the manner in which the "Additional Act" had been presented, it was reduced to a simple revision of votes. In order that the ceremony should make more impression on the public, Napoleon determined to distribute the colours to the troops about to leave for the northern frontier. These standards given to men, who swore to die in their defence within a few days, was a circumstance well calculated to touch the feelings of the numerous citizens collected at the Champ de Mai. Even to the very eve of the ceremony, the most contradictory reports were in circulation as to what was to take place. These originated with the Duke d'Otranto. This indefatigable intriguer was always dreaming of getting rid of Napoleon, not that the Bourbons might be recalled, whom he considered still worse, but to have, if possible, a regency under Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, thinking that he himself would rule under the government of a woman and a child. M. de Metternich's attempt at a secret negociation with him, interrupted by M. Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to Basle, had only increased his idea of his own importance, and confirmed his resolution of getting rid of Napoleon, and substituting for him Maria Louisa and the King of Rome. He boldly said to every one that would listen to him, with an imprudence, that nothing but Napoleon's precarious situation could explain, that if this *man*, as he called him, had any patriotism he would retire from the stage and abdicate in favour of his son, by which he would infallibly disarm Europe, or at least show that she was in the wrong, and so make it incumbent on every Frenchman to fight to the death. He added that they would not be obliged even to fight, as in all probability Napoleon's abdication would be sufficient to appease Europe. When M. Fouché was asked on what authority he made such assertions, he answered with a mysterious air, that he had good reasons for what he said, hinted at intimate relations with foreign Powers, by which he not only gave authority to his words, but importance to himself. According to him, Napoleon ought to profit by the Champ de Mai to give this proof of his disinterestedness and to essay this profound stroke of policy. It may be imagined what progress such assertions made, especially when uttered by the Minister of Police, a man not much respected, but supposed to be of

great weight. To avert Napoleon's anger and excuse any of these remarks that might reach his ears, M. Fouché resolved to present him what he considered a most profound project, which was, to offer his eventual abdication to the Sovereigns, on condition of an immediate peace, and should this be rejected, to denounce their bad faith to the nation, and summon every man to take up arms.

According to the Duke d'Otranto's reasoning, should this proposal be accepted by the Sovereigns, Napoleon would have secured the crown to his son, and vast glory to himself, and would be accompanied by the universal respect of mankind into whatever retirement he might choose; whilst on the other hand, if the Sovereigns refused, he would have a right to demand the very greatest sacrifices from France.

Napoleon disdainfully rejected this scheme of an over-excited brain, more remarkable for fertility of invention than soundness of judgment. Whenever Napoleon had the wisdom to restrain himself in M. Fouché's presence, he treated him with the greatest disdain; a convenient mode of acting towards a presumptuous person, whose assumption he might otherwise be obliged to treat too seriously. It was not very difficult for him to prove both to M. Fouché and others how chimerical such a project was. When Europe demanded that Napoleon should be sacrificed, she only meant to disarm France and that once done, to make us pass under the yoke. Indeed, were this offer of an abdication, not immediately followed by the delivery of Napoleon into the hands of the Sovereigns, which would have been an act of baseness on the part of France, and of deceit on the part of Napoleon, Europe would have looked upon the whole thing as a jest, deserving only of contempt. And had Napoleon been given up, the French would be in the same position as the Carthaginians, who having delivered their arms and ships to the Romans, were then compelled to yield Carthage too; and so, Europe, that did not approve, either of Maria Louisa or the King of Rome, would have imposed the Bourbons on a people that had been so silly as to put themselves in her power. And the sole result of these tergiversations would have been to exhibit both hesitation and fear, to weaken Napoleon's authority at the moment he most needed support, to spend in useless negotiations, time so valuable for military preparations, and above all, to enervate the moral strength of the military who saw only Napoleon, and wished to see no other object than him. Reasons so evident, showed how very superficial was M. Fouché, and how very little solidity there was in his plans. This did not prevent M. Fouché from expatiating on his project in every direction, which caused no little excitement in the public mind, by propagating the idea that Napoleon, by an act of devotedness,

might have saved France from the fearful dangers to which she was left exposed. The real self-sacrifice on the part of Napoleon would have been to die at Elba, an act of virtue too heroic to be expected from any mortal. Were it not so, the aspirations of master-spirits would never shape themselves into acts, which is to say, that the human heart would be void of ambition.

This question of an eventual abdication, which, indeed, had never been seriously proposed, having been put aside, it was next to be considered in what character Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai. Should it be as a general, more a soldier than an emperor, or as a sovereign surrounded by all the pomp of a throne? Many very sincere liberals, but inclined to republicanism, who only wished to use Napoleon as a means of ridding them of the Bourbons, desirous that even externals should correspond with what they considered the true state of the public mind, were anxious that Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai as a simple soldier. On the other hand, the alarmed partizans of authority exclaimed loudly, when it seemed that Napoleon was likely to yield to the liberals; they did not hesitate to say that he was abandoning himself to the revolutionists in order to win their support, and that it would have been as well for him to have remained at Elba as to return to be their slave. Napoleon took as little heed of the demands of the one party as of the affected fears of the other, but he was piqued by the assertion that he had sunk in position, that he had fallen into the hands of the *canaille*, merely because he had consented to reign as a constitutional monarch. Therefore, though he did not attach much importance to what had been said by the zealous partisans of imperial authority, he did not wish to justify their unfriendly remarks by appearing as it were uncrowned before the thousands assembled from all parts of France. He consequently determined to appear at the Champ de Mai, with the same state as at his coronation. This was certainly no very serious fault since his fate was to be decided by a battle in Flanders, and not by the fleeting impression produced by a futile spectacle on agitated minds, but still it was an error as he needed the support of the friends of liberty whose feelings he ought to have conciliated in trifles. However that may be, he did not give himself much trouble about these conflicting opinions, but appeared on the 1st of June at the Champ de Mai wearing silken robes, a plume of feathers and imperial mantle, and in the coronation carriage drawn by eight horses, preceded by the princes of his family, and with marshals riding on either side. Amongst the latter was Marshal Ney, whom Napoleon had not seen for a month. When he saw him he could not restrain a movement of anger, and said "I thought you had emigrated." He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, through

: gardens of the Tuileries, the Champs Elsyées, and by the na bridge, and ever through an inquisitive and anxious crowd, at applauded him very warmly. On one side of the Champ e Mars, were the twenty-five thousand men composing the arisian National Guard, and on the other, twenty-five thousand oldiers of the Imperial Guard and of the 6th corps, who were o leave immediately after the ceremony. Napoleon was cheered by all, but the Imperial Guard and 6th corps received him with almost frantic acclamations. These impassioned cries, it must be acknowledged, did not proceed from an interested devotedness to the revolution they had affected, but were the expression of their resolution to die for the honour of the French army !

Napoleon drove round the military school, where he entered by the rear. When he had ascended to the first floor, he was conducted to the place set apart for the ceremony. This was an external building of a semi-circular form, the two extremities connected with the military school, and the centre opening on the Champ de Mars. The throne, to which rose on the right and on the left a semi-circular flight of steps was supported against the Ecole Militaire ; opposite was an altar, and through the open space beyond was seen the Champ de Mars all bristling with bayonets. In front of the building, a platform was erected from which Napoleon was to distribute the standards, and from this platform a long flight of steps decorated with magnificent trophies communicated with the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon, accompanied by his suite, took his place on the throne amid enthusiastic cries of *Vive l'Empereur*. His brothers were seated on *tabourets* on either side. Behind and a little higher was a gallery close to the windows of the Ecole Militaire, occupied by his mother and sisters. To the right and left, on the benches of the semi-circular amphitheatre were seated according to their rank, the different Corps d'Etat, the civil and military authorities, the magistrates, the newly-elected representatives, the deputies of the electoral colleges, and the military deputies come to receive the standards of their regiments. This vast assembly comprised from nine to ten thousand persons. At the altar, stood M. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours, surrounded by his clergy, and preparing to celebrate mass, whilst from all parts of the enclosure the Champ de Mars could be seen occupied by fifty thousand soldiers of the regular army and National Guards, and a hundred pieces of cannon. Paris had never seen a more imposing spectacle. Content, that sentiment that vivifies everything, was alone wanting to the scene. The Emperor had been received with the loudest acclamations by the electors and military deputies, but alas, these acclamations spoke more of desire than of hope. Napoleon's noble countenance wore a grave and almost sad expression

beneath his plumed cap. No wife, no son, sat beside him, and all felt the painful isolation to which the inexorable will of Europe had reduced him. Instead of wife and child were seen brothers, whose presence recalled the many fatal wars undertaken for family aggrandizement. Amongst these brothers, Lucien alone was beheld with favour, for he alone had never worn a crown. Some of those present disapproved of the pomp displayed—others, and they were the greater number, were occupied with more serious thoughts, and were reflecting on the pressing dangers of the state. From time to time the soldiers uttered convulsive cries of *Vive l'Empereur*; in them the prevailing sentiment of sadness, gave way to the noble enthusiasm of patriotism. In a word, the aspect of the whole scene was that of preparations made for a duel unto death—not between two individuals, but between one nation and the entire world.

The ceremonies commenced by imploring the blessing of heaven upon a throne that had been restored, God alone knew for how long, and upon a nation now prostrate at the foot of the altar. Mass was celebrated, and a *Te Deum* sung. After mass the deputies of the electoral colleges, about five hundred in number, and headed by the Prince High Chancellor, advanced to the front of the throne. Their spokesman then read the address in a loud and sonorous voice, and was distinctly heard by all present. This discourse spoke of devotedness to the Emperor, of liberty, of peace, could it be obtained from Europe, and if not of a desperate war, for these were the sentiments of all who desired or submitted to Napoleon's return. The substance of the address was as follows:

“Assembled from all parts of the Empire, around the tables of the law, on which we have just inscribed the wishes of the people, it is not possible for us, the organs of France, not to give utterance to her sentiments, and not to tell the head of the nation, in presence of all Europe, what the nation expects from him and he may expect from her. What do these monarchs desire, Sire, who are advancing against us with such war-like preparations? What have we done to justify their aggressive proceedings? Have we violated any of the treaties of peace? Enclosed within frontiers which nature had not marked out for us, and which even before your reign had been removed by victory and peace, we have not overstepped these narrow bounds, through respect for treaties which you have not signed, and which you still were willing to observe. What, then, is the object of our enemies? They do not like the ruler we have chosen, and we do not like him they would impose on us. They have dared to proscribe you—you that have been so often master of their capitals, and who have generously propped them on their tottering thrones! This hatred on the part of our enemies increases

our love for you. If they persecuted the humblest of our citizens, it would be our duty to defend him with the same energy, for he would be under the eyes of France.

"Do they not wish for guarantees? Are they not to be found in our new institutions, and in the will of the French people, democratical united in voice? Vainly do they seek to conceal their evil designs, under the simple pretence of seeking to separate you from us, and of giving us masters, who understand us no more than we understand them! Their short stay amongst us has destroyed every illusion connected with their name. They can no longer deceive our souls nor we their promises. It was but too evident that they sought to restore titles, privileges, feudalism, and all that had become hateful to us. A million officials, hypocrites during the twenty-five years to the maxims of the 1789, a still larger number of enlightened citizens, who have adopted those same principles after mature reflection, and from amongst whom we have chosen our representatives, five hundred thousand warriors, our strength and our glory, and six million landed proprietors, who owe their title of possession to the Revolution, these were not the Frenchmen of the Bourbons; they wished to reign for the advantage of a few privileged men, who during the last twenty-five years had been either punished or pardoned. Their throne raised for a moment by foreign arms, and surrounded by incurable errors, has sunk before you, because you brought with you from your retreat—which generates great thought only in the minds of great men—true liberty, and solid glory. Has not the triumphal march from Cannes to Paris opened all eyes? Does the history of any people present a more national, a more heroic, or a more imposing scene? Is not this bloodless triumph sufficient to undeceive our enemies? Do they wish for a more bloody one? Well, then, Sire, you may expect from us all that the heroic founder of a throne may hope from a faithful and energetic people, who are immovable in their twofold desire for liberty at home and independence abroad.

"Confiding in your promises, our representatives are about to revise our laws in the calmness of matured wisdom, and to assimilate them with the constitutional system, and may the rulers of nations listen to us during this time. Should they accept your offers of peace, the French people will expect that your firm, liberal and paternal government will console them for any sacrifices made for peace; but should we be left no choice between disgrace and war, the nation will rise as one man to free you from the perhaps too moderate offers that you have made in order to spare Europe fresh convulsions. Every Frenchman is a soldier, victory will again follow your eagles, and our enemies

who counted on our dissensions will have cause to regret having provoked us."

This discourse of which we have only given the principal passages, and which was pronounced with a sonorous voice and touched all present, won the warmest applause even from the prejudiced.

The Arch-chancellor then announced the number of votes, which was, as we have said, 1,300,000 affirmatives, and 4,206 negatives, and declared that the Additional Act had been accepted by the French people. The Act was presented at the foot of the throne. The Emperor signed it, and then pronounced the following discourse, conceived with his usual strength of thought, and couched in his customary nervous style.

"Electors, Deputies of the Army and Navy,

"As Emperor, Consul, and soldier, I have received everything from the people. In prosperity, and in adversity, on the battlefield, in the council-chamber, on the throne, or in exile, France has been the abiding and sole object of my thoughts and actions.

"Like the Athenian king, I have sacrificed myself for my people, hoping that her natural integrity, her rights and honour, would be assured to France, as had been promised.

"Indignation at seeing these sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years' victory, ignored and lost for ever, the cry of the wounded honour of France, and the desires of the nation, have recalled me to this throne, which is dear to me because it is the palladium of independence, honour, and national rights.

"Frenchmen, when, amidst the general rejoicings, I traversed the different provinces on my way to my capital, I necessarily calculated on a long peace; all nations are bound by the treaties their governments have signed.

"I had then but one thought, that of founding our liberty on a Constitution suited to the wishes and interests of the people. I have convoked the Champ de Mai.

"I soon learned that those princes, who ignore all principles of honour, who have outraged the opinions and dearest interests of so many peoples, are about to attack us. They mean to enlarge the kingdom of the Low Countries, by giving her our northern frontier fortresses as a barrier, and also to appease their own dissensions by dividing Lorraine and Alsace between them.

"We have been obliged to make preparations for war.

"However, before trusting my own person to the risks of battle, my first care has been to constitute the nation without delay. The people have accepted the Act I presented to them.

"Frenchmen, when we shall have repulsed these unjust aggres-

sors, and that Europe will be convinced of what she owes to the rights and independance of twenty-eight millions of men, a solemn law, modelled after the forms designed by the Constitutional Act, shall consolidate the different requirements of our Constitution, which, at present, exist in distinct and separate forms.

"Frenchmen, you are about to return to your provinces. Tell your fellow-citizens that the present position of public affairs is serious, that by concord, energy, and perseverance, we shall come victorious out of the struggle between a great people and their oppressors; that future generations will scrutinize our conduct severely, and that a nation has lost everything when she has lost her independance. Tell them that foreign kings, whom I have placed upon their thrones, or who are indebted to me for the preservation of their crowns, and all of whom, in the days of my prosperity, vied with each other for my alliance and the protection of the French people, all now direct their blows against my breast. Did I not see that it is our nation that they detest, I would place this life, for which they are so anxious, at their mercy. But also tell your countrymen, that the rage of our enemies will be powerless so long as Frenchmen regard me with that affection of which they have given so many proofs.

"Frenchmen, my wishes are those of the people; my rights are theirs; my honour, my glory, my happiness, can be no other than the honour, glory, and happiness of France."

The discourse excited the warmest acclamations. The Archbishop of Bourges, acting as grand almoner then presented the New Testament to Napoleon, who with his hand upon the book swore to observe the Constitutions of the Empire. The Prince High Chancellor was the first that took the oath of fidelity. "We swear!" cried thousands of voices. Then arose loud acclamations on every side and together with the oft-repeated cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were mingled cries of *Vive l'Impératrice*. The latter exclamation not being warmly responded to, caused some embarrassment, since none could tell whether it was right to repeat it in the absence of her, who should have hastened with her child to join her husband, but who had neither the courage or the inclination to do so. This painful silence was broken after a few moments by the military deputies, who brandished their swords and cried *Vive l'Impératrice, Vive le Roi de Rome. We shall bring them back.*"

When this part of the ceremony was ended, Napoleon rose, laid aside the imperial mantle, crossed the semi-circular enclosure and advanced to the platform where he was to distribute the flags. The scene at this moment was glorious because the grandeur of the moral feeling that pervaded the assembly cor-

responded to the magnificence around. Close to the Emperor, stood the Minister of the Interior holding the standard of the Parisian National Guard, the War Minister with the flag of the first regiment of the line, and the Minister of Marine holding the flag of the first naval corps. The numerous steps communicating with the Champ de Mars were crowded on one side with officers holding the flags of the National Guards and of the army, and on the other with the deputations commissioned to receive them. In front, were fifty thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon ranged in several lines; in short nearly the entire population of Paris was assembled in the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon advanced to the first step and addressing the detachments of the different corps, who were immediately in front and within reach of his voice, he said, as he took hold of one of the flags, "Soldiers of the Parisian National Guard and of the Imperial Guard, I confide to you the eagle and the national colours, you swear to defend them with your lives if necessary against the enemies of the country and the throne!" "Yes, yes, we swear it!" was replied by thousands. "You," resumed Napoleon, "You soldiers of the National Guard, swear not to allow foreigners again to sully the capital of this great nation." "Yes, yes, we swear it," cried the National Guards in all sincerity and fully determined to fulfill their promise. "And you, soldiers of the Imperial Guard you swear to excel yourselves in the approaching campaign, and to die rather than allow foreigners to dictate to your country!" "Yes, yes," replied the soldiers of the Guard with enthusiasm, a promise they soon fulfilled on the plains of Waterloo not by conquering alas! but by dying. These short addresses being finished and responded to with ardour, the military deputations advanced in serried ranks to receive their standards. Napoleon became animated by a scene that recalled the many encounters in which these regiments had distinguished themselves, and addressing suitable phrases to each, filled up the measure of their enthusiasm. This scene, though prolonged, produced a deep effect upon the spectators. As the day was now far advanced, and as there was not sufficient time to distribute the flags of the National Guards to the deputies of the electoral colleges, this part of the ceremony was adjourned to the following days. The troops then defiled in quick step, amid the flourish of trumpets and cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, enthusiastically repeated by the soldiery, and soon caught up by the National Guards who were carried away by the prevailing enthusiasm.

Whilst this portion of the ceremony, which was pronounced magnificent by the beholders, was being performed in the Champ

de Mars, anxiety, disunion, and deep preoccupation reigned in the enclosure behind, in which the different Corps d'Etat were assembled, and whence they had not a sufficiently distinct view of the ceremony to be impressed by it. The liberals, tainted with republicanism, thought the scene before them bore too much resemblance to the old Empire; their opponents, more alarmists than alarmed, considered it too like the revolution—whilst the greater number of electors, who had come in all sincerity to Paris, would have wished to approach nearer to the Emperor, and not be separated from him by the pomp of a great ceremony. Thus, whilst in front all hearts were transported with national enthusiasm, those assembled in the rear, were saddened and divided by an anxiety arising naturally from the circumstances. It was no longer the federation of 1790, when the nation was ignorant, enthusiastic, and united; it was the morrow of a vast revolution, in which the nation had acquired information, had fallen, was overwhelmed by faults of her own commission, almost driven to desperation, and retaining none of the sentiments of 1789, except a heroic bravery, well exercised by twenty-five years of warfare. M. Fouché imprudently contributed to these dissensions, which ultimately brought about his own ruin; he dared, during one of the intervals of this long representation, to say in a low voice to Queen Hortense: "The Emperor has lost a great opportunity of filling up the measure of his glory, and of securing the crown to his son by abdicating. I have advised him to do so, but he will not take advice." Such expressions were not calculated to unite all in a common resolve to defend France and liberty under Napoleon, whom all parties ought to have accepted, since they had either desired or permitted his return, and who, indeed, was the best military leader they could have found.

Wishing to complete the distribution of the standards, and come into closer connection with the electors, Napoleon determined to assemble them in the great gallery of the Louvre, where, drawn up in two lines, they, together with the military deputies, would have sufficient space. He appointed the following Sunday, the 4th of June, for this second ceremony, and fixed the opening of the Chambers for Monday the 5th, or Tuesday the 6th, according to the time necessary for arranging them. He intended to leave on the following Monday, June the 12th, and expected to have the Chambers installed and set to work before leaving for Flanders to decide his own fate and that of France. There was a great difference of opinion, some thinking it would be better not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to await the enemy between the frontier and the capital, and so throw upon them the odium of being the aggressors, whilst others, more influenced by military than political reasons,

and knowing that the English were alone on the frontier, wished to overpower them by attacking them unexpectedly. Napoleon listened to all; replied but rarely, that he might conceal his designs, whilst he watched the movements of the adverse masses with an observant eye, and calculated the point where he might interpose and strike, before the different columns of the enemy could combine their forces.

He estimated that the time for this would be about the 15th of June, when he hoped to have assembled the forces necessary for effective operations. The Count de Lobau pressed him to commence operations: "Wait," he said, "until I shall have at least a hundred thousand men under my command, and you will see what I shall do with them." He expected to collect a hundred and fifty thousand men by the middle of June, and having fixed his own departure for the 12th, Napoleon wished, before leaving, to arrange with the Chambers the mode of managing public affairs.

He convoked them for Saturday the 3rd of June, so that they might be able to verify the credentials of their members, choose a President, Vice-President and Secretaries, and be regularly constituted before the Imperial *séance*, for at that time the members were sworn, and the business of the Chamber in full operation before the Sovereign came in person to open the session. Napoleon had a private motive for acting thus. He wished, as we have already said, that his brother should be chosen President of the Chamber of Representatives, for which purpose he had him elected representative of the department of Isère, and that indeed without the least difficulty. He therefore wished to await the result of the scrutiny in the Chamber of Representatives, before publishing the list of peers, amongst whom he could not refuse to inscribe his brother's name in case he should not obtain the presidency of the second Chamber.

In any case Napoleon's project was very difficult of execution. The six hundred and odd members of the Chamber of Representatives, the greater part of whom were, as we have said, old magistrates, military officers, holders of national property and sincere revolutionists, were all animated by the very best dispositions, and determined to support Napoleon, but to restrain him within the bounds of the new constitution. They were, certainly, displeased with the Additional Act, not because they wished any addition to what it contained, but because it connected the second Empire too closely with the first, and because it left them very little to do. However, as the Emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai seemed to authorise their remodelling the Imperial laws, in order to adopt them to the Additional Act, and even to modify the latter if necessary, they had been gratified on all essential points, and had no serious cause for opposition.

Still, having been elected under the general feeling of distrust toward the Imperial despotism, they were extremely anxious to prove their independance. All who exercise authority, individuals or assemblies, have their foibles, the members of the Chamber of Representatives had one which was the fear of appearing servile. They were therefore always ready to address Napoleon in the language of the Tribunes of old, though animated by very different sentiments, whilst they ought to have been on the contrary, though ready to resist if he returned to his old customs, willing to join him in saving France and the principles of the Revolution. This susceptibility rendered the Chamber of Representatives little disposed to choose Prince Lucien; the members would have considered themselves compromised by assuming the Imperial colours at the very commencement of their sittings. To this feeling was added the inexperience of newly-arrived provincials, who knew nothing of Paris, of men, or the management of public assemblies. Though they rejected Lucien because he was the Emperor's brother, they did not know whom else to choose. Some members inclined to republican principles would have been satisfied with M. de Lafayette, who though he had accepted the Additional Act, did not conceal his disapprobation of Napoleon, but the revolutionists accused him of an inclination for the house of Bourbon. He was too revolutionary for some, not sufficiently so for others, and was not likely to get a majority of votes. M. Lanjuinais was approved by all parties because he had opposed the Mountain in the days of the Convention, and the Emperor during the first Empire. His being ennobled by Louis XVIII was not considered an objection. That would show that the members of the Chamber were not exclusive, but chose the friends of liberty wherever they found them. M. Lanjuinais had, therefore, every chance of being chosen President of the Chamber of Representatives.

The inconvenience of a too-lately conceded liberty is, as we have already observed, that it is first put into operation under perilous circumstances, when power and freedom are mutually jealous, and when they oppose each other instead of uniting for the common good. The government, as deficient in experience as the Chamber, did not understand the motives which influenced the latter, and committed the mistake of seeking an impossibility in the presidency of Prince Lucien, whilst they would have advanced their own interests more by giving up this project, and not opposing the election of M. Lanjuinais, which was neither offensive nor injurious.

The Chamber of Representatives assembled on Saturday, the 3rd, voted a provisional president, and then divided into committees to verify the elections, and declare all those duly admitted, to whose elections no objection could be made. The

commissioners appointed to examine the elections of Isère, remarked in all simplicity, and not from any ill-feeling, that as in all probability Prince Lucien would be elevated to the peerage, it would be necessary to know this before admitting him, or his colleague, M. Duchesne. The Chamber deferred his admission until the lists of peers should be officially announced. The admission of all to whose election any objection could be made, was in like manner postponed. This objection to Prince Lucien did not arise from ill-will. But ill-will soon came; it was whispered that Napoleon wished his brother to be appointed president, that that was the real reason for deferring the publication of the list of peers, and this was soon followed by many unfavourable remarks. One member said that the Chamber ought immediately to proceed to the election of the *bureau*, for which it would be necessary to know who was to be appointed to the peerage, that no mistake might occur in the selection. The government made no reply, since no arrangements had been made for the direction of the Assembly, and all remained in a state of indecision, which though it had not yet called forth any expression of dissatisfaction, would eventually do so. It was arranged though the Chamber had been invited to take part in the ceremony at the Louvre, that the members should hold a sitting at the palace of the Corps Législatif, in order to finish the question of the elections, and proceed to business as quickly as possible.

On the next day, the 4th of June, whilst the deputations that had assisted at the Champ de Mai were assembled at the Louvre, the representatives assembled at the palace of the Corps Législatif, in order to continue their labours. At the very opening of the meeting, the question of Prince Lucien's election was again raised, and this time with a malicious feeling, and it was asked in what light his election was to be regarded. One member suggested that Prince Lucien being a peer in his own right, he could not be a representative. The assembly, more inclined to assert its own independence, than to seek causes for hostility, was by no means pleased at this suggestion, and rejected the proposed motion for adjournment. Things were in this state, when a letter addressed to the provisional president by Carnot, Minister of the Interior, announced that the list of peers would not be published until the Chamber of Representatives should be constituted. So despotic a mode of proceeding showed but little knowledge of public assemblies. The Chamber expressed strong disapprobation; one member, M. Dupin, exclaimed, "And if we in our turn say that we will not resolve ourselves into a deliberative assembly until the list of peers is published, what reply can be made to us?" This remark, though very just, expressed more anger than was felt by the Assembly, and was received with loud murmurs; the members then proceeded to the election of a

president, without deciding the question of the elections of Isère. Prince Lucien's name was not mentioned, as the decision concerning his admission had been deferred. Not one vote was given to him; all were divided between M.M. Lanjuinais, de Lafayette, de Flaugergues, and some other candidates. M. Lanjuinais had one hundred and eighty-nine, M. de Lafayette, sixty-eight, M. de Flaugergues, seventy-four, M. Merlin forty-one, M. Dupont de l'Eure, twenty-nine. These votes expressed the sentiments of the Chamber. The Chamber wished to assert its independance, and was evidently inclined to choose the man most likely to maintain it, for M. Lanjuinais had been one of the Opposition in the old Senate, without being the declared enemy of the Emperor. However, although M. Lanjuinais had the greatest number of votes, he had not an absolute majority; the scrutiny was recommenced, when he obtained two hundred and seventy-seven votes, M. de Lafayette, seventy-three, and M. de Flaugergues sixty-eight. M. Lanjuinais was appointed president, subject, however, to the Emperor's approval, as provided by the Additional Act.

Whilst these scrutinies were going on at the Palais of the Corps Législatif, the second ceremony of the distribution of colours was proceeding at the Louvre. The Emperor, seated on his throne, first received some deputations come to present addresses, and then proceeded to the Louvre gallery, which contains the *chefs-d'œuvres* of painting, collected by our kings during so many centuries, for the amusement and instruction of the French people, and for the glory of France. On one side were ranged the deputations from the electoral colleges, with the standards for the National Guards; and on the other the military deputations. This gallery, the largest in Europe, filled with glorious standards, and containing ten thousand persons, produced a grand and singular effect in its lengthened perspective. This ceremony was principally for the sake of the electoral colleges. Napoleon, whom they had the pleasure of hearing and seeing quite near, addressed them with his usual felicitousness of expression, and produced a good impression on the greater number. Their imaginations no longer represented him as an oriental despot, but as a great man, simple, accessible, and ready to listen to the demands of his subjects. When he had reached the large square saloon at the end of the gallery, Napoleon turned back, and directing his looks towards the military deputies, again electrified them by his presence and his words. He told them that they would soon again meet where they had so often met before, where they had learned to know each other's value, on the battle field, whither they were now summoned not by the love of conquest, but to assert the national independance. This ceremony commenced at noon,

and did not finish until seven in the evening. It was succeeded by a magnificent fête in the gardens of the Tuileries.

At the close of the day, Napoleon had to examine the scrutinies of the Chamber of Representatives, and to come to a resolution on the subject. His first feeling was one of extreme displeasure. Opposing him on an important question would not have wounded him so deeply as this personal slight, this repelling his brother for another, a respectable man indeed, but who had been one of the opposition in the Senate under the first Empire. He considered that it would have been wiser, as well as more generous, to unite themselves closely to him, at a moment when all Europe affected to make war on him alone. But, as we have often had occasion to repeat in this history for the general benefit, the consequence of our faults is to be punished for them at a time when this chastisement is most poignant. After having during fifteen years accepted, encouraged, and exacted boundless servility, Napoleon could not now obtain that personal consideration, which at this moment would have had the double merit of being a proof of courage, and a beneficial demonstration in the presence of a foreign enemy. He had restrained himself during two months and a half, but could do so no longer, and gave way to the greatest irritation. "They wish to insult me," he said, "by electing an enemy. As the reward of all the concessions I have made, they want to offend and weaken me. If it be so, I will resist, I will dissolve this assembly, I will appeal to France, who knows but me alone, that will confide her defence but to me, and values not these obscure men, who altogether could do nothing for her. These men," he added, "do not want the Bourbons, they would be miserable if they risked their places, their properties, and opinions by their return, and will not support me who alone can secure what they fear to lose, for it is only by cannon shot that the revolution can be defended, and who amongst them could fire one?"

This first explosion of anger would not have had any bad consequences, or rather would have had the advantage of calming Napoleon, by giving vent to the feelings that oppressed him, had it not been divulged and even exaggerated by the perfidy of the Duke d'Otranto, who told everywhere that Napoleon was incorrigible, that he wished to dissolve the Chambers the very day after their assembling. Napoleon became calm after having given vent to his anger. Carnot, the Prince High Chancellor, M. Lavalette, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, endeavoured to calm him, which they did without difficulty, as his anger once passed, his own great mind suggested to him all that the wisest men could say. He saw that disunion at this moment would be madness, that some allowance must be made

for the weakness of this assembly, that wished to appear disobedient when most devoted. Besides, M. Lanjuinais was an honest man, friendly to the revolution, though opposed to its excesses, anxious for the success of the common cause, and easily won by kindness. This was warmly asserted by M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, who by his past career, and brilliant eloquence, was eminently qualified to become the organ of the government in communicating with the Chambers. For this reason, he was more anxious than ever to win their good opinion by supporting their cause with the Emperor. Although sincerely devoted to Napoleon, he had fallen under M. Fouché's influence, who seeing that he was flattered by the important part he was called upon to act with regard to the Chambers, encouraged him to accept the position, and facilitated his success by every possible means, and endeavoured to persuade him that Napoleon could only be saved by opposing him, which was, alas! only too true some years before, and which had it been recognized and practised in time, might have saved both Napoleon and France; but it was too late in 1815, and might be even most dangerous when practised in the face of all Europe. However, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély's advice to accept M. Lanjuinais as president was very wise, for at the time, any other choice would have been unsuitable and impossible.

Whilst some were endeavouring to persuade Napoleon, others had gone in search of M. Lanjuinais, and told him, which was true, that he owed it to the Emperor, to wait on him and come to an explanation after his long opposition in the Senate, and reassure him as to the use he would make of the immense power he would possess as president. M. Lanjuinais repaired to the Palais d'Elysée, the very same evening, and was immediately admitted. Napoleon received him with extreme amiability and frankness, and said: "The past is forgotten, I am not so weak as to think of it; I estimate men only by their existing dispositions and opinions. Are you my friend or my enemy?" M. Lanjuinais was touched by the frankness with which Napoleon questioned him, and said that he was not his enemy, that he looked on him as the representative of the revolution, and that he would support him cordially, provided the conditions of the constitutional monarchy were maintained. "We are agreed," said Napoleon, "I ask no more." The interview terminated in the most amicable manner, and Napoleon resolved to confirm the choice of the Chamber.

However, the rumour of his first opposition to the choice had spread abroad. M. Fouché told it to everybody, he said Napoleon was still the same, that he could not suffer an independant assembly, and that it would be a miracle if the Chamber were not dissolved in a few days. The next day, Monday, the 5th,

the members assembled to complete the work of their organization ; what had happened was whispered from bench to bench, and as the result of M. Lanjuinais' interview with Napoleon was not yet known, great discontent prevailed. The temporary president announced that he had communicated the decision of the Chamber to the Emperor, who had replied that he would think about it, and communicate his resolution by his chamberlain. This announcement was received with loud murmurs. One member very justly remarked that it was not through the intervention of a chamberlain that the monarch ought to communicate with the Chambers. M. Dumolard, and after him, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, endeavoured to explain the Emperor's reply by saying that the temporary president had not caught his words, an explanation the latter immediately adopted as a reparation for his want of tact in repeating what it would have been much wiser to conceal. During this discussion, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, in order to put an end to a difficulty that interrupted the proceedings of the Chamber, hastened to the Elysée, and returned with the decree appointing M. Lanjuinais to the presidency, which he presented in his character of Minister of State, and thus removed all cause of offence. The discontent of the Chamber was appeased by M. Lanjuinais' election being approved. The members then chose their vice-presidents, M. de Flaugergues, (403 votes), M. Dupont de l'Eure, (279 votes) and M. de Lafayette, (257 votes). The fourth vice-president was not appointed until the next day, when General Grenier was chosen.

At the same time that the definite appointment of a president was announced to the Chamber of Representatives, the Chamber of Peers was presented with a list containing the names of those that were to be nominated to the peerage. Napoleon had desired his brothers and principle ministers to draw up a list of peers, each according to his own views. From these different lists he composed one consisting of one hundred and thirty names, a number which could and ought to be increased afterwards, according as success should attract new supporters, especially amongst the old *noblesse*. M. de Lafayette had been pressed by Joseph to accept a seat in the Upper Chamber, but he preferred taking his place in the Chamber of Representatives, where he would find more conformity of opinion, and would exercise more direct influence over passing events. Napoleon had chosen his brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome, (who were peers in their own right), his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his adopted son, Prince Eugène, (detained at Vienna by the Coalition), Marshals Davout, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Moncey, Soult, Lefebvre, Grouchy, Jourdan, and Mortier ; the ministers Carnot, Decrès, de Bassano, Caulain-

court, Mollien, and Fouché; Cardinal Cambacérès, the Archbishops of Tours, (de Barral), of Bourges (de Beaumont) de Toulouse, (primate); Generals Bertrand, Drouot, Belliard, Clausel, Savary, Duhesme, d'Erlon, Exelmans, Friant, Flahault, Gérard, Lobau, La Bédoyère, Delaborde, Lecourbe, Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoëtes, Molitor, Pajol, Rompon, Reille, Travot, Vandamme, &c. He had chosen many regicides, Sièyes, Cambacérès, Carnot, Fouché, Thibaudeau, not because they were regicides, but because they were eminent men, whom being regicides should not exclude from important public functions. From the old noblesse he had chosen M.M. de Beauvau, de Beaufremont, de Boissy, de Forbin, de la Rochefoucault, de Nicolaï, de Praslin, de Ségur, &c. If he did not choose a greater number of the old noblesse it was because there were not more to choose from. He expected that his approaching victories would win over others. It was not his love for old names, as was said, that directed his choice, but because he saw the advantage of placing these men in the Upper Chamber, which should be at once conservative and independant.

Prince Joseph was greatly offended when he heard the decree read, by which he was appointed peer, as he considered that he was one in his own right. Notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to keep him silent, he declared that it must be by a mistake of print that he was mentioned in the decree, as he was a peer by birth, and not by the Emperor's nomination. It was great imprudence on the part of the Emperor's brothers not to restrain themselves in the midst of the disturbances that were already commencing. Who could be blamed for speaking unwisely if the Emperor's brothers could not forbear such childish protests. They committed another fault no less important, in not wishing to sit with their colleagues, but demanding distinctive seats beside the president. They gave up this pretension when they saw how badly it was received. Prince Lucien was the first to give the good example by taking his seat amongst his colleagues.

The 5th and 6th of June being occupied by these proceedings, the imperial *séance* was deferred until the 7th. This *séance* was to consist in reading the speech of the Crown, and in the Members of both Chambers taking the oath of fidelity to the Emperor. Napoleon had as usual written the speech that he was to deliver, and had drawn it up in that concise, frank, and firm style that accorded so well with a mind so resolute as his. He wished to grant a constitutional monarchy, not that he himself might be restrained, but from the conviction that it was needed, and that his own faults had rendered it indispensable. He determined to explain his views in brief but decisive terms. Knowing also that the Representatives saw with regret that a

complete constitution was presented to them, in which there was nothing that required alteration, he consented to grant them the right to take part in its construction, by amalgamating the old constitutions with the new. To this permission he wished to add some advice given in the same firm tone as the concession itself. This done, there still remained important points to be treated on. Although by no means inclined to persecute, Napoleon was determined that he would not allow himself to be attacked by any of the opposing parties with impunity. He would have wished to anticipate the insurrection in Vendée, but on this subject he found himself at variance with his ministers. The latter, though believing that certain conspiracies ought to be repressed, were still afraid that if anterior laws were put in force, it would only furnish a pretext to those who said that the old arsenal of revolutionary laws was still allowed to exist. This difficulty must be arranged, and measures proposed, that without being arbitrary, would restrain the somewhat daring activity of all parties. The press had been freed from the censorship, but this only made it the more necessary and right that its excesses should be restricted by the regular tribunals. Lastly, a budget was to be presented.

All this would afford sufficient and regular occupation to the Chambers, and Napoleon had himself drawn out the plan of procedure, in a clear and concise discourse, which was unanimously approved by his ministers when communicated to them.

Whilst he was preparing his address to the two Chambers, the Lower one with the eagerness of all new assemblies, was impatient to enter on the most delicate subjects. On Tuesday, June the 6th, the eve of the imperial *séance*, a member proposed a motion relative to the oath to be taken on the following day. He proposed that a declaration should be made purporting that no oath could be exacted but by virtue of some law, and that the oath to be taken on the following day, should not in any way prejudice the right of the Chambers to modify the imperial constitutions.

This proposal caused great excitement. Were it taken in its strictest sense, it must be concluded that the required oath was illegal, and ought not to be taken unless a law were drawn up on that very day to authorize it. But even were this law immediately drawn up, it would not be possible that it could pass both Chambers within twenty-four hours, and it would therefore be impossible to take the oath on the following day, by which it would seem to all Europe that the Chambers refused to swear fidelity to Napoleon. Such a circumstance, at a time when five

hundred thousand soldiers were marching towards France, might produce the most serious results.

This proposal was received with evident displeasure by the members, for though very watchful of their independance, they were aware that having placed Napoleon on the throne, it would be wrong to seek to weaken his position. Several members objected at once. They said that former *Senatus-Consultes* had authorized the taking of the oath to the Emperor, and that it was perfectly legal, since these had not been repealed; that besides, it was an understood thing that this oath only implied fidelity to the imperial dynasty, and by no means involved an admission of the immutability of the laws, since their revision had been decided on and even alluded to by the Emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai. M. Roy, afterwards Minister of Finance under Louis XVIII and Charles X, and who had been harshly treated by Napoleon, replied that since the second Empire was commencing with a new order of things, the Chamber of Peers having no resemblance to the Senate, nor the Chamber of Representatives to the *Corps Législatif*, the *Senatus-Consulte* that had been spoken of, should be considered as having fallen into desuetude, and insufficient to legalize the oath required of the two Chambers. The Assembly, aware of the danger involved in this discussion, gave evident signs of dissatisfaction. M.M. Dumolard, Bedoch, and Sébastiani, replied warmly to M. Roy, saying that if the peerage and the Chamber of Representatives differed from the Senate and the *Corps Législatif*, the monarch still remained, and they were as much bound to be faithful to him under the new *régime*, as under the old; that besides as the common safety depended on the concord of those in power, it was only complying with the exigence of the time to take the proposed oath with alacrity. M. Boulay de la Meurthe, Minister of State, went still further, for he spoke of a foreign party, amongst whom he did not class, he said, either the originator of the motion, nor those who supported him; this party, he said, was headed by the royalists, who only sought to create disunion at home, that they might open the gates of France to the enemy. These exaggerated assertions were received in embarrassing and even reproving silence. The termination of the discussion was demanded on all sides. At first it was proposed to return to the order of the day, but soon something more definite was desired, and the oath was declared legal, suitable, and necessary. Whether it was that its opponents were absent or converted, this proposal was unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

In a country long accustomed to the exercise of liberty, where it has become customary to attach importance to the acts of the majority, and not of individuals, which must be left free,

as they are thus deprived of any dangerous tendency, much importance would not have been attached to this *séance*.

But his opponents profited by the opportunity to assert that Napoleon was not supported by the nation, since the Representatives objected to the oath of fidelity the very day after their instalment. Napoleon was much affected by it. He had wished, that since the Allied Powers directed all their attacks against himself individually, that the Chambers would have met this feeling by identifying themselves with him. Seeing that fate itself was against him, he had become sad, especially since Murat's fall; he became still more so now, when instead of the firm and cordial union that he needed, he saw himself reduced to a state of isolation. He felt more deeply than ever, that it was arms alone that would decide and win him back the hearts of the people which—it is sad to say—are most attracted by success.

On the 7th he repaired, clad in a simpler costume than he had worn at the Champ de Mai, to the Palace of the Corps Législatif, where he was warmly applauded by the representatives, whose sentiments were excellent, if their experience was but small, and who, strange to say, received him much better than the Chamber of Peers. In consequence of the extremely liberal tone of public opinion, the Chamber of Peers, embarrassed if not ashamed of owing its existence to mere authority, thought it better suited to its dignity to receive its founder with moderate applause, whilst it left a more vivacious expression of sentiment to the Lower Chamber, that owed its existence to the nation.

The Emperor having taken his seat on the throne, with his brothers on either side, the Prince High Chancellor read the oath, which was as follows. "I swear to be obedient to the imperial constitution, and to be faithful to the Emperor." The High Chancellor then summoned the Peers and the Representatives, who all took the oath most readily. This done, Napoleon pronounced in a tone of impressive gravity, the following discourse, which is a model of simplicity, conciseness, and dignity.

"My lords and gentlemen of the Chamber of Representatives,

"During the last three months, circumstances and the national confidence have invested me with unlimited power. This day the dearest wish of my heart is satisfied, I am come to found a constitutional monarchy.

Men have no control over the future; the destiny of nations can be fixed but by institutions alone. France needs a monarchy to secure her liberty, her independence, and the rights of the people.

"Our laws are scattered; one of our most important duties

will be to collect them into a single form, and to re-construct them on a uniform principle. This is a work that will distinguish the present epoch in the eyes of succeeding generations.

"I desire that France should enjoy all possible liberty. I say possible, because anarchy will ever lead to an absolute government.

"A formidable coalition of kings is opposed to our independence; their armies are at our frontiers.

"The frigate 'Melpomene' was attacked in the Mediterranean, by an English frigate, and taken after a desperate resistance. Blood has been shed in time of perfect peace.

"Our enemies calculate on our internal disunion. They are exciting and fomenting civil war. There have been meetings of malcontents; communications are held with Ghent now, as with Coblenz in 1792. Legislative measures are absolutely necessary. I feel perfect confidence in your patriotism, intelligence, and attachment to myself.

"The liberty of the press is an essential part of the existing constitution, of which no portion can be altered without changing our entire political system; but repressive measures are necessary, especially in the present state of the nation. I recommend this important object to your consideration.

"My Ministers will inform you of the state of our affairs.

"The state of the finances would be most satisfactory, but for the increased expense caused by existing circumstances.

"However, all expenses might be met if all the resources of the budget were available within the year, and it is to the means of obtaining such a result that my Minister of Finance will direct your attention.

"It is very likely that the highest duty of a monarch will soon summon me to fight for the country at the head of her children. The army and I will do our duty.

"Let you, peers and representatives, give the example of confidence, energy, and patriotism to the nation, and like the senate of that great nation of old, be resolved to die rather than survive the dishonour and degradation of your country. The sacred cause of nationality will triumph."

This discourse, which treated on every important subject with such exquisite tact, and perfect dignity, was received with the applause it so well deserved. A more complete acknowledgement of constitutional monarchy could not be desired, nor a more explicit profession of its principles.

At the commencement of a career, in which the English had preceded us by two centuries, it was only natural that we should imitate their customs. Each Chamber therefore deter-

mined to present an address in reply to the speech from the throne, and their *bureau*, increased by some additional members, was ordered to draw up the address, so that it might be presented within the week, as Napoleon's departure was announced for the following Sunday or Monday.

Napoleon had, indeed, decided to strike that blow, which since his return to Paris he had been preparing against that portion of the Coalition that was within his reach. It is not yet time to tell of his arrangements; it will suffice to say, that midst all the occupations caused by the insurrection in Vendée, the assembling the Chambers, and the presence of the electors who had come to the Champ de Mai, he had never ceased, day or night, in making preparations to commence the attack on the 15th of June. The day after the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, he had sent the Guard and 6th corps to Laon, he had ordered Generals Erlon and Reille to join in those operations which General Gérard had been conducting for several days, and by which the general concentration of the army behind Maubeuge would be effected. He gave them the most minute instructions as to the precautions they were to take in order to deceive the enemy, and which indeed did deceive them as we shall soon see. Napoleon calculated that if the Guard and 6th corps reached Maubeuge on the 14th, that on the 15th he could appear beneath the walls of Charleroy at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men. He would have had one hundred and fifty thousand, but for the insurrection in Vendée, but with the force at his command such as it was, he hoped if not to finish the war, at least to give it such a character as would make the European Powers reflect, and would bring about the union of the disturbed and discordant minds in France. If these preoccupations did not interfere with his other labours, neither did his other labours interfere with them. Though he affected the greatest gaiety in the numerous receptions at the Elysée palace, where he dined in public every day, he sank into profound sadness when alone with Queen Hortense and M. de Lavalette. The eagerness of the Chambers to avoid all appearance of servility, which led them to separate from him at a time when they ought to have offered him their most cordial support, affected him more than he cared to confess. He was afflicted at no longer seeing concord amongst those in power, at finding the public mind in a state of confusion, each one rushing into the arena of theoretical discussions, which Napoleon had hoped to close by publishing the Additional Act; everybody lauding his own chimera, and trying to give it publicity, and the general aspect of affairs so depressing as to render the assembling of the Chambers inevitable at a time when the first essay of liberty was to be made within ear-shot of the enemy's

cannon. In the midst of the confusion produced by this spirit of contradiction, he felt that the superstitious admiration, of which he had been the object for fifteen years, and which his miraculous return from Elba had re-awakened for a moment, was now gradually fading away; he saw himself surrounded by suspicion, and his most trifling actions criticised in every possible way. His most sincere friends, who formerly would not have dared to repeat what was said of him, now hastened, some through affection, others through a diminution of respect, to tell him of the harshest things that were said against him. From those he learned that M. Fouché still continued to make the most impertinent remarks, that he did not execute his orders, especially those with regard to the royalists, who were in communication with Ghent and Vendée; that on the contrary he treated them with the greatest consideration, and frequently sent for them to his office that he might win favour with them by disobeying the Emperor's orders. When Napoleon learned this treacherous conduct, he became angry, was tempted to punish, but forebore, fearing it might be said that he had re-assumed the despot, and thus his former severity towards inoffensive persons, such as the bearers of the Bull, for instance, deprived him now of the power of restraining formidable enemies detected in overt acts of treason. He recovered his serenity in thinking of war, and the chances it offered to a man of genius, in thinking of the triumphs he had won in 1814, which would have saved him had he had a few redoubts outside Paris, or a brother worthy of him within. But scarcely had his courage been revived by these thoughts, than it sank again when he reflected on the masses of enemies that were marching towards France, when he thought of all the enemies at home; and he asked himself if his government would be able to bear a reverse, which was possible even in a war destined to be eventually successful; and with his vast sagacity, he believed that the present state of things gave unerring indications of an abiding opposition to his interests, a feeling that though it did not shake his strong heart, cast a veil of sadness over his spirit. He often spoke on this subject with his friends, and sometimes though overpowered by fatigue, he often passed a great part of the night in discussing the change in things around him, in reflections on the fate of great men, and his own destiny in particular, which indeed had all the appearance of a declining star.

It was whilst under the influence of these gloomy forebodings, that he determined to visit Malmaison, where the Empress Josephine had died the preceding spring, and where he had not been since his return from Elba. He felt a want of revisiting that modest dwelling, where he had passed the happiest

years of his life, with a wife who certainly was not faultless, but who was a true friend, one, like whom a man does not meet a second in his lifetime, and one whom he never ceases to regret once that she is lost. He made Queen Hortense accompany him; she had not ventured to visit a spot so full of distressing memories since the death of her mother. Notwithstanding his numerous occupations, he spent several hours wandering through this little château and the gardens, where Josephine once cultivated the flowers she had caused to be brought from all parts of the globe. He fell into a mournful reverie as he again beheld these objects, at once so dear and so saddening. What a difference between 1815, and the years 1800, 1801, and 1802, when he was admired, trusted, and loved by every body. But at that time he had neither ravaged countries, nor enslaved nations, and instead of a tyrant, he was looked upon as a saviour. As he reflected on these things, he did not palliate his own faults, but with the clear-sightedness of genius, applied to his own conduct the rules of inexorable justice. Still he thought that as he had been cured of his faults, the world might have some little confidence, and allow him to prove the new wisdom he had brought back from Elba. But, alas! men do not restore their confidence once they have withdrawn it, God alone accepts repentance, because he alone can judge of its sincerity.

As Napoleon wandered through a spot at once so attractive and so painful, he said to Queen Hortense, "Poor Josephine, I feel as if I ought to meet her at every turn. Her death, which I heard at Elba, was one of the saddest events of that fatal year 1814. She had her weaknesses to be sure, but *she* would never have abandoned me."

When Napoleon returned from Malmaison, he desired Queen Hortense to order a copy of one of Josephine's best portraits. Not knowing where he might be in a month, he wished to take this talisman with him, as a memento of the happiest years of his life.

Little time was left him to indulge his sadness, for the numerous affairs to be arranged before his departure, soon concentrated all his attention. Next to the preparations for war, the direction of the Chambers was the most serious subject of consideration. He had several conversations on this topic, on which he spoke with as much intelligence as though instead of being a warrior, administrator, and absolute monarch, he had all his life been Prime Minister to George III. On the eve of his departure, when ready to step into his carriage, he said to his ministers, "I do not know how you will conduct the Chambers during my absence. M. Fouché thinks that public assemblies can be ruled by bribing some old corrupt

politicians, or flattering some young enthusiasts, but he is mistaken. That is intrigue and intrigue will not do much. In England though such means are not absolutely neglected, nobler and more important measures are employed. Remember how Mr. Pitt acted, and see how Lord Castlereagh acts. The English Houses of Parliament are old and experienced; they have been long acquainted with the men who are to guide them, they like or trust them either because of their talents, or of their character. These they almost impose upon the Crown, and having made them ministers, it would be very inconsistent and even injurious to themselves and their country, if they did not follow their direction. It was for this reason that Mr. Pitt was able to rule the English Houses by a look, and that Lord Castlereagh can guide them so easily at present. Ah! had I such instruments, I should not dread the Chambers. But, have I anything of the kind? Look at these representatives, men come from all parts of France, all well-intentioned no doubt, and anxious that I should get myself and them out of difficulties, but for the most part wholly inexperienced in the duties of public assemblies, knowing nothing of the anxiety or responsibility of legislation; and personally at least unacquainted with my ministers to whom they are equally strangers. Who do you suppose will direct them? I certainly could not have chosen my ministers better than I did. I have taken them, as one may say under the influence of public confidence. The country itself would have given them to me, had I left the choice to it. Could I, for example, find a better Minister of Justice than the wise Cambacérès, a more imposing Minister of War than the laborious and severe Davout, a safer Minister of Foreign Affairs than the grave and pacific Caulaincourt, a Minister of the Interior better suited to satisfy and arm the patriots than that excellent Carnot? Would not the financiers themselves have pointed out the probity and talent of Count Mollien? And will not the people believe that the government has its eye always upon them, when M. Fouché is Minister of Police? And yet which of you, gentlemen, would appear before the Chambers to address them, to gain a hearing, or to lead them. I have tried to supply this want by means of my ministers of state, Regnaud, Boulay de la Meurthe, de Merlin, and de Defernon. Regnaud has talent certainly, but do you think that he could appease a storm in time of danger? No, nobody in an inferior position can impress me, rule, or influence them. Alas! it is not in our peaceful council state that men are prepared to face the fury of public assemblies. No, no," repeated Napoleon, "you cannot govern these Chambers, and if I do not soon gain a battle they will swallow me all up, however great you may be. You well know, that

cumstanced as I was, it was not possible for me to avoid convoking them, for I was placed within a vicious circle. I gave the Additional Act myself in order to avoid the interminable and confused discussions of a new Constituent Assembly, but men would not believe in the Additional Act, and to win their faith I was forced to convoke the Chambers, which I see clearly are about to resolve themselves into a Constituent Assembly. All that follows as a consequence. For our part, we must try to extricate ourselves as well as we can. Those to whom the administration is confided, and the ministers of state will speak as best they can, and I shall fight. If I am victorious, we shall oblige everybody to keep his proper place, and we shall have time to accustom ourselves to this new *régime*. If I am conquered, God alone knows what will become of you and me. It was our fate, and nothing could avert it. All will be decided in twenty or thirty days. For the present let us do what we can, and wait what the future will bring. But let the friends of liberty look well to it; if through their own clumsiness they lose the game, it is not I but the Bourbons that will gain it."

After this singular conversation, which took place the night before his departure, Napoleon passed a decree, declaring that the ministers and his brothers should form a council of government, with Joseph as president, that the four ministers of state, aided by six councillors of state, should conduct all communications with the Chambers, where they would appear in the name of the Crown, discuss the laws, and give all necessary explanations whenever it might be necessary to justify the acts of government. As he signed this decree he smiled, and repeated several times. "Ah, indeed, it is essentially necessary to you that I should win a battle." He did not mean by this that a victory would enable him to crush the authority of the Chambers, and re-establish an absolute government, for he could not see how it would be possible in the present state of the public mind, to govern in the name of a solitary silent authority; but he hoped that when the anxieties attendant on danger would have passed away, that confidence would return, and that he would be able to infuse unity and simultaneousness of action into the public mind, and so enable the new institutions to work smoothly. Were he victorious it is very possible he would not have confined his views to this, but at that time he was convinced that his own cause was identical with that of moderate liberty, and that the triumph of the opposite opinions would be the triumph of the Bourbons. "If we do not succeed in this attempt," he often said, "we must only yield the place to Louis XVIII." He did not foresee that even with the Bourbons themselves, supported by five hundred thousand foreigners,

liberty would rise again, provided that the country were allowed the right of voting the laws and budget in an independent assembly, though that assembly were composed of the most violent royalists.

During these three days, the two Chambers had prepared their addresses. Many circumstances occurred in the Lower Chamber, which proved its desire of remaining united to the Emperor, at the same time that it dreaded appearing servile. M. Felix Lepelletier in replying to the motion relative to the oath, proposed that Napoleon should be styled the saviour of the country. The anxiety immediately depicted on every countenance showed how all dreaded that a new course of adulation was about to begin. "What will you say then," interrupted a member, "when Napoleon will have saved the country?" This inopportune proposal was put aside by some judicious remarks of a few representatives devoted to the government. The proposed address breathed the prevailing sentiments of the time, that is a desire to unite with Napoleon, but it also revealed a great watchfulness over the public liberty, and extreme anxiety to revise the Imperial laws, and assimilate them with the "Additional Act," which it was their secret wish to remodel altogether. Even the Chamber of Peers itself, as inexperienced as the Lower Chamber, sought to adopt the prevailing tone of the time, and presented an address that said, "should our success correspond to the justice of our cause, to our confidence in the Emperor's genius and bravery of the army, *the nation will have nothing afterwards to fear but the intoxication of success and the seductions of victory.*" This phrase disturbed Prince Cambacérès, who asked permission to communicate it to Napoleon. The latter disapproved of it extremely, and it was changed to the following: "*should our success correspond to the justice of our cause... France asks no other result than peace. Our institutions will serve as guarantees to Europe that the French government will never be hurried away by the seductions of victory.*" This correction was adopted after a warm discussion.

Thus, as it often happens, each one forgetting his individual rank and character, became the flatterer of the ruling spirit. Napoleon was to receive the two Chambers before leaving, and he resolved to give them some sage advice, authorized by present circumstances, and which is not forbidden to the Crown—especially when in the right—even in the most rigorously constitutional monarchy. Napoleon received the Chambers on the 11th of June.

Having heard the address of the Peers, he made the following reply:

"We are engaged in a serious struggle. It is not the *intarsi-*

cation of success that endangers us to-day. It is the *yoke* under which foreigners seek to make us pass.

"The justice of our cause, the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the army, give us every reason to hope for success; but should we meet with a reverse, it is then that I should most desire to see the energy of this great nation displayed; it is then I would wish to see the Chamber of Peers give proofs of its devotedness to the country and to me.

"It is in times of danger that great nations, like great men, display the energy of their character, and become objects of admiration to posterity."

When Napoleon had heard the address of the Chamber of Representatives he said :

"It gives me pleasure to hear my own sentiments expressed by you. In our present serious position my thoughts are all absorbed by this impending war, on which the independance and honour of France depend.

"I shall leave to-night in order to take the command of the army; the movements of the enemy have rendered my presence indispensable. I shall be glad if during my absence a commission appointed by both Chambers would deliberate upon the entire body of our laws.

"The Constitution is our rallying point, it must be our polar star in these stormy times. Every public discussion that will tend to lessen confidence in that will be a misfortune for the State. We should find ourselves in the midst of shoals without compass or guide. We have arrived at an important crisis. Let us not imitate the example of the Lower Empire, which became the laughing stock of posterity, because when surrounded on all sides by barbarians, the people occupied themselves with the discussion of abstract questions whilst the battering rams of the enemy were beating in their gates."

These noble but severe remarks offended those to whom they were soon to be only too applicable; but so great was their truth and justice that they made a profound impression on the majority. It was indeed true that the dangers to be feared were not those that result from victory. It was no less true than an allusion to the Greeks of the Lower Empire attacked by Mahomet's battering rams was inopportune. The representatives, who were present in great number, commenced to applaud loudly, but were restrained by M. Lanjuinais under pretext of deference for the Crown. Napoleon would, assuredly, have pardoned such a breach of etiquette. The greater number who were devoted to Napoleon as the defender of the Revolution and of France, were greatly displeased by the President's prohibition. They retired each with very different sentiments; Napoleon's friends declaiming against foreigners, whilst his enemies

declared that a decree ought at once to be drawn up forbidding the dissolution of the Chambers, as they asserted that should Napoleon return victorious, his first act would be to dissolve them. The persons who spoke in this way did not consider that a decree of the Assembly anticipating the Emperor's right to dissolve the Chamber, would be simply violating the constitution in the most audacious manner. The majority, believing in all sincerity that it would be a good and patriotic work to labour at the remodeling of our laws, were thinking of appointing a committee to revise and amalgamate the Imperial constitutions.

Having dismissed the members of the two Chambers, Napoleon completed his preparations on the same Sunday evening, took leave of his Ministers, gave his last instructions for the defence of the capital to Marshal Davout, whom he had appointed Commandant of Paris, took leave most cordially of Carnot, whose sincerity had touched him, parted coolly but without any appearance of anger from M. Fouché, and then passed the remaining moments with his family and friends. As the hour of strife approached, his spirits rose, for he felt himself upon the ground he had ever trod as master. He folded Queen Hortense, his adopted daughter, affectionately in his arms, and said to Madame Bertrand, as he shook hands with her before getting into his carriage, "Let us hope, Madame Bertrand, that we shall not soon have to regret the Island of Elba." Alas! the hour was approaching when he would have to regret everything, even the saddest days of his past life! He set out on Monday the 12th of June, at half past three in the morning.

Such was, until military operations commenced, which was very soon as we shall shortly see, such was that fatal and sombre period called the "Hundred Days," a period that commenced with an extraordinary triumph, but soon changed into difficulties, annoyances, and gloomy presentiments! This contrast may be easily explained; from Porto Ferrajo to Paris, from the 26th of February to the 20th of March, Napoleon stood in opposition to the faults of the Bourbons, and besides he enjoyed a succession of successes from Porto Ferrajo to Cannes, from Cannes to Grenoble, from Grenoble to Lyons, and from Lyons to Paris. It seemed as if fortune herself had returned to associate with her favourite; sometimes bringing a favourable wind to his flotilla, and sometimes bringing to meet him, men who could not withstand his influence. But having once entered Paris, it was no longer the faults of the Bourbons that stood opposed to him, it was his own, the faults that had accumulated during his first reign, to remedy which all his genius and repentance seemed unavailing. The Treaty of Paris which he

had so obstinately refused in 1814, and even sacrificed his crown rather than accept, he now accepted without hesitation, and offered terms of peace to Europe with a humility that well became his glory. "No," replied Europe, "you offer peace, but not sincerely." And she repulsed the suppliant with proceedings so rude as even to forbid his couriers to pass the frontiers. Napoleon next addressed himself to France with a sincere offer of liberty, for though his temper abhorred restraint, his genius enabled him to see that he could no longer govern without the nation, and that liberty was the only choice left him. France did not reply in the same terms as Europe, but she seemed to doubt, and to convince her of his sincerity, Napoleon was obliged to convoke the Chambers at once, those Chambers filled with excited, violent and implacable parties, who offered him no support against Europe, but their divisions. Repelled by Europe, received with distrust by France at a moment that he needed all the support that she could give, Napoleon, after twenty days of joy, sank into a state of gloomy sadness, which he could only shake off when extracting from our military ruins, the heroic but unfortunate army of Waterloo! He triumphed through the faults of the Bourbons, but sunk beneath his own, and after having presented to the world so many glorious and instructive spectacles, he offered another more deeply moral and tragic—genius sincerely, but vainly penitent. But we must say that midst all these vicissitudes, these twenty days of fleeting joy, these "Hundred Days" of mortal sadness, there was one actor that had not one, no, not one single day's content, and that was France! France, the hapless victim of Napoleon's faults as well as of those of the Bourbons; a victim because she had allowed these faults to be committed, which was at once her error and her punishment. What a sad century is ours, at least for those who saw its commencement. Heaven grant that the generation which succeeds us may see it close with happier days! But let the men of that generation believe that it is by turning to profit the lessons in which the first half of the century abounds, and which it has been the object of this history to narrate truthfully, that they will be enabled to ensure and to deserve this happy termination.

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